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1. 
EXPLANATORY NOTES 
1. Information and comments relating to the text of the 
thesis which cannot be accommodated in footnotes, are 
given in numbered chapter notes at the end of the thesis. 
The numbers of these chapter notes are given in foot-
notes on the pages on which the text appears to which 
they refer. Extraordinarily long notes, especially those 
which are referred to more than once, are given as ap-
pendices at the end of the thesis after the chapter 
notes. The numbers of these appendices are also given 
in footnotes on those pages·on which the text appears to 
which they refer. 
~ial Note on Ch~ter g 
The subjects SE..§:.£~ and time fill many vo.lumes, and it 
stands to reason that only a small portion of this mass 
of literature can be studied for the purposes of a thesis 
which is not primarily concerned vJi th space and time o I 
therefore limited my reading to those works that deal 
with the reawakening of the interest in time in the t\ven-
tieth century, those that point out the inseparability of 
space and time, those that deal with time and history, 
and, above all, those that give clues to the connection 
of space and time with personality. My reading was, as it 
were, prescribed by what I wish to submit as my thesis: 
~conn~ction of the human p~rson wi~ace ?nd ~~~~ 
provides the no~int of view from which the tr~at~~i 
of human relationsh~§._E_L_~Land gQ_~sse§:~is seen .. 
It is the connection of space and time with personality, 
rather than space and time or space-time, that is of im-
portance in this thesis; that is why the study of space 
and time in Chapter 2 is, as is indicated by th~ title of 
this chapter, focussed on it. Nevertheless, considerable 
"background" study was necessary in this context so that 
most of the appendices refer to space and time. The mat~ 
2. 
ter contained in these appendices falls outside the main 
path followed in Chapter 2, but is nevertheless impor-
tant and th~ chapter would not be complete vdthout them. 
2. Passages from authors which appear in the text of the 
thesis as translations, will be found in the original 
languages as numbered chapter notes at the end of the 
.thesis, unless they are quite short, in which case they 
are given in the original languages as footnotes. 
3. In those cases in which a translated passage is taken 
from a published English translation of the work of 
an author, the reference in the footnote will relate to 
the vrork in the original language only, since a number 
of published translations were used in some cases, and 
if all were given in the bibliography, the list vmuld 
become unnecessarily long. In any case, some transla-
tions are my own. 
4. \rfu.ere I quote from Prof. Whi ternan's Foundational Prob-
lems of Space and Time I indicate only the chapters 
from which the quoted passages are taken and not the 
': 
pages also, since page numbers are bound to be different 
in the published work. Page numbers will probably also 
differ in the final manuscript. The manuscript from which 
I worked, appeared to be a preliminary one. 
5. D-1ring 1963 Prof. C.A. van Peursen delivered a lecture 
at Stellenbosch which was recorded on tape by Dr. J.J. 
Degenaar. ~is is referred to in the bibliography and in 
notes as the "Stellenbosch Lecture." 
6. Unless otherwise indicated, underlined words in quoted 
passages are words italicized by the authors of the 
passages. Wherever, iri. a quoted passage, words are in-
serted in parenthesis and are not the author's but mine, 
these words will be underlined. If they are those of the 
author, they will not be Underlined. However, in most 
cases it should be quite clear whether such words are 
mine or those of the author. 
7. The spelling and punctuation in quoted passages are 
those of the authors of the passages or the published 
translations of the works of the authors. 
8. I use Galileian, derived from Galilei, whereas some 




Outline of the Subject' and Historic?-1 .J3ackgrpund 
(i) 
vve shall be concerned in this study' ~Ji th the 
grounds arid nature of human relationships as they are 
conce~ved in the thought of Hume and Rousseau. By im-
plication, therefore, the notion of the groun<l;s and 
natu:::-e of human relationships varies from person to per-
son. VIe can hardly think otherwise than that our notions 
of these relationships are determined by our views on 
human beings, so that when we contemplate human rela-
tionships, we are at once involved in questions about 
human beings as human beings and quite apart from their 
relationships to one another. Questions about human be-
ings which will be of the greatest importance to us, 
will be those about human E~.rsonali t~ and human ~~· 
We shall hold that both Hume and Rousseau treat human 
relationships in terms of human nature rather than in 
terms of human personality, and this study is, broadly 
speaking, a study of the consequences for the individu-
al and society of this course in their thought. Our 
contention will be that they take this course in their 
treatment of human relationships because they adopt a 
specific space and time, the space and time of the 
science of their day. 
Since the question of human personality is involved 
in a study of Hume's and Rousseau's treatment of human 
relations~ps, this thesis begins with a consideration 
of the human person. We find, as the study proceeds, 
that Martin Buber's notion of meeti~ provides a key to 
the difference bet'llveen human relationships seen· in terms 
of personality and human relationships seen in terms of 
human nature. Buber sees this mee:t~.E:£, not as a mere 
"coming across., 11 but as a "coming together" vvhich, we 
' 
shall find, is in effect a confluence or interpenetra-
tion of spaces and times.of human persons, a notion 
which is absent in the· thought of our two philosophers. 
In his contention that "All real living is m~eting" 
Buber accepts that men possess a directedness towards 
one another which lifeless objects do not possess. ~­
ing is the effectiveness of t~~s vectorial nature of 
men, and we shall hold that it involves a space and time 
quite different from those which apply to scalar en-4 · · 
tities .such as stones which cannot meet. We shall hold, 
also, that there is a connection between this space and 
time and human personality which cannot exist between 
personality and the space and time of lifeless objects. 
.. 
6. 
The directedness of men consequently flows from human 
personality by virtue of this space and time, so that 
when we say that Hume and .Rousseau see human relation-
ships in terms of human nature rather than in terms of 
human personality, we intimate that they take human 
beings out of this space and time of personality and 
place them in the space and time of lifeless objects. 
Human relationships seen in terms of human person-
ality must have as their source the human person looked 
upon as a self-conscious, directed and acting being. 
(We find that words in all languages which indicate a 
directedness of men towards one another, more often than 
not require some sort of action, and these cannot but 
involve one's fellow men). To possess human personality 
a man must be considered to possess a freedom to act 
and exercise his directedness. Freedom is thus closely 
connected with action so that personality seems to be 
created by action. Consequently it is possible to lose 
personality or never·to achieve it, or to achieve it 
only imperfectly. 
It follows that when Hume and Rousseau take men out 
of the space and time-of personality and place them in 
the space and time of lifeless objects, they take this 
ability to act away from them. They take away the di-, 
rectedness of men and therefore "dismantle" the human 
?. 
person so that men can no longer ~· 
Since the actions of men require a space and time 
quite different from the space and time of lifeless 
things, it is necessary, before going on to study those 
aspects of the thought of our two philosophers with which 
we shall be concerned, to investigate different spaces 
and times and to apply the knowledge gained to the ques-
tions of ~eting and action. It will then become clear 
that if men cannot ~~i and act, they remain undifferen-
tiated from one another, that is, they do not possess 
personality; they possess only human nature, which is 
what all men have in common. Men are then abstractions, 
, 
and the basic guiding influence of Hume and Rousseau in 
their treatment of human relationships is precisely that 
they reduce human beings to abstractions. Hume is an em-
piricist and Rousseau has been called the father of 
romanticism, yet their thought has this common outcomeo 
It would therefore be reasonable to surmise that there 
is an underlying bond between Hume's empiricism and 
Rousseau's romanticism, and that this common outcome is 
a mode in which it manifests itself. This bond 'life shall 
attempt to trace with respect to space and time. 
However, v!e shall be conce.rned mainly with human 
relationships. The connection of the human person with 
space and time provides the novel point. of vievl from 
B. 
which the treatment of human relati.onships by Hu.me and 
Rousseau is seen. This is our thesis. 
(ii) 
For a better understanding of the common outcome in 
the thought of Hume and Rousseau and the underlying bond 
which it indicates, it is necessary that vle examine them 
in the light of the century in which the two men·wrote. 
Hume and Rousseau were contemporaries in the :Enlighte:l-
ment of the eighteenth century, and the characteristics 
of their age are interwoven with those of the philoso-
.phies of our two thinkers. 
The age of the Enlightenment was "an age of ferment" 
following the passing of the system of life and thought 
of the Middle Ages, and the co:,:1cern of Hume and Rousseau 
with society has its roots in this "ferment," in the 
disturbance in human affairs brought about by the passing 
of a long-established order of things. The "ferment" was 
really a "rethinking" of man and a search for nevr foun-
dations for his life to replace those of the Middle Ages 
which had now been discarded. One must see the thought 
of H1me and Rousseau as part, not only of this search, 
but also of the discarding of the old foundations., The 
consequences of this "rethinkingn of man reached beyond 
the eighteenth century into our own, and it is this that 
makes the philosophies of Hume and Rousseau important 
9. 
for our times. 
We shall be concerned with four characteristics of 
the Enlightenment period which we find reflected in the 
writings of our two philosophers: 1) Its naive self-as-
surance and its apotheosis of science (without a knowl ... 
edge of its limitations, however); 2) its hostility to 
Christianity which issued from its boundless faith in 
science; 3) its physico-mathematical orientation in which 
the work of Galilee looms large; 4) its scientifically-
inspired notion of progress as opposed to history. 
' 
We shall also be concerned with its conceptions of 
space and time, and its viev-rs on men, but these issue 
from. its world view, which v-ras one of rigid causality, 
objectivity, simplicity and absoluteness, from which the 
human point of view and the passage of time as it had 
been contemplated by the mediaeval thinker, had been 
eliminated. From such a world view the reduction of men 
to abstractions follmvs. The Enlightenment wished to 
study man as a phenomenon, that is, scientifically; a man 
consequently became nothing more than a standard example 
of something in which science was interested. It is in 
looking upon this man, an abstraction, as a subject for 
philosophy, that Hume and Rousseau·are children of their 
times. 
Two of the attributes of individual men which are 
left out of account when the Enlightenment science and 
philosophy "construct" a standard man, are \vhat we shall 
call their private subjective spaces and times. These 
subjective spaces and times are those by which men are 
able to ~' so that the "man-in-general" cannot meet 
another man. This inability of abstract men to meet de-
termines what human relationships are in the thought of 
Hume and Rousseau. Both our philosophers see the human 
scene as a machine. As the parts of a mechanism function 
in spatial and temporal isolation and need a motive 
force outside them to set them in motion, so the men in 
the philosophies of BUrne and Rousseau spatially and tem-
porally exclude one another and have lost the ability to 
act of their own free will. 
(iii) 
Science, however, provided a closer bond between 
our two philosophers than the common outcome of mechanism 
in their treatment of human relationships, one from 
which, in fact, the common outcome of mechanism is a 
logical issue. Science brought NATURE to the fore, and 
it became the task of Enlightenment thinkers, scientists 
and philosophers alike, to prove the self-sufficiency of 
nature "without any transcendenta,l mediation." Hence the 
hostility to Christianity in Enlightenment thought~ and 
also in the thought of Hu.me and Rousseau. 
11. 
We shall find that the space ru1d time of this nature 
contemplated by the Enlightenment, are the space and time 
of the science of the age. We apply them still, in our 
times,to machines. Under the all-pervading influence of 
mathematics nature became identified with the "great 
machine," and man became a part of this machine. Purpose 
in his existence was taken avmy from him and scientific 
cause and effect -substituted; his persuasion of a des-·. 
tiny in God was made a persuasion of a salvation in this 
world in a Utopia which was held to be within his grasp. 
We shall be concerned in this study \vith'the share which 
Burne and Rousseau had in the establishment of this no-.. 
tion of a Utopia. 
The preoccupation of the Enlightenment with nature 
and the Utopia cannot be seen out of the context of its 
idea of progress: there must be uninterrupted improve-
ment (as there is in science) and everything must be bet-
ter than that which preceded it. We shall find that this 
progress is quite unlike history, and had to take the 
place of history in Enlightenment thought. Now nature 
was reduced to a machine, consequently wherever nature 
enters into the views of our two philosophers on men and 
their relationships to one another, it enters in the 
guise of mechanism. The space and time of the Utopia then 
· become the space and time of a mechanism. 
(iv) 12. 
Since it was the mathematical orientation of the 
thought of the eighteenth century that made nature syn-
onymous with a machine, this orientation lies at the very 
root of the tendency of the Enlightenment to make human 
beings abstractions. The more spectacular results were 
shown by those sciences which made prediction possible, 
that is, the mathematical sciences. It became ~~ assump-
tion of the Enlightenment that reason with its mathemat-
ical weapon could cope with any investigation that had 
to be undertaken .and "that the real may be identified 
with the quantitative." If Galilee had been correct in 
saying that God had written the book of the universe in 
mathematical characters, then man could be looked upon 
as a measurable quantity. 
Hume takes up the study of man at this point, and 
looking upon himself as the "Net"ton of moral philosophy, " 
wishes to see a 11science of man 11 created so that order 
and certainty might enter into human affairs. Rousseau 
shares his belief in the possibility of such a science. 
Both link order in the affairs of men with foreseeability 
of these affairs, that is, if there is to be a Utopia, 
the 1r11ay in which all men 11function 11 must be known so that 
society can be pre-designed as it were. Nmr:T all men can-
not be known except if only those characteristics which 
all have in common, are taken into account. Consequently 
13. 
the science of man becomes a science of man-in-general, 
a science of abstractions, and the Enlightenment simpli-
fied man to take his place in the simplified universe of 
the mathematician. This meant a dismantling of the human 
person through which men became things. 
This dismantling of the human person has a signifi-
cance, quite apart from its effect on the treatment of 
human relationships by Hume and Rousseau, which we can• 
not neglect: it lends support to the control of human 
beings which issues as a corollary from the treatment 
of human relationships by our two philosophers. To es-
tablish order in human affairs both thinkers have to es-
tablish a rigid control over the citizens of the Utopia. 
Moreover, the reduction of men to things by Enlighten-
ment thought was accompanied in history by the incipient 
industrialization of Europe and colonization by European 
powers all over the world. This control of matter made 
it necessary to control men in commerce and industry, so 
that we have a very definite reification of men by the 
events of history. The conclusion that thought and the 
actual events of history are intimately bound up with 
each other from the seventeenth century onwards, is dif-
ficult to escape, and this vlill be the subject of our 
investigation in the last part of this study. A more im-
mediate task is an examination of space and time and 
14. 
their connection with the human person to discover the 
process in the thought of Hume and Rousseau by which the 
human person is dismantled. 
CHAPTER 2 
§I?.~es and Times_and the Human Person 
(i) 
The scope of our examination of space and time is 
determined for us by the purpose of our study, and we 
shall be interested in and examine 1) The nature of 
spaces and times which allow meeting.. 2) The nature and 
purpose of space and time which do not allow ~yting. 
3) The derivation of the latter space and time as a ne-
cessary complement to and fulfilment of the needs of the 
development of science from the seventeenth century on-
wards. This space and time our two philosophers, under 
the influence of the science of their day, adopted for 
a "science of man." 
The time element came into physics with the work of 
Galilee, and a new mathematics became·necessary, a math-· 
ematics that could deal with both space and time. This 
was the infinitesimal calculus, but it could deal with 
space and time only by dividing them into infinitesimals, 
that is, by cutting them up as one would cut up a piece 
\ 
15. 
of matter, and by treating them as separate entities. In· 
1908 Minkowski came to the conclusion that this space 
and time were abstractions and that nature treated space 
and time as inseparable. If this is so, then there must 
be a real space and a. real time which cast these shad-
ows; accordingly space and time 1:mre investigated £2.. 
~in the twentieth century. The result is that both 
have acquired, in many modern views, some at least, of 
the characteristics of the space and time contemplated 
by the mediaeval Christian who, in turn, inherited his 
conceptions .of space and time from the ancient Hebrew 
through the Old Testament. This space and time of the Old 
Testament were a space and time closely connected with 
the human person in a manner which we shall find worthy 
of close attention, and we shall point to the severing 
of this connection in the philosophies of Hume and Rous-
seau as the very kernel of the subject of this study. 
One of the characteristics that space and time con-
ceptions of our century have in common ~ith that of the 
mediaeval Christian is that space and time are subjec-
tively constituted, that is, we have the presence of the 
human person in these views on space and. time. In modern 
views on time we find the central conviction that time 
and change are connected in a way which cannot be deduced 
from the space and time of elementary mechanics, and that 
16. 
space and time are connected with the human person in a 
way which we cannot discover in a where measured vdth a 
rule and a when indicated by a clock. This ~ indicat-
ed by a clock has nothing of the carrying effect of time 
which permeated the mediaeval Christian time philosophy 
through the association of time with purpose. We shall 
find the notion of p~rpose absent also in the thought of 
Hume and Rousseau. 
(ii) 
We can better appreciate the import of Hume's and 
J 
Rousseau's adoption of the time of Galileian science for 
human relationships if we first consider the connection 
between the human person and that time which seems to 
"carry" us in its movement and which we can conceive as 
having a purpose. The notion of purpose in time and its 
carrying effect are lost unless time is in some vmy con-
nected with the human person. The time measured by our 
clocks is, on the contrary, outside us. Its parts, like 
the spaces occupied by things, cannot overlap or inter-
penetrate, so that meeting in it can only be a contigu-
ity or a "coming across." In the case of subjective 
spaces and times, however, parts can overlap or inter-
penetrate, and persons can ~· This time, moreover, is 
not outside us as is the time of our clocks. It "takes 
us along" and generates the notion of a destination in us. 
Space and time subjectively constituted must be 
"lived" by the human person and must contain, so to 
speak, all the richness of the life and experience of 
the _person who "lives" them. The present of this time 
has a 11thickness" which is really the seat of the dire,ct-
edness of the human person. This "thickness" of the pres-
ent issues from the fact that a man's existence is not 
confined to the immediate moment or his immediate sur-
roundings, but is spread out temporally and spatially 
beyond himself. The past, as Bergson puts it, gnaws in-
to the future and grows ever bigger; the present encom-
passes both past and future. 
The "thickness" of the present is best understood 
by considering what is encompassed when a person speaks 
the word ~· This short word really establishes a con-
nection between time and the human person. It encompas-
ses one's past experiences as well as one's hopes and 
fears for the future, but it also encompasses other per-
sons, each with his own ~' and as it "moves along" it 
describes one's world. This now is also inseparable from 
a here, so that we have the now as the heart of one's -
real time and the here as the heart of one's real space 
combined as the seat of one's directedness as a human 
person, that is, they constitute a continuum which makes 
meeting possible as a confluence of spaces and times. 
(iii) 18. 
Through a person's here and now by which his space - - ' 
and time flow together with those of other persons, he 
becomes connected with the events of his world, that is, 
.with history. In this way the ancient Hebrew .felt, and 
the ~ristian . .feels, himself assumed in history, as it 
were, and being carried by time to some destination. For 
both God created time and in God is their ultimate des-
tiny; the end of time gives meaning to the present. His-
tory becomes a ''story," the "story" of the dealings of 
God with men~ It is a "story" with the human person at 
its core, for time is connected with human persons. It 
is a becoming, since there is a purpose in it. 
Since in history so conceived we have a person 
standing at a ~ which encompasses other persons, mo-
rality is closely connected with the community, that is, 
with the state, so that both become historic. The dis-
mantling of the human perspn must then become a denial 
of history as a becoming and a denial of morality as his-
toric. Sinoe .freedom and mol;'ality are closely bound up 
with each other, freedom also becomes divorced from his-
tory. This is what we find in the thought of Hume and 
Rousseau. 
It is in such words as b~coming and ~tory that we 
find the difference between history as the ancient Hebrew 
and Christian see :it, and progress as the Enlightenment 
19. 
conce~ved it. In history human choice emerges in situ-
ations which are unique·~ These situations involve one 's 
fellow men and consequently the directedness of men to-
wards one another. Freedom then becomes an exercising of 
responsible choice. In the Enlightenment view of pro~ 
gress1 on the contrary, progress follows tne natural or-
der in the space and time of the nature of the scien-
tist, and since this nature is a machine, there is no 
place in it for the responsible choice of men. 
(iv) 
In the thought of Hume and Rousseau there is no be~ 
comins. This observation brings us to a consideration of 
conceptions of time akin to the views of these twq phi~ 
losophers on that movement of the human scene which we 
call history, and contrast with those of the ancient 
Hebrew and mediaeval Christian. These time conceptions 
are divorced from personality and the notion of an ~ 
of things. This study raises the point that linear time 
conceptiqns such as that of the Hebrew can be linked with 
human personality while conceptions of time as cyclic, 
such as the Greek time conception seems to be, are con-
ceptiqns of ~me in which human personality has no place. 
Furthe'rmore, the notion of an end of things goes with 
the notion of history as a "story," the notion that thei'e 
is a purpose in our existence, a destination to which 
20. 
time carries us. We cannot then have a repetition of 
events, for the carrying effect of time would be lost. 
In conceptions of time as cyclic, on the other hand, 
we cannot have personality at the. core of a becoming, for 
human choice and action, redundant in inescapable cycles 
of events, would be eliminated. The "story" of history 
is replaced by what we may look upon as the rudiments of 
laws of nature, namely the predictability of events. 
Predictability is precisely what· the philosophers of ·the 
Enlightenment, among them Hume and Rousseau, sought. 
Hume 's concept.ion of history is; in fact, an eternal re-
turn; Rousseau's is less explicitly so, but the notion 
of cycles of events permeates his political writings. 
(v) 
With the mention of laws of nature we have arrived 
at the question of the space and time of science •. How 
did it come about that the v·Jest inherited the space and 
time conceptions of the ancient Hebrew, so closely as-
sociated with personality, yet also became the birthplace 
of the space and time of Galileian mechanics which are 
merely two separate frames of reference divorced from .the 
human person? The answer seems to be that Galileian time, 
from fulfilling the function of a frame of reference in 
the study of moving bodies, was soon taken to be the only 
time, just as the space of Greek geometry, which was the 
21. 
science of the spaces occupied by objects and the physi-
cal space in which they move, was taken to be the only 
space. This space and time are those treated by the cal~ 
culus, and their cardinal property is that their parts 
cannot overlap. The ancient Hebrew looked upon space and 
time as created by God, but the space and time of Gali..;. 
leo's physics are 11 just there" as the result of the suc-
cession of events and objects, and their emergence, so 
to speak, was brought about by the necessity of counting 
and measurement. The space and time of Galileian physics 
were abstracted from real space and time by the exclusion 
of the element of personality, that is, Galileian space 
and time were obtained by making the spaces and times of 
particular persons "uniform 11 as men themselves were made 
uniform in the Enlightenment. 
(vi) 
The result of looking upon space and time as mere 
frames of reference had far-reaching effects which Gali-
lee could not foresee, especially with regard to God .. The 
Hebrew and mediaeval Christian view was that God was out-
side space and time (which He created) but the effect of 
Galileo!s work was to place God's creation also outside 
space and time (which had become nothing but frames of 
reference). God as a final cause came to be excluded in 
scientific .thinking, hence tl:.a rise of atheism when na-
22. 
ture, through the influence of mathematics, became the 
"great machine." The atomization of space and time, more-
over, facilitated the atomization of human psychical pro-
cesses and the destruction of the self with which we have 
to do in the thought of Hume and Rousseau. The Hebrew 
dure~ requires an unfragmented self and, conversely, an 
unfragmented self hardly experiences time as fragmented 
as it is in the calculus treatment of it. 
CHAPTER 3 
The Human Be~p.g__;hn Derived §£~~~~1!.~ 
(i) 
In a mechanism the here and ~~ of any particular 
part are points. of reference on frameworks outside the 
part. ~ve have here the separation of space and time from 
the action and substance of a thing. The parts of a mech-
anism cannot ~eet; they can, at most, touch. In the 
thought of Hume and Rousseau men are reduced to thin~ 
such as the parts of a machine. In this chapter the pro-
cess of this reduction is studied, and the starting point 
is Descart.es, for it was in his philosophy that the human 
person first ceased to be a directed unity of body and 
soul. Descartes cleaves man into body and mind, that is, 
one part is the matter which, in motion, corresponds to 
the moving particles of elementary mechanics. Descartes, 
moreover, intimates that God created the world in time; 
this time must therefore be a time outside things, uncre-
ated by God. We have here an anticipation of the calculus 
\ 
view of space and time which we shall find inHume's 
thought, and more latently in the thought of Rousseau. 
It was inevitable also, that Hobbes, devoted to mathe-
matics, and much under the influence of Galilee, should 
see men in terms of mathematics and mechanics and produce 
a thoroughly materialistic philosophy. Everything in the 
universe is matter in motion, and human psychical life 
is fragmented into elements of sensation, caused by mo-
tion, in Galileian space and time. 
(ii) 
This fragmentation of human psychical life Hume car-
ries to its logical conclusion in the destruction of the 
self. The human person ceases to exist and a man becomes 
an abstraction and a scalar entity. It is a fragmentation, 
moreover, which goes with his fragmentation of space and 
time as they are fragmented in the calculus. The similar-
ity of Hume's treatment of space and time to the calculus 
treatment is, in fact, very close. As an interval of 
space or time in 'the calculus is a summation of fragments, 
so inHume's thought an interval of space and time is a 
summation of fragments. They are also ideas or· impres-
sions in the same vray as a tree is an idea or impression. 
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Hume "physicalizes 11 space and time outside the hu-
man person. He now has frames of reference; by making 
men things he has matter in motion against a background 
of these frames, and this he achieves by destroying the 
self. Human ps.ychical life is fragmentary, he tells us; 
it consists entirely of ideas and impressions which "suc-
ceed each other with inconceivable rapidity and are in 
perpetual flux and movement." If human psychical life is 
so fragmentary, there cannot be a real, unfragmented 
self, that is, the human person ceases to exist. 
(iii) 
1rJhat strikes one with great force is that, for Hume, 
the human person is a function of the physical 1.vorld ---
in so far as the human person can be said to exist at 
all. Once it is admitted that there is really no such 
entity as the self, the projection of men as masses of 
matter against frames of reference of Galileian space and 
time becomes a matter of course, and Burne's critique of 
personal identity makes the existence of such a self im-
possible. 
We find inHume's destruction of the self the under-
lying concept in his thought of the hostility of reality 
to the intellect. The self is a mere abstraction of which 
the intellect is forced to make use because of its in-
ability to know reality. This hostility of reality to 
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the intellect is also the so~rce of Hume's destruction 
of causality. Causality, he says, is mere custom, and if 
there is no necessity in causality, there is also no 
necessity in the human person of which we have a notion 
only because it is caused. The idea of a soul "substance 11· 
which has never caused an impression on the mind, is de-
cidedly intolerable. Only man a t~ing remains therefore. 
~1an becomes an object, spatially and temporally isolated 
from other men. 
This isolation of men from one another is, however, 
traceable inHume's philosophy along a different path. 
Ilis empiricism must, in the last analysis, lead to an 
idealism. The mind, says Hume, is simply a series of ex-
periences .or.impressions; there is no mind or self as 
entity. This is objective idealism. Since, hovvever, Hume 
also destroyed causality, we are not to infer that some-
thing causes these impressions, and \lire are left with sub~· 
jective idealism or solipsism. The human being is then 
completely isolated, and there can be no question of a 
directed human person .• 
(iv) 
Now how does Rousseau reduce human beings to abstrac-
tions? We have in the thought of this philosopher a de-
struction of the self as a result of a flight from time 
and the reality of the vwrld rather than as a result of 
a reasoning. in which Galileian space and time are pro-
jected on the human person. We find Rousseau continually 
expressing the wish to "freeze" the world into change-
lessnesse He does not accept change as a §1~e-~ua no~ 
for his being, and longs desperately for a state "where 
the soul finds a place of repose solid enough to rest 
there entirely and to collect there its entire being 
without having to recall the past or ponder the future; 
where time is nothing for it, where the present lasts 
for ever without, however, marking its duration and with-
out any trace of succession •••• " Time is an enemy to. 
Rousseau, and we shall find that this hostility to time 
cuts him off from the real world and also from his fel-
low men. 
(v) 
Rousseau separates past, present and future from 
one another. There is consequently a fragmentation of 
time; time is not a ~ur~~ in Be~gson's sense of the word. 
This fragmentation goes further than these few divisions, 
and where in Hume's thought we have a succession of im-· 
pressions, we have in Rousseau's a succession of feelings. 
The result is the same, and ultimately Rousseau tells us 
that we must look upon spaces and times as a series, so 
that we encounter once again the calculus view of space 
and time. 
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Rousseau does not treat the past as unalterable; 
he changes it to suit his purpose, while the future he 
regards as something to be feared because it brings only 
unhappiness. The present divides these two .and is an in-
stant cut off from both, a Galileian moment. In all this 
we see a flight from time and from reality, and in the 
same way space is, for Rousseau, something that brings 
unhappiness as much as time does. His inability to see 
space as a mode of action and his hostility to it, be-
comes interwoven with his hostility to time. 
(vi) 
This flight by Rousseau from space and time cuts 
him off from his fellow men and from himself. He sees 
men as ~hings of which the motions can be calculated by 
means of the laws of mechanics. From this stems his per-
secution mania. We have in Rousseau's fragmentation of 
time really a destruction of the unity of the human per-
son. The human person ceases to be directed and becomes 
as much an abstraction as he does for the purposes of 
science. We find this dismantling of personality through-
out Rousseau's Confessions. The final result is that we 
have in his thought a fragmentation of human psychical 
life as effective in destroying personal identity as that 
in the philosophy of Hume. 
Rousseau's hostility to the established order of his 
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day may be traced to h~s flight from his fellow men, and 
that to his flight from space and time. Having reduced 
men to abstractions, and looking upon them as masses of 
matter, he is quite incapable of ~~~~ them. 
This reduction of men to abstractions penetrates to 
the core of Hume's and Rousseau's political and moral 
theories. 
CHAPTER 4 
The Reified Human Bel£g_in Histor~ 
(i) 
The question now arises: If Hume and Rousseau reduce 
human beings to abstractions, if they bring about a uni-
formity among human beings through which they cease to 
be differentiated from one another 1 how do these tvm 
philosophers regard the human scene in that movement of 
it which we call history? 
1.tJe find in Hume 's view of history a tendency towards 
that natural science ':vhich tinged the entire Enlighten-
ment period, while in Rousseau's we find a flight from 
history as 1:1e found there a fl~ght from time o The thought 
of beth these philosophers leads to a vievl of history as 
an eternal repetition of events, and in neither is there 
an er;chatology as there is in the historiography of the 
Old ~~estament. In the thought of both the study of his~ 
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tory becomes an instrument which must be made useful, and 
this use is closely related to the relationships among 
human beings that arise from their reduction to things 
which cannot meet. -
History is essentially the "functioning" of humanity 
in a repetitive process in which the parts of the "great 
machine" have their places :in spatial and temporal isola-
tion. The space and time of history then become the space 
and time of G~lileo's·physics, and the human scene moves 
according to discoverable laws, hence the search for a 
"science of man." Burne's destruction of personal identity 
helps to create the "universal man" which is amenable to 
prediction as things are in the natural sciences. If his-
tory can help men to understand the principles of human 
nature, it can help to create the Utopia which the En-
lighternnent sought .. Hence our dictum that the Enlighten-
ment (exemplified in Hume and Rousseau) wished to sub-
stitute progress for history. 
(ii) 
Hume tells us that men are always and everywhere the 
same; Rousseau assumes that they are, and sees in the 
study of history the same use that Hume sees in it. But 
in Rousseau's thought we have the additional element of 
hostility, and we find him deliberately "lifting" his 
body politic out of that change which we know as the pas-
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sage of time, and placing it in the space and time of 
Galileo 's physics. He takes refuge from his:b.orT·in arche-
types, and we cannot escape the conclusion that Rousseau 
sees himself as an archetype, destined to be a legislator 
for mankind, a reappearance in the world, so to speak, of 
Hoses, IVIohammed, Lycurgus or Solon. 
Rousseau, cut off from his fellow men by his hos-
tility to time, is unable to see history as a becoming of 
the ¥Torld which encompasses all the people in it. Hence 
the absence of a sense of becoming in his Confessions. 
Rousseau's ~encompasses only himself with other people 
as objects; it is not the heart of a real time which en-
compasses other persons by the overlapping of times. 
There is no interrelatedness of human beings. 
The point to note is that both Hume and Rousseau be-
lieve in the possibility of a science of human nature; in 
other words, their philosophies are once again joined by 
the word natur~. But nature for the philosopher of their 
time was the same as nature for the scientist, and the 
space and time of nature were those of science. 
(iii) 
Hume wrote history, and it is therefore natural to 
ask why he wrote it and what characteristics his view on 
history give his historiography. The most m~rked charac-
teristic of this historiography is that Burne reverses the 
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chronological order as if to confirm his judgment that it 
does not really matter when or where one observes events 
since they are merely a repetition of events somewhere 
else and at some other time. He does not describe a be-
coming, but puts the events he describes to a use in the 
service of the "science of man." He condenms what his age 
wanted condemned and supports the clear-cut ideas of the 
Enlightenment. The result is that his history lacks real-
ly thorough research. 
Rousseau did not write history, but we can see _ 
clearly that if he had written it, it would have been 
put to a use. One use would have been that of a v1eapon 
against the established Christian faith. There is, in~ 
deed, much history in the §gcia!_CQntract and it is used 
to show that the world has deteriorated and must be saved 
somehow. This latter use of history goes with Rousseau's 
contention that the body politic is corrupted by contact 
with the things of time. The Social Contract then becomes 
an attempt to break with the past, and is therefore re-
moved from time and history. 
(iv) 
Rousseau's attack on the m1ristian Church and Hume's 
view on history alike raise the question of what the -_-
position of God is in the thought of these two philoso-
phers. This question leads in turn to the questions of 
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progress, morality and freedom in philosophies in which 
history as a "story" is denied. In this "story" the 
Hebrew and Christian find a purpose of their God. History 
describes a becoming, and through his choice and action 
the human person stands at the core of this becoming. 
Since his ~ encompasses not only his o~m actions, but 
his fellmv men and their actions, morality is involved 
in human relationships, and both become historic. 
But Rousseau's ~~encompasses only objects, so that 
his morality must have its source outside real time which 
has this now as its heart, and cannot be historic. The 
social contract becomes this source. Rousseau says that 
it creates a "moral and collective body." This source of 
·morality is not the association of men in a becoming of 
the \vorld, but "this act of association 11 among men whom 
Rousseau sees merely as masses of matter. The position 
in the. thought of Hume, who reduces men to objects, is 
the same. 
Now if the source of morality is not in time, then 
what is the position of the God of time and the morality 
of the Old and Ne1PJ Testaments? Vve find that since God 
cannot be the source of morality in the state as envis-
aged by Hume and Rousseau, these two philosophers have 
no choice but to replace Him as Sovereign vvi th an entity 
which they regard as the "voice of the people.ll Hence the 
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hostility of both our philosophers to the established 
Christian Church. Both appear to look upon God merely .as 
a mechanic, and religion becomes a social morality. 
The important point to note inHume's and Rousseau's 
hostility to Christianity is that, taking it together 
with their denial of God. as a Sovereign, it removes.the 
state from time and history as a 11divine revelation." 
(v) 
We must now answer the question: What do these two 
thinkers mean by progress? What they regard as the cyclic 
nature of the events of the past make.s progress, like the 
Good, "the birth of a simple moment 11 and the "product of 
a single effort." Progress amounts to nothing less than 
the breaking of the cycles of past events. History, our 
two philosophers find, is full of corruption, mistakes~ 
folly and imperfection. Progress would eliminate all this 
because men would be educated to avoid it. History tells 
us of the rise of civilizations ru~d their fall through a 
lack of knowledge of human nature. The future must be 
different; the advancement of the natural sciences can be 
tranEplanted on society. 
Progress is therefore not a historic growth but a 
break with history by man. In fact, Rousseau forecasts a 
doom for mankind if it does not make this break with the 
things that time has produced --- cities, industries, all 
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man-created insti tutiQ,JlS that bring men together "like 
ants in an ant-heap." 
(vi) 
Progress then, can be brought about only by human 
intervention. Implied i:n this intervention is the En-:. 
lightenment notion that whatever follows a certain stage 
in history, must be better than that which preceded it. 
History, however, does not show such a course, consequent-
ly progress must replace history. This means, in fact, 
that the space a~d time of technics must be made to apply 
in societyo In history as a 11 story 11 we have the presence 
of persons to one ,another by the overlapping or inter-
penetration of their personal Epaces and times. This be-
:Comes impossible when men contract to isolated mass. par-
ti:cles, and their relationships to one another are seen 
in terms of science and the space and time of science. 
It appears that there is no real choice of men in 
this human intervention to replace history with progress. 
A "new order" has to come about by the application of a 
bett-er knowledge of the laws of the science of man. r1en 
-~-
are still abstractions which are amenable to prediction. 
They are given their morality by a ~~will and are 
not themselves to think what is right and what is va-ong .• 
Hume 's 'borrected" society is bound to be as "uniform '1 , 
with men still mutually exclusive, and consequently as 
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bereft of real freedom as that of Rousseau. It will have 
been removed from time and change and the only space and 
time left to it will be the space and time of Galilee's 
physics. 
CHAPTER 5 
The State and its Laws in Derived §12_~cy and Time 
(i) 
Rousseau does not look upon man as a "political 
animal" as does Aristotlea Thls is to be expected if one 
bears in mind what history is for Hlli~e and Rousseau; the 
human scene is.the motions of men as masses of matter in 
spatial and temporal isolation, that is, their motions 
resemble those of the parts of a machine. No philosopher 
who founds the state on a social contract can look upon 
man as a "political animal," for in the social contract 
theory vle have the element of hostility between men. 
Rousseau thus lays the blame for ~an's ills on the growth 
of society, and this hostility of men tovmrds one another 
and Rousseau's hostility towards society permeates his 
Social Contract in no uncertain way. 
Rousseau wrote the Social Contract from the point of ---
view that man is really not a "political animal , " but 
that since he has been corrupted by his own advancement 
and fall into society, and has become insufficient in 
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himself and dependent on others, he is now in society 
and must get along with his fellow men somehow. Rous-
seau's task is to justify the subjection of men to soci-
ety by finding some form of subjection to society which 
will, as far as possible, preserve the isolation of in-
dividuals from one another. 
He may have chosen the expedient of a social con-
tract to resolve the ills of society because he thought 
that men may really have been forced into such ~ contract 
by their continual warring against one another, but this 
.expedient was certainly also the prevalent one of the 
time. Hobbes used it and so did Locke, while Hume, though 
not actually using it, nevertheless writes politics as if 
he supported it. Now if the social contract idea was the 
prevalent idea of the time, one must expect to find other 
ideas prevalent at the time, to lie at the root of.it. 
One of these is the idea of mechanism. A mechanism is, as 
has been pointed out, a thing of which the parts function 
in spaces and times which do not interpenetrate. This is 
precisely the characteristic of the state founded on the 
social contract. Underlying the idea of any social con-
tract is the notion that men are isolated from one an-·. 
other in space and time and at war with one another. Hu-
man relationships have become clashes of material par-
ticles in motion in Galileian space and. time, the space 
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and time of a mechanism. Rousseau, in fact, tells us very 
clearly that this is how he sees men. 
(ii) 
Now if men in the body politic are merely masses of 
matter in motion, "bereft of all morality" as Rousseau 
says they are for him, then the body politic must derive 
' all morality from outside men ~nd, consequently, from 
outside real space and time~ T'1orali ty. is then nothing 
more than the regulation of the motions of masses of 
matter, that is, it is a forced, utilitarian morality. 
This Rousseau tells us in the Social Contract, and his 
words are at the same time an admission that this forced 
morality leads to two freedoms: the freedom of the state 
of nature and civic freedom. Between these two freedoms 
there is no bridge, and this too, Rousseau tacitly ad-
mits. We shall show, hov.rever, that what he calls civic 
freedom, is a spurious freedom. In Hume's philosophy we 
find something similar: Hume makes a distinction between 
"natural relationships" (friendship, family ties, etc.) 
and 11artificial relationships" (those that arise because 
the state becomes necessary). This brings us to the que~­
tion of legislation. 
The General Will mruces the laws, says Rousseau, but 
the General Will is atemporal so that its laws must also 
be atemporal. It legislates to stop the state of war be-
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tween men, that is, it regulates the motions of men (mas-
ses of matter) in Galileian space and time to·~revent 
clashes. In this sense its laws are a flight from real 
space and time. We find then, that the legislation of the 
General Will is legislation for civic freedom, a freedom 
into which, Rousseau tells us, men can be "forced," a 
freedom of which the space and time prove to be those of 
Galilee's physics. The legislation of the General Will is 
therefore legislation for Galileian space and time, for 
men who are spatially and temporally isolated from one 
anotl:.er. Hume 's political thought follows the same lines. 
We now go on to study the characteristics of the en-
tity which legislates, the General Will. 
(iii) 
Rousseau's men do not stand at a now in ~tThich they 
are faced with a particular situation which calls their 
wills and choice into action. Their wills are assumed in 
the General Will which makes all decisions and directs 
the wills of the individuals. The person therefore at 
once ceases to be free since his will is replaced by an-
other \'Thich is not his. He can no longer strive after 
personality, since freedom of will and action is a pre-
requisite for this striving. 
Now since the General vlill has to keep these men who 
have become masses of matter, from clashing in chaos, it 
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is a device and not a person. Rousseau admits this when 
he speaks of the state as a ~ers£na fict~, and the con-
tention that the General Will is a device is further sup~ 
ported by the method which Rousseau gives for determining 
it: by a mere algebraic summation. But the fact that the 
General vi/ill is so very corruptible b~)T the things of time 
that Rousseau has to place it in Galileian space and time, 
is perhaps the strongest testimony to its lack of person-
ality. The Sovereign then becomes altogether ahistoric, 
and must be bound to the subjects by mechanical bonds and 
not through the confluence of spaces and times. 
Civ) 
Rousseau takes precautions to protect the General 
Will against corruption by the things of time and the 
"seduction of particular wills." It must be "educated" to 
knOirJ what is good for the people, and among the things 
that it must be taught is to see spaces and times as a 
series, that is, it must be tru~en out of real space and 
time and placed in the space and time of predictability. 
In order to educate the General Will Rousseau needs 
the help of a Legislator. This Legislator will, however, 
like God, have to stand outside time, and would himself 
have to be something of a god if he is to be all that 
Rousseau wishes him to be. He would, moreover, soon have 
the General ~vill at his mercy and become the· de facto 
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ruler of the state and make men even more isolated parts 
of a machine. 
Hume regards men no more as "political animals" than 
does Rous.seau. This follows from his fragmentation of hu-
man psychical life: If our inner life is an artificial 
composition of succeeding fragments of sensation, our 
outer life must be an artificial relationship of things 
in Galileian space and time. If a man becomes an abstrac-
tion, so must his society become an abstraction --- a 
collection of lli· Hume does, in fact, look upon the 
state as an artificial construction. 
CHAPTER 6 
. i!£§.tice and Moraill;y_~9-_Space and Tim~ 
(i) 
If, in BUrne's and Rousseau's states, human beings 
are alienated from their true selves and from every other 
person, we must expect to find in the thought of our two 
philosophers conceptions of morality quite unlike those 
which we find among persons related to one another through 
the overlapping of the spaces and times of their inner 
lives. We have found that human relationships are mech-
anical since men have become matter in motion. To prevent 
clashes the Sovereign has the duty of policing, and that 
it actually is a policeman, both Hume and Rousseau tell 
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us in the Treatise and the Social Contract. Justice be-
comes the keeping of the peace and is divorced from the 
~~e!i£~ of men; it becomes utilitarian. 
Hume's theory of good and evil is.precisely that of 
Hobbes: they are nothing but new names for pleasure and 
pain respectively., and this pleasure and pain result, 
largely from motions in Galileian space and time. The 
Sovereign must then see to it that no person causes pain 
to another: this is justice. It is clear that there is no 
c<;mnection between good and evil and society, that is, 
there is no history in morality; the individual is soli-
tary and exclusive. 
\llhen Hume writes on morals he uses the language of 
a scientist, saying, for instance, that "in the produc-
tion and conduct of the passions there is a certain reg-
ular mechanism •••• n He treats morality as Newton treats 
moving bodies. This is to be expected since he writes on 
morals in terms of the "universal man." 
(ii) 
Burne's theory of good and evil provides us with a 
clue for the breaking of the cycles of past events, that 
is, for the substitution of progress for history. To 
break these cycles an act of vvill would be required on 
the part of men, but men cannot choose except in so far 
as they can avoid pain and grasp at pleasure. Now if phi-
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losophers (like Hume and Rousseau) can provide a blue·-
print for a society with order and pleasure and without 
pain, this absence of pain and presence of pleasure (ab-
sence of evil and presence of good) will awaken desire in 
men and they will then adopt this society. The cycles of 
the past will then have been broken. 
Clearly Hume's morality is a morality of feeling. 
This morality, associated with utilitarian justice (order 
in society) gives us grounds for saying that as Hume dis-
tinguishes between 11artificial" and "natural 11 relation-
. ships, he implicitly distinguishes between an "artifi-
cial11 and a 11natural" virtue and an "artificial" and a 
"natural" moralityo "Natural" virtue and morality then go 
with "natural" relationships just as "artificial" virtue 
and morality go with 11artificial 11 relationships. Between 
them there is a wide rift which cannot be bridged, even 
though both have their roots in feeling. 
(iii) 
Rousseau's feelings are all-important to him, and 
virtue is, for him as for Hume, a question of feeling. It 
has nothing to do with the relationships betvmen persons 
and is consequently ahistoric. Rousseau's autobiographic-
al works, especially the Confessions, abound with in-
stances where the author lays stress on the virtue of his 
or someone else's behaviour simply because that behaviour 
touches his feeling. Provided an .act could in some 'tvay 
be made to give Rousseau a f.~~~~ of virtue, it was vir-
tuous. This virtue is not established by an I-Thou rela-
tionship; it is centred only on the person who feelso 
Basically Rousseau's virtue of feeling is the same 
as Hume 's. VJhatever transmission of sympathy and morality 
there is between men, is purely mech~~ical; there is no 
overlapping of spaces and times, and no becoming. The 
transmission is similar to the conduction of' heat in a 
solid where energy is handed from atom to atom: it is a 
matter of cause and effect. Consequently there is no con-
nection between religion and morality in the thought of 
our two philosopherso Certainly Rousseau's "natural re-
ligion" cannot be founded on an~rthing but feeling. 
(iv) 
Since morality is, for both philosophers, a matter 
of utility, one must expect religion also to become a 
matter of utility. It turns out, in fact, that both Hume 
and Rousseau wish to create a utilitarian state religion. 
The General V.Jill, and not God, then becomes the Sovereign. 
\r.Je have here a very clear destruction of the "vertical 11 
relationships betvveen men and God wherever men regard 
such relationships as existing. Rousseau's natural re-
ligion is not itself the state religion, for it does not 
encompass other people; vJhatever one has to do v.ri th other 
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people is a matter for the state. Hence the state re-
ligion. This state religion is a designed religion close-
ly connected with the control of people to which atten-
tion is given in the next chapter. 
Now if the state is a mechanism outside real space 
and time, the state religion must also be outside real 
space and time. It becomes an instrument for regulating 
the motions of masses of matter, and its space and time 
are the space and time of Galilee's physics. 
CHAPTER 7 
The Control of Men as Masses of Matter 
(i) 
The hostility of men towards one another that under~ 
lies the social contract theory, makes this expedient to 
resolve the problems of society an expedient in which the 
control of men is inherent. We commence our examination 
of this control with the deprivation of their wills by 
Th1me and Rousseau. Both require that for order among men 
to come about, men should place their wills at the dis-
posal of some larger, all-embracing entity which Rousseau 
calls the General Will. This means that a person whose 
will is so assumed in the General Will, suffers a loss of 
will. OUr two philosophers go further: they have the no--
tion that a person can be f£~~ into freedom. Dissenters 
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from the General Will, says Rousseau, must be compelled 
to bring their wills into conformity l!vi th their reason 
(which would tell them that the General Will is right). 
Compulsion is control; the individual becomes will-less 
and comes under the control of the General Will •. 
. -
The "forcing into freedom" is then really a suppres-
sion of personality. Civic freedom becomes a freedom from 
·clashes with one's fellow men, but can extend no further. 
Since real freedom is so closely bound up with human per-
sonality, and since men have, in the philosophies of Hume 
and Rousseau, come to be particles in motion, it should 
not surprise us to find these two philosophers using the 
. word free do~ to indicate something connected \vi th forced 
morality and utilitarian justice. The freedom of Hume and 
Rousseau is something quite apart from human personality 
and consequently outside real space and time. It is, how-
ever, a spurious freedom. It is a freedom from fear of 
one's fellow men; a man wills laws, not because they are 
a striving to the Good, but because his will has been 
directed by the danger of exploitation by his fellow men, 
or by the c.ontrol of the General \!Jill. 
(ii) 
If morality in the body politic is forced, and if 
freedom itself is closely connected with compulsion, we 
.. 
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have a controlled and "designed" morality in the state. 
The state must then become that· around which the cont:;:-ol 
must centre, for morality and justice go no further than· 
. 
the keeping of the peace among men. Control and design 
of morality must, in turn, issue in a control of religion, 
consequently Hume and Rousseau alike are in favour of a 
state religion. This state religion is nothing more than 
an instrument to aid in the control of men in the ending 
of the war of man against man. It ends, hov;ever, in the 
isolation of God from men as men are isolated from one 
another. The state and its laws come first. We find then, 
that the space and time of this state religion are the 
space and time of Galileian mechanics. 
(iii) 
If one asks on what grounds a man should be expect-
ed to accept the state religion, the answer can only be 
that he must accept it if he wishes to be a good citizen. 
Privately the citizen can believe what he pleases "so _ 
long as their dogmas contain nothing contrary to the du-
ties of citizenship." 
The question of forcing a man into freedom, taken 
together with the notion of forcing him into a state re-
ligion, raises the question of whether it would be pos~ 
sible for anyone to consider himself as not having been 
a party to the social contract that created a particular 
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state with its legislative body. The answer seems to be 
that a man cannot do this. The social contract is then 
not a contract of consent; individuals are forced to co~­
sent as they are "forced into freedom. 11 
(iv) 
The control of the General \~ill over men extends 
further than their persons: it includes their property. 
Rousseau leaves no doubt that the.individual is to have 
no choice or say in the matter of what he would be will-
ing to part with in exchange for the blessings of citi-
zenship. The General '\rvill is the sole judge, and it can 
judge that it should control everything. Rousseau's (and 
Hume's) thought consequently contains the germ of state-
ovmed property. VJe find that the arguments which Rousseau 
might have had against this judgment are not valid, and 
the conclusion which forces itself upon us is that the 
social contract expedient .is a blueprint for a society in 
which men and their belongings are controlled as matter 
is controlled in a workshop. The space and time of Gali-
lee's physics apply to men and things alike. The licence 
granted for 11forcing into freedom 11 is really a licence 
granted for the enslavement of men by the "superman 11 as 
history has seen in several countries this century. 
(v) 
i.rJe novr link up the thought of our ttvo philosophers 
idth the actual events of history in their own century 
and after,- and with certain characteristics of our times. 
The state created by Hume and Rousseau, we have de-
cided, is a mechanism, an artificial construction in 
which men are controlled as parts. This mechanism goes 
with the notion of Hume and Rousseau of a science of m&~. 
The purpose of the science of ·man is the creation of a 
good and orderly society, but this society turns out to 
be one which cannot be orderly without the control of~ 
the General \!Jill over the citizens. 
About a decade after the deaths of Hume and Rousseau 
the French Revolution, instead of establishing a true 
democracy, established an extensive coercion of men, a 
"forcing into freedom," and the bloodshed of this period 
in French history testifies to the force that is neces-
sary to make men "universal men," and to strip them of 
the spaces and times proper to them. 
At the same time there v.ras an expansion of Europe to 
dominions beyond the seas, and Europe began to "think im-
perially." Inperialism meant movement, of both men and 
matter with little distinction between the two. It meant 
that men were subjected to the same space and time (that 
of Galileian science) as things. From the necessity to 
dominate matter flowed the necessity to dominate men, so 
·that we have a blossoming of the slave trade and a total 
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disregard :for the well-being of vwrkers, male, female and 
even children. 
(vi) 
We end this thesis viTi th a consideration of our own 
age. The workerin any industrial country is still very 
much a reified engine of production. He is,. there;fore, a 
controlled part of the mechanism which is modern industry, 
and his motions,·. like those of the things he handles, are 
in Galileian space and time. If we wish to point out that 
our industrial age seems to disregard what Bergson, Alex-
ander, Heidegger and others regard as real space and 
time, we must also point out that our age is applying the 
space and time of the thought that produced the age. For 
some three centuries Europe has been told that space and 
time vvere outside the human person, imposed on him by the 
succession Of events and things in the material world. 
It seems that v;re can rightly speak of a space and 
time of freedom, and a space and time of controlo In the 
space and time of control, which are the space and time 
of technics, the actions of meri are not responsible ac-
tions and personality must be submerged in the necessity 
of l2..w and prediction• The·space and time of .freedom are· 
the space and time O·f the ;historicity of men, that is, 
their possession of choice and responsible action emergeso 
The control ·or men as masses of matter may seem a 
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strange outcome in the thought of two philosophers who 
were champions of the individual. We can explain it only 
by the fact that they isolated the individual in space 
and time. They did not see him as a directed being with 
a subjective, personal space and time overlapping those 
of other individuals. For the sake of the individual they 
wanted a science of man and the order that goes with it; 
they failed to establish that order without subjecting 
the individual to control. 
CHAPTER 8 
A Postscript: From Hume and Rousseau to Hei~~ger 
Heidegger is of special interest to us because we 
made such liberal use of his -thought in this study. Now 
Heidegger is much concerned vri th the future of mankind, 
and this concern can be linked to the thought of Hume and 
Rousseau through the reification of men as we see it in 
the industrialized world of today, and their separation 
from the spaces and times proper to them. For Heidegger 
the central fact of man's present history is technology, 
through which he has acquired a domination over things 
and has achieved the first global civilization in history. 
This civilization was given to the world chiefly, or al-
most entirely, by the -vvest, and Heidegger tells us that 
the West could do this because it inherited the thought of 
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the Greeks whose philosophy 11detached clear and distinct 
objects from the enveloping presence of Being and made 
these into objects for rational research. Because the 
Greek philosophers began to grasp Being in a certain way, 
science became possible. 11 
In the light of this thesis this separation of ob-
jects from Being is, in fact, a separation of things from 
the spaces and times proper to them. It was, we have said, 
because of the separation of men from their subjective 
spaces and times, the spaces and times proper to them, 
that men became things. Now Heidegger thinks that the age 
of technology t'ITill last a very long time. The consequence, 
he thinks, (which is really the consequence of the sepa-
ration of things from Being and, in the light of this 
thesis, from the spaces and times proper to .them) may be 
that man will lose his historic sense altogether and live 
in a present of ceaseless technological change. 
For Heidegger, as for Spengler, our present era is 
the evening of the 'i!Jest, an evening before a night. that 
may be very long before there is another davm. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Outline of th~ Subject and Historica~Background 
(i) 
Certain words in the vocabularies of all languages 
derive their meaning from human intercourse, that is, 
they indicate that a man is a member of society~ We point 
in English to such words as !£!~, £g~radesh~£, sym£atp~, 
state, law and 9bli~~~£~, and we say that they cannot 
have a meaning for a man vvho is altogether cut off from 
his fellow men·. lrJhen we use these words and others like 
them, we use them as· implying some sort of bond between 
one human being and another (or others), that is, they 
indicate the existence of vvhat we call hum~_E.~~onse_~§.· 
In this study v1e shall be concerned with the grounds and 
nature of these human relationships as they are conceived 
in the thought of Hume and Rousseau; by implication, 
therefore, different people have different notions of 
the grounds and nature of human relationships, that is, 
the concepts vlhich such vmrds as ~' £.2.illrad~§.hip, :,:;zm_-
~~' ~' la~ and obligation convey to people, vary 
from person tb.person. 
Now we can hardly think otherwise than that our 
notions of human relationships are determined by our 
views on human beings, so that when we contemplate human 
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relationships we are at once involved in questions about 
human beings as human beings and quite apart from their 
relationships to one another. Questions about human 
beings which will be of the greatest importance to us in 
this study will be those about human Eersonality and 
human nature• We shall hold that both Hume and Rousseau 
treat human relationships in terms of human nature rather 
than in terms of human personality. This study is, broad-
ly speaking, a study of the consequences for the indi-
vidual and society of this course in their thought. 
Our contention will be that they take this course 
because they adopt a particular space and time, those of 
the science of their day. The outcome of this choice 
is that, whereas for a thinker such as Martin Buber 
"Thou (that is,.a human perso~) has no bounds:1 )HU.me 
and Rousseau gi·ve human beings sharply determined bounds 
and make them limited objects, as is suggested by Rous-
seau when he tells us that he sees men as "masses of 
matter."2 ) There is something profound in human rela-
tionships for Buber; for him "All real living is meet-
1) I and Thou, Page 4. In this statement Buber wishes 
to tell us that the physical limits of the human body 
are by no means the boundaries of human personality. 
2) This is an important remark by Rousseau and we shall 
return to it in due course. 
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ing,"1 )and it will become clear presently, that the 
word meeting provides a key to the difference bet,r~een 
human relationships seen in terms of personality and 
human relationships seen in terms of human nature. Buber 
sees this meetin~, not as a mere crossing of paths or as 
a "coming across.," but as a "coming together." In the 
course of this study this "coming together 11 will be ex-
plained as in effect a confluence or interpenetration 
of spaces and times of human persons. We shall conse-
quently encounter the notion that the human person is 
surrounded by a space, very much as a magnet is sur-
rounded by a magnetic field,i2)and that it is possible 
for persons to have a common time in a sense quite dif-
ferent from being together at the same moment indicated 
by a clock. We shall point to the absence of such a 
notion in the thought of our two philosophers and the 
consequent inability of their men to ~· 
In his contention that all real living is meeting, 
Buber expresses his conviction that men possess a 
directedness3)towards one another which lifeless objects 
1) I and Thou, Page 11. 
2) Hence his "boundlessness" in Buber's sense of -the 
term. The modern physicist is well aquainted with 
this notion. See Chapter Note 1. 
3) See Chapter Note 2. 
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do not possess. tle~ting is the effectiveness of this vec-
1) . 
torial nature of men, so to speak, and we shall hold that 
it involves a space and time quite different from those 
which apply to scalar entities such as stones, which cannot 
~· We shall hold, furthermore, that there is a connec-
tion between this space and time and human personality 
which cannot exist between personality and the space and 
time which apply to lifeless objects. ·The directedness of 
men consequently flows from human personality by virtue of 
this space and time, so that when we say that Hume and 
Rousseau see human relationships in terms of human nature 
rather than in terms of human personality, we intimate that 
they fail to recognize this space and time of personality 
and look upon the space and time of metre sticks and clocks 
as those of men and things alike, that is, as the only pos-
sible space and time. 
As obvious indications of the directedness of men 
we can point to their speech, and to the fact that words 
such as love, comradeship, SJWPathy, state, ~~ and 
obligation which men use in their speech, require their 
directedness if they are~to have any meaning. (The 11shade 11 
or 11tone" of the meaning of such words as·..J these will, 
in fact, depend on the extent of the directedness which 
1) Henceforth, whenever the word meetin~ is underlined, 
it will have the sense which Buber gives it. 
.. 
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we attribute to men). Now speaking is an action, and 
words which indicate a directedness more often than not 
require some sort of action, and these cannot but in-
volve a man's fellow men. Furthermore, we look upon 
man's speech as the possession of a being endowed with 
reason and self-consciousness; we doubt the possession 
of this reason and self-consciousness by animals and' 
plants, in facf, because they have no speech, though, no 
doubt, also for other reasons. 
Human relationships seen in terms of human person-
ality must have as their source, then, the human person 
looked upon as a self-consciqus, directed and acting 
being. The Christian thinlcer, Y~erkegaard for instance 
(and certainly St. Thomas Aquinas), would add to this: 
"which isa unity of body and soul," but for the moment 
we are concerned '~th the words actin£ and directed. To 
possess human personality a man must be assumed to pos-
sess a freedom to act and exercise his directedness. In 
the context of human personality the idea of freedom is 
an important one; thinkers of our century, in fact, seem 
to regard freedom as a sine g}la non for the PC?Ssession 
of personality, 1 )but since it is so closely connected 
with action, personality seems to be created by action, 
that is, by the "putting into operation" of freedom. 
1) See Chapter Note 3. 
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Consequently it is possible to lose personality or never 
to achieve it, or to achieve it only imperfectly.1 ) 
Now when Hume and Rousseau fail to recognize the space 
/) 
and time of personality and place human'beings in the space 
and time of lifeless objects, they take this ability to 
act away from them; this follows necessarily from the con-
tention that they do not see human relationships in terms 
of personality. It must follow also, that they take away 
the directedness of men .. This amounts to a "dismantling" of 
the human person, so that men can no longer ~ their 
fellow men. The actions of men then, require a space and 
time quite. different from the space and time of the forced 
(or caused) motions of lifeless objects, and we shall find 
.it necessary, before we go on to study those particular 
aspects of the though~ of our two philosophers with which 
we shall be concerned; to investigate different spaces and 
times, and to apply the knowledge gained in this way to 
the questions of meetin& and actio~. In the course of 
this investigation it will become clear how, if men cannot 
meet and act, they remain undifferentiated from one another 
as things are which have no personality, and possess only 
human nature, which is an attribute which all men have in 
1) An infant, therefore, has no personality, or is at most 
a very imperfect person. He has to acquire or "earn" 
personality in the course of growing up. 
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common. This means that if men are stripped, as it were,(; 
of the space and time of personality, they become abstrac-
tions, and the basic guiding influence in the thought of 
Hume and Rousseau in their treatment of human relationships 
is then precisely that they reduce human beings to abstrac-
tions.1) 
Now in studying the thought of Hume together with that 
of Rousseau, we are coupling two men with widely.different 
characters, and we have every reason to expect that -their 
methods and approaches to the questions they examine, dif-
fer as widely .. We find that this is indeed so; Hume is an 
empiricist, and Rousseau has been called the father of 
romaticism, yet their thought has this common outcome of 
the reduction of men to abstractions. It would therefore 
not be unreasonable to surmise that there is an underlying 
bond between Hume•s empiricism and Rousseau's romanticism, 
and that this common outcome in the thought of our two phi-
losophers is a mode in which it manifests itself .. This 
bond we shall attempt to trace with respect to space and 
time. . ~ J .. 
(ii) 
For a better understanding of this common outcome 
in the thought of Hume and Rousseau and the underlying 
1) Compare Roubiczek 's Existentia;!:-ism, For and Again...§!, 
Chapter 1, Page 11. 
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bond which it indicates, it is necessary that we ex-
mine them in the light of the century in which the two 
men wrote. Our two philosophers were contemporaries in 
the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century; only a 
year separated their births and two years their deaths;) 
and their lives stretched over fully two-thirds of their 
century, so that, although they were among tne makers 
of that century, they also stood fully exposed to its 
influences. 
The age of the Enlightenment was, as Whitehead puts 
it, 2 )"an age of ferment 11 following the passing of the 
system of life and thought of the Middle Ages. The con-
cern of Hume and Rousseau with society has its roots in 
this "ferment," in the disturbance in human affairs 
brought about by the passing of a long-established order 
of things.3)The "ferment 11 was really a "rethinking" of 
man and his position in the scheme of things, and a 
search for new foundations for his life to replace those 
of the Middle Ages which had now been discarded. One 
must see the thought of HUme and Rousseau as part, not 
--------------------------------------------------------1) David Hume, 1711-1776• 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1712-1778. 
2) Science and the Modern World, Chapter 1, Page 1. 
3) Though science, as we know it today, received a great 
impetus at the close of the Middle Ages, the pe:iod 
that followed was in many ways one of general d~srup­
tion and decomposition. See Appendix 1. 
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only of this search, but also of the discarding of the 
old foundations. The consequences of the 11rethinking" of 
man in the Enlightenment reached beyond the eighteenth 
century into our own, and it is this that makes the phi-
losophies of Hume and Rousseau important for our times. 
In his popular book The $!gry of Philosophz, Will 
Durant conveys the spirit of the times of the Enlighten-
ment to us in the statement that "the ancient God fell 
from his throne along with the Bourbons, heaven faded 
into mere sky, and hell became an emotional expres-
sion. 111 \ve can add to this that, along 't'Vi th God and the 
Bourbons, man fell from his position of Crown of Cre-
ation which he had held in the ~liddle Ages, to being a 
phenomenon to be studied by science. The ·~rethinking" 
of man left no aspect of human life untouched. Temmer 
sees it as an attempt "to prove the self-sufficiency of 
nature and intellect as opposed to any transcendental 
mediation, u2 )and quotes (through Cassirer) the vvords of 
D' Alembert3) (who had a part in this rethinking ) as 
1) Chapter 6, Page 227. 
2) See Chapter Note 4. 
3) ~aezpents de. Philosop~~n He lange de Li.tt_erature; . 
d'Histoire et·de Phiiosophie, (6 vOis., Amsterdam, 
1759), Vol. 4,- Pages 3 an(f 4. Quoted by E.Cassirer 
in The Phi;tosonfl:Lof_tpe Enl;:Lghtemne~t, Princeton, 
1951, Page 'b. (Tliis footnote appears also as a foot-
note in Temmer's Time in Rousseau and Kant, Chapter 
4, Page 58. . - · 
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testimony to its thoroughness·: "Thus from the principles 
of the secular sciences to the foundations of religious 
revelation, from metaphysics to matters pertaining to 
taste, from music to morals, from the scholastic dis-
putes of theologians ••••• everything was discussed, end 
analysed, or at. least mentioned ••••• " Everything vras 
discussed, however, in terms of what we might call a 
credo, \'lorded by Hazard in such a way as to suggest that 
search for proof of the self-sufficiency of the intel-
lect was considered quite unnecessary:l)"Reason is self-
sufficing. Whoso possesses reason and uses it aright, 
never goes astray: negue ~5iecipi tur F§l.tio, ~e9..u~_fl.epi£i t~ 
unguam. Reason treads infallibly the road to Truth. 
Reason needs not Authority, of which she is, practically 
speaking, the precise antithesis, Authority being the 
fountain-head of error. Reason reeks not of Tradition; 
nor does she concern herself either \lli th the .Ancient or 
the Modern School~ Every aberration comes of believing 
blindly in things without investigating them in the · 
light of reason." 
~ve shall be concerned vTi th four characteristics of 
this period, which we shall find reflected in the 
writings of our two philosophers:l) Its naive self-as-
--------------·~----··-----·---
1) ~pean Thought in the Eighteenth Centu£~, Part 1, 
Chapter 3, Page 40. · 
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surance and its apotheosis of science (without a knowl-
edge of its limitations, however). 2) Its hostility to 
Christianity-. This issued from its boundless faith in 
science. 3) Its physico-mathematical orientation in 
which the work of Galilee looms large. 4) Its scientif-
ically-inspired notion of progress as opposed ~o history. 
We shall, of course, be concerned with the concep-
tions of space and time pf this age, and also with its 
views on men, but these go with, and issue from, its 
world view, which was one of rigid causality, objectiv-
ity, simplicity and absoluteness, from which the human 
point of view and the passage of time as it had been 
contemplated by the mediaeval Christian thinker, had 
been eliminated. 1 )From such a world view the reduction 
of men to abstractions must necessarily follow. The En-
lightenment intellectual sees a man as a phenomenon to 
be studied scientifically; an underlying assumption is 
therefore that he is exactly like another man, that is, 
he has lost his individuality and is looked upon as an 
example of a class of beings. The man of the Enlighten-
ment is a "constructed" man, "built up" with attributes 
which individual men have in common; he is the "univer-
sal" man or "man-in-general" and is a standard example 
of a phenomenon in which science is interested. It is in 
1) See Chapter Note 5. 
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looking upon this man, an abstraction required by sci-
ence, as a subject for philosophy, that Hume and Rous-
seau are children of their times, and show us to what 
extent the science of their age permeates their thought. 
vfuen ~he eighteenth century dawned, this science had be-
come a veritable flood which no intellect could escape;) 
so that even Rousseau, with all his antipathy to science, 
appears to have been more influenced by it than he knew 
or cared to admit. 
Now two of the attributes of individual men which 
are left out of account when the ·Enlightenment science 
and.philosophy construct a standard man, are what we 
shall call their private subjective spaces and times. 
The reason why they are left out of account is precisely 
that they are private and subjective and not common to 
all men. These subjective spaces and times are those by 
which mem are able to mee~' we shall find, consequently, 
that this constructed man cannot meet another man, and 
this inability of abstract men to ~ determines what 
human relationships are in the thought of Hume and Rous-
seau. Hume's treatment of man on scientific lines (in 
·'·1:;:1;!•:' 
which he adheres strictly to the methods prescribed oy:·· 
Francis Bacon) eventually leads him to see the human 
scene as a machine. r'lechanism is also the outcome of 
1) See Chapter Note 6. 
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Rousseau's contemplation of man among his fellow men, 
though it may seem, at first sight, a strange outcome 
in the thought of a man \-.rho was as hostile to science as 
was Rousseau. We have seen, however --- and it will be-
come more evident as we proceed with this study --- that 
it is a result which is quite in keeping with the spirit 
of the age, the influence of the science of which he 
could not escape. 
Now we shall be much concerned with the word mech-
anism and its import for human relationships. An im-
mediate question therefore seems to be: What are the 
characteristics of a mechanism v.ri th which we v1ould just-
ify the statement that mechanism is the outcome of the 
thought of both our philosophers? Vle can point firstly 
to the fact that the parts of any machine function in 
spatial and temporal isolation, and secondly to the fact 
that these parts do not move of their o\m accord, but 
need a motive force outside them to set them in.motion. 
Now~if· .. both Hume and Rousseau make men abstractions 
which spatially and temporally exclude one another and 
have lost the ability to act of their own free will, the 
similarity between the men in their thought and the 
parts of a machine at once becomes 'Clear. 
(iii) 
Science, however, provided a closer bond between 
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Hume and Rousseau than the common outcome of mechanism 
in their treatment of human relationships, one from 
which, in fact, the common outcome of mechanism is a 
logical issue. This closer bond is associated, further-
more, with the hostility to the Christian faith which is 
so characteristic a feature of the Enlightenment, and 
which we find also in the thought of our two philoso-
phers. It is to be found in the reply to the question: 
"Vfuat must I do to be saved?" This reply formulates what 
might be called the dogma of their age: "You know per-
fectly well what to do: your own nature informs you ••••• 
whether you looked without or within, Nature (without 
any supernatural revelation) offered you all that was 
needed for salvation .• 111 )Here then, we find another man-
ifestation of an underlying bond between romanticism 
and empiricism: NATURE in which they both have their 
roots. We shall find that the space and time of this 
~tu~~ of the Enlightenment are the space and time of 
the science which brought it to the fore and sought to 
prove its self-sufficiency, 2 )as Temmer puts it, without 
1) See Willey's The Eighteen!:_h.::-~~!1-.tury Backg£_£Und, Chap-
ter 1, Page 15. 
2) Compare Maritain's Moral Philos~, Chapter 6, Page 
92: "From the time of the Renaissance to that of 
Kant, the spectacle offered by moral philosophy is 
one of progressive secularization or 'naturalizing' 
of the traditional Christian heritage." 
66. 
any transcendental mediation. 
But it would be an error to think that with the 
fall of the "ancient God 11 from his thron.e, Europe fell 
suddenly into atheism and that the Enlightenment rever-
ence for nature was synonymous with atheism. What took 
the place of the Christian faith in intellectual circles 
was a deism. 1 )This was a belief in a god through the 
universe; we have the view of a "divine universe" through 
the "rehabilitation of nature. rr2 )It v-.ras only when, 
through the influence of the mathematical sciences (1r.rhich 
we shall discuss presently), nature became identified 
with the "great machine" that atheism could become a 
competitor with this deism which vlas as hostile to the 
established Christian faith as was atheism itself. There 
was no function for God after the construction of the 
machine which was the universe,3)and He could therefore 
be dispensed with and eliminated from its further work-
---------------------------------------------
1) See Chapter Note 7. 
2) Willey's ter~. See his ~££_S~~~teenth-ce~tury Back-
ground, Chapter 2. :f\1en 's eyes hadt'Obeturned away 
from "other-worldly" things and fixed on ~~e. See 
Chapter Note 8. 
3) See Appendix 3 and also Footnote 1 overleaf. There was, 
of course, those who did not require God even for a 
creation. Compare also Willey's ~.Eigh~eenth-cen~ 
tury Background, Chapter 1, Page 11: " ••••• the uni-
verse" came more and more to be regarded as the Great 
r'lachine' working by rigidly determined laws of materi-
al causation." · 
ing, for it now ran in accordance with fixed laws and 
could be relied upon not to fail. 
A part of this machine, a very intricate part per-
haps, and really another mechanism, but still a part of 
the whole, was man. Man was induced to look upon himself, 
no longer as a being for whose benefit the universe ex-
isted, and placed therefore at its centre whence he 
could survey all in the light o~ Scripture, but as an 
item in Being, subject to all the laws of nature. 1 )Pur-
pose in his existence was taken-from him and scientific 
cause and effect substituted; his persuasion o.f a destiny 
in God was made a persuasion of a salvation in this world 
in a Utopia which was held to be within his grasp. We 
shall be concerned in this study with the share which 
Hume and Rousseau had in the establishment of the notion 
of "the heavenly city of the eighteenth-century philoso-
phers11 as Becker calls this Utopia in the title of his 
book on the thought of this period. It is a share in 
which the notion of nature plays a significant role, but 
a role which is inseparable from their idea of progress. 
1) See Burtt's The Metaphysical Foundations of Hode!Jl 
Physical Science, Introduction, Pages 4, 5 and 6, and 
compare this.description of mediaeval thought with 
that given by Leighton in his The Field oLPhilosophy, 
Chapter 13, Page 157, of the period that followed the 
birth of science. See Appendices 2 and 3 and also 
Chapter Note 9. 
'.:This is to be expected, since science made their age and · 
science in its progress had brought nature to the fore. 
The preoccupation of the Enlightenment with nature can-
not be seen out of the context of this idea of progress: 
there must be uninterrupted improvement (as there is in 
science), and everything must be better than that which 
preceded it. life shall find that this progress is quite 
unlike history and had to take the place of history in 
Enlightenment thought.1 ) 
Now once nature had taken the place of the "ancient 
God" its reduction to a machine by the all-pervading in-
fluence of mathematics was assured. Consequently where 
nature enters into the views of our two philosophers on 
men and their relationships to one another, it enters in 
the guise of mechanism, and progress becomes a machine-
like movement or a series of machine-like movements. A 
machine is a neat and orderly thing, and through.science 
nature had come to be synonymous with order, unity, per-
specuity and proportion, the opposite of the non-repeti-
tive universal change which we shall associate in the 
next chapter with the time of the Hebrew and Christian 
God and with history. 
1) We shall also find it difficult to resist asking: 
Does this sort of progress not lead to nothing? Is 
there not a sort of nihilism latent in it? 
(iv) 69. 
We shall encounter this mathematical orientation of 
the eighteenth century again when we come to investigate 
the space and time of a material mechanism and their 
derivation, but we are concerned at this point with its 
immediate effect on the contemplation of man. Since it 
was this characteristic of the eighteenth century which 
made nature synonymous with a machine, it lies at the 
very root of its tendency to make human beings abstrac-
tions. The more spectacular results were shown by those 
sciences which made prediction possible, 1 )that is, the 
mathematical sciences such as physics and astronomy, es-
pecially the subdivision of physics which we know as 
mechanics. It became an assumption of the Enlightenment 
that reason with its mathematical weapon could cope with 
any investigation that had to be unc1ertaken and "that 
the real may be identified with the quantitative."2 )so 
thoroughly did the mathematical sciences dominate the 
age that even "the le.ter b::.ological and sociological 
branches took over their basic postulates from the ear-
lier;victorious mecbanics."3)If Galileo had been correct 
in saying that God had written the book of the universe 
-------~ 
1) See Chapter Note 10. 
2) 
3) 
See Chaptei:' Note 11_and also Appendix 3. 
See ~rtt 1 s. ~he ,Met~bhysica~ Foundations .~f !19§ern 
Phys~Q.§l1·Sc~enc~, In roduct~on, Page.I'(. 
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in mathematical characters, then man could be looked 
upop. as a measurable quantity, " ...... for magnitude, body, 
motion, time, degree of quality, action, conception, 
speech and names (in which all the kinds of philosophy 
consist) are capable of addition and subtraction."l) 
Hume takes up the study of man at this point, and, 
looking upon himself as the "Newton of moral philosophy;' 
wishes to see a "science of man" created2 )so that order 
and certainty might enter into human affairs."But may we 
not hope," he. asks,3)"that philosophers, if cultivated 
with care, and encouraged by the attention of the public, 
may carry its researches still farther and discover, at 
least in some degree, the secret springs and principles 
by which the human mind is actuated in its operations? 
••••• a philosopher .•••• arose who .••• determined the laws 
and forces by which the revolutions of the planets are 
governed and directed. 4 )The like has been performed with 
regard to other parts of nature .. And there is no reason 
to despair of equal success in our enqiries concerning 
---------------------·---------
· 1) Hobbes in De Cor~ore, Chapter 1, Section 2. Hobbes 
visited Ga!iieo ~n 1638. See also Chapter Note 12. 
2) We shall return to this point in Chapters 4,5 and 6. 
3) Of the Different Species of Philoso~hy Sec. 1 of ~· 
~qulry Concernj.ng Human_"Q.:gderstand~~g, Page 11 of 
Volume 2 of the ~ays. 
4) Hume is here referring to Newton. 
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the mental powers and oeconomy if prosecuted with equal 
capacity and caution. " 
It is clear from this passage ho\'r Hume --- and Rous-
seau shares his belief in the possibility of a science 
of man --- links order in the affairs of men with fore-
seeability of these affairs, that is, if there is to be 
a Utopia, the way in which ~men "function 11 must be 
known so that society can be pre~designed as it were. 
Now ~ men cannot be kno~m except if only those charac-
teristics which all have in common, are taken into ac-
count. Consequently the science of man becomes a science 
of man-in-general, a science of abstractions. 1 )The sci-
ence of man becomes a science which, like any natural 
science., simplifies, and in the eighteenth century it 
simplified man to take his place in the simplified uni-
verse of the mathematician: 2 )With such a dismantling of 
the human person La rllettrie 's ·homme machine3 )becomes ~ 
a th~~' even though he is still more complicated than 
a stone. 
1) Compare Bul tmann 1 s History and Esc~ol~;y_, Chapter 1., 
Page 8: "Man himself alsobecame the obJect of natural 
science, and therefore the question of his real sel~, 
as something distinct from the world of sense experl-
ence, was eliminated •••• " See also Chapter Note 13. 
2) See Chapter Note 14. 
3) See Chapter Note 15o 
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This dismantling of the human person has a further 
significance, which cannot be neglected; it lends. support 
to the control of human beings which issues as a corol-
lary from Hume's and Rousseau's treatment of human rela-
tionships. The control of 'men is a necessary implication 
of, the utilitarianism which emerges when \l'le analyse the 
th~ught of these ~~o philosophers~ to establish order in 
human affairs and to create a Utopia, both Hume and 
Rousseau have to establish control over its citizens. 
Prof. Versfeld couples1 )the utilitarianism of the times 
from Descartes onwards vvi th, not merely an estrangement 
of human beings from one another, but a decided hostili-
ty between them, and traces both to the reduction of 
men to things which cannot meet: "It is a most curious 
metaphysical situation that the natural light in which 
the Cartesian subject ~rms evident to itself, was used to 
illuminate the physical world, and to canalise the West-
ern intellect in the direction of concentrating its 
energies on thinking about things rather than persons. 
The isolated spiritual atom concerned itself with il-
luminating the physical world, and when it thought about 
itself, it thought about itself as a thing ••••• One of 
the consequences of this reification of human beings is 
1) See his Education .for Africa. 
to destroy the space and time proper to them. A stone 
spatially excludes another stone. When Thomas Hobbes re-
duced human beings to a sort of complicated stones, he 
made them exclusive of each other, and thereby laid the 
foundation of that egoism which served as an ideological 
basis for the exploitation of man·by man." 
The last sentence of this passage obviously refers 
to times after Hobbes, even after Hume and Rousseau, to 
our own times, in fact. 1 )For the purpose of this intro-
ductory chapter, however, we look no further than the 
nineteenth century. I~ that century science became even 
more powerful, more independent and capable of more spec-
tacular achievements, and from science man derived an ever 
greater self-assurance. 2 )This was not only the century 
~f Charles Darwin's Qrigin of Species which seemed to 
destroy the last arguments of religion for a divine ori-
gin of man, but it was also the century of the explana-
tion of chemical changes in terms of changing combina-
tions of atoms. This latter achievement ultimately found 
its way into biology and consequently to the very basis 
of the life process. It seemed indeed that the mechani-
cal and material view of the universe was being confirmed 
1) This is evident when we read the quoted passage in its 
context in the essay. 
2) See Chapter ~ote 16. 
from every quarter of science. Galilee's mecpanics, 
transplanted to men, made of them "blindly operating 
mass particles moving in space, 111 )and of their actions 
"the inescapable consequences of a blind push from _the 
past •••••• the inevitable echo of the past. 112 ) 
This effect of science, moreover, went hand in glove 
with the effects of two important events in history: the 
incipient industrialization of Europe, and the coloniza-
tion by European powers all over the world. The achieve-
ments of science and the new technology that was gradu~ 
a~ly beginning to flow from them, were the beginnings of 
the almost complete conquest of matter as we kno\JIT it 
today, and the age of industrialism.3)These beginnings 
not only ea~e at the same time as, but aided and also 
made nec:essary, the conquest and colonization of nevl 
world_s in almost every corner of the Globe by ~vest,... 
European nations~ both for sources of raw materials and 
markets. So the control of matter made necessary the 
cont:rol of men; this control of men \vent a step further 
--------~------
l) See Leighton's The Fic~_q_gf_ P~~losqphy, Chapter 14, 
Page 157, and also Appendix 3· 
2) ~· 
3) James Watt obtained his patent for his steam engine 
in 1769~ for instance, about a decade before the 
deaths of our tvw philosophers. Here we have one of 
the beginnings of the rapid displacement of man :i,.n 
space and the annihilation of time i::r:t our century. 
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and became an actual manipulation of some men by others, 
so that we have a very definite reification of men by 
the events of historyo Thought and the events of history 
move so perfactly "in step" with each other from the 
seventeenth century onljvards that the conclusion that they 
are intimately bound up with each other, that the.one is 
th~ outcome, or at least the justification or encourage-
ment of the other, is diff.icult to escape. This will be 
the subject of our investigation towards the end of this 
study. Our immediate task, however, is an examination of 
space and time and their connection with the human per-
son. We undertake this in order to discover the process 
in the thought of Burne and Rousseau by which the human 
person is dismantled by the destruction of what we have 
termed his subjective natural space and time. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Spac~s and Times and the Human Person 
(i) 
The scope of our examination of space and time is 
determined for us by the purpose of our study, and we 
shall be interested in and investigate 1) the nature of 
spaces and times which allow meeting; 2) the nature and 
purpose of space and time which do not allow meeting, 
that is, the space and time of .the motion of lifeless 
objects; 3) the derivation of the latter space and time 
as a necessary complement to and fulfilment of the needs 
of the development of science from the seventeenth cen-
tury onwards. We shall find that Hume and Rousseau, in-
spired by the science of their day, adopted this space 
and time in their quest for a "science of man. 11 
Before Galileo the time element played no role in 
physics, though there are indications that its introduc-
tion had been felt to be necessaryo The physics of 
Archimedes was an altogether timeless physics as the 
geometry of Euclid was (and is) an altogether timeless 
mathematics. With the advent of the ~liddle Ages and 
scholastic thought, the central problem that occupied 
the minds of men was not the material world and its 
conquest, but the relationship of man and the world to 
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God and eternity. The elements of space and time en-
tered into the thinking of men through this contempla-
tion and not the contemplation of the physical world. 
We shall have occasion to give attention to this r6le 
of space and time in mediaeval thought since we shall 
need a "background contrast 11 for the study of the space 
and time with which vle shall be concerned; we shall find, 
moreover, that the mediaeval space and time not only 
provide a contrast to the space and time of Hume and 
Rousseau, but are a starting point from which the deri-
vation of their space and time may be tracede 
When, in the seventeenth century, the element of 
time came to the ;fore in physics, it made a nev-1 math-
ematics necessary, a mathematics that could deal, not 
only with space, as geometry had hitherto done, but 
also with time. This need was largely, or almost entire-
ly, the result of the studies of Galilee Galilei, an.d 
we shall find that the coming to the fore of the time 
element in physics through that work, meant in reality 
the birth of that time 1ri th vlhich we shall be concerned 
in this study. The mathematical method of dealing with 
it brought about the view of space with which we shall 
be concerned. 
The infinitesimal calculus, invented simultaneously 
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but independently of each other by Leibnitz and Newton, 1 ) 
satisfied the needs of the introduction of time into 
physics, but it could only do so because it assumed a 
space and time which could be divided into infinitesi-
mals. These infinitesimals imply a "cutting up" of space 
and time as one would cut up a piece of matter, an im-
plication of which the consequences will prove to be 
far-reaching in the context of the human person. More-
over, the calculus treated, and in modern elementary 
mechanics still treats, space and time as two separate 
entities. In 1908, however, Minkowski came to the con-
clusion that nature treated space and time as insepa-
rable, and judged these two separate entities of the 
calculus to be mere shadows or abstractions. But shad-
ows or abstractions of what? If Minkowski was right, 
there must be another space and another time which cast 
these shadows, and these we shall call real space and 
real time, or original space and original time. One mean-, 
ing which we must therefore attach to the phrase coined 
by Henri Bergson, that time must be "taken seriously, 112 ) 
is that there must be this real space and time of which 
1) See Chapter Note 1. 
2) Bergson did not take space very seriously, but we shall 
find that it is necessary to do so as, according to 
Minkowski, nature does. 
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the space and time treated by the calculus are merely 
shadows. 
Minkowski's use of the word abstractio:r:t~' moreover, 
indicates that we have to do, in the case of these shad-
ows, with a space and time simplified in accordance with 
the .general trend of simplification by the science of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (and also of to-
day). It was this simplified space and time that domi-
nated thought from those centuries onwards, and only in 
the twentieth century did the necessity become apparent 
for a search for the real space and time behind these 
shadows. 1 )we might say that the space and time of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries issued from a decom-
position, so that those thinkers who found it necessary 
to investigate space and time· de novo, have really had 
to effect a composition. 2 )consequently space and time 
have acquired, in many modern views, some at least, of 
the characteristics of the space and time contemplated 
by the mediaeval Christian thinker who, in turn, inherit-
ed his conception of space and time from the ancient He-
brew through the Old Testament. Now this space and time 
of the Old Testament were a space and time closely con-
1) See Chapter Note 2. 
2) It seems to me that this is, in fact, what physics 
has had to do. See Appendix 7. 
80. 
nected with the human person in a manner which we shall 
find worthy of close attention, and we shall point to 
the severing of this connection in the philosophies of 
Hume and Rousseau as the very kernel of the subject of 
this. study. 
It is not in being Christian that the mediaeval 
view of space and time strikes one as being "contempo-
rary;" rather, it is that in mediaeval thought space and 
time are subjectively constituted, that is, we have the 
presence of the human person in the mediaeval view on 
space and time. St Augustine's is a good example. 1 )rn 
this view he anticipated Kant in a conception of time as 
subjectively constituted, 2 )as he anticipated Descartes 
in commencing his philosophical activities with the cer-
tainty of his own existence. His modernity is precisely 
that he looked upon space and time as connected \llfi th the 
human person in a way which we cannot discover in a 
wher~ measured with a rule and a ~indicated by a 
clock. So we find in the results of the investigation of 
time in our century, the central conviction that time 
and the continual change we see in the world about us, 
1) See his Confessions, Book 11. On Page 254, for in-
stance, he writes: "Let us see then, thou soul of man 
••••• for to thee it is given to feel and to measure 
. length of time • " 
2) See Chapter Note 3. 
t 
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are connected in a way which cannot be deduced from the 
space and time of elementary mechanics, and that we our-
selves cannot be eliminated from this connection in the 
way in which the human point of view was eliminated in 
the Enlightenment period. 
A.S.Alexander, for instance, makes time creative,1 ) 
and in this follows Bergson whose views on time we shall 
find to- -l?~ -of special interest in this study, as we shall 
also find Heidegger's. Heidegger sees the problem of time 
directly connected with Being, and through Being with 
questions about man. 2 )He ends his investigation of Being 
with the questions: "Is there a way from primordial Time 
to the sense of Being? Does Time perhaps reveal itself 
as the horizon of Being?"3)Kierkegaa~ anticipates Hei-
degger in joining the question of man to the question of 
time. Not only is a man a synthesis of body and soul, he 
says, but he as the same time a synthesis of the temporal 
and. the eternal.4 )Now since, as has been said, mathemat-
ics can deal only with a space and time which can be 
1) See Chapter Notes 2 and 4. 
2) See ·Chapter Notes 5 and 6. 
3) Sein und Zeit, Page 437: "Ftihrt ein Weg von der Ur-
sprlinglichen-~ zum Sinn des Seins? Offenbart sich 
die Zeit selbst als Horizont des Seins?" We shall re-
turn-ro-Heidegger presently. 
4) See his The Concept of Dread, Pages 39 to 40. See 
also Chapter Note 7. 
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fragmented, we should expect to find mathematics power-
less to deal with a time as closely bound up with Being 
in its entirety as it is in the thought of Heidegger, .. 
and when it is looked upon as "the very substance of a 
finite thing. til)Spengler, in fact, expresses this impo.o.. 
tence of mathematics when he says --- and according to 
him Goethe agrees with him on this point --- that mathe-
matics. describes the world-as-nature in contrast to the 
world-as-history. 2 )rn the world-as-history, says Spengler, 
we have a picture of things-becoming. Now in this hyphen-
ated word things-becoming we find the notion of the car-
rying effect of time which was associated with a pur-
pose3)in time in the thought of the mediaeval Christian 
(and of the Biblical Hebrew). We shall find the notion 
of purpose entirely absent in the thought of Hume and 
Rousseau; both, in fact, look upon space and time as 
nothing more than the space and time that can be treated 
by means of the calculus. 
(ii) 
viTe shall better appreciate the import of Hume 's and 
Rousseau's adoption of the time of Galileian science for 
1) See Chapter Note 6. 
2) See Chapter Notes 8 and 9. 
3) See Chapter Note 9. 
human relationships if we first consider the connection 
between the human person and that time which seems to 
"carry" us in its movement and which we can conceive as 
having a purpose and some destination. The time which is 
measured by our clocks gives us the impression that it 
is moving along outside us. 1 )It is a time separated from 
our persons, and we unwittingly make it a frame of refer-
ence against which we project ourselves and our fellow 
men. The primary property of this time of our clocks is 
that every moment follows the preceding moment and is 
exclusive of every other moment, as it is the property 
of the spaces occupied by things that every part of them 
lies. outside every other part. Meeting can be only a 
contiguity in this space and time, or a mere "coming across" 
or crossing of paths. 
It is from space and time subjectively constituted, 
connected with our persons, that we derive the possibility 
of me~ting, as a "confluence" in Buber 1s sense, for in this 
space and this time, what we have called real space and 
time, parts can overlap, interpenetrate or be co-exten-
sive with one another. The space and time of one person 
can overlap or be co-extensive with those of another, and 
men are not exclusive of one another. And we can, more-
1) We shall be much concerned with this "outside-ness" of 
the time of our clocks. 
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over, derive from such a time a consciousness of things-
becoming, since the time which is connected with our 
persons does not move on outside us; it is in us and 
takes us along, so to speak, so that the notion of an ul-
timate destination is generated in us. Space and time 
subjectively constituted must be "lived 11 by a person and 
must contain, as it were, all the richness of the life 
a,nd experience of the person who ·"lives 11 them. 1 )In this 
sense space and time can be said to define him and be 
modes of his being. In the context of this "living" of 
space and time Bergson has this to say with regard to 
time: 2 ) 11 The inner life is •• ~.variety of qualities, con-
tinuity of progress, and unity of direction. It cannot 
be represented by imageso But it is even less possible 
to represent it by £~~£t§, that is by abstract, general 
or simple ideas ••••• no image can reproduce exactly the 
original feeling I have of the flmv of my own conscious 
life ••••• No image can replace the intuition of duration." 
The notions of the "living" .of space and time and 
the confluence of spaces and times seem to accord with 
Heidegger's view that man's existence is ·not confined to 
1) Compare Roubiczek's Existentialism, For an~ainst, 
Chapter 9, Pages 168 to' I7o. --
2) Introduction to Metaphysics, Page 13. We find the 
same view expressed in his other works. 
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the immediate moment or his immediate surroundings in 
space, but is spread out temporally and spatially beyond 
himself. To give Barrett's words:1 )something "has meaning 
to me now only because my own being is spread out tem-
porally in such a way as to encompass the possibility of 
all those particular future experiences" in relation to 
that something. "Only a being whose being is essentially 
temporal can have concepts and meanings." .And, of course, 
if a man's being is "spread out temporally," his time can 
coalesce with or interpenetrate that of another person, 
and they can meet. This is so also v.ri th a person 1 s space. 
The reality or originality of "lived" time is to be 
found in the fact that its present is not a mere tick of 
the clock which passes and is lost for ever as is the 
present of the time of science which is precisely such a 
tick of the qlock. This real ti'me has a present which has 
a -"thickness" derived from the richness and experience of 
the life of the person vrho "lives" it. It is this 11thick-
ness" of the present that we find in Bergson's view on 
time as an accumulation, a growth or a duration. 2 \re 
shall find, presently, that it is in this "thickness 11 of 
1) What is Existentialism? Part 2, Chapter 5, Page 173. 
2) Henceforth the word duree will be used instead of 
duration. The French word is more expressive of what 
Bergson actually means than ~~· See Chapter 
Note 10. 
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the present that we have the seat, as it were, of' the 
directeaness of the human person, and that this "thick-
ness" of the present is inseparable from his "here-ness," 
which is more than his location in physical space. 
Bergson looks upon 9-.££!~ as "the continuous progress 
of the past which gnaws into the future and swells as it 
advances."1 )The past is never lost, for "from the moment 
it commences to enlarge itself ceaselessly, it also con-
serves itself indefinitely."2 )The past then, abides in 
\.,rhat we have called the ".thickness" of the present, in 
the richness and experience of the life of the human per-
son. "Doubtless we think with only a small part of our 
past,"· says Bergson, "but it is with our entire past ••••• 
\ 
that we desire, will and act."3)"Each moment.is not only 
something new, but something unforeseeable."4 )It is pre-
cisely through his action, choice and freedom that the 
human person becomes a directed entity. Since, if we 
1) L 1 Evolution Creatrice. Chapter 1, Page 4: "La duree 
est le progres c-oni:ln~ du passe qui ronge l 1avenir et 
qui gonfle en avancant. 11 
2) Ibid. "D..1 moment que le passe s 1 accro:Lt sans cesse, 
indefiniment aussi il se conserve." 
3) Ibid .• , Page 5: 11 Sans doute nous ne pensons qu 'avec une 
:P0fite partie de UOtre paSSe; illa~S C I est aVeC notre 
pc:tsse tout en tier ••.•• que nous des irons, voulons, 
agissons." 
4) Ibid., Page 6: "Chacun de ces moments ...... n'est pas 
seu!ement du nouveau, mais de l'imprevisible." 
agree with Heidegger, meaning is impossible without time· 
--- only a temporal being such as man can give something 
a meaning and frame concepts --- a person's choice and 
action can be meaningful only because they are ndefined" 
by time. And since only a human being possessing person-
ality can choose and act meaningfully, personality be-
comes a function of time, so to speak. Action and choice 
(and through choice also freedom) are then, by their very 
nature "functions of time,n1 )so that time is of the es-
sence of the directedness of the human person. With his 
notion of the unforeseeability of (each moment and the de-
pendence of the events in it on human choice Bergson also 
establishes this connection betiV'een human personality and 
time. We shall proceed from it presently to show the sep-
aration by Hume and Rousseau of the human person from . 
time and the "dismantlingn of personality by this separa-
tion. This will be our task in the next chapter. 
But the connection between time and the human person 
is similarly established by Van Peursen. His view on what 
is encompassed when a person speaks the word now2 )will 
serve to give us a notion of the "thicknessn of the pres-
ent, and through this also of the directedness of the hu-
------------------------------1) See Chapter Note 11. 
2) Stellenbosch Lecture. It seems to me that Van Peursen 
here has some affinity to Kierkegaard. See Chapte~ 
Note 12. 
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man perso in its connectedness with time (and, we shall 
with space). This ~ is where a person stands 
in time; ·t is the heart of his private time which con-
sists of ast, present and future, but it is not a mere 
instant·wlere the past is welded to the future. It en-
compasses a person's past experience1 )as well as his 
hopes and fears for the future, but it is also that part 
of his time in which are encompassed other persons in the 
world in 4hich he finds himself in his E-..QJ!• In this way 
any person's now overlaps those of other persons. 2 ) -- . 
This ~is, however, not a congealed instant; it is 
fluid, and as it moves along from the past into the fu-
ture (Bergson would say: as the present gnaws into the 
future and the past grows), it describes the person's 
world as a moving point in geometry would describe a line. 
This ~must obviously be inseparable from a person's 
~, ~d what is encompassed in the ~ must be encom-
passed in the here, so that we have a person's inner 
space and time as the source of that person's directed-
ness. Hence, says Van Peursen, the greater the number of 
people I encompass in my ~' the more fully am I a per-
·son. We might add to this that the greater the number of 
1) Compare Bergson's notion of time as an accumulation 
and a duree. 
2) Compare Heidegger .•. 
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persons with whose space my own overlaps, the more am I 
a human person. Through my ~ and ~~ I am open to the 
world, to use Van Peursen's phrase. If this is so, then 
every person's private space and time have been enormous-
ly extended in our own century by the development of com-
munications. It has become possible for a man to influ-
ence people many thousands of miles from him. 1 ) 
If we accept the views of Heidegger, Bergson and Van 
Peursen, it is in the sense of being able to say ~with 
all that it entails in choice, action, experience and 
hopes, and its attachment to a here that a perons "lives" 
a space and time and has, each in his life, his ovm na-
tural space and time and finds his differentiation from 
all other persons. 2 )There is no inseparable ~and~ 
in a space and time which are nothing more than frames 
of reference; a person projected on such frames is sepa-
rated from the space and time which define him with 
their content, and consequently undifferentiated from 
others, with a here and ~ as points on those frames 
I . 
which do not allow meetin& as a confluence of spaces and 
times. Against such a projection by Hume and Rousseau of 
human beings on space and time reference frames Buber 
1) See Chapter Note 13· 
2) See Chapter Note 14. 
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rises in rebellion. 1 ) 
(iii) 
From the view of spaces and times which issues from 
the he~~ and~ conceived as the seat of a person's 
directedness, it follows that a man must, through his 
here and £~ by which his space and time overlap those 
of other persons, become connected with the events of his 
world, that is,- with history. 2 )so the Biblical Hebrew was 
connected with the events of his people, and through the 
moving ~ felt himself and his people ·carried by time to 
some destination. This conception he handed down to 
Christianity, so that Hebrew and Christian alike felt 
their ultimate destiny to be God.3)For the ancient Hebrew 
and Christian alike, it is the end of things in time, 
God's eternity, that gives to the present the sense that 
it has. 4 )Through the end of things both ancient Hebrew 
and mediaeval Christian found the times of their inner 
lives connected with the eternity of God, and time, with 
1) See his I and Thou, Pages 8 to 9. It is clear that 
Buber relies much on the notion of personal spaces and 
times in his notion of meetin~. In this context it is 
of interest to note Karl Heim s treatment of space in 
dealing with the problem of the transcendence of God. 
See Chapter Note 15. 
2) See Chapter Note 16. 
3) See Chapter Note 1?. 
4) See Chapter Note 18. 
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everything in it, was the creation of God who created 
continually as time moved on. 1 )In such a view, as in that 
of Heidegger, what is not in time, does not exist in the 
world of visible and tangible tbings. 2 ) 
The notion of the end of things and the conception 
of a real space and time inherent in personality leads 
easily· to the conception of history as a be£oming which 
bas the human person at its core. l:fe have in such a phi-
losophy of history the human person standing at the ~ 
as the heart of the time of his inner life, of real time 
as a duree, and der'i ving from this ~ an opportunity of 
contact with the world in its becoming3)wbich is the 
events of the human scene. History then becomes a "story," 
that "story'i which both Biblical Hebrew. and mediaeval 
Christian read as the movement of the world to God. It is 
the "story" of God's continued creation and His dealings 
vuth men and things to His divine purpose. 4 )No doubt this 
is how Thomas Carlyle saw history vvhen he wrote: "Con-
sider history with the beginnings of it stretching dimly 
into the remote time; emerging darkly out of the mysteri-
1) See Chapter Note 19. 
2) See Chapter Note 20. 
3) Van Peursen in his Stellenbosch Lecture. 
4) See Psalm 78. 
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ous eternity: the true epic poem and universal divine 
scripture." In the words ~~rsal divipe scriptu~ we 
have an echo of St.Augustine (whose philosophy of history 
we may regard as a model for the ~ftddle Ages) in his 
making of history the "story" of the dealings of God with 
men. 
\Vhen the ·Christians inherited the view on history as 
a "story" from the ancient Hebrews, they removed the em-
phasis from national history and placed it on a history 
of mankind, but in no way was the notion of movement, of 
the "story~' lost; indeed, it could not be lost, for there 
is no break in the development of Christianity out of 
Judaism. 1 )vfuat is, however, important for the purpose of 
this study is that with the preservation of a "story", 
we also have the preservation of the presence of the hu-
man person at the core of history. 2 )we have to do with a 
philosophy of history in which time is connected with the 
becoming of human persons, in which time is a duree and 
the present has a "thickness.tr It must be borne in mind, 
hovrever, that such a philosophy of history need not be 
-----------------------------------------------------------1) Compare Albright's ~chaeolo and the Reli i?n ?f 
Israel, Postscript, Page 17 : "The Judaeo-C rJ.stJ.a~ 
tradition is unique in this respect (of unbroken hJ.s-
torical growth). No other great religion of the past can compete ~;:ji"th Judaeo-Christiani ty as a phenomenon 
of historical order." 
2) See Chapter Note 21. 
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Christ~an, in fact, need have no religious basis. \fuat 
is important is that in this becoming of human persons, 
manifest in their choice and actions, we find their con~ 
nectedness with other persons, and in this connectedness 
we shall find, presently, a notion of freedom and moral~ 
ity quite different from that of our tvm philosophers 
and their times. 1 ) 
It was the special genius of the Biblical Hebrew to 
be conscious of the effectiveness of his God in his life; 
that is why it was natural for him to project the time of 
his inner life, the life rhythms within his ovm person 
(which he received from God), on the life of his people, 
a process by which Jaweh became the God of each Hebrew 
and that of the Hebrew people. So the Will of Jaweh be-
came the measure of the good and the bad of his actions 
and those of his people. In this way morality became 
c~osely connected with the community (which became the 
Hebrew theocratic state). Both became ce.nnected with his-
t0ry and time, since it was in time that the Hebrew sm . .r 
the deeds of God with his people, 2 )which deeds constituted 
the history of that people. For the ancient Hebrew then, 
as for Bergson, time is a duree, and because he is aware 
1) See Chapter Note 22. 
2) See Chapter. Note 23. 
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of time as a duree, he makes morality historic and in-
. timately connected \'lith the human person. We find, that 
is, that the Biblical Hebrew derives morality from that 
same directedness of men towards one another which we 
find in the thought of our century, 1 )and finds the human 
person at the core of history. 
It is precisely in such words as beco~ing and story 
that we find the difference between history as the an-
cient·Hebrew and mediaeval Christian see it, and progress 
as the Enlightenment conceives it. In history human be-
ings are involved in situations which are unique and in 
which their choice emerges. These situations involve 
one's fello\t.r men and consequently the directedness of men 
towards one another. From this choice the ~' which is 
the point in time where we make this ch9ice, derives its 
moral content; freedom then becomes the exercising of 
this responsible choice, and this is, of course, an ac-
tion.2)In the Enlightenment view of progress, on the con-
trary, progress follows the natural order in the space 
and time of the nature of the scientist, and since this 
1) Compare, for instance, Kwant's social philosophy of 
"togetherness," expounded in his Socia!,e Filosofie. 
2) We shall have occasion to point to the difference be-
tween this freedom of responsible choice and that in 
Rousseauts Social Contract into which, according to 
the author, a man can be forced. 
nature is a machine, there is no place in it for the re-
sponsible choice of men. Man can then not stand at the 
core of history as he must if he has such a responsible 
choice. 
The dismantling of the human person must then become 
a denia~ of history as a becoming, and a denial of moral-
ity as historic. Now the space and time which we shall 
find in the thought of Hume and Rousseau are, as has been 
pointed out, the space and time of the newly-born mech-
anics of their day, abstracted, so to speak, from the 
space and time which, we have concluded, must lie behind 
them and irJhich we have called real space and time. This 
process of abstraction, identical with the simplification 
and decomposition which gave us the simplified man of the 
Enlightenment, vms, Heidegger would tell us, a process in 
which space and time were detached from Being. From the 
Biblical and Augustinian point of view this detachment 
was, in its essence, a separation of God from the events 
in the lives of men, and 'live shall find that this separa-
tion of God from the lives of men, that is, from history, 
becomes, in the thought of our two philosophers, a prob-
lem of what to do with God. It follow·s, of course, that 
the detachment of space and time from Being was at the 
same time a detachment of space and time from the human 
person, and if we accept that space and time are of the 
I . 
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essence of human personality, we have in this separation 
the basie operation in the dismantling of the human per-
son. (iv) 
The absence of a notion of becoming in the thought 
of Hume and Rousseau, reflecting the Enlightenment idea 
of progress without the "story" which we find in the 
Bible and associate with an ability to act and chaos~, 
seems to bear a very definite relationship to the cyclic 
view of time which we find in many ancient cultures, not- · 
ably the classical Greek. The connection seems to be the 
elimination of human personality. Vie have the presence of 
the element of personality in one view on time, the He-
brew, and the absence of this element in the other, the 
Greek, 1 )and we shall find that an exclusion of it from 
a contemplation of space and time is a major requirement 
for the derivation of the space and time of science. 
If we accept that there will be an end to time and 
that time carries us to some destination, then we accept 
with this that no two succeeding situations in the world 
are identical, otherwise there would be no becoming, 2 )no _______________ , -------------------------------------
1) See Chapter Note 24. 
2) Compare Alexander's The Historicity of Thin~, Page 16 
of PhilosoJ?hY and History: "Novelty is the essence of 
history and so it is with the world of things. Every 
event is considered 'strictly new ••••• It is not novelty 
that calls for explanation so much as repetition, reg-
ularity, uniformity." 
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movement to the end of time. It seems to be characteris-
tic of a time unconnected with the human person that 
. this eschatalogical element is absent from it. 1 )0ur no-
tion of an end to be reached, a purpose in time there-
fore, which goes with its movement, seems to be insepa-
rable from human choice (which is redundant in an unpre-
ventable repetition of events). There can be no unfolding 
towards an end in the absence of choice. Now both BUrne 
and Rousseau resort in their treatment of human relation-
ships to mechanisms of v-Thich the space and time are those 
of science, and we shall find in their thought a concep-
tion of the events of history as phases of cycles2 )as \'le 
find time conceived in many anqient cultures as cyclic.3) 
We shall also find there that the choice of men has been 
eliminated. In Rousseau's writings, moreover, we find the 
strongest evidence of a hostility to time, just as we 
find a hostility to time in Plato's thought. 4 )Rousseau, 
--------------------·----------------------------·-------1) See Chapter Note 25. 
2) Vle must distinguish, I think, between the time of 
science which is a frame of reference, but which, al-
though separated from the person, still has a linear 
characteristic, even though some processes and events 
in it are cyclic as seen against the background of the 
frame of reference, ond, on the other hand, the pro-
cess of change of the universe itself as conceived as 
a cyclic time. This question is not a simple one, and 
is treated in Appendices 4, 5 and 6. 
3) See Chapter Note 26. 
4) See Chapter Note 27. 
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in fact, on more than one occasion indirectly expresses 
his admiration for ~lato, and we cannot fail to note this 
affinity betvleen the two philosophers on the question of 
time. 
The attitude of our two philosophers to time is the 
very antithesis to that of the Biblical Hebrew for whom 
"Time is determined by its content,rr1 )and in whose 
thought2 )we have time rhythms rather than time cycles or 
time~lines.3)Now it is rhythm, rather than cycles or 
lines, that requires life and subjectivity, and it is in 
rhythm that we find the m£Vem~g! of time. 4 )The rhythms of 
the life of the human organism and in nature about him5) 
are then very easily projected by the time-conscious He-
------------~---------------·-------------------·---------------
1) Boman: Hebrew Thou&ht Compared with Greek, Chapter 3, 
Page 131. We shaiT return to tne word conten~ later 
on in this study. 
2) One might well wonder \'/~ether one can properly speak 
of Hebrew th£ught where time is concerned. The Hebrew 
seems to have been aware of time rhythms without 
thinking about them. See Chapter Note 28 and also 
Footnote 4 below. 
3) See Boman's Hebrew Thought_Q£m..J2.~red __ with_Gr£_ek, Chap-
ter 3, Pages 133 to 134. 
4) As every musician knows. Although we hear one note or 
one chord of notes at a time, we still have the im-
pression of movement. The parts of a symphony are 
called its movements. Compare also Boman's Hebrew 
Thought Co¥1QaredwitQ_Greek, Chapter 3, Pages 133 to 
134 and Chapter Note 2~ 
5) See Chapter Note 28. 
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brew on the life of the whole people, so that the' rhythm 
then becomes one of birthi growth, decline, death, birth 
and so.on till the end of tinie. 1 )It is also of interest 
to note, when we compare the Hebrew time sense with that 
of the Greeks (or Boman and Spengler would say the Greek 
lack of it), that the Hebrew beginning of things was a 
beginning at the beginning of time, a very definite mo-
ment and act of c-reation, whereas the Greek beginning 
was a beginning in timeless Being. 2 )More significant for 
our purpose is the·fact that in the Hebrew beginning we 
have a person, God, who is absent from the Greek begin-
ning, just as the human person is necessary for the He-
brew time conception of rhythms, but is not necessary in 
the Greek time conception.3)The difference between a be-
coming in which human personality is involved, and a 
passage of things in vlhich only human nature is involved, 
------------- ·-----------
1) Hence the historic sensi ti vi ty of the He brev-1. Compare 
Deut. 32:7: "Remember the days of old; consider the 
years of generation upon generation; ask thy father 
and he will sho111 thee; thy elders, and they will tell 
thee." There is rhythm even in these words. 
2) Parmenides, and also the Atomists. In fact, Greek phi~ 
losophy had its genesis in the sea~ch for the unchang-
ing behind the changing world. 
3) See Chapter Note 29. Boman tells us that we can dis-
cern the difference between the two space and time 
conceptions even in the languages of the t\'!O pe'oples. 
This proposition has been challenged by, among others, 
Barr. See Appendix 5. 
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is, in the light of Scripture, this: As soon as person-
ality becomes involved, also God, who is a person, be-
come·s involved, while God cannot be involved in a passage 
of things seen against a background-frame of space and 
time. 
This absence of the element of "the person" in the 
time of Greek thought we find exemplified in the thought 
of Plato1 )and we shall point to it in the thought of the 
. I' ' 
man who so often took Plato as an example on vn1ich to 
model himself: Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It is, however, .as 
absent in the thought of Hume. It is purpose in change 
that we miss in the philosophy of Plato. 2 )The change we 
see in the world about us, is unreal, he tells us, only 
the "forms" or "ideas" behind the world of visible, tan-
gible anct changing things are real. This change contains 
·no "story," for if change is unreal, so must history be 
an illusion. The "story" in history gave to the Biblical 
Hebrew, and still gives to the Christian and Hoslem, a 
promise of ultimate oneness with God3)and a freedom from 
1) See Chapter Note 29. 
2) ·see Chapter Note 27. 
3) Only in the later Judaism. It is this later Judaism 
v-d th its promise of a resurrection that gave rise to 
Christianity. In earlier Judaism the promise went no 
further than a promised land and a long and prosper-
ous life in this world. 
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the tyrnnny of the material world. When the "story" is 
destroyed, so is the promise; consequently a time in 
which the element of personality is lacking, cannot give 
men a promise of any kind of salvation. Such a severance 
from the person, and therefore this absence of a promise, 
we find in the notion of a cyclic time, the notion that 
whatever events we witness nmv, vrill be repeated again 
and again. The "salvation" in such a time and history is 
that we ourselves reappearol) 
l'fo\ll in this notion of a cyclic time \vi th its eter-
nal recurrence, we approach lmrls of nature, some'thing the 
Greek mind v-ras always seeking, 2 ) and something, as we 
shall find, Hume was seeking in a conception of history 
which is akin to the notion of eternal return .. This no-
tion resembles a formulated law of nature both in its 
origin and in the element of predictability which it im-
plies. Obviously its origin is to be found in certain 
phenomena of nature such as the rising and setting of the 
sun, moon, stars and planets, the tides, the seasons and 
others which exhibit a return, and it has the element of 
predictability in that it simulates in the· return of 
events the periodicity of natural phenomena.3) 
1) See Chapter Note 30. 
~) See Chapter Note 31. 
3) See Appendix 4. 
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With the mention of laws of nature we have arrived 
at the question of the space and time of science. If 
Christianity could, in the \'Jest, become the heir to the 
Biblical Hebrew of the conception of time as linear and 
of history as a "story, 11 hovJ did it come about that the 
same West could produce the derived space and time of the 
mechanics of Galileo? Bergson would reply that, though 
the Christian conception of time and history is a heri-
tage, a time conception which is really spatial, is in-
herent in the vlestern psyche •1 )Boman would reply that the 
notion of time lines is inherent in Western languages, 
and consequently also in the \'/estern psyche. 2 )Heidegger 
woulQ reply that the West inherited Greek thought and 
simply continued (or repeated) the process which started 
with the Greeks, of separating objects from all-envelop-
ing Being and mrucing them objects for rational research, 
and in this way separated men from the spaces and times 
proper to them.3) 
If we accept these views, it would be no accident 
that Galileian space and time were born in the V.Jest. irvith 
------------------------------------------------------·~-1) See his Essai sur les Donnees Immediates de la Co£-
~~£, Chapter 2. 
2) See Chapter Note 32. 
3) We shall return to this 
separating men from the 
them is really the same 
"envelope 11 of Being. 
point in Chapter 8. Of course, 
spaces and times proper to 
as separating things from the 
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regard to space and time Galilee would then be an artifi-
cer, but one who found his artifacts nearly ready~made 
in Western conceptions and languages. It would appear, 
however, that more is involved in the birth of Galileian 
space and time.than psyche and language (if we admit the 
factor of language). We shall find that perhaps the Greek 
heritage of the West did play the role which Heidegger 
assigns to it. To get to the root of the matter one has 
first to examine the nature ana. function of this space 
a.nd time of Galilee's mechanics. 
The space and time used by Galileo for ~s studies 
of moving bodies are nothing but frames of reference, and 
have no content. They are,, in fact, nothing more than 
scales of measurement, and the significant fact is that 
space and time are separate scales: a time scale can be 
used without a space scale, and a space scale without a 
time scale. The two scales became joined into one only 
when t1inkowski and Einstein pointed out that space and 
time varied -jointly and that a time dimension had to be 
added to the three dimensions of space in order to de-
termine an event. In classical physics time is usually 
regarded as being measured by the swing of a pendulum or 
some bther reciprocating movement in space, or the move-
ments of the hands of a clock. Perhaps, however, it \'JOUld 
be more accurate to say that these instruments effect the 
lQLI.. 
subdivision of the straight line of time into units and 
sub-units in the same way as a measuring rule is subdi-
vided into feet and inches or centimetres and milli• >';·:.:: 
metres. 1 )Hours, minutes and seconds "ticked off" in this 
way are as spatial and physical as feet and inches, and 
are also placed one after another. Against the background 
of these subdivisions we see the men and things of the 
world move and have their beingc Just as the foot-rule or 
metre-s"(;ick is a material thing representing an abstrac-
tion, the standard foot or metre, so this time scale 
marked off by pendula or clocks, is a representation of 
an abstraction: the time of Galilee's mechanics. 2 ) 
·The question which Galileian space and time help to 
answer is: How do objects fall or otherwise move under 
the influence of a force? This ~ excludes all connec-
tion of space and time with the essences of the things 
that move. Horeover, the purpose of this space and time 
directs the attention to their cardinal property: that 
their parts do not overlap or interpenetrate. The motion 
of a piece of matter through space consists in its being 
1) vve have to do here with the difficulty mentioned in 
Footnote 2 on Page 97. See Appendix 6. 
2) Nodern physics goes even further and tells us that 
length is not something inherent in things, but chang-
es with velocity. So also there is a time dilation 
with increase in velocity. Contrast Galileian space 
and time. 
in one place in one moment and in another in the next 
moment. The impression it creates is that in moving it 
leaves the space it occupied in one moment, behind it and 
occupies a new space in the next, that is, space is ex-
terior to it.1 )We also have a succession of moments, 
otherwise the piece of matter would not move, and tbis 
succession of moments resembles a succession of points 
along a line~ No body can be in two places in the same 
moment, just as it cannot be at the same place in two 
successive moments if it is moving.2 ) 
In this property of derived space and time we dis-
cover the definitions of velocity and acceleration given 
in books on elementary mechanics: velocity is the time-
rate of displacement, and acceleration is the time-rate 
of change of velocity. One has.to do here with a frag-
mented or atomized space and time, as its treatment by 
means of the mathematics of the calculus so clearly shows 
in the exact mathematical forms it .gives these defini-
tions of velocity and acceler.ation.3)Both displacement 
(space) and time are split up into minute fragments or 
infinitesimals. These, by the process of mathematical i~-
--------------------
1) See also Margenau's The NatuFe of Physic~l Reality, 
Chapter 7. -
2) See Chapter Note 33. 
3) See Chapter Notes 33 and 34. 
106. 
~egration, which is in actual fact a summation of the 
fragments between certain limits, become an interval of 
space or time. 1 )This mathematical integration amounts 
really to a placing end to end of fragments of space or 
time without overlapping. \Ve discern in this mathematical 
process the simplification which the Enlightenment pro-
jected on man himself. It is this simplification which 
led ultimately to the control of matter in motion and 
which, projected on man, leads to the destruction of hu-
man personality and reduces man to an aggregate of matter 
in motion which, to use Rousseau's words, can be calcu-
lated by means of the laws of mechanics. 2 ) 
Now as the abstraction of physical time was achieved 
largely by the removal of the element of personality from 
what we have called real time, so we find that the ab-
straction of physical space from what we have called real 
space, was achieved in a similar way. The removal of the , 
element of personality was, in fact, also the process 
whereby space and time became separated into two differ-
ent scales of measurement, for personality joins space 
and time in one siggJ:e continuum. 3 )We have this exempli-
1) See Chapter Note 34. 
2) This too is an important statement by Ro~sseau to which 
we shall return later. 
3) As has been said: "here-ness" and "now-ness" cannot be 
separated. See Chapter Note 35. 
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fied in the Hebrew view, so that in this context the con-
trast between the Biblical Hebrew and ancient Greek once 
again proves useful. Space did play a role in Hebrew life 
though, perhaps, as Boman would have us believe, a role 
which was inferior to that of time, and we find that it 
entered into Hebrew life through the ubiquitous nature of 
the Hebrew God. This God was everywhere; He was present 
at all times and in all places. 1 )The Biblical Hebrew 
looked upon space, not as a void, but as something ere• 
ated by God. It '1rlas the presence of God, so to speak, 
though just as God was outside the stream of llis time in 
His eternity, so He was outside the space which He cre-
ated,2)and only made His presence felt through that space 
in the history of the Hebrew people, which history was, 
of course, a history in time. Jammer3)has this to say on 
------·--------·-------~------·-------
1) Compare, for instance, Psalm 139: 
"Vfuither shall T go from thy Spirit? Or whither 
shall I flee from thy presence? 
If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there: if 
I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there. 
If I take the winds of the morning, and dwell 
in the uttermost parts of the sea; 
Even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right 
hand shall hold me." 
2) Compare Jammer's 2£nce£t~££ Spa~, Chap~er.2, Page 32, 
where the author points out that for Chr1.st1.an and 
Moslem alike, as for the Hebrew, the question "VJhere 
was God before creation?" has no meaning. 
3) Ibid. Jammer also says that for the Hebrew, space was 
iiffi'O'tanhysically the way to God." See also Appendix 6. 
It se~ms clear that the role of space in Hebrew thought 
cannot have been insiguificant. 
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the Hebrew view on space: "Space, the entity that is 
neither corporeal nor immaterial, serves as the inter-
mediary between the two worlds (that of man and that of 
god). Indeed, it was created by God for the fulfilment 
of His function •••• " 
So through God, a person, ana his own directedness 
towards God, the Hebrew was able to effect a union of 
space and time1 ~which he could not have achieved without 
the binding factor of the human person. We must conclude, 
moreover, that in a space which is "metaphysically the 
way to God," the overlapping and interpenetration of 
spaces or parts of space v,rould necessarily follmr,r. One 
would also regard it as something to be expected that; as 
Boman tells us, the absence of boundary lines is typical 
of Hebrew thought. 2 ) 
This real space and this real time in which the pre-
sence of the element of personality is so manifest, were 
the Biblical legacy of mediaeval Christendom in the \!Jest. 
But, at the same time, that same West inherited as rich 
a legacy in Greek geometry. Now the science of space for 
the Greeks was geometry3)and, conversely, the space of ge:2-
--------------------------------------1) See Chapter Note 36 and also Appendix 7. 
2) See Chapter Note 37. Contrast the perfect definition 
of space in Greek art. 
3) Compare Heidegger's view of the separation of objects 
from Being by the Greeks. 
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ometry with its sharply defined lines, and angles and 
surfaces is Greek, vlhether it be Euclidean or non-Euclid-
ean geometry. 1 )When, with the passing of the ~addle Ages, 
under the. influence of the £1:!:12.ido scj.~p.di, the nominal-
istic tendency in the thought ·which contributed to the 
crumbling of the system of the Hiddle Ages, made itself 
felt in the scientific investigation of particular things, 
geometry gave to the science of the day its space. 2 )At 
the same time that which most easily gives us the sensa-
tion of the passing of time, moving objects and succes-
sion of events, gave that science its timen3)This meant 
that the space of geometry was to the Hesterner of the 
sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the space 
of the real universe, and the time of moving objects and 
clocks its real time. 4 )The study of the things of the rna-
-------------------------------~~-----------~·--------------
1) See Chapter Notes 38 and 40 and also Appendix 5. 
2) Compare Einstein's Relativ~~e Special_~~£_2?Eera~ 
;.r_heor;z, Part 1~ Chapter-r;- Page 2: 11It is not cllfrr:-
cult to understand why ••.•• we feel constrained to call 
the propositions of geometry 'true. 1 Geometrical ideas 
correspond to more or less exact objects in nature, 
and these last ·are undoubtedly the exclusive cause of 
the genesis of those ideas." 
3) Hence Hobbes' definitions of space and time : "Time is 
the phantasm of before and after in motion." (De C2£-
12..S~' Chapter 7, Section 3) ••.• "to compound space. of 
spaces or time of times is first to consider them one 
after another and then altogether as one." (De Cor-
12.9£~, Chapter 7, Section 8).. -·-··-
4) See Chapter Note 39. 
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terial world necessitated measurement, and if, as Bergson 
holds, the Western time conception is really spatial, the 
11spati.alization" cannot be seen apart from the necessity 
of measuremen~.l)We use numbers in measurement, and num-
bers were first given to man by physical objects which 
could be counted. These physical objects were, and, of 
course, still are, in physical space, so that, in order 
to measure time we must, as Prof. ~fuiteman points out, 
first measure space.2 )Galileo and his contemporaries, and 
those who succeeded them, appear unconsciously to have 
worked from the supposition that when spatial and tempo-
ral relationships have been established by measurement, 
space and time have been established, whereas the diffi-
culty is that 11\ve cannot explain the universal concepts 
of space and time in terms of measurements which presup-
pose them."3)The conclusion one must arrive at is that 
Galileian space and time c9,me into being through that 
same process of simplification and "making uniform" that 
gave us the Enlightenment man: what is left when we ab-
stract from the private spaces and times of men, arc the 
·---.... -------
1) See Chapter Note 40. 
2) See Chapter Notes 40 and 41. It seems to me that in 
this measurement we have to do with what Heidegger 
"rouldw call the separation. of space and time from Being. 
3) See Prof. \rJhi ternan's E.2!:!.ndati~al .. rFobt.g~§._Qf _§"Q.~£9.. 
~ Time, Chapter 3. See also Appendix • 
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universal space and time of the mechanics of Galileo. 1 ) 
(vi) 
It is doubtful whether Galilee fully appreciated 
that the space and time of his mechanics and the phys-
ical universe were not the real space and time of the 
universe as the Biblical Hebrew and mediaeval Christian 
saw it, the universe created by the God in whom Galilee 
continued to believe. It is clear, however, that the 
question of God did arise for him, and that he encounter-
ed those difficulties that made God a problem for Hume, 
difficulties which led in some philosophies of the :En-
lightenment and after to a complete denial of God. After 
Galilee, moreover, when telescopic astronomy had grovm 
into the extensive body of knowledge that it is today, 
the treatment of physical space and time as the only real 
space and time led to a state of affairs which gave rise 
to the jest that "the housing shortage has arisen in the 
case of God, "2 )since in this physical spo.co, God had no-
where been seen in a telescope. For Galilee the problem 
did not develop quite so far, but he did destroy God as 
a final cause3) ___ no doubt without being conscious of it. 
---------~ ------- ------
1) See Chapter Note 41 .• 
2) Sec Chapter Note 42. 
3) See Chapter Note 43. 
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But even if Galileo did not clearly and emphatically him-
self destroy God as a final cause, that destruction was 
the outcome of his and Kepler's worko "Galileo never 
thought of denying an ultimately religious answer to the 
1\ 
problem of the universe," Burtt assures us, ;but a scheme 
of things in which God is a first cause, nature essen-
tially mathematical and in indep~ndent existence after 
creation while man stands outside nature, we owe to the 
work of Galileo .• 2 )He appears to have realized that man 
was not mathematical, but he also did not appreciate that 
the space and time of his mechanics were a derived or ab-
stract space and time. In this scheme of things there was 
• no longe·r any question that creation and continued ex-
istence had ceased to be indivisible actions, Bs St~ 
Thomas Aquinas had held them to be. 
Whereas the Biblical Hebrew and mediaeval Christian 
view had been that God· stands outside time and His ere-
ation, the ef~ect of the work of Galileo was to place 
God's creation also outside time. It had become external 
to space and time, something fortuitous and observable 
------------~--~-
'I 
1) The Metaph~?ica;!-. F~un9:_§.!.2:_~g_.§....2_f._Mode£._I?:.._Ph;rsical_§ci~£~, 
Chapter 3, Page 9Io See also Chapter Note 44o 
2) Burtt (Qp. Cit., Page 91) gives us a diagram to illus-
trate this scheme. The diagram consists of three quite 
separate circles, one representing God, one nature and 
the third, man. 
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only when things are viewed against space and time. as a 
background or frames of reference. We shall see, present-
ly, this consequence of Galileo's work in the philosophy 
of Descartes. Now when human beings are viewed against 
these frames, the effect is that they are seen, not as 
active selves, but as masses of matter moved by some un-
known force. Time is detached from their choice which, in-
deed, ceases to exist; it is detached from their actions . . 
and freedom, and this separation brings about the reduc-
tion of human beings to controlled particles of matter 
in motion. 
hlb.en we consider the "time rhythms" of the ancient 
Hebrew, the Bergsonian view of time as a £_~ and the 
mediaeval Christian time conception, we realize that they 
all require an unfragmentec1 self. No mere succession of 
conscious states can account for a "time rhythm" or duree, 
and it will be shown in the next chapter that it is be-
cause Hume destroys the mlf by fragmenting human psychic-
al life that he sees human beings as particles moving in 
Galileian space and time. A similar result issues from 
Rouss'eau 1 s hostility to time and change. In his thought 
space and time become as fragmented as they are inHume's, 
and Rousseau is cut off from himself and his fello\'1 men so 
that they become, in his view, nothing more than masses 
of matter in motion. 
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CHAPTER 3 
~he Human Being in Derived Space and Time 
(i) 
vfuen we say that the· parts of a mechanism function 
in spatial and temporal isolation, we mean that the here ...__ 
and ~ of any particular part are points on a frame of 
reference or on. frames of reference;1 )we also mean that 
no part can have a £ere and a ~ which encompasses any 
other part, that there can never be a common space be .... 
tween tvm parts and that a common time bet\'leen them is 
me~ely fortuitou~. In other words, we have to do with 
the separation of space and time from the action and sub-
stance of a thing. The parts of a mechanism cannot meet; 
a,t most there can be a contiguity between them in physic-
al space, the space of science. 
Nov: it is a fundamental proposition in this thesis 
that a basic guiding influence in the thought of.Hume and 
Rousseau with regard to human relationships is the reduc-
tion of human beings to abstractions. We shall find that 
they reduce men to things that cannot ~; in their phi-
losophies men cto, in fact, become parts of a mechanism,. 
for they make the state a mechanism.. It will be our task 
in this chapter to study the process of the reduction of 
1) See Chapter Note 1. 
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men to abstractions before we go on to the consequences 
of this reduction in the treatment of human relationships 
by our two philosophers. Our starting point is the phi-
losophy of Descartes, for it was in his thought, the first 
of the great scientifically worked-out systems of the 
seventeenth century, that the puman person first ceased 
to be that directed unity of body and soul which was the 
man of the Christian Middle Ages. 1 )In his examination of 
man Descartes attempts to show how, on the assumption that 
the human body is nothing but a material thing, the mech-
anical motions of its parts alone account for what we call 
its life. He writes, for instance :2 ) 11 But since we knovl, 
from the nature of our soul, that the diverse motions of 
the body are sufficient to produce in it all the sensa-
tions which it has, and since vm learn from experience 
that several of its sensations are in reality caused by 
such motions, while we do not discover that anything be-
sides these motions ever passes from the organs of the 
external senses to the brain, we have reason to conclude 
·--------------------------
1) The dissolution of this unity had far-reaching con-
sequences, as will be evident throughout this study. 
vfe have one of the first echoes in the thought of La 
Mettrie, already referred to. In our own century there 
appears to be a return to the directedness of men; it 
seems to be the very kernel of the thought of, for in-
stance, Kwant and Teilhard de Chardin. 
2) Principles of Philosophy, Part 4, Page 257. 
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that we in no way likewise apprehend that in external ob-
jects, which we call light; colour, smell, taste, sound, 
heat or cold, and the other tactile qualities, or that 
which we call their substantial forms, unless as the vari-
ous dispositions of these objects which have the power of 
moving our nerves in various ways. 111 )l.Jve have, in other 
words, the notion that life itself is matter in motion. 2 ) 
It is one that issued from the science of the day, and 
prepared the way for the mechanism which we find in the 
century of Hume and Rousseau. 
Such a notion is a natural basis for Descartes' 
cleaving of man into two distinct substances: 11 •••• I did 
afterwards discover these (bodily functions like those of 
animals, not de~ndent on mind) as soon as I supposed God 
to have created a Rational Soul, and to have annexed it 
to this body in· a particular manner which I described."3) 
"And although we suppose that God ti.nited a body to a soul 
so closely that it was imposs~ble to form a more intimate 
union ••••• the two substances would remain really distinct, 
notwithstanding this union; for with whatever God connect-
1) \rJe shall find·, presently, the same view put forward 
by Hobbes. 
2) We shall be much concerned with matter in motion in 
subsequent chapters --- hence the importance of this 
notion in the thought of Descartes •. 
3) Discourse on Method, Part 5, Page 46. 
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. ed them, he was not able to rid himself of the power he 
possessed. of separating them, or of conserving the· .one 
apart £rom the other, and the things which God can sepa-
rate or conceive separat~ly, are really distinct."l) 
For a solution of the difficulty.of·how mind (or 
rational soul) ~nd matter, so diverse in nature, can in-
.fluence ·each ·other, Descartes could fall ba·ck on God. 
Like Gal;ileo, Descartes never lost his belief in God, but 
God he found, not in the unrolling of time, not in a pro-
gressive revelation, but from the principle of causality: 
God£.~~ our ideas of Himself. 2 )we see immediately how 
God is reduced to a sort of super~mechanic and the human 
being to something which resembles a mechanism in that he 
consists of at least two main parts, body and mind, which 
"touch" each other. (His body can then be further subdi-
vided into material parts). Man is no longer a unity, but 
a duality of·body and spirit; he is not directed or vee-
torial, but Syalar, and because he is scalar, he is an 
isolated entity. In Descartes' thought we also have the 
notion of a soul substance, something which can apparent-
ly enter or leave the body, or is generated by at least 
a part of the body, the brain. This soul substance Hume 
l) Principl~s of Philosophy, Part l, Page 220. 
2) See Chapter Not~ 2. 
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demolished with great success1 )as he also demolished 
causality. 
But it is not his splitting of the human person into 
two parts, taken by itself, that makes Descartes our 
starting point. With this dichotomy we must also take its 
consequence: if we accept that "the very substance of a 
finite thing is time," then the cleaving of man into body 
and soul means, in fact, that he is taken out of the time 
which "defines" him and placed in a time which flows on 
outside him. On this point Descartes could hardly be more 
explicit: 2 )" •••• we consider the nature of time, or the 
duration of things; for this is of such a kind that its 
parts are not mutually dependent, and never co-existent; 
and, accordingly, from the fact that we now are, it does 
not necessarily follow that we shall be a moment after-
wards, unless some cause, namely that which farst produced 
us, shall, as it were, continually reproduce us, that is, 
conserve us." 
--~-,--------~-----------
1) Compare Bultmann's Histor and Eschatol~, Chapter 1, 
Page 10: "Human nature was conceived in terms of sub-
stance as something static and permanent, an unvary-
ing substratum ..... In fact, Hume had already destroyed 
this conception of buman nature by replacing the con-
cept of mental substance by the concept of mental pro-
cess." 
2) Princi£les of Philosophy, Part 1, Page 202. In Part 2, 
Page:2~o Descartes-makes- it clear that he also regards 
space as something sharply marked off by bodies, that 
is, spaces cannot overlap, and are not a mode of action. 
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Here we have an anticipation of the somewhat less 
explicitly calculus view on space and time that we shall 
find inHume's thought, and the influence of the work of 
Galileo could hardly be clearer. No doubt we can trace 
Descartes' lack of historical sensitivity to this view on 
$pace and time. 1 )He wished to control matter in motion, 2 ) 
and the space and time involved in the study of matter in 
motion are the space and time of the physics of Galileo. 
Indeed, Galilee's study was of matter in motion, and his 
space and time were derived for that purpose. 
Now when once a man has been reduced to two separate 
substances, one of which is matter, and placed in a time 
which does not "define" him, the projection of that mass 
of matter against the Galileian space-time frame or frames 
of reference must necessarily follow. Matter is, after 
all, something that affects the senses, and its motion is 
best observed against a frame of reference or frames of 
reference of derived space and time in which the senses 
are also involved. It was inevitable, therefore, that 
0 
Hobbes, devoted to mathematics, and very much under the 
influence of Galileo, should have seen men in terms of 
mathematics and mechanics, and declared that " ••••• every 
1) See Chapter Note 3· 
2) Science had to be made useful. See Chapter Note 4. 
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man brought philosophy, that is Natural Reason, into the 
world with him •••• "1 )and defined philosophy as the knowl-
edge "of effects and appearances (as) we acquire by true 
ratiocination •••• By ratiocination I mean computation."2 ) 
From this view theJdefi:i:l.itions of space and time already 
given, must follow.3) 
For Hobbes, as for Descartes, time is not the "very 
substance of a finite thing," and tempora'lity and change 
do not "belong to its very being" and do not "define"what 
it is." So also spatiality is not a "mode of action" of 
things, since things have no action which is not a blind 
motion originating in a push in the past, against a back-
ground of a space-time framework outside them, the space-
time frame of Galilee's physics, a physicalized, derived 
and separate space and time. With the projection of ~his 
frame of reference on human beings and their thought, and 
the application of the doctrine that all is matter in mo-
tion in the universe, Hobbes ultimately arrives at the 
----------------
l) De Qorpo~e, Chapter 1, Section l. No doubt when Hobbes 
visi.ted Gaiileo in 1636 he was greatly impressed by 
studies which were then entirely new in physics. It is 
known that. Hobbes did his best to become proficient in 
mathematics. 
2) Ibid., Section 2. 
3) Chapter 2 of this study. Space is compounded of spaces 
and time of times. Note the similarity to the views of 
Descartes. We shall find these again presently in the 
thought of Humo•-
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conclusion that, in our psychical life, "all that is real 
being the concussion or motions of parts of that nerve •••• 
apparition of light is really nothing but motion within ••• 
ul) d II th . . . . f • d ••• an •••• ere 1s no 1mpress1on 1n a mans m1n 
which hath not first, wholly or by parts been begotten 
upon the organs of sense."2 )Imagination, says Hobbes, is 
decaying sense, both being motions. We must conclude then, 
that we cannot have a thought which is not simply a math-
ematical summation of fragments of sensation as an inter-
val of Galileian time or portion of Galileian space is a 
mathematical summation of fragments. 
(ii) 
This fragmentation of human psychical life Hume car-
ried to its conclusion in the destruction of the self, and 
it is the culminating point in his thought where the human 
person ceases to exist and a man becomes an abstraction 
and a scalar entity. The same fragmentation is found in 
his treatment of space and time; indeed, his fragmentation 
of human psychical processes and his fragmentation of 
space and time go together as they go together in the phi-
losophy of Hobbes. Since "All the perceptions of the human 
mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I 
l) De Homine, Chapter 2, Section 7. 
2) Ibid., Section 8. 
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shall call impressions and ideas,"1 )and since, as we shall 
see presently, Hume regards the mind as nothing but a 
bundle of perceptions, our conceptions of space and time 
can be nothing but a collection of ideas, that is, they 
come from the world outside us. Hume tries to represent 
space as a series of points which he regards as both math-
ematical points and minima visibilia, and describes time 
as merely the consciousness of succession. 2 ) 11 'Tis there-
fore certain," he says,3)"that the imagination reaches a 
~~~ and may raise up to itself an idea of which it 
cannot conceive any subdivision, and which cannot be di-
miniE;hed without total annihilation." 
The resemblance of the substance of this passage in 
words to the meaning of the mathematical expression in 
symbols of the essence of a differential coefficient is 
noteworthy. A differential coefficient4 )is the limit of 
a ratior' of which one infinitesimal, the denominator, tends 
to zero, but would, if it actually reached zero, destroy 
the meaning of the limit, and so also the differential co-
-··--·--·------
l) A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part l, Section l, 
.Page 3n-:---~--·-· 
2) Compare Hobbes. 
3) A Treatise of Human Nature, Book l, Part 2, Section l, 
Page""3"35-. ----~~-----
4) See Chapter Note 34, ·Chapter 2 of this study. 
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efficient.1 )As was shown in the preceding chapter, the 
space and time of Galileian physics are treated mathemat-
ically with such differentials: displacement, velocity, 
acceleration and time are regarded as variables and a pro-
cess of fragmentation into infinitesimals is imposed on 
them. Hume proceeds to apply precisely this treatment to 
space and time:2 )"I first take the least idea I can form 
of a part of extension, and being certain that there is 
nothing more minute than this idea, I conclude that what-
ever I discover by its means, must be a real quality of 
extension." 
He can then repeat this operation, and by means of 
what amounts to simple summation, or in the parlance of 
the calculus, an integration of infinitesimals, arrive at 
infinite extension. The argument serves also to show that 
the infinite divisibility of space is impossible, but what 
is of importance here is the compounding of "space of 
spaces and time of times" as Hobbes compounds them, for 
time can be treated in a similar manner. "The idea of 
time," says Hume,3)"being derived from the succession of 
) f' 
1 \ D.Y =dy/dx 
~~ 
x~o 
The ~ means an infinitesimal of. If the 
~ should become zero, the meaning of 
dy/dx would be destroyed. 
2) A Treatise of HUman Natu~, Book 1, Part 2, Section 2, 
Page 337~ 
3) ~~~~., Section 3, Pages 341 to 344. 
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our perceptions of every kind, ideas as well as impres• 
sions, and impressions of reflection as well as of sensa-
tion, will afford us an instance of an abstract idea, 
. ' 
which comprehends a still greater variety than that of 
space, and yet is represented in the fancy by some par-
ticular individual idea of a determined quantity and qual-
ity ••••• 'Tis evident that time or duration consists of 
different parts: for otherwise we could n,ot conceive a 
longer or shorter duration. 'Tis also evident that these 
parts are not co-existent, an unchangeable object, since 
it produces none but co-existent impressions, produces 
none that cart give us the idea of time; and consequently 
that idea must be derived from a succession of changeable 
objects, and time in its first appearance can never be 
severed from such a sucoession.o •• There is another very 
decisive argument which establishes the present doctrine 
concerning our ideas of space and time, and is fo1mded 
only on that simple principle that our ideas of them are 
compounded of parts which are indivisible." 
Hume then treats this "decisive argument 11 in which he 
returns to the conviction that space and time are ideas. 
He is also concerned with the detailed treatment of space 
as mathematical points and minima visibi1ia, 1 )but the im-
1) A Treatise of Human Nature, Sections 1 to 4- of Part 2. 
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portant points which emerge from his whole treatment of 
space and time can now be listed: 
1. The quasi-mathematical treatment of space and time and 
the assertion that both space and time are composed of 
parts that are not ·co-existent• "It is a property insepa-
rable from time, and in a manner vn1ich constitutes its 
essence, that each of its parts succeeds another, and 
that none of them, hovmver contiguous, can ever be co-
existent."l) 
2. The separation of the time of a being from its sub-
stance2)and the separation of space from its action. 
(What was said above of the thought of Hobbes, is equally 
true of that of Hume). 
3. The dependence of the notions of space and time on the 
human senses which must receive them before they are 
simple, distinct ideas. 
The significance of these points is that they are a 
summing-up of the "physicalization" of space and time by 
Hume outside the human person, for he not only treats them 
in the same way as space and time are treated in Galilee's 
physics, but he makes them functions of the outside world, 
that is, of the physical world in which Galileian physics 
1) !_~at~~~-of Human Nature, Part 2, Section 2. 
2) Compare Heidegger's notion of the separation of objects 
from all-enveloping Being. Have we not here the sepa-
ration of space and time from Being? 
126. 
applies. He now has frames of reference; by making men 
things, undifferentiated from one another, he has masses 
of matter in motion against the background of these 
frames of reference, and this he achieves by destroying 
the self. 
Space and time are ideas and impressions in a psych-
ical life which is fragmentary and also dependent on the 
outside \1/0rld in that "All the perceptions of the human 
mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I 
shall call impressions and ideas o The difference betvJixt 
these consists in the degree of force and liveliness with 
v-1hich they strike upon the mind. o •• 1 )Thus we find that 
all simple ideas and impressions resemble each other; and 
as the complex are formed from them we may affirm in gene-
ral, that these two species of perception are exactly 
correspondent •••• we shall here content ourselves withes-
tablishing one general proposition, That all our simple 
ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple 
impressions which are correspondent to them, and which 
they exactly represent. "2 ) 
Now if human psychical life is so fragmentary and de-
1) Compare Hobbes' motion philosophy. It seems to me also 
that Hume is here not very far removed from Locke's 
notion of the mind as a ~l~-~· 
2) A Treatise of Human Nature, Part 1, Section 1, Pages 
311 to 3'14-:--------
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pendent on impressions, there cannot be a real and un-
fragmented self. 111 desire those philosophers, 11 flume 
challenges,l)"who pretend that we have an idea of the 
substance of our minds, to point out the impression that 
produces it, and tell distinctly after what manner it 
operates, and from what object it is derived ••••• I may 
venture to affirm to the rest of mankind that they are 
nothing but a bundle or collection of different percep-
tions which succeed each other with inconceivable rapid-
ity, and are in perpetual flux and movement. Our eyes 
cannot turn in their sockets without varying their per-· 
ceptions. Our thought is till more variable than our 
sight. rr2 ) 
Bergson would term Hume's treatment of space and 
time and human psychical life a treatment according to 
the cinematographical method to which physics is restrict-
ed.3)In contrast to Hume's treatment of the human psyche 
we accordingly have Bergson's. Orle may think of one's 
perceptions as a motley crowd, he says, 4 )but, deep down, 
----------------- ------------------------------~-------· 
1) A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part 4, Sections 
5 and 6, Pages 5r~nd ~. 
2) See Chapter Note 5. 
3) Bergson seems to me to have some affinity with Heideg-
ger. There is a separation between parts and the whole. 
The cinematographer makes separate pictures of some-
thing that cannot really be split up. See Chapter c 
Note 6. 
4) See Chapter Note 7 and also Appendix 9. 
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there is an unfragmented self, something combining and 
containing the motley crowd of perceptions into which 
Hume dissolves the self. Kant, having been awakened "out 
of h;i..s dogmatic slumbers" by Hume, set about finding an 
answer to him, but though space and time are subjective 
for Kant (as forms of thought), time is still not a duree 
and space not a mode of action, and both are connected 
with the human person, ~s Spengler points out, according 
to a scheme. 1 )Hume was, no doubt, not conscious of the 
fact that his conception of space and time was that which 
had given mathematicians so much trouble through the 
ages. Had he been more of a mathematician and had he had 
the "new physics" at his disposal, he might have been 
more av.rare of the problem of Zeno 's flying arrow. 2 ) 
Though Hume's time is an experienced time in the 
sense that it is (as space is) an impression or idea from 
the world outside the person, it is not a duree immediate-
ly experienced in the sense in which Bergson speaks of a 
duree and in tbe sense in which the Hebrew of the Old 
Testament experienced it. Hume's time, the time of Gali-
leian science, is, according to Heidegger,3)itself in 
1) See Chapter Note 8 and also Note~3, Chapter 2. 
2) 
3) 
See Chapter Note 9. 
Sein und Zeit, Introduction to Division 2, Page 278~ 
~ee also Chapter Note 10. 
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time, that is, derived time is in real time very much as 
a chair is in a room. In the same sense, of course, 
Hume 's derived space is itself in real space. Van Peursen 
would perhaps say that derived space and time are only,:. 
"edges" of real space and time, or their "shells." 
(iii) 
vfuat strikes one with great force is that, for Hume, 
the human person is a function of the physical 'tvorld ---
in so far as the human person can be said to exist at 
all. The human person is not directed to the world, but 
the physical world is, as it were, the source of the hu~ 
man person. From Hobbes, Locke and Hume sprang the "As-
sociationist" school of psychology which sought to ex-
plain all the more complex mental processes as results of 
the compounding (mathematical integration) of atom-like 
sensations and images, one of.the laws of compounding be-
ing association by contiguity in space and time as con-
ceived in the physics of Galileo. We see then, how human 
beings are projected as masses of matter against the 
framework of Galileian space and time. Once it is admit-
ted that there is really no such entity as the self, this 
projection becomes a matter of course, and this destr~c­
tion of the self Hume achieves in his critique of person-
al identity which is inseparable from the atomization of 
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psychical processes. "The identity which we ascribe to 
the mind of man," he says, 1 ) 11is only a fictitious one, 
and of a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetable 
and animal bodies. It cannot therefore have a different 
origin, but must proceed from a like operation of the 
' imagination upon like objects ••••• It is evident that the 
identity ~J.r.hich we attribute to the human mind, however 
perfect we imagine it to be, is not able to run the sever-
al different perceptions into one, and make them lose 
their characters of distinction and difference, which are 
essential to them. It is still true that every distinct 
perception which enters into the composition of the mind, 
is a distinct existence, and is different and distinguish~ 
able, and separable from every other percep"tiion, either 
contemporary or successive •••. the understanding never ob~ 
serves any real connection among objects ••••• even the 
union of cause and effect, when strictly examined, re-
solves itself into a customary association of ideas." 
We find in the above passage the underlying concept 
inHume's philosophy of what Prof. Versfeld terms the hos-
tility of reality to the intellect. The self does not , . 
exist; it is a mere abstraction of ~ .. J'hich the intellect is 
forced to make use because of its inability to know re-
l) A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part 4, Section 6, 
Page 5'40. ----~·---
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ality. We are, in fact, mere constructs. 1 )we have here an 
interesting situation: It seems that Hume himself was 
dissatisfied with his treatment of personal identity and 
felt himself to be more than a mere construct; 2 )but, at 
the same time, we have no other treatment of personal 
identity by him, and since this treatment goes with his 
fragmentation of psychical processes and the fragmenta-
tion of ·space and time, we must look upon it as an inte-
gral part of Hume's philosophy. We shall find also that 
it is inseparable from his isolation of individuals in 
his treatment of human relationships. 
Such is the result, then, of founding our notion of 
personality on causality, that is, on the conviction that 
the outside world causes our loose impressions and ideas 
and that these are the mind. But, according to Hume, cau-
sality is itself mere custom.3)u"Wb.atever changes, he (the 
I.?.£.rs on) endures, 11 says Hume , 4 ) "his several parts are 
still connected by the relation of causation •••• As a mem-
ory alone aquaints us with the continuance and extent of 
this succession of perceptions, 'tis to be considered, 
- -~-----~~-----·-
1) See Chapter Note 11. 
2) See Chapter Note 12. 
3) See Chapter Note 13. 
4) A Treatise of Human 
Page--,4~ 
............ _ Nature, Book 1, Part L~' Section 6, 
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upon that account chiefly, as the source of personal iden-
ti ty. Had vve no memory, we never shou 'd have any notion 
of causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes 
and effects, which constitute our self or person." And if 
there is no necessity in causality, 1 )if it is merely cus-
tom, there is as little necessity in the human person, 
while the idea of a soul "substance 11 which has never 
caused an impression, is decidedly intolerable. One can-
not fail to notice that Hume's treatment of causality is 
inseparable from his fragmentation of human-psychical pro-
cesses and his fragmentation of time. A person cannot 
stand at a now and look to past and future. "For all in-
ferences from experience," says Hume, 2 ) 11suppose as their 
foundation that the future will resemble the past •••• It is 
impossible (therefore) that any arguments from experience 
can prove (this) resemblance of the past to the future." 
We notice that whereas Descartes still needed God to 
bring his matter and mind together, there is no need for 
God inHume's philosophy, since there is no mind and no 
soul substance, only matter projected against a Galileian 
snace-time frame of referenceo Hume does bring God into 
J; 
·---------------------------------------
1) See Northrop's remarks on Pages 19 to 28 of his Intro-
duction to Heisenberg's !:hYS;h£.§.._~9-._Ehilosophy. 
2) $CeQ tical Doubts, Part 4 of Conc~rning .. Jiu~_Und~.­
stan~, Page 33 of Volume r-of the Essaxs. 
his thought, but for quite another purpose. We shall find 
that he brings God in merely as an aid and that he does 
not really need Him. Now since Hume has effectively dis-
posed of mind, the human person has been completely dis-
mantled. and men are objects which cannot have an "inner 
time" as in the Old Testament time is the inner time of 
the person connected with the time of a whole people. The 
impossibility of connecting the event with the person in 
Hume's philosophy is reflected in his theory of history 
which we shall examine in the next chapter. 
We cannot help asking why Hume should include a ! ~. ,-
9uasi-mathematical treatment of space and time in a work 
on human NATURE. The only possible reply seems to be that 
he did so because his anthropology demanded it. Hume wrote 
when man had become a phenomenon to be studied by science, 
subject to all the laws of nature, a thing without choice. 
Observation of this phenomenon demanded its separation 
from the space and time natural to it •1 \1e have, in other 
words, in ffume's empiricism the choice of a specific space 
and a specific time for a specific purpose, though, no 
doubt, Hume was not conscious of the fact that he was 
making this choice. The choice is made when he isolates 
every individual from every other individual by the frag-___________ , ________ __ 
1) Compare Heidegger. See Chapter Note 14. 
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mentation of human psychical life and the destruction of 
the self .. 
This isolation must, of course, necessarily follow 
from the destruction of the directedness of the human per-
son if we accept that real space and time are of the es-
sence of this directedness, but we can arrive at the fact 
that it is inherent inHume's philosophy by argument along 
a different path. It can be pointed out that his empiri-
cism must, in the last analysis, lead t~ an idealism of 
some type or other. In general idealism lays dovm that 
everything that can be knovm, that is, every object of ex-
perience, is really the contents of consciousness. 1 )Now 
the mind, says Hume, is simply a series of experiences or 
impressions. If we take objective idealism to mean that 
experiences always consist of ideas (without reference to 
the subject to whom ideas and consciousness belong) then, 
since for Hume there is no self or mind, we judgo b.fum to 
be an objective idealist. We are assuming now that we can 
infer that something causes these experiences; but since 
Hume also destroyed causality, we are not to infer that 
anything causes these experiences, and we are left with 
subjective idealism or solipsism which defines the content 
of consciousness as a purely subjective process. The human 
----------------------------·-----------------·-------- -----------
1) See Chapter Note 15. 
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being is then completely isolated, and there can be no 
question of a £it~ human person. 
(iv) 
Now how does Rousseau reduce human beings to abstrac-
tions? Hume sets about his philosophizing empirically and 
his maxim is: "VJhat I see I believe." Rousseau is not so 
methodical and is more inclined to believe what he feels. 
In the end, however, human beings are, as he sees them, 
also removed from the reality of the time process. He sees 
them as '~mechanical beings ••••• masses •••• bereft of all 
morality."l)We have this strange outcome that Hume, the 
rigorous empiricist, and Rousseau, the romantic, both move 
away from concrete reality when they think about human be-
ings. Whereas in the philosophy of Burne the destruction 
of the self follows logically on the fragmentation of hu-
man psychical processes by the projection of the human 
person against the Galileian space-time frame of reference, 
the philosophy of Rousseau is not so rigorous and direct 
on its path to that outcome which we are about to discuss. 
In his case the destruction of the self is the result of 
a flight from the process of change which is time, and 
from the reality of the world in which he lives and which 
1) Les Reveries du Promeneur Solitaire (Huitieme Promenade) 
Pagesl30 and r~rr:·-w::· .. des etres rnecanique .•••• d.es 
masses •••• depourvues de toute moralite." This passage 
1.r1ill be quoted more fully in a later chapter. 
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is subject to that time process of change, rather than a 
result of a reasoning in which Galileian space and time . 
are projected on the human person. It must be remembered 
that Rousseau was not a professional philosopher in the 
modern sense of the word; he was an eighteenth-century 
French philoso:Q_£e, a "philosophizer" rather than a phi-
losopher. 
"To my mind," says Rousseau, 1 ) 11the distinctive facul-
ty of an active or intelligent being is the ability to 
give a meaning to this word is. 11 Rousseau fin'ds."this word 
is" (ce mot est) indicative of much more than mere exist-
ence., and he says further: 2 ) 11In the abil-ity to will, or 
rather to choose_, and in the consciousness of this ability 
we find only pure spiritual actions of which we cannot 
explain anything by the laws of mechanics .• 11 We make these 
two assertions by Rousseau our starting point. 
Now if we accept with Bergson, St.Augustine and others 
that time is the substance of a being, or with Heidegger 
that what is not in time, is not, then time is the very 
essence of "this word is. 11 But we shall find that time is 
~----------------------------
1) Emile, Book 4, Page 552 of Volume 2 of the Oeuvres de 
Rousseau: "Selon moi la fac.ulte distinctive de l 1etre 
actif ou intelligent, est de pouvoir donner un sens a 
ce mot est." 
2) On the Origin of Inequality, Page 170 of the Everyman's 
volume.· Original French in-Chapter Note 16. 
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precisely what Rousseau takes away from men, and that in 
the end we have to explain the actions of his men "by the 
laws of mechanics." If we accept that time defines real-
ity, then we must accept a flight from the one as a flight 
from the other, and Rousseau finds it easy to dream him-
self into a world of his imagination. This he admits only 
too clearly in his Con~sions and other works of an 
autobiographical nature. 
Now this private world into which Rousseau can so 
easily flee, must be one in which men of the real world 
have no place; we shall see presently how Rousseau is, in 
fact, cut off from his fellow men by his hostility to the 
realities of time. Obviously, 1vere he not cut off from 
them, he would have no need of a refuge from them. He 
looks upon the men of time as part of the world of time in 
which "All is in a continual flux on the earth. Nothing 
preserves a constant and fixed form, and our affections 
which become attached to outside things, necessarily pass 
away and change as they do. Always in front of and behind 
us, they recall the past which no longer exists or precede 
the future which often cannot be: there is nothing solid 
to which the heart can attach itself. Also one has here 
only pleasure which passes; I doubt if lasting happiness 
is known. There is hardly in our greatest enjoyments an 
instant when the heart can truly say to us: I would that 
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this instant could last for ever."l) 
Rousseau here really expresses a wish to be able to 
freeze the world in an eternal now-ness. The man who does 
not flee from time, who accepts time as, so to speak, a 
sine gua non for his being, would reply to Rousseau: Of 
course everything is in a continual flux in the world. 
Change is the becoming of the world to what it is at each 
moment of one's life. 
The everlasting change which is the subject of Rous-
seau's lament is the reality of the time process, so that 
his dislike of change is, in fact, a dislike of time. (One 
notices in the passage quoted abov~ the division between 
past and future by the present. We shall return to this 
point presently). It cannot be by mere coincidence that 
we find an almost exact parallel to Rousseau's words in 
\ 
Plato's Theaetetus1) "All things we are pleased to say 
1 are, ' really are in a proc.ess of becoming, as a result of 
movement and change and of blending one with another." It 
would appear that some connection can be found between 
Rousseau's hostility to flux and Plato's theory of the 
passing nature and unreality of things, and the reality of 
1) Les Reveries du Promeneur Solitaire,(Cinquieme. Promen-
ade), Page 85. For the original Piench see Chapter 
Note 17. 
2) 152 D. 
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the ideas or form~, which are timeless and rigidly un-
changing. These realities, says Walsh, 1 )quoting the above 
passage from Plato, "not only are vvhat they seem to be, 
but further are eternally what they are. Each of them is 
all it is capable of being, timelessly itself." The things 
of the world about us contrast with them just by failing 
to possess this quality; the fact that they are liable to 
change makes Plato say that, strictly speaking, they ~ 
not anything at all but are merely beco~ing something. 
Change to Plato means variability, and variability means 
deceptiveness, in things just as in men. True reality is 
single and simple, appearances many and various. " 
Rousseau longs desperately fo.r a state "where the 
soul finds a place of repose solid enough to rest there 
entirely and to collect there its entire being without 
having to recall the past or ponder the future; where time 
is nothing for it, where the present lasts for ever -vvi th-
out, however, marking its duration and without trace of 
succession •••• "2 ) Again we see the desire to ·freeze the 
world into an everlasting novJ-ness. But this novv-ness 
would not be the eternal now-ness as one would regard the _____ , ______________ _ 
1) Metaphysics, Chapter 2, Pages 23 to 24. 
2) Les Reveries du Promeneur Solitaire (Cinquieme Promen-
ade), Pages 83-to-84. For tne original French see 
Chapter Note 18. 
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now-ness of God to be. If we look upon a person's now as 
the heart of his real time1 )which encompasses the world 
around him, and fashions the becoming of the world for 
that person by its fluidity, its "moving along," then we 
~~ .. can look upon the eternal now-ness of God as a now in 
which all the universe in all its past and future is en-
compassed,2)and which need not be fluid or moving for a 
description of the universe. From this eternal now-ness of 
God the now's of humans, the time of the ancient Hebrew 
and the Christian issue by His creative action. From the 
frozen ~for which Rousseau longs, a ~plucked out, so 
to speak, from God's time, time would not issue; the ever-
lasting now-ness of which Rousseau dreams, would be a 
state removed from time, in whiqh men would resemble an 
array of statues and busts in a museum. It would be a math-
ematical instant3)isolated from others. 
We conclude then, that Rousseau regards time as an 
enemy. It is, moreover, an enemy with which he is very much 
preoccupied4 )because be senses somehow that his chaotic 
1) Van Peursen's Stellenbosch Lecture. 
2) To such a~ the ~of Daniel approximates. 
3) The poet N.P. Van ~zyk Louw describes the world seen in 
such a frozen state in a mathematical instant in his 
poem Suiwer Wiskunde. See Chapter Note 19. 
4) Compare Poulet's Etudes sur 1e Temps Humain, Chapter 10, 
Page 165, where the author says-that for Rousseau time 
is a place "du·. mal et du malheur, 11 and 11ce. drame du temps 
il l'a vecu jusqu'a l'anguoisse, jusqu'a l'affolement." 
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life and the "disjointed" way in which he experiences time, 
are connected.1 )His Confessions appear very much as an at-
tempt to "take stock" of himself and to find a unifying 
bond in his life which was, to say the least, most frag-
mented.. We have an attempt to provide his life with some 
interior coherence where he tells us in the Confessions2 ) 
that his appetite for reading saved him from himself in his 
growing sensuality, a sensuality which was part of Rousseau 
as a man of the real world, but found no outlet in that 
real world because Rousseau was cut off from it~ So once 
again he had recourse to a remedy (for his sensuality) out-
side real space and time. "This consisted in feeding myself 
upon the situations which had interested me in the course 
of my reading, in recalling them, in varying them, in com-
bining them, in making them so truly my own that I became 
one of the persons who filled my imagination and always 
saw myself in the situations most agreeable to my taste; 
and that finally, the fictitious state in which I succeeded 
·in putting myself, made me forget my actual state with 
which I was so dissatisfied •••• In the sequel we shall see 
1) Compare Temmer's Time i~_R9~~~eau and K~t, Introduc-
tion, Pages 10 to 11 .. See also Chapter Note 20. 
2) Book 1, Volume 1, Pages 74 to 75. Note that he says that 
"we shall see more than once the curious effect of this 
disposition." For the original French see Chapter Note 
21. See also Chapter Note 20. · 
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more than once the curious effect of this disposition, ap-
parently so gloo~y and misanthropic, but which is really 
due to a·too affectionate, too loving and too tender a 
heart, which~ being unable to find any existence resembling 
it, is obliged to nourish itself with fancj:es." 
The effect of Rousseau's hostility to time is the ef-
fect to which he admits in this passage: he is cut off from 
the world and his fellow men, and, in fact, also from him-
self. 
(v) 
In his struggle with time Rousseau separates past from 
future by separating the present from both. There is, in 
other words, a fragmentation of time and no dur~e in the 
sense in which Bergson uses the word to indicate the es-
sence of real time. It is, moreover, a fragmentation which 
/ 
goes further than the few divisions between past, present 
and future; it is a fragmentation brought about by a suc-
cession of feelings. 1 )When we read Rousseau's autobiograph-
ical works, we are struck by the fact that whereas he some-
times makes mistakes when he has to deal with facts and 
actual events, 2 )and sometimes alters facts "to suit his art~' 
1) Compare Temmer's Time in Rousseau and Kant, Chapter 3, 
Page 41: "Jean-Jacques prefers to link feelings in order 
to mark succession of his being." 
2) \Ve have the testimony of people of his time and immedi-
ately afterwards that this is so* 
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as Temmer puts it, there is never any uncertainty in his 
mind about his feelingso After all, he tells us·more than 
once in the Con[~~-~ that it is really his soul that he 
wishes to bare to his readers. We must assume then, that ac-
tual events and facts are of· secondary importance, and that 
only Rousse~u's feelings matter. These follow one another 
precisely as Hume•s impressions do, and do not constitute a 
duree. In fact, Rousseau tells us clearly in the Confessi~ 
that these feelings do indeed rapidly succeed one another: 
"I am a man of very strong passions, and, v.rhile I am stirred 
by them, nothing can eqtlal my impetuosity •••• tvith the ex-
ception of the single object which occupies my thoughts, 
the universe is nothing to me. But all this lasts only for 
a moment, and the following moment plunges me into complete 
annihilation. "1 ) 
In view of the fact that Rousseau admits that his Con-
fessions are not meant to describe a becomi~g and that his 
nO\IIT does not encompass other persons, the question seems to 
arise: How would he regard space and time unconnected with 
his feelings? He answers this question himself and tells 
us in the Social Contr~~2 )that they must be regarded as a 
--------------·-----· 
1) Part 1, Book 1, Page 67: For the original French see 
Chapter Note 22. 
2) Du Contrat Social, Book 2, Chapter 6, Page 96. This im-
portant passa~ill be referred to a~ain. See also 
Chapter Note 23. 
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series. This, we already know, is precisely the conclusion 
concerning space and time that we find inHume's thought, 
and precisely the view of space and time that we find in 
the elementary calculus. The significant-thing is that we 
find this "scientist's" view of space and time coupled in 
Rousseau's writings with his fragmented experience of time, 
and we shall find that we can only conclude that Rousseau, 
realizing that the chaos in his own life stems from his 
hostility to and his "disjointed 11 .experience of space ~d 
time, is suggesting the space and time of science as a space 
and time of order. 
But the space and time of the calculus are still a 
fragmented space and time, and we are at the moment con-
cerned with this fragmentation. When one regards time as a 
unity, as a duree, when one stands at a ~ as the heart 
of a real time which joins past to future, which, in fact, 
~ncompasses past and future, the past is what it is, quite 
unalterable, but if time is not a unity, as it is not for 
Rousseau, and the past is severed from the present, one can 
alter the past to suit one's purpose, as indeed~ Rousseau 
does. It is known that some of his autobi.ography is fiction, 
and it turns out that it is fiction to a purpose. That pur-
pose, we shall find in a later chapter, is closely connect-
ed with his feelings and his notion of virtue, but it also 
serves the purpose of helping Rousseau to flee from reality. 
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When one alters the past, then, since this past is encom-
passed in one's ~' the ~ow cannot encompass reality. Con-
sequently, in contemplating a past which is not the past 
which he has lived, Rousseau really extricates himself from 
history and breaks with reality and his fellow men. So, in 
the Confessions, he movingly describes his boyhood in which 
he was, as he would have u~ believe, cherished by a father 
who, in fact, gave many indications that there were times 
when he was more at ease ~r.Ji thout his turbulent son. 
Temmer shows by means of a most effective simile ho'IJIJ 
Rousseau's past often stands outside real time and contains 
little of reality: 1 ) 11 The thought or objectified past is a 
major source of Rousseau's ideas concerning himself. Motion-
le~s and ironic, they resemble the fragments of a broken 
mirror, suggesting the outline of a possible whole. By dint 
of contemplation he seizes their respective meanings, and 
the joining truces place when. the order and purpose of his 
life are understood. Vife shall see that the CQ_nf.~Q_E:.§.. a-
bound with such sudden insights, often followed by expia-
tion and elegy. Accepting the implications of such insights, 
the autobiographer resists the temptation to deny their es-
sential truths, although he alters them to meet the demands 
of his art." It seems appropriate to remark in this context 
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that if Rousseau is so prepared to take liberties with the 
\ 
writing of the history of his own life, one would hesitate 
to entrust the writing of the hlstory of mankind to him. We 
shall see, when the question of histor,y is considered, that 
he would indeed have written history to suit himself. 
Rousseau recreates the past to suit his art, but what 
can he do about the future? Nothing, so he does not wish to 
dwell on it. The future, he thinks, is the part of time 
which is to be feared, and he exclaims in low spirits: 
"Foresight! foresight which unceasingly carries us beyond 
ourselves •••• here we have the true cause of our miseries. 
How stupid of a being as transitory as man to look always 
far to the future which so rarely comes, and to neglect the 
present of which he is certain."!) The future then, Rousseau 
regards as the time of possible (indeed, probable) unhap-
piness .• The primitive man, the savage, or infant, living in 
a present of pure sensation, is much better off since he is 
without past and without "foresight." 
It must be stressed again, however, that this present 
which Rousseau has in mind, is not the present of real time 
since such a present would encompass past and future .• The 
present which Rousseau has in mind, is timeless since it is 
--~----------------------------------------
1) ~ile, Book 2, Page 432 of Volume 2 of the Qeuvres de 
Rousseau. For the original French see Chapter Note 24. 
The Confessions, Rousseau's QQ_~res:e_ondance, La Nouvelle 
Heloise and ~i~~ abound with such passages. 
cut off from the past and the future, and 11physicalized" 
into a Galileian moment. It is not a now in Van Peursen 1s -
sense of the word. For primitive man, as for the infant, 
"all their knowing is in sensation, 11 says Rousseau ;1 )the 
life of primitive man "was the life of an animal, bounded 
in the beginning by pure sensation."2 )Poulet comments3)that 
Rousseau's primitive man and infant are "without past and 
future, without foresight and without memory," a blissful 
state to be in, since it is timeless. It is a single iso-
lated moment without the torments which time holds for 
Rousseau. What is important, however, in this theory of the 
life of primitive man and the infant is that we have in it 
the same fragmented time and the same fragmented psychical 
life that we have in the thought of Hume. There is no duree 
and no real Eerson. 
Rousseau tells us in his Confessions4 )that his pre-
dilection for imaginary objects and.the ease with which he 
can take possession of them completes his dislike for every-
thing around him and initiated in him his love for solitude. 
1) Emile, Book 2, Page 451 of Volume 2 of the Oeuvres de 
Rousseau: " •••• tout leur savoir est dans la sensation." 
2) See his On the Origin of Inequality, BAges 169 to 1?9 of 
the Everyman's volume. 
3) Etudes sur le Temps Humain, Chapter 10, Page 158: "•..... . 
sans passe et sans futur, -sans prevoyance et sans memoire ~' 
4) Part 1, Book 1, Page 75. Here, if anywhere in Rousseau's 
writings, we have an undisguised admission of flight from 
reality. 
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He also says:1 )"We do not exist where we are, we only exist 
vrhere we are not." .And as if to illustrate this in his own 
case, he tells us in the Confessions2 )of his powers of 
imagination which can transport him from one calling to 
another and beautify each as he wishes. He can, moreover, 
take up his abode in any of his many castles in the air 
without any difficulty since none of them is far from the 
place where he is. Evidently space is as much something 
that brings ·,unhappiness as is time. 3 )Since space is not a 
mode of action to Rousseau, it is not surprising that he 
cannot become attached to real things; his lack of appreci-
ation of what we have termed real space, becomes interwoven 
with his hostility to time. 
(vi) 
Rousseau then, is not fleeing only from time, but also 
from -space, and we can now examine more closely the effect 
which this flight has on Rousseau himself, on his fellow 
men and on his relationships with his fellow men. We have 
already concluded that his hostility to time cuts him off 
from them. The extent to which he is cut off from them, 
1) :Emile, Book 2, Page 432 of Volume 2 of the Oeuvres de 
Rousseau: "Nous n 'existons plus ou nous sommes, nous 
n 1existons qu 'ou ne sommes pas." 
2) Part 1, Book 1, Page 78. 
3) See Chapter Note 25. 
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Rousseau himself tells us all too frequently in all his 
works in passages such as that in which he compares men 
with things of which the motions can be calculated by means 
of the laws of mechanics. From this stems his persecution 
mania, and it is significant that this feeling that he is 
alv-mys being persecuted -is projected on his youth some 
thirty years afterwards when he writes his Confessions. 
Poulet comments on Rousseau's fragmentation of time1 ) 
that it "has dismembered, so to speak, the different parts 
of our inner being, and the sensing of our existence is 
clouded by it. By our desire vle live in the future, by our 
passions in the past, by our sensations in the presento Our 
l (~) is cut up at different points in the duree. We have 
to do with the opposite of concentrating all the strength 
of our being comprehended by the soul in the present in-
stant." What ,we have in Rousseau's fragmentation of time is 
really a destruction of the unity of the person through the 
absence of a now in Van Peursen's sense of the word. The 
human person ceases to be directed and ceases to give a 
"sense to this word is.,n 
The whole of Rousseau's Confessions tells us of this 
dismemberment of personality~ The author gives only elements 
(and these in no particular order) which the reader must 
1) Etudes sur le Temps Humain, Chapter 10, Page 170. For 
the original French see Chapter Note 26." 
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assemble for himself. 1 )so he tells us:2 )"As in general, ob-
jects make less impression on me than my meor~es of them, 
and since all my ideas assume the form of images, the first 
traits which imprinted themselves on my mind have remained 
there and those which subsequently imprinted themselves on 
it have rather combined with them than effaced them. There 
is a certain succession of effective states and ideas which 
modify those that follow them and which must be known in 
order to be .properly grasped. I alv-mys endeavour to de-
velop the first causes in order to make the concatenation 
of effects felt .. " ~ve seem to have here a fragmentation of 
human psychical life as effective in destroying personal 
identity as that of Hume; vve have the same atom-like en-
tities in Galileian space and time.3)we have mentioned th~t 
the Associationist school of psychology sprang from the 
thought of, among others, Hume, but here in Rousseau 1 s phi-·. 
losophy we have the same basic principle. 4 ) 
---------------------------------------
1) Compare Temmer 's simile o{ the br.oken mirror. We shall 
return to Rousseau's method.of presenting the events of 
his life when vle come to consider his views on history. 
2) Confessions, Part 2, Page 171. For the original French 
see Chapter Note 27. 
3) Compare Green's Jean-Jac~~_Bousse.~12:.: _,.!_Qritical Study· 
of his Life and Writi_:g_g_§_, Chapter 1, Page 44: "BUt here, 
surely, Rousseau is the victim of the fallacy that the 
fundamental self of the individual can be recomposed from 
a series of juxtaposed 'elements 1 of psychic states." 
S~e also Chapter Note 28. 
4) See Chapter Note 28. 
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From such a fragmentation of psychical life, and the 
consequences for personal identity i'Jhich must issue from 
it, must necessarily follow the reduction of human beings 
to abstractions in precisely the same way as this reduction 
follows on the destruction of personal identity by Hume. It 
is therefore not surprising that Rousseau who writes that 
bis "too tender a 
resembling it, is 
should also write 
heart ••• being unable to find any existence 
obliged to nourish itself with fancies,"l) 
. 2) 
of his fellow men that they 11 ••••• were 
to my mind nothing but mechanical beings, acting only on 
impulsion, (and) of which I could calculate the actions 
only by the laws of motion •••• in this way their inner dis-
position· ceased to be something to me; I furthermore looked 
upon them only as masses moved somehow, bereft, to my mind, 
of all morality .. u3)Throughout his life Rousseau felt himself 
persecuted by others; when he died he hardly had a friend 
in the world. He quarreled also with Hume who certainly bore 
him no ill will. Having reduced men to abstractions, and 
looking upon them as mere masses of matter, he "Iivas quite 
incapable of meeting them. 
This reduction of men to abstractions by both IIw~1e and 
1) See Page 142 of this studyG 
2) Les Reveries du Promeneur Solitaire (Huitieme Promenade), 
Pages 130 and 131.~or the original French see Chapter 
Note 29. 
3) See Chapter Note 30. 
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Rousseau·. st-rikes deeply into their philosophies; it pene-
trates into the core of their political and moral theories, 
that is why it 'lrras pointed out in the first chapter of this 
study that it is the basic guiding influence in their treat-
ment of human relationships. We can now begin to consider 
that treatment of human relationships. 
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CHAPTER 4 
The R~ified Human,Being in Historz 
(i) 
The question to which we shall find an answer in 
this chapter is: If Hume and Rousseau reduce human be-
ings to abstractions, if they bring about a uniformity 
among human beings through which they cease to be dif-
ferentiated from one another, how do these philosophers 
regard the human scene in that movement of it which 
we call history? This history the Old Testament Hebrew 
regarded as the living out of the relation of the 
Divine Will to human wills in which each person was re-
lated to every other person in the onward flow of a 
God-created time. How do the vievvs of Hume and Rousseau 
contrast with this view? 
The preceding chapters lead us to expect that we 
shall .find in Hume's view on history a tendency towards 
that natural science which tinged the entire Enlighten-
ment period, and in Rousseau's thought a .flight from 
history as we .found there a flight .from time .• This is 
indeed what we do .find. We shall discover, moreover, 
that, as in the end the thought o.f Hume and Rousseau, 
apparently so diverse in nature, have the common out-
come of the reduction of human beings to abstractions, 
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so the thought of both these philosophers lead to a 
view of history as an eternal repetition of events, 
that is, in the thought of neither one or the other is 
there an eschatology as there is in the historiography 
of the Old Testament• In the thought of both our phi-
losophers the study of history becomes an instrument 
which must be made useful, and in the thought of both, 
the use of this study is closely related to the rela-
tionships among human beings that arise from their re-
duction to things which cannot meet. . . ....,_... . 
Hume is most explicit in giving us his view on his-
tory; he does it in one quite short paragraph:l)"~'Ia.nkind 
are so much the same, in all times and places, that his-
tory informs us of nothing new or strange in this par-
ticular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant 
and universal principles of human nature." We have here 
a view on the human scene in terms of what Spengler 
calls the set-fast, 2 )tha~ is, in terms of that about 
which laws can be formulated. But for a better appreci-
ation of the "rigidity" of the human scene as Hume sees 
it, it is worth quoting a longer passage from his essay. 
"It is universally acknovTledged," says Hume, "that there 
l)·Of ;Liberty and Necessity, Section 8 1 Part 1 of~ Enquiry Concerning_Human U~standing, Page 68 of 
Volume 2 of the Essays. 
2) Decline of the \Vest, Introduction, Page 4-9. 
155. 
is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all 
nations and ages, and that human nature remains still the 
same, in its principles and operations. The same motives 
always produce the same actions: The same events follow 
the same causes •••• • Would you knovv the sentiments,. incli-
nations and course of life of the GREEKS an.d ROJ.I.'LANS? Study 
well the temper and actions of the FRENCH and ENGLISH: You 
cannot be much mistaken in transferring to the former ~ 
of the observations, which you have made with regard to 
the latter. 11 Even irregularities in human actions Hume 
looks upon1 )as 11in a manner the constant character of hu-
man nature." There is constancy "noti:vi thstanding these 
seeming irregularities; in the same manner as the winds, 
rain, clouds and other variations of the weather are· sup-
posed to be governed by steady principles," in spite of 
apparent capriciousness. 
We see clearly in this view on history, the eigh-.: ·., 
teenth-century construction of the "universal man 11 which 
has so much in common with the universal falling body, the 
universal expanding gas or the universal compressed fluid. 
This "universal man," we shall find, is the man we meet 
as a citizen in the state reduced by Hume and Rousseau to 
a mechanism. Humeis view of the universe is essentially 
1) pf_Jd-berty and Necessi t.Y,, Page 72 of Volume 2 of the 
Essay~. 
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mechanis~ic;)and it is as no more than a material part 
that man has a place in it. All men in it are similar, 
and history is essentially the "functioning" of humanity 
in a process of repetition in which these parts have their 
places in spatial and temporal isolation. This means that 
the space and time of history become the space and time 
of Galilee's physics. Human beings are then similar to 
pendula; generations that come and go;mark.dff.the CaP-
tesian axis of time in a sort of reciprocating movement. 
Every generation is precisely the same as the one before 
it, but finds itself a little further on in time. 
Now since history is the movement of the parts of a 
machine, the human scene moves according to discoverable 
laws which must really be lmvs of nature, since this 
machine of. which human beings are parts, is nature. irJe 
begin to see the use that the study of history must have 
when we read :2 ) "Hovl could :Q_oli t~ be a science, if lavJS 
and forms of government had not a uniform influence upon 
society? \rJhere would be the foun.:'1ation of morals, if par-
ticular characters had no certain or determinate po'ltrer to 
produce particular sentiments, and if these sentiments 
had no constant operation on actions? 11 Hume's view on his-
1) See Chapter Note l. 
2) Qf L~~rt~ and Nece~ity, Page 73 of Volume 2 of the 
;§§.§.a;y_§_ • 
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tory is inseparable from his idea of himself as a "Newton 
of moral philosophy.rrl)Newton was a man who sought laws 
of nature, hence we find throughout Hume's writings, a 
desire to establish a "science of man" which "is the only 
solid foundation for the other sciences."2 )"There is no 
question of importance, 11 says Hume, "whose decision is not 
comprised in the science of man; and there is none, which 
can be decided.· with any certainty, before we become a-r1.~2. 
quainted with that science. 11 It is clear that, inHume's 
opinion, the study and writing of history must stand in 
the service of this "science of man;" indeed, bistory~is: 
regarded as a handmaiden of the other sciences: "History, 11 
says Hume,3)"is not only a valuable part of knowledge, but 
opens the door to many other parts, and affords materials 
to most of the sciences." 
It is understandable no'lll that Hume 's great work 
should be a 'lllork on human NATURE and not personality, for 
it is human nature that people have in common4 )and is the 
·--------------------------------------------------------1) Hume 's biographer, l\1ossner, seems to consider this an 
important point. He draws our attention to this role 
·.which Hume singled out for himself, in Chapter 10, 
Page 131, of his The Li,£~f David Hu~~· 
2) A Treatise of Human Nature, Introduction, Page 5. V.!e 
find this notion also in Rousseau's thought. 
3) Of the Study o[_Fist9ry, Page 390 of Volume 2 of the 
Essa;r~· 
LJ-) See Chapter Note 2. 
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one element which·can possibly make them amenable to 
treatment according to scientific law and the prediction 
that goes with it. It is human NATURE that is associated 
with the reduction of human beings to abstractions with 
which science can deal. These abstractions have mental 
processes which are subject to definite laws which the 
study .of history can help to elucidate. 1 )Here we find the 
connection between Hume's destruction of personal identity 
and his view on history: his destruction of personal iden-
tity helps to create the "universal man," an abstraction 
of which the movements, with those of other "universal 
men" in Galileian space aad time, create the human scene 
of which the laws are found in history. 2 )so in his Of the 
Rise and Progress_££ t~ciences he sees laws 
in history and explains the cycles of growth and decline 
in past centuries in terms of human nature.3) 
Now if history can help us to understand human na-
ture better, then it can help us to create a better world, 
------·---------------------------------------------------~ l) See Chapter Note 3. 
2) 
3) 
See Chapter Note 4-. 
Compare Stewart's !he Moral and Political ~ilosophy 
of David Hume, Chapter 11, Page 29:3 : " ••.•• we have 
~cyclic theory (of histor~) set forth in Of the 
~se and Progress of the Art~ ~nd Sciences, (174?5 and 
The Natural History of Relig1on tr?57) •.••. The r1se 
and fall of tne-arts and sciences, in short, can be 
explained in terms of human nature and men's circum-
stances." 
that wo;t'.l¢1. w!lich the :Ep.lightenxnent saw as a Utopia. 1 )To 
create a better world was, of course, also Rousseau's 
goal as set in the Social Contract, and we shall return -.-
to the Enlightenment i.deas of progress presently o At this 
point we·merely st;r-ess that the whole point of a "science 
of man" is this better world which it must help to build. 
We must not look upon it as a science for its own sake. 
Through its service to the "science of man" history can 
make. its contribution to this Utopia, but it would not be 
able to do so if .:manl\:ind were not "so much the same in 
all t.imes and places." A view of history as a "story" is 
at variance with the ideals of science and indicates an 
absence of control by man. 2 )In science improvement goes 
hand in hand with control and predictability, hence the 
absence in-Hume's view on history of an eschatology. The 
purpose we find in his philosophy we find in the use of 
the study of history and not in the direction of the move-
ment of history as we do in the philosophy of history of 
the Christian3)and the Old Testament Hebre'l.'ll' .. In._his view 
on history Hume gives the human memory a pragmatic func-
tion, and the contingent has no place in it; hence our 
1) See Chapter Note 5. 
2) See Chapter Note 6. 
3) See Chapter Note 6. 
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. dictum that the Enlightenment (exemplified inHume and 
Rousseau) \'ITishes to substitute progress for history. 
(ii) 
Hume tells us that men are the same at all times and 
everywhere; Rousseau assumes that they are, hence the 
phrase taking men as they~re1 )in the opening paragraph of 
the Social Contract. There would, after all, be no point 
in writing a blueprint for what he considers to be a model 
society if he did not assume this. He also assumes, in 
other words, the possibility of a "science of man," in 
spite of his antipathy to science. So he tells us: "I am 
seeking Right and Reason; I am not arguing about facts."2 ) 
The preface to the Discourse on_yhe Origin of InegualitJ, 
in fact, begins with the statement: "Of all human sciences 
the most useful and most imperfect appears to me to be 
that of mankind ...... For ho\IIT shall we know the source of 
inequality between men if we do not begin by knowing man-
kind?" Furthermore, Emile seems to be based on the assump-
tion that there must be such a science (for educational 
purposes) .. Rousseau clearly thinks in terms of the "uni-
1) See Chapter Note 7· 
2) A sentence in the original draft of the Social Contraci 
quoted by Green in his Jean-J§E_g_ues Rouss~u: A Or~ t-
ical Studh o_f_his Life and Wri ti:g,g,s, Chapter 7, Page 
283. We s all refer to this statement again. 
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versal man 11 of the Enlightenment. "We must then, 11 he says 
in Emil~,l)"generalize our views and consider in our pupil 
man in general --- man exposed to all the accidents of hu-
ma."1 life. 11 One cannot fail to notice too, the frequent use 
in the Social Contra£~ of words such as alw,a;y§_ and ~: 
the priestly interests would always be stronger than those 
of the state, 2 )no state has ~been founded without a 
religious basis,3)and so on. 
With this assumption that men are always and every-
where the same, Rousseau embarks on his prescription for 
a better world with "universal men" moving, as we saw in 
the preceding chapter, in Galileian space and time, as they 
also move in Hume 's philosophy. \rJe find, however, in ad-
dition to the element of "eternal return," a decided ele-
ment of hostility to history in the sense in which the 
Christian and Biblical Hebrew see history. Here we have a 
man who is in history, who makes history and is even, as 
we shall see, prepared to use history, but at the same 
time denies it. History in the sense of a "story,rr of 
course, means change, an.d we are by now aquainted with 
1) Book 1, Page 40~ 9f the Oeuv~~de Rousseau. Cyolume 2): 
"Il faut done generaliser nos vues, et cons~derer dans 
notre eleve l'homme abstrait, l'homme expose a tousles 
accidens de la vie humaine." Note the word ?:.!:'strait. 
2) Th1 Contrat Social, Book 4, Chapter 8, Page 116. 
3) ~· 
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Rousseau's hostility to change. It comes as no surprise, 
therefore, when we find that Rousseau deliberately lifts 
his body politic out of that change and places it in the 
space and time of Galilee's physics, which are the space 
and time::of repetition and consequently of certainty and 
prediction. He tells us that contact of. the Sovereign with 
the things of real time corrupts it, 1 )and takes measures 
to protect it against this corruption. He tells us accord-
ingly that the General Will of the body politic is to be 
taught "to see times and spaces as a series, rr2 )which is as 
Galileo, Hume and all users of the calculus see times and 
spaces. This space and time are the space and time of a 
science, and we must conclude again that Rousseau wishes 
to see human beings in terms of a science, as nature is 
seen by scientists. Here we see again how much Rousseau 
was influenced by the science against which he directed 
his abuse, and we see again how the notion of nature forms 
an underlying bond between Hume 's empiricism and Reus.:..· 
seau's romanti@ism. 
1) Du Contrat Social, Book 2, Chapter 6, Page 96. This ( 
contention by Rousseau is an important one in our at-
tempt to gain an insight in his attitude to time, and 
will be referred to again in the next chapter. 
2) Ibid •.. Tnli.ef.sto..toinept too, is most important. It has 
already been referred to and will be referred to again. 
For the original French see Chapter Note 8. Is this the 
influence of Descartes, or the direct influence of Gali-
lee? 
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All through Rousseau's writings we find a longing for 
the past. In his Confessions he longs for days that he 
spent in quiet picturesque places, and for circumstances 
that could no longer be at the time when he wrote his auto-
biography.1)In the Social Q2_ntre.£!_ he longs for the "good 
old days" of Greece and Rome when, so he thinks, the world 
was a better place. This hostility to history leads Rous-
seau to hide from it in the refuge of archetypes. 2 ) 11The 
Judaic law (of Mos£.§_), rr. he tells us, 3) "which still subsists, 
and that of the child of Ishmael, which, for ten centuries, 
has ruled half the world, still proclaim the great men who 
laid them down ••••• the true political theorist admires in 
the institutions they set up, the great and pmr1erful genius 
which presides over things made to endure." He also mentions 
Lycurgus with approval, 4 )and one cannotescape the the con-
clusion that Rousseau sees himself as a great lawgiver, 
destined to legislate for mankind, 1:1 reappearance in the 
world, so to speak, of Moses, Mohammed, Lycurgus or Solon. 
1) It is in this longing for the past that Rousseau fails to 
make sense of time in his autobiography. One expects an 
autobiographer to establish some connection between him-
self and the passing events of his time. This Rousseau 
fails to do. See Chapter Note 9o 
2) See Chapter Note 10. 
3) Du Contrat Social, Book 2, Chapter 7, 
original French see Chapter Note 11. 
4) Ibido, Page 98. 
Page 101. For the 
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He betrays himself in this respect in a short sentence in 
the Confessions where he relates how angry he became when 
his cousin was ridiculed by a crowd of young hooligans, and 
actually started a brawl in his defence. "Behold," he says, 
"me already a redresser of wrongs." The word alread.y1 )is 
the eloquent word in this remark. 
Rousseau's Confessions do not tell us of a man who 
stands at a ~ as the heart of his personal time which en-
compasses other persons by the overlapping of spaces and 
times and which describes the becoming of the world to him 
by its movement; consequently Rousseau cannot see the move-
ment of the human scene which i~ history, as a movement 
which is brought about by the interrelationship of htunan 
beings. Rousseau, it must be borne in mind, is cut off from 
his fellow men, so that we have in the Confessions no con-
sciousness of a connectedness between the becoming of the 
author and the becomi~g of the world of human persons. We 
have, instead, nothing more than a collection of incidents, 
not necessarily in the correct chronological order, not 
necessarily true, and betraying a lack of historic sensitiv-
ity, if by historic sensitivity we mean a consciousness of 
1) Book 1, Volume 1, Page 53: "Me voila deja redresseur des 
torts." I cannot see that the word alreadz. can indicate 
anything else. If Rousseau did not look upon himself as 
a (future) master lawgiver, why did he use this word 
here? See also Chapter Note 12. 
1 
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the relatedness of one's own becoming to the becoming of 
the world. In this context it cannot go unnoticed that in 
the Confessions Rousseau gives us, at the very beginning1 ) 
where he describes his boyhood, a character sketch of him-
self as a man some thirty years older, as if in those thir-
ty years he had undergone no changeo One might say that in 
this ~vork which we are asked to look upon as the author's 
autobiography, Rousseau sho'VITS no concern over "making sense 
of himself" in the context of the world about him. 
The sharpest contrast one can find in the literature: 
of the world with respect to life descriptions is perhaps 
the contrast bet"~:men Rousseau's Confessions and the Old 
Testament books of the Prophets. In the latter we have, not 
only what these ancients regarded as a direct communion 
with God, but a consciousness of every Prophet of the ... · 
closest connection between himself and the events of his 
time. In this context we can couple the Con.fessions with 
Greek literature in .which autobiography and biography are 
almost completely non...:.existent~)while in the works of the 
dramatists of the classical period we have no character 
develo£~eni, and situations instead of ~uree. The absence 
1) Part 1, Book 1, Page 67. 
2) Plutarch is perhaps an exception, but he came long after 
the classical period~-- after the-beginning of the· 
Christian era, 
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of the con_~ection between the person and the events ~f the 
human scene in the Confessions makes this work a flight 
from history, and this flight Rousseau also projects on his 
treatment of human relationships in his political works. 
Prof. Versfeld can consequently point out that the contrast 
between Rousseau and the Old Testament Prophets exists also 
between Rousseau and St.Augustine. Rousseau's Confessions, 
says Prof. Versfeld, 1 )goes with the Social Contract as St. 
Augustine's Confessio~ goes with the City of God. 
We can do no better, if we wish to demonstrate the 
difference in historic sensitivi~y of an Old Testameht 
Prophet on the one hand and Rousseau on the other, than to 
quote with the opening chapter of the Book of Daniel, 2 )the 
opening paragraph of Rousseau's Confessions. (Historic sen-
sitivity we look upon as the consciousness of the connected-
ness of one's own becoming with the becoming of the world)~) 
Daniel begins by telling us of the events of his time: 11In 
the third year of the reign of Jehoikim, King of Judah, 
1 
came Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babylon, unto Jerusalem and be-
sieged it." Only in the sixth verse do we read: "Now among 
---------------------------------------------·-----------------
1) Rousseau's Moral and Religious Views and their Con-
sequences. We sfiafr examine the timelessness of the 
social contract body politic presently. 
2 )' See Chapter Note 13. 
3) See Chapter Note 14. 
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these (those taken into exile) were of the Children of Ju-
dah, Daniel, Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah •••• " Compar~d 
with this there is a decided ring of arrogance and aloof-
ness from the world and its becoming in the opening lines 
of the Confessions: "I wish to show my readers a man in all 
the truth of natu.re; and I shall be that man. "l) We shall 
return to these words presently; we are concerned at the 
moment only with what they can tell us about Rousseau's 
historic sensitivity. One is struck by the narrowness of 
the now which must be Rousseau's, for it encompasses rea:ly 
only Rousseau himself, whereas we find that the ~of 
Daniel encompasses every member of his pe.ople, in fact, a 
span of the future history of the world as well as its past. 
We have in Daniel's a now which, so to speak, approximates 
to the eternal "now-ness" of his God, but the now of Rous-
seau centres on his own nature, and encompasses his fellmv 
men only as objects. It is, in the light of the rest of his 
Confessions and his other works, not the heart of a real 
time which, in moving, describes the events of his world. 
(iii) 
Now Hume wrote history; and the question might well be 
asked: '\Nhy did he 'lrvrijie history, and what are the charac-
1) "Je veux montrer a mes semblables un homme dans toute la 
verite de la nature; et cet homme ce sera moi." 
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teristics given to his historiography by his views on his-
tory? The first marked characteristic of his history writ-
ing is that he does not proceed with his treatment of events 
according to the chronological order of these events. It is 
as if he wishes to confirm his judgment that it does not 
matter when or where one observes events, since they are 
merely a rep~tition of events somewhere else and at some 
other time. 1 )He commences then, vlith events in the Britain 
of the Stuarts and ends with events in Roman times. 2 )0ne 
cannot fail to notice here too, the sharp contrast with the 
historic sensitivity of the Old Testament Prophets. We find 
inHume's history, not an intention to describe a becoming, 
but an intention to put the events which he describes, to a 
use, that use being service to the "science of man." His 
age had clear-cut ideas, ready-made by philosophers (in con-
flict, more often than not, with the established Ch~rch) on 
society, justice and morality, and these went into BUrne's 
historiography.3)The result was, furthermore, that Hume's 
1) It must be borne in mind that BUrne wrote history in 
terms of the "universal.man" of the Enlightenment. See 
Chapter Note 15. 
2) His first volume (published in 1754) covers the reigns 
of James I and Charles I. His second (1756) covers the 
period from 1649 to 1689. He then wrote two more volumes 
covering the Tudor dynasty and then another two on medi-
aeval England .• By 1761 he had completed his history of 
England from Julius Caesar to William III. 
3) See Chapter Note 16. 
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history was written without really thorough research and 
scholarship. 1 )He had, however, ideas concerning the task of 
the historian as clear-cut as the ideas of his age on so-
ciety, justice and morality. That task was to serve these 
ideas and to improve the world. "The history of all ages," 
he wrote in a preface for the second volume on the Stuarts~) 
-- and we note the words 9f all ages --- "and none more 
than that of the period, which is our subject, offers us 
examples of the abuse of religion; and we have not been 
sparing, in this volume more than in the former, to remark 
them ••••••• The historian, therefore,. o. ~.may retain the 
highest regard for true piety even while he exposes all the 
abuses of the false." 
Nmv as Hume wrote history, and no autobiography as a 
major literary work, so Rousseau wrote autobiography but no 
1) Compare Greig 1 s David hume, Chapter 20, Page 267: "We 
need not waste time examining his 'antient English His-
tory. 1 He undertook the task lightly, and performed it 
in the same spirit. It is readable, of course, but not 
history. He vlrote it with his feet up on a couch." In a 
footnote Greig says: "Henry Mackenzie says that this is 
literally how he wrote the book --- which may or may not 
be true. Metaphorically, it is indisputable." See Chap-
ter Note 17. 
2) This passage is taken from the original draft, according 
to Messner (Life of David Hume, Pages 306 to 307). The · 
preface was never published, says Stewart on Page 392 of 
his The Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume, 
but its essence appears as a footnote in the volume for 
which it was meant to be a preface. Hume wrote it be-
cause he was surprised at the criticism roused by his 
first volume on the Stuarts. 
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history~ But the question can still be asked: What sort of 
history would he have written, had he written history? 
There is much history in the Social Contract, though this 
work was not meant to be historical;)and the history we 
find there gives us a clear indication that, had Rousseau 
written history, it would also have been utilitarian. One 
of its uses would have been that of a weapon against the 
Christian Church. "Of all the Christian writers," he says~) 
"the philosopher Hobbes alone has seen the evil ('that 
whenever the clergy is a corporate body, it is master and 
legislator of its own country') and how to remedy it. But 
he should have seen that the masterful spirit of Christi-
anity is incompatable with his system, and that the priest-
ly interests would always be stronger than that of the 
state." (In the Middle Ages, of course, th~ interests of 
the state and the "priestly interests" could be thought of 
, as not in conflict; the notion that that conflict must be 
there, was part of Rousseau's heritage of dualisms). He 
continues:"I believe that if the study of history were de-
veloped from this point of view, it would be easy to refute 
the contrary opinions of Bayle and Warburton, one of whom 
1) We find something similar in Macchiavelli's writings. 
One short quotation from The Prince will suffice to show 
how a ruler must £~history. See Chapter Note 18. 
2) Du Contrat Social, Book 4, Chapter 8, Page 200. 
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holds that religion can be of no use in the body politic, 
while the other, on the contrary, maintains that Christi-
anity is its strongest support. We should demonstrate to 
the former that no state has ever been founded without a 
religious basis, and to the latter, that the law of Chris-
tianity at bottom does more harm by weakening than good by 
strengthening the constitution of the state."l) 
It is clear that this particular use o.f history against 
the Christian Church must be seen in the context of the 
wide·r use it would have for Rousseau .in his idea of creat-
ing a better world. We shall find that he actually replaces 
the Sovereignty of God vli th the Sovereignty of the General 
Will, V>Thile the Christia.11 of the I'·1iddle Ages looked upon 
God as the Sovereign of the state. Rousseau continually re-
fers us to past civilizations (Greece and Rome)2 )and a state 
of things which no longer exists (or no longer exis~ed in 
his time), as if to tell us that the world has deteriorated 
and must be saved somehow.3)The remedy he proposes is, of 
course; the state as he sees it in the e£Ci~_C£~tract. The 
use of history in demonstrating to us the superiority of 
-------------------- ~---------
1) See Chapter Note 19·for the original French. 
2) See, for instance, Book 3, Chapter 12 and Book 4, Chap-
ter 4 of the Social Contract, but there are many other 
instances. ------ ----
3) See Chapter Note 20. 
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past communities must, in its turn, be seen together with 
the notion, already referred to, that by contact with the 
.things of time the General vvill is corrupted.l \ve have here 
a pessimism which anticipates Spengler, and \r-Te shall return 
to it towards the end of this chapter. Eut one must not in-
fer that because Rousseau refers us to the past, he looks 
upon the i;nstitutions of the future as possibly growing 
from those of the paste On the contrary, we shall find in 
the next chapter that he sees in the established order of 
his day the evils of things to come, and wishes to break 
with the past. 2 )There \NOUld, after all, be no point in Rous-
seau's or anyone's establishing a fixed pattern for society 
such as the Social Contract is meant to establish if he 
thought that the coming of the Utopia could be left to his-
tory and evolution. The Soc.ial Contract is an attempt to 
break the cycle of birth, expansion, decay and death3)which 
is the life-course of a society as Rousseau sees it in 
history. 
One must also not be delucled into thinking that men 
change in the course of this cycle; men are everywhere and 
at all times the same, and merely corrupted, like the Gene-
1) Du Contrat Social, Book 2, Chapter 6, Page 96. See also 
Chapter 7 and Book 3, Chapter 10. 
2) See Chapter Note 21. 
3) See Chapter Note 22. 
ral \vill, by the things of time such as science and culture 
as is Rousseau's judgment in his Discourse on phe Origin of 
Ineg_uali t;y: and his Discourse on the ArtsE9:..__Sciences to 
which more attenti'on will be given in the next chapter.~ 
It is precisely because the Social Contract is meant 
to be a £ermanent blueprint for society that we are just-
ified in saying that it is timeless and removed from his-
tory.1)In this context it must be pointed out that there is 
no social contract event in history; the social contract is 
a device and not a historical event, 2 )though we shall find 
in the next chapter that Rousseau may have considered it as 
a possible historical event. 
(iv) 
Rousseau' attack on the Christian Church and Hume's 
view on history both raise the question of what the posi-
tion of God is in the thought of these two philosophers. It 
will be remembered that it was pointed out ·in Chapter 1 
that .the reduction of human beings to abstractions develops 
in the erid into a question of what to do with God. This 
question leads, in turn, to the question of progress, mo-
rality and freedom in philosophies in which history as a 
11story 11 is denied. vie have seen that the :Biblical Hebrew 
1) See Chapter Note 23. 
2) See Chapter Note 24. 
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and the Christian find a purpose of their God in this 
"story .• " History describes a becoming, and through his 
choice and ac.tion the human person stands at the core of 
this becoming u .And since his no\\r encompasses not only his 
own actions, but also his fellow men and their actions, mo-
rality is involved in human relationships and both become 
historic. 
But if one's ~encompasses only objects, as does that 
of Rousseau, one's morality cannot be established by this 
~which, by its movement, describes the becoming of the 
human scene. Morality must then have its source outside 
real time which has this now as its heart, and cannot be 
historic 0 vve shall find that this is so in the thought of 
both our philosophers. Rousseau says in the Social Contract: 
"Each of us puts his person and all his power in common un-
der ~he supreme direction of the general will, and, in our 
corporate capacity, we receive each member as an individual 
part of the vi hole. At once, in place of the individual per-
sonality of each contracting party, this act of association 
creates a moral and collective body, 1 )composed of as many 
1) We shall analyse this passage again in a subsequent chap-
ter to show that "this act of association" actually ren-
ders a person will-less; attention is here dravm to the 
words in place of the individual_persona~each_co~­
!E.§:.Cting par~. We must take these words as they stand. 
If Rousseau did not mean that the individual's person-
ality is ~§:_£ed, he should not have used these words. 
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members as the assembly contains votes, and receiving from 
this act its unity; its common identity, its life and its 
.. l. l ul) 
w~ • 
We notice that Rousseau's source of morality is not 
the free association of men in a becoming of the world, but 
"this act of association" in which the word association 
does not indicate an I-Thou relationship, since Rousseau 
sees men as "masses moved somehmrJ, bereft (to my mind) of 
all morality." There cannot, therefore, be a confluence of 
spaces and times; in fact, Rousseau need not tell us that 
he sees men as masses of matter to make this clear, since 
he tells us in the passage quoted above that the Eersonal-
ities of the individuals are replace~. For Rousseau the 
good is "the birth of a simple moment" (the act of associ-
ation); it is the "product of a single effort,"2 )and not a 
becoming in history as a "story." 
There are, to be sure, relationships between a man and· 
the 11\'lrhole" in Rousseau's state, but this whole, "composed 
of as many members as the assembly contains votes, 11 and a 
thing with a "common identity 11 (which abstracts, therefore, 
from the separate identities- of those who compose it), can 
hardly be a persono Rousseau says of the subjects of the 
1) Book 1, Chapter 6, Page 68. See Chapter Note 25 for the 
qr:i:ginal French. 
2) See Chapter Note 23o 
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state that "as a member of the sovereign he is bound to the 
individuals, and as a member of the state to the sove~ _ 
reign."1 )These words bound to, we have just seen, can have 
no bearing on historic I-Thou relationships and must there-
fore refer to a m·ere mechanical attachment in Galileian 
space and time. Rousseau tells us that the state is a per-
son2)with a will (the General Will), but in the absence of 
concreteness it can be a person only in the sense in which 
a company is a person in law.3)we shall return to this point 
in the next chapter; we note here merely that Rousseau's 
Sovereign is too abstract to be "directed 9 " that is, to 
allow the establishment of ~~ relationships. 
We also defer a discussion of the nature of morality 
in the thought of our two philosophers to the next chapter, 
and note here simply that it is ahistoric. The ahistoric 
nature of this morality, however, raises the question of 
the position of God. If God is the God of time and history 
(and therefore the source of historic morality) as He is to 
the Biblical Hebrew and Christian, then He can have no con-
nection with an ahistoric morality. He cannot, in any sense, 
-----------------------------------------~------------ - ------1) Du Contrat Social, Book 1, Chapter 7, Page 69. For the 
original French see Chapter Note 26. 
2) Discourse on Political E~~' Page 236 of the Every-
man's volume:-
3) In the Social Contract Rousseau admits that the state is· 
a Eersona ficta. (Book 1, Chapter 7, Page 71). See Chap-
ter Note 2?. 
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be regarded as a lawgiver. Now when Rousseau makes "this 
act of association" by which the General Will comes into 
being, the source of morality, he at once replaces God with 
the General Will. This he confirms when he tells us that 
the Sovereign is "in the position of an individual who 
makes a contract with himself" so that there "neither is, 
nor can be any kind of fundamental laws binding on the body 
of the people--- not even the social contract itself."l) 
If the social contract itself, which is the source of mo-
rality, cannot be binding on the Sovereign, we must con-
clude that the laws of God cannot hold for it either, es-
pecially since the Sovereign is not created by God, but by 
"this act of association," and "draws its being wholly 
from the sanctity of the contract."2 ) 
Any doubt one might have concerning the replacement of 
God by the General Will, is removed by Rousseau's assurance 
that the General Will is infallible and impeccable,3)and 
"can never bind itself, even to an outsider, to do anything 
derogatory to the original act, for instance to alienate 
any part of itself, or to submit to another sovereign."4 )It 
1) Du Contrat Social, Book 1, Chapter 7, Page 69o For the 
original French see Chapter Note 28. 
2) Ibid., Page 70: "-. ••• ne tirant son etre que de la sain-
tete du contrat •••• " 
3) I£i£., Book 2, Chapters 3 and 4. 
4) Ibid., Book 1, Chapter 7, Page 70. For the original 
French see Chapter Note 29. 
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can hardly be doubted that Rousseau makes God an "outsid-
er"1)since God has no part in the contract; and even if God 
were in some way a Sovereign, the General Will still could 
not submit to Him. 
In addition to this clear exclusion of God from the 
regUlation of relationships betweep men, we have in the 
Socia!_Contract an equally clear expression of the author's 
hostility to the established Christian Church of his day. 
This hostility, we can hardly doubt, sprang precisely from 
the question of sovereignty and the 11sanctity" of the social 
contract. If the body politic were to recognize God as the 
Sovereign, it would mean that the General Will alienates a 
part of itself and submits to another Sovereign. There is 
a gulf between the state with God as the Sovereign, and the 
social contract state with the General Will as the Sove-
reign, which Rousseau cannot bridge. He is forced to sur-
render the one or the other, and he surrenders the sove-
reignty of God. Hence his attacks on the servants of the 
Church. He does not regard priests as good citizens or 
makers of good citizens, for they want to be legislators, 2 ) 
and turn the attention of the people away from the consti-
tution of the state. In any case, the General Will would not 
1) Kant's philosophy has a somewhat similar outcome. See 
Appendix 10. 
2) Du Cont~_§.£_ci~~' Book 4, Chapter 8, Page 200. 
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be safe in the hands of Christians, for they do not care 
enough for the sovereignty of the General Will, and are 
interested only in the sovereignty of God.. They are, we 
must conclude, some of the things of time which corrode the 
General Will. A truly Christian state could not last, Rous-
seau thinks. 1 )The reason he gives is Christian meekness, 
that is, the philosophy of turning the other cheek. A single 
Catiline or Cromwell (Rousseau iooks upon these two as 
"self-seekers") would become master of a Christian state in 
a short time. 11 Christianity preaches only servitude and de-
pendence." "True Christians are made to be slaves, and they 
know it and do not much mind: this short life counts for 
too little in their eyes. 11 For the Christian, says Rousseau, 
"the essential thing is to get to heaven, and resignation 
is only an additional means of doing soon Rousseau's final· 
summing-up is that nChristianity as a religion is entirely 
spiritual, occupied solely with heavenly things; the coun-
try of Christianity is not of this world .• n 
If Rousseau's philosophy was an undermining of the 
Christian religion, Hume's was a devastation of it. His ar-
guments constitute a veritable arsenal for the atheist, even 
------·----------
1) DL1 Contrat Social, Chapter 8, Book 4-, Pages 204- to 205 .. 
See Chapter Note 30 for the original French of the rele.,.-
vant passage. One notices how abstract Rousseau's Chris-
tians are, how they can be collected as a class of things 
without differentiation between members of the classG 
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though Hume himself professed, throughout his life, some 
sort of belief in a. Supreme Being. This Supreme Being he 
needs, as we have seen, as a mechanic to start his mechan-
ism, but beyond that his thought destroys all the certitude 
which the Christian looks upon as given by revelation. Hume 
being an empiricist, tells us that, since our ideas cannot 
reach further than our experience we can have no lmowledge 
of divine attributes and operations. Accordingly natural 
reason does not permit us to judge otherwise than that the 
scope and intention of man's creation is limited to the 
.present life.l) We can now understand Hume's indifference, 
one could almost say contempt, towards the New Testament, 
which we find in his works on questions relating.to re-
ligion.2) 
Hume•s view mn history and his method and purpose when 
he writes history are in direct opposition to the Christian 
view of history as a "story. rr3 )The events of the human '3CS 
scene as Hume sees them, are, we have established, an in-
finite repetition "ticking off" Galileian space and time. 
God, therefore, cannot be the creator of space and time; 
space and time must be "just there" as the result of things 
l) See his Essay Q_n Imm9rtalit;y: 
2) See Chapter Note 31. 
3) See Chapter Note 32. 
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and events which give us a sensation of them. It follows, 
therefore, that morality cannot be historic and must, as 
for Rousseau, have a source outside real space and time. As 
in the philosophy of Rousseau, it is "designed" to keep the 
peace between men in a state of conflict; this "design" 
will occupy our attention in the next two chapters. Moral-
ity in the thought of our two philosophers, we shall find, 
stems from the regulation of the motions of particles of 
matter in Galileian space and time; it is utilitarian~ 
lrJhen Hume writes philosophy and history to combat pre-
judice and superstition, he includes under this heading 
much of the Christian fai tho F.is history must therefore be 
coupled with his religious vievrs, and the ~~ which both 
must have, serves as the connecting link between them. He 
does not believe in miracles and concludes (rightly, no 
doubt) that one cannot be a Christian unless one does. 1 ) 
This repudiation of the Nev.r Testament goes with his views 
of God as a mechanic, 2 ) and his view of himself as a "Be-vvton 
of moral philosophy,n a man who seeks .laws of morality out-
side history as a "story, 11 in periodicity and away from God 
whom he cannot observe,3)and must assume, from his observa-
tions of the world around him, to be a mechanic --- if He 
1) See his ~~@.§;LQ.B_!iirac~e§_. 
2) See Chapter Note 1. 
· 3) See Chapter Note 33. 
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exists at all. Since his,tory is, in Hume 's opinion, no~ a 
unique series of events in linear time, one must expect him 
to repudiate with the New Testament, also the Old Testament 
as a "story" of revelation, and certainly as a canon. That 
he does indeed repudiate the whole Bible is hinted at in-a 
conversation which he is reported by his biographer to have 
had with Lord Charlemont concerning Rousseau. The latter, 
he said, "has a hankering after the Bible and is indeed 
little better than a Christian in a vvay of his own. rrl) 
But, as we have seen, ,Rousseau could not have regarded 
the Bible in a light very different from that in which Hume 
regarded ito 2 )He was a believer in natural~~~i0£,3)the 
utilitarian consequences in the context of human relation-
ships of which we defer till the next chapter. Both Hume 
and Rousseau do allow their states to have a religion be-
cause, as Rousseau puts it, "no state has ever been founded 
without a religious basis."4 )God is, in this way, removed 
1) Lord Charlemont: Anecdotes of Hume in RIA, ]\1S-12/R/7 
f.519. Quoted by Mossner in his~fe of David_~~~· 
2) See Chapter Note 34. 
3) Compare Barbara Bray's article on Rousseau's religion in 
the March 1962 issue of the Unesco Courier in which she 
describes Rousseau as the founder of natural religion 
which needs no mediator between God and man. See also 
Chapter Note 34. 
4) Du Contrat Social, Book 4, Chapter 8, Page 201. See also 
Chapter Note 3~ 
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from His position as sustainer of the becoming of the world 
by the living-out of the relation of human wills to the 
Divine Will, and made useful to the state. The important 
point to note inHume's and Rousseau's hostility to Chris-
tianity is precisely that, taking it together with the de-
nial of God as a Sovereign, it removes the state from time 
and history as a divine revelation (as Carlyle puts it). 
They both ask us to think of history in terms of human na-
ture which they wish to study with its aid, and we must 
constantly bear in mind this contrast between history seen 
in terms of human nature (which makes it a constant repeti-
tion) and history as a "story" which is written by human 
personality with the will and choice which it involves. 
The use which God and religion must have for the state 
can, however, become something more than a function of 
binding or cementing the body politic; it can, as we shall 
discover in the penultimate chapter, become an instrument 
of control in the hands of the Sovereign. 
(v) 
The use that history and the writing of it must have 
according to Hume and Rousseau, the use that God and re-
ligion must have, and the utilitarian nature of morality, 
all have a direct bearing on vvhat these two philosophers 
regard progress to be. The cyclic nature of the events of 
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the human scene makes progress, like the good, "the birth 
of a simple moment" and the "product of a single effort." 
It amounts to nothing less than the breaking of the cycle. 
Progress is therefore not a historic growth, but a break 
with history by man. The argument in the thought of our two 
philosophers seems to run along the following lines: Com-
munities and civilizations are born, they grow and expand, 
and ultimately decay and die. In this way cycle after cycle 
comes and goes. Time passes without bringing anything real-
ly new. In every cycle there is human misery, immorality, 
corruption, greed, ignorance, prejudice, superstition and 
hostility between men. If more were known about human na-
ture, education could eliminate the evils that cause the 
. 
decay in societies, and ultimately the Utopia will have 
been established -'-- when man's knowledge of man is com-
plete. Barrett agrees that the Enlightenment vision of the 
future was one in which the cycles of past events will have 
been broken. ·He writes:1 )"In the eighteenth century (how-
ever) the notion of progress enters •••• oHere indeed, in all 
aspects of his life, man vJill have a future that is radic-
ally different from his past. The modern consciousness of 
history thus begins not so much from a new understanding of 
the past as from a radically different expectation of the 
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future •••• The historical vision of the Enlightenment is an 
optimism intoxicated with the possibilities of reason op-
erating in all areas of human life: history will henceforth 
move om·1ard and upward~ if not always in an unvarying 
straight line, at least more or less continuously and with-
out any catastrophic breaks or drops in the curve."l) 
That Hume wishes to break the cycles of past events as 
he sees them, becomes clear when one reads his Political 
Discourses and notes his ideas on moral development in his 
Tre.a~_ise. Here Hume appe{:l.rs to be writing history, but con-
trary to his views on history, we have here traces of a 
"linear" history. 2 )6n a little reflection, however, one 
finds that he is writing what Stewart describes as "specu-
lative history, 11 that is, a history as he would have it if 
it conformed to his iftea of progress, or a history as the 
human scene would have been if the cycles had been broken 
right at the beginning. He treats, as Stewart puts it, the 
logical steps in man's moral advance as chronological steps. 
One might say that Hume here makes use of a device very , _____ _ ________ , ____________________ , 
1) Compare also Bongie's ~~vid H~, Prophet of the Counter-
revolution, Chapter 2? P~l: "Good education for the 
individuar and for the society, good legislation, can 
change man, not overnight of course, but at least in a 
generation •••• history becomes bunk, and progress, even 
indefinite progress, becomes a real possibility." 
2) I regard this as an important point. The apparent con-
flict . requires an e:x:planation.. See Appendix 11. 
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much as Rousseau does when he founds the state on a social 
contract (which is not a historical event). 
In Of the 0E_;h_g:;h_£_£f.__~~ent Hume proceeds in the 
sa.me v1ay, and it is worth quoting from that essay to illus-
trate this: After telling us that men find it necessary to 
protect themselves against their ovm weaknesses, he says: 1 ) 
"J'vlen must therefore endeavour to palliate v,rhat they cannot 
cure. They- must institute some person •••• v1hose peculiar 
office it is, to point out the decrees of equity, to punish 
transgressors, to correct fraud and violence, and to oblige 
men, however reluctant, to consult their o~1 real and per-
manent interests •••• The persons, who first attain this dis-
tinction by the consent, tacit or express, of the people, 
must be endowed with superior personal qualities ••••• and 
after government is established, a regard to birth, rank 
and station has a mighty influence over men, and enforces 
the decrees of the magistrate. The prince or leader exclaims . 
against every disorder, which disturbs his society. He sum-
mons all his partisans and all men of probity to aid him in 
correcting and redressing it •.••• He soon acquires the power 
of rewarding these services; and in the progress of society, 
he establishes subordinate ministers and often a military 
force •••• Habit soon consolidates what other principles of 
1) Pages 114 to 116 of Volume i of the Ess5l~· 
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human nature had imperfectly founded ..... " 
Hume then admits that what. he has written here is "in-
vented history," for he says: "But though the progress o-f 
buman affairs may appear certain and inevitable, and though 
the support which allegiance brings to justice, be.founded 
on obvious principles of human nature, it cannot be expect-
ed that men should beforehand be able to discover them, .or 
foresee their operation. 1 )Governmen~ccommences more casual-
:I.y and more imperfectly.. It is probable that the first as-
cend.ence of one man over multi tudes began during a state of 
war~ where the superiority of courage and of genius dis-
covers itself more visibly •••• the long continuance of that 
~:~tate, an incident common among savage tribes, enured the 
people to submission •••• " 
This 11hy:pothetical history" and his notion of breaking 
the cycles of human existence, must be seen with Hume's 
idea of·prgress in the context of his (and Rousseau's) be-
lief in the possibility of a science of man. This belief, 
we can hardly doubt, stems from his admiration for the ad-
vancement achieved in the natural sciences (to which the 
frequent mention of Ne'ti'Jton 's name bears testimony). Hume 
saw the natural sciences advancing·. on all fronts, yet the 
1) This history must help man to do. Note the distinction 
drawn bet1r1een history and progress in this passage. The 
Enlightenment saw progress as an unbroken and continu-
ous improvement. 
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events on the human scene, as he saw them, could not a-
chieve a breaking away from an eternal repetition in which 
man was ever subject to a decay in society. Naturally then, 
progress in the moral field could only come if a science of 
man were established to break these cycles and bring about 
a progress comparable vdth that of natural science. 1 ) 
In the context of history and progress Rousseau's con-
tention, given in the Social Contract, that the General 
Will is always corrupted by the things of time, goes with 
his view, as found in Emik, 2 )that "]\~en were not made to 
live in crowded ant-heaps, but scattered over the earth 
which they must till. The more gregarious men become, the 
more they corrupt each other." It is this cycle of the birth 
of men in happy isolation from one another, their coming 
together in communities and consequent corruption and final 
death of the community that must be broken. "Do not forget, 
please," Rousseau wrote to Charles Bonnet in 1755,"that ac-
cording to me, society is natural to the human species in 
1) The idea that our two philosophers have of progress as a 
break with history, a single moment, is the very an-
tithesis of that of Kwant. According to Kwant real pro-
gress is always sustained by the past; the world, the 
"humanized world," he calls it, finds a thrust in tradi-
tion. Such was his exposition in a private lecture. 
2) .Book 1, Page 416 of the Oeuvres de Rousseau: "Les hommes 
ne sont pas faits pour etre entasses en fourmilieres mais 
epars sur la terre qu'ils doivent cultiver. Plus ils se 
rassembient, plus ils se corrompent." The growth of 
cities is, of course, history, a product of time. 
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the way that decrepitude is natural to the individual. rrl)\l!e 
have here, not only a hostility to the things which time 
has produced --- towns, cities and industries but a 
forecast of doom for humanity, an anticipation of Spengler's 
doom of culture in the "big city." What it all amounts to 
is, as Green puts it, 2 )that unless human consciousness can 
be reorientated in a more natural direction (that is, real-
ly aw~ from the time pEQce~s !hich has produced cities and 
~dustries) our cult for scientific social progress will 
result in the global extinction of humanity --- for this 
bunching tendency among men occurs everywhere and alwa;ys, 
and man falls from a state of nature into a state of society 
and time. 
(vi) 
The difference between history and progress as the En-: 
lightenment conceived it, is now clear. Progress is not in-
herent in history;3)it has to be made by human interven-
tion.4)Implied in this human intervention is the notion---
1) Quoted by Green in his Jean-Jacgues Rousseau: A Criticel. 




"Nroubliez paS,J6vous prie,-que, selon moi, la societe 
est naturelle a l'espece humaine comme la decrepitude a 
l'individu." 
J~~Jac~ues R££~~eau: A_Qritical Stud;t: of his Life and 
~'i t1.ng§_; Chapter '(, Page :2'85. 
See Chapter Note 36. 
See Chapter Note 37. 
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and this is what is typical of the Enlightenment --- that 
whatever follovlS a certain stage in history, must be better 
than whateverpreceded it if there is·to be progress. 1 )Now 
if the study of history is to be an aid in the study of hu~ 
man nature (which is considered to remain constant) in order· 
to bring about this uninterrupted improvement, then history 
must be the relation of something which shows repetition, 
and its space and time must be those applicable to something 
in which repetition and la'-'T apply, that is, science. As 
soon, hov1ever, as human personality enters into one's con-
sideration of history, the space and time of technics can 
no longer apply, since these are not the space and time of 
personality. On thE? contrary, personal subjective spaces 
and times will be involved, and there will be a confluence 
of these spaces and times. In terms of Buber's thought: 
there. will be a E.E_esence of persons to one another, and if 
we accept God as a person, there will be the presence of 
God who will direct history through His presence. History 
cannot then be the relation of events vJhich exhibit the same 
repetition as do the pistons in their motion in an internal 
combustion engine. 
But in the thought of our tvvo philosophers, in which 
history is associated with human nature, men immediately 
1) See Chapter Note 38. 
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contract to isolated mass particles which cannot be present 
to one another, and, since personality is excluded from his-
tory, God as a person is excluded and no longer directs his-
' 
tory to a purpose. Hence progress must replace history and 
the movement of the human scene is made purposeless. His-
tory seen in terms of personality is brought about by the 
action and choice by which personality is gained and pre-
served; history seen in terms of human nature is devoid of 
human actions and men move, as Rousseau sees them, in ac-
cordance with the laws of mechanics. 
It seems clear that in a picture of events on the hu-
man scene as cyclic, men must be quite choiceless. They are 
caught in a trap of never-ending sameness out of which they 
have never succeeded in escaping. One might think that hu-
man intervention such as the writing of the Social Contract ...;...;.._...___...._ _
and Hume's condemnation of prejudice and superstition, gives 
men the opportunity of breaking the sameness by choosing to 
do so, but it turns out that we have to do with a spurious 
choice, ,and that, in the end, men are controlled into the 
"new order.".This we shall examine in the next two chapters; 
we end this chapter with a short comtemplation (for the sake 
of interest) of the characteristics of a society "reformed" 
to conform to the principles of our two philosophers. 
The linew order" has to come about by application of a 
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better knowledge of the ~ of the science of man. Men are 
still abstractions which are amenable to prediction.· They· 
are given their morality by the General Will which makes 
the laws, and are not to think, individuallyt what is right 
and what is wrong. In fact, Rousseau tells us quite clear~ 
ly1 )that a man's private will must sometimes conflict with 
the General Will, but there is no doubt about which will 
prevail in the mrucing of laws. In this way morality becomes 
utilitarian and religion an instrument of control, for men 
are particles of matter, spatially and temporally isolated 
from and exclusive of one another, moving in Galileian space 
and time, and have to be prevented from clashing. 
Since one of Hume's postulates is that men are not par-
ticularly interested in one another's welfare and are basic-
ally selfish, it is difficult to see that his philosophy, 
in spite o.f its condemnation of prejudice and superstition, 
and its purpose of making society better, is any less pes-
simistic than that of Rousseau~)We do not find any explicit 
forecast of doom in it, but it seems to imply that unless 
humanity mends its ways, that doom will surely follow. It 
furthermore gives rise to pessimism, for we cannot escape 
the question: Will a society created on Hume's principles 
0--~---------------------------------·---EM ~-
1) Du Contrat Social, Book 1, Chapter 7, Page 71. 
2) See Chapter Note 39. 
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really be better than the one he is trying to correct? He 
"' gives us no reason to believe that his will not be a society 
of absolute dull uniformity in which men will be as abstract 
as he made them in order to establish his science of man~ 
They will not be good or bad because their·morality will be 
imposed on them by the General Will~ There will be no march 
of events on the human scene, that is, there 'lrlill be no his-
tory created by human personality; there will not even be 
cycles of events, for these vlill have been eliminated by the 
establishment of continuous improvement in the place of his-
tory. Society ~trill me:rely exist 'lfli thout end or purpose ;1 )it 
will have been removed from time and change, and the only 
space and time left to it will be the space and time of the 
motions of its reified citizens, which are the space and 
time of Galileo 's ph~rsics., Will such a Utopia not be self-
contradictory? It seems that in the absence of an escha-
tology in Hume's (and Rousseau's) progress, we are left with 
a kind of nihilism. 
This society --- it is also the society which Rousseau 
wishes to see created --- for vvhich only the space and time 
of Galileian physics are left as frames of reference against 
which motions of people 'lrfho cannot ~' are projected, will 
now be studied in greater detail. 
--------------------~---------------·----------·----------------
1) See Chapter Note 40. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The State and its Laws. j.n Derived Space and Time 
(i) 
When we bring the contents of the Social Contract 
into conjunction with Rousseau's other works which re-
late to man and society, it is hardly possible to con-
clude otherwise than that he did not look upon man as a. 
"political animal." Indeed, it is difficult to see that 
man can b.e .a "political animal" in any theory of the 
state based on a social contract. The reason is the ele-
ment of hostility in this theory which has as a basic 
assumption homo homini lupus.1 )For Aristotle, on the 
other band, man is a "political animal" (or what is the 
sai!le·thing, a "social animal") because he is born into 
the company of other men and wants to be in it. There is 
a directedness in Aristotle's men which we do not find 
in the men of the social contract; Aristotle's men~' 
because they cannot come into existence if they do not. 
But bearing in mind what the views of Hume and Rousseau 
on history are, we cannot expect a view on man in soci-
ety from either of our two philosophers comparable with 
that of Aristotle; for them the human scene consists of 
1) See for instance Hobbes' views on society in Chap-
ter Note 7. 
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masses of matter moving in spatial and temporal isolation 
like the parts of a machine, and it is by something more 
than coincidence that both refer to the state as a ma-
chlne.l) 
Aristotle held that the City was invented to preserve 
life and existed to further the good life. 2 )compare with 
this judgment Rousseau's letter to Charles .Bonnet: "Do not 
forget, please, that according to me society is nat'!lral to 
to the human species in the way that decrepitude is nat-
ural to the 'individual." For Aristotle a man's need of 
other men is natural and makes him necessary to·society; 
for Rousseau a man's need of other men is an insufficien-
cy, and makes society necessary to him. We must note in 
this context that Rousseau's letter to Bonnet indicates 
that he is hostile to society in general, any society, and 
not only to the society of the France of his time or some 
other particular society •. If we interpret this letter in 
any other way, we should be giving it a meaning which it 
does not have, and it would then certainly contradict the 
judgment which its writer gives in Emil~: the more gre-
1) Rousseau in Du Contrat Social, Book 2, Chapter .7, Page 
97, and Burne in Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth, Volume 
1, Page 493 of tne Essays. We snall quote the relevant 
passages in due course. 
2) See his Politics, Book 1, Chapter 2, Pages 3 to 4-., For 
:A:ristot·le the state really precedes the individual 
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garious men become, the more they corrupt one another. 1 ) 
It would then, in fact, contradict the whole of his judg~ 
ment on society as we find it in his two Discourses. In 
these he attributes the ills of mankind to the growth of 
society, the arts and the sciences. Rousseau's hostility, 
we may be certain, is towards human society in general 
and not specifically towards the society which his writ-
ings helped to set on fire towards the end of the eigh- · 
teenth century. 
This hostility permeates the Social Contract in no 
uncertain way in its author's wish to break with what his-
tory had produced in his day, that is, in this work Rous-
seau's hostility to time and his hostility to society be-
come closely connected. The society to which he is so 
hostile is what Bergson would call an accumulation, a 
product of time. We might say that Rousseau's hostility 
to time manifests itself as an antipathy towards society. 
It seems certain that Rousseau wrote the Social Contract 
from the point of vievJ' that man is really not a "political 
animal," but that since he has been corrupted by his own 
------------------------------------------1) We shall find, presently, that this judgment by Rous-
seau can be connected with a characteristic of the 
Sovereign in the Social Contract, namely its corrupt-
ibility by the thJ.ngs of time. It lies at the root of 
the control of men in society which issues from Rous-
seau's treatment of human relationships, and must affect 
our judgment of his plea for government by consent. See 
also Chapter Note 1. 
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advancement in time and has become insufficient in himself 
and dependent on others,1 )he is now in society and must 
get along with his fellow men somehow. Rousseau must, in · 
other words, "justify the abandonment by uncivilized man 
of his natural liberty and primitive happiness"2 )by find-
\l 
ing some form of subjection to society which will, as far 
as possible, preserve the isolation of individuals from 
one another. Time has brought men into society, and Rous-
seau must, as far as possible, undo the damage of time. 
Green appears to be very much under the impression 
of the hostility of men towards one another which perme-
ates the Social Contract. According to him3)the question 
of hmr1 man came to live in society was always a mystery to 
Rousseau who was convinced that political society was 
never comprised in nature's plan. He thinks that Rousseau 
actually d,id, at least at a certain stage of his life, re-
·--------·-·------
1) We find a similar notion in Plato's Republic, though 
Plato does not condemn society because men are mutu-
ally dependent. In Book 2 (Page 60) Socrates says: "A 
State, I said, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs 
of mankind; no one is self-sufficing, but all of us 
have many wants. Can any other origin of the State be 
imagined?" Adeimantus then replies: "There can be no 
other." 
2) Green: Jean-J~cgu~s Rousseau: A Critical S~dy of his 
Life and Writ~n~, Chapter 7, Page 2B3. 
3) Ibid., Page 286. Certainly Rousseau was always attr~ct­
edlby the micro-world rather than the macro-world; ~f 
there must be societies, let them be small. 
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gard the establishment of the social contract as a his-
torical event; or to have had sonie.historical event as a 
background. Green writes: "Civilized society aswe know 
it, he (Rousseau) thinks, originated in a series of ter-
rible accidents which forced men to choose between extinc-
tion and an association based on a pact which seemed 
equitable but was really a cunning trick to enslave them, 
invented by a clever minority who exploited the simplicity 
of the ignorant masses. Now this hypothesis, vfhich is co~­
tained in the second Discourse, 1 )does not reappear in the 
Social Contract ...... " In ..;this work, of course, Rousseau 
simply says that he does not know how it all happened, and 
we have established that he and his contemporaries, cer-
tainly his contemporaries, did not care very much. But 
Green is not satisfied that Rousseau did not think ~bout 
the matter, even though he may not have taken much trouble 
to go into facts. Green continues : "It is, hovvever, a 
painfully evident fact that our primitive ancestors some-
hmnT took the wrong turning. Yet they might just as easily 
have taken the right one leading to a very different kind 
of political association. Rousseau now takes us back to 
that crucial bifurcation and speculates on what might have 
occurred had there been no clever, rich and guileful mi-




nority, but only a mass of simple, bewildered and desperate 
individuals like the 'independent man' in the original ver-
sion of·the Social Contract. Given such a situation, what 
kind of association would have been most likely to appeal 
to the individual and best calculated to ensure his future 
happiness?" 
The answer to this question is given in the Social Con-
tract. 11 Wbat can make it (£olitical socie!l_) legitimate? 
That question I think I can answer."1 )Throughout this answer 
Rousseau is led by the conviction that the becoming of so-
ciety is the source of all those human ills that issue from 
the ine·quali ty of men: 11 ••••• as there is hardly any inequal-
ity in the state of nature, all the inequality which now 
prevails; owes its strength and growth to the development 
of our faculties and the advancement of the human mind, and 
b.ecomes. at last pem.anent and legitimate by the establish-
ment of property .~nd laws."2 )This means, in fact, that man 
is everywhere in chains because of advancement and change, 
those processes at the very heart of which lies time. That 
is why Poulet sees the transition of man from the state of 
nature to the state of society in Rousseau's political phi-
1) Du Contrat Social, Book 1, Chapter 1, Page 55: "Qu 'est-ce 
qui peut rendre-regitime? Je crois pouvoir resoudre cette 
. question. " 
2) Discourse on the Origin of Ine~ualitx, Page 221 of the 
Everyman's volume. See also Page rg~ 
200. 
losophy as a fall, a degradation, into time. 1 )In the phi-
losophy of Aristotle the state is good because it is neces-
sary, and it is necessary because it is good;2 )Rousseau 
makes the state a necessary evil. 
Rousseau sees that the state is necessary, an accom-
plished fact which he cannot undo; he therefore wishes to 
mimimize the evil of the necessity, so to speak. "I mean to 
inquire if in the civil order, there can be any sure and 
legitimate rule of administration, men being taken as they 
are and laws as they might be. In this inquiry I shall en-
deavour ah'll'ays to unite what' right sanctions ~ri th what is 
prescribed by interest in order that justice and utility 
may in no case be divided. "3) Clearly Rousseau here indicates 
that the fall of man into the state of society brings about 
a clash between right.and interests, between justice and 
utility;4 )this is the same as saying that men have come to 
be at war with one another. But this he tells us more ex-
plicitly in his basic supposition:5)"I suppose men to have 
reached the point at which the obstacles in the way of their 
1) See Chapter Note 2. 
2) See Chapter Note 3. 
3) pu Contrat Socia~, Book 1, Introduction, Page 53. For the 
original French see Chapter Note 4. 
4) See Chapter Note 5. 
5) Du Contrat Social, Book 1, Chapter 6, Page 65. For the 
original--French see Chapter Note 6. Rousseau is here not 
far removed from Hobbes. 
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preservation in the state of nature show their power of re-
sistance to be greater than the resources at the disposal 
of each individual for his maintenance in that state •••• the 
human race would perish unless it changed its manner of ex-
istence." 
Rousseau may have thought that the social contract had 
real historical events as a background, but in using this 
expedient to resolve the ills of society, he made use of 
what seems to have been a prevalent idea of the time. Hobbes 
used it, and so did Locke; and we can hardly doubt that the 
reduction of men to isolated masses of matter had made it 
the prevalent idea of the time. Hume did not actually use 
this device, but he did write on politics in a way which 
makes it clear that he had no doubt concerning the hostility 
of men towards one another. In his writings he supposes, as 
does Hobbes, that men have come to be in a state of war with 
one another. 1 ) "Nothing is more certain," he says, 2 ) "than 
p 
that men are, in a great measure govern'd by interest, and 
that even when they extend their concern beyond themselves, 
'tis not to any great distance ••••• 'Tis no less certain that 
'tis impossible for men to consult their interests in so ef-
1) Although Hume repudiates the social contract device, he 
"drifts" into a not very different origin for the state. 
See Appendix 12. 
2) A Treatise of Human Natur~, Book 3, Part 2, Section 7, 
· .]?age ~00. 
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factual a manner, as by universal and inflexible observance 
of the rules of justice, by which alone they can preserve 
society, and keep themselves from falling into that wretch-
ed and savage condition which is commonly represented as 
the state of nature."1 )The only difference between Reus; 
seau's ideas and those of Hume in this. respect seems to be 
that whereas for Hume man is at war with his fellow men in 
the state of nature, for Rousseau he has fallen into that 
state of war because of his fall into society and time. 
Hume supposes that laws (that is, the state) had their 
origin in scarcity, so that scarcity seems to be the cause 
of this war between men. Justice,.upon which Hume looks as 
synonymous with keeping order in society, would be quite 
useless in a world of plenty. "For what purpose make a par-:-
tition of goods," he asks, 2 )"where every one has already 
more than enough? ••••• Why call this object mine when, upon 
the seizing of it by another, I need but stretch out my hand 
to possess myself of what is equally valuable? Justice, in 
that case, being totally USELESS ••••• could never possibly 
have place in the catalogue of virtues." 
Now if the social contract was a prevalent idea of the 
1) See Chapter Note 7. 
2) Of Justice, Section 3 of Concerning the PrinHITiles of 
Morals, Page 180 of Volume ~ of the tssays. - e 1s 
thought seems to be very close to the social contract 
idea here. 
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time of the Enlightenment and the century that preceded it, 
we must expect other ideas prevalent at the time, to lie at 
the root of it. One of these is the idea of mechanism, so 
th~t we find Rousseau resorting, in spite of his antipathy 
to science (which pointed the way to mechanism) and his 
preoccupation with feeling, to a feelingless mechanism. As 
has been pointed out, a mechanism is a thing of which the 
parts are temporally and spatially isolated. We find that 
the state founded on th9 social contract model possesses 
precisely this characteristic of a mechanism. Underlying 
the idea of the social contract, any social contract, is the 
notion that men are isolated from one another in space and 
time1 )(and, we repeat, at war with one another). Human re-
lationships have become clashes of material particles in 
motion, and the state has to be created to regulate these 
motions. Men are then the isolated parts of a mechanism 
which have to be kept in an orderly motion in Galileian 
space and time in that machine. 
Rousseau tells us very clearly that this is how he sees 
men. Though he may in the Social Contract be trying to soft-
en the harshness of Hobbes' Sovereign (the Leviathan, the 
"mortal god"), he sees men no less as particles in motion 
when he says of them that they "are in my opinion nothing 
----·------~------·--------;----~--------------------------------
l) See Chapter Note 7. 
2()4.. 
but mechanical beings, acting only on impulse, of which I 
can calculate the actions only by the laws of motion ••••• 
So it is that their inner disposition ceased to be something 
for me and I looked upon them more as masses of matter moved 
somehow, bereft, to my mind, of all morality."l) 
The expedient of the social contract goes well with 
Rousseau's whole life. The supposition that man is a wolf 
to man.is not strange for a man who continually felt him-
self persecuted by his fellow men and was, through his hos-
tility to the realities of the world and to time, so cut 
off from them that he should write that since he is unable 
to find any existence resembling his own, he is obliged to 
nourish himself with fancies. 2 ) 
(ii) 
Now if men in the body politic are merely masses of 
matter in motion, "bereft of all morality, " as Rousseau· says 
they are to him, then the body politic must derive all mo-
rality in it from outside men, and consequently from out-
side time. We shall find that this is so in the thought of 
our two philosophers. It means, of course, that morality.is 
detached from human personality, of which time is of the 
essence, and made dependent on human nature which all men 
------------------· 
1) For the original French see Chapter Note 29 of Chapter 3. 
2) See Chapter Note 21 of Chapter 3. 
205. 
have in common. Morality is then nothing more than the reg-
ulation of the motions of masses of matter. It must be,that 
is, a morality "foisted" on men, a forced morality. This 
also Rousseau tells us: "The passage from the state of na-
ture to the civil state produces a very remarkable change 
in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, 
and giving his actions the morality they had formerly lack-
ed. "l )Rousseau further confirms that morality is not in men 
bu.t outside them wh~n he says that ".Although he (~) de-
prives himself of some advantages which he got from nature, 
he gains in return others so good •••• that did not the abuses 
of his new condition often degrade him below that which he 
left, he would be bound to bless continually the happy mo-
ment which took h'.m from it .for ever. 112 ) 
This is an important passage in the Social Contract. 
We must note, firstly, the word moment in it. The good is 
the "birth o.f a single moment." It is a moment which stands 
alone, an "air-tight" division between past and future, a 
small cell, so to speak, which lies between past and future 
and is sundered .from both. This momen1t is not a nmr1 in which 
responsible decision is taken, but is, as we shall see pre-
sently, a moment in which a decision is thrust on men .from 
1) Du Contrat Social, Book 1, Chapter 8, Page 72. For the 
or~ginal French see Chapter Note 8. 
2) Ibid. For the original French see Chapter Note 9. 
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outside themselves by the necessity of self-protection. This 
-is what makes Rousseau's morality as utilitarian as that of 
Hume. Secondly one can point in the words did not the abuses 
of h~s new condition often degrade him below that which he 
left, the fall of man into time and society. There is in 
them, furthermore, an admission on Rousseau's part that the 
dualism between the freedom of the state of nature and civic 
freedom, and the rift between the subject and the Sovereign 
cannot be wholly eliminatede In Hume•s thought we have the 
same dualism, but Hume admits its existence more explicitly 
in his Of the Origin of Governm~:l)"In all governments, 
there is a perpetual intestine struggle, open or secret, 
between AUTHORITY and LIBERTY; and neither of them can ever 
absolutely prevail in the contest." 
·Hume distinguishes between "natural" relationships and 
"artificial" relationships;2 )the former are those relation-
ships which exist between men because they must have the 
companionship of other men, and include the family, friends 
and other persons close to one, while the latter correspond 
to Rousseau's civic relationships, that is, relationships 
which arise because the state becomes necessary. Now the 
fact that Hume calls such relationships artificial is im-
1) Page 116 of Volume 1 of the Essays. 
2) Hume was a very sociable man, and his disposition seems 
to clash with much of what he wrote on the relationships 
between men. See Chapter Note 10. 
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portantt for the word at once betrays spatial and temporal 
isolation, and we shall have to return to this point pre-
sently as we shall have to return to the matter of the dual-
ism of freedom in the state of nature and civic freedom. 
The point in this dualism at this stage is that if it can-
not be eliminated, we cannot escape the conclusion that at 
least some force is necessary in a social contract state, 
that its morality is a forced morality from outside men, and 
therefore a timeless and ahistoric morality. It serves also 
as a starting point for an examination of the legislation 
which imposes this morality. 
If Rousseau's whole attitude to change and time is one 
of hostility, we must expect this hostility to be r~flected 
also in his treatment of legislation and everything connect-
ed with it, that i'S, in his measures to regulate the rela-
tionships between moving masses of matter. The assumed 
changeless core around which Rousseau builds his theories 
is, as he says in his explanation of the purpose of the 
Social Contract, "men as they are and laws as they might 
be."1 )But for Rousseau "men as they are," are masses of mat-
~ 
ter without morality; all men are the same, that is, he re-
gards them as so many similar natures rather than as persons. 
·-----------------------------------------------·------------------
1) Du Contrat Social, Book 1, Introduction, Page 53: "(pren-
nant} les hommes tels qu'ils sont, et les lois telles 
qu'elles peuvent etre." 
208 .. 
He wishes to make laws, therefore, for men who are isolated 
from one another. Rousseau confirms this when he gives us a 
definition of a law. He asks: "But what, after all, is a 
law?" an.d replies: "(But) \ll!hen the whole people decrees for 
the. whole people, it is considering only itselfeo.oin that 
case the matter about which the decree is made is, like the 
decreeing will, general. This act is what I call a law." He 
continues: "On this view, we at once see that it can no 
longer be asked whose business it is to make laws, since 
th t f th 1 . 11 ,,l) Th d 1 ey are ac s o e genera WJ.. • • • • e wor g~g_er~-
in this passage indicates to us, wherever it occurs, that 
the man Rousseau has in mind here is the "constructed man" 
of the science of man, that is, the man "built up" with all 
those attributes which all men have in common, the man who 
cannot meet other men. VJe shall discover presently, more.:.. 
over, that the General ·will is obtained by a mere algebraic 
summation of spatially and temporally isolated parts and 
that, consequently, the laws made by the General Will are 
made by something without perso_nality and something atem-
poral, if we accept personality to be associated with real 
space and time • 
The General Will comes into being by "this act of as-
sociation" and is the product of a moment plucked out of 
~-----------· --------·-----------
1) Du Contrat Social, Book 2, Chapter 6, Page 94. For the 
<Yriginal French see Chapter Note 11. 
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time rather than a historical event issueing from growth. 
It is something which must cope with a situation among men, 
namely the state of itvar between man and man. Its laws must 
regulate the motions of human beings to prevent this, and 
that the legislation of the General Will is really to this 
end Rousseau admits when he says: " •••• what a man, whoever 
he be, commands of his own motion cannot be a lavl •••• Laws 
are, properly speaking, only the conditions of civil associ-
ation."1)Rousseau finds that he needs a Legislator to en-
lighten th~ General lnlill2 )and by the very fact that he says 
that the General Will does not always know \.vhat is good for 
it, he admits the necessity of the regulation of the motions 
of men so that "the parts are made to work exactly together 
and the whole is raised to its highest power."3)Here, if 
anywhere in Rousseau's writings, is an expression of spatial 
and temporal isolation of the parts of the "great machine" 
and the necessity of regulation in Galileian space and time. 
We might usefully contrast Rousseau's legislation by 
the General Will to the Law which Israel looked upon as 
given to them by God (as we con~rasted his Q££fessions to 
--------------~-----
1) Du Contrat Social, Book 2, Chapter 6, Pages 94 to 95. 
Original French:in Chapter Note 12. 
2) !_!?.id., Chapter 7. \Ne shall return to this presently. 
3) Ibid., Chapter 6, Page 96. For the original French see 
Chapter Note 13. Note the suggestion of "drilling" in 
Rousseau's words. We shall return to this also. 
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the Books of the Prophets). The Legislator of Israel is a 
person, God. This Legislator sets norms for human relation-
ships with Him and relationships of men among themselves, 
but requires no "forcing into freedom." The state, that is, 
human society is an established fact since it £recedes the 
individual, as it also does in Aristotle's thought. It re-
quires no justification and no social contract to come into 
being. It is in being because there is a directedness of men 
towards God and towards one another, and is not the product 
of a "single moment." The Decalogue is accordingly a code 
"for time;" it is a code for the will of each man and not 
the product of a summation of votes in order to deal with a 
war of man against man. Since the execution of these laws 
requires free action and the choice of men, they presuppose 
personality, and accordingly issue from the confluence of 
spaces and times. Lawgiving such as this can be said to be, 
in a sense, a construction of human time in that it gives 
free play to human choice and action; for the same reason 
it offers men a possibility of realizing values --- a pos-
sibility which only exists when actions are meaningful.1 )If 
this is so, then Rousseau's legislation must be looked upon 
as a destruction of human time, since what should be the 
actions of men, issue from the forced morality of the social 
---------·-----------------l) Compare Heidegger on meaning and time (Chapter 2 of this 
study). See also Chapter Note 14. 
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contract state and are really blind mot~ons devoid of all 
meaning. 
Laws which require a free choice and action are a 
necessary condition for history, since history issues from 
the exercising of such a choice and from action~ laws such 
as those of Rousseau's General \.vill, in which the choice 
and action of the individual are rendered impotent, may 
allow progress in the sense in which the Enlightenment un-
derstood the term, but not history in the ancient Hebrew 
and Christian sense. No1."' if we accept history as a becoming, 
1r1e cannot· exclude the future from it, for we find that the 
future belongs to history through our hopes and desi,res. 
That our desires relate to the future also accords with 
Heidegger 's vievl that vle are projected, as it were, beyond 
the present moment. In the parlance of existentialism: man's 
being is a ~Q.:-be; he desires because he is not yet what he 
wishes to be. Law in society must be concerned with the 
situations which arise from the desires of men, tha~ is, 
laws must be concerned with the futures of men, and society 
must, as Prof. Versfeld points out, 1 )progressively reveal 
to us. what T.!le are and consequently what we desire. In this 
sense also, legislation should be a construction of human 
time. Legislation in a so.ci.al contract state is, however, 
------------------------------------------
1) See his Law and the Idea of the Conte~Q_rary. 
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legislation for the present only, a present in which men 
are a threat to one another. There is no relation to past 
or future; indeed, there cannot be, for the General Will 
must ignore the will of the individual and "consider only 
itself," as Rousseau tells us, and it has no history since 
it is the product of a moment. It can have no history be-
cause, as we shall see, it is not a person. 
We have seen that in Rousseau's (and Hume's) thought 
there are two freedoms, a natural and a civic (Rousseau 
uses £~il) freedom. Rousseau states this explicitly:l) 
"What man loses by the social contract is his natural lib-
erty •• ~.what he gains is civil liberty ••• " In the ~f3ptl.bli:: 
cana Christiana of the ~nddle Ages the two were thought to 
be one; there was not an exchan~~· To suggest such an ex-
change is to admit the existence of a dualism between the 
Sovereign in the state and its subjects, and to admit the 
necessity of compulsion2 )into freedom in the state is to 
admit failure in justifying completely the existence of the 
state, at least by ~eans of the device of the social con-
tract. For the Christian of the Middle Ages, as for Aris-
1) Du Contrat Social, Book 1, Chapter 8, Page 73. For the 
original French see Chapter Note 15. 
2) The notion of forcing a man into freedom (we find it al-
so inHume's thought) will have to be examined again,so 
we postpone quoting Rousseau's and Hume's actual words. 
The notion is an important consideration in the control 
of men which is examined in the penultimate chapter. 
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totle, the state needed no justitication, and the dualism 
which Rousseau admits, is part of his heritage of dualisms 
after the Middle Ages. One might point out, furthermore, 
that to admit that the state cannot be completely justified 
by means of the device of the social contract, is to admit 
that any state founded on a social contract rests in the 
last analysis on force, that very force which Rousseau finds 
in the society of his time and to which he is so hostile. 
Rousseau's legislation is legislation for this civic 
freedom into which men can be forced. He as much as tells us 
this:1 )" ••••• when we have defined a law of nature, we shall 
be no nearer the.definition of a law of the state."2 )He then 
goes on to define a law and gives the definition already 
quoted. Rousseau tells us also that men are quite incapable 
of appreciating the justice which emanates from God3)and 
says: "Humanly speaking, in default of natural sanctions, 
the laws of justice are ineffective among men: they merely 
make for the good of the wicked and the undoing of the just, 
when the just man observes them towards everybody and nobody 
1) Du Contrat Social, Book 2, Chapter 6, Page 93: " •••• quand 
on aura dit ce que c'est qu'une loi de la nature, on n'en 
saura pas mieux ce que c'est qu'une loi de l'Etat." 
2) The state is all-important to Rousseau, as we shall see 
in due course. 
3) Du Contrat Social, Book 2, Chapter 6, Page 92. 
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observes them towards him. 111 ) 
In Hume 's writings we find a similar idea: "Had every 
man sufficient sagacity to perceive, at all times, the 
strongest interest, which binds him to the observance of 
justice and equity and the strength of mind sufficient to 
persevere in a steady adherence to a general and a distant 
interest, in opposition to the allurements of present pleas-
ure and advantage; there had never, in that case, been any 
such thing as government or political society, but each man, 
following his natural liberty, had lived in entire peace 
and harmony with all others."2 ) In this passage there is, 
/ 
unmistakably, an overtone of the corruption of the General 
Will by the things of time, as well as one of the origin of 
the state in scarcity, and accordingly also of "forcing in-
to freedom. 11 
In considering Rousseau 1 s treatment of man as a member 
of society one must constantly bear in mind that Rousseau 
is not dealing with history. He does not tell us how the 
passage from one state, the state of nature, to the other, 
the state of society, was effected, though, as we have seen, 
·he may have had the idea at the back of his mind that it 
1) Du Contrat Social, Book 2, Chapter 6, Page 92. For the 
original French see Chapter Note 16. 
2) An Essay Concerning the Princi9les of Morals, Section 4 
to? Political $ociety), Page I 7 of Volume 2 of the 
Essays. 
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came about through some disaster or other. 1 )This "dormantn 
notion in Rousseau's mind of men warring for domination 
over one another and for one another's goods --- which is 
present also inHume's thought in his notion of the origin 
of the state in scarcity --- is eloquent of the isolation 
of men from one another in space and time. We cannot, there-
fore, expect a solution to the problem of society from our 
two philosophers which involves history; we must expect 
rather the solution that we do get from them, that is, a 
mechanical device of pieces of matter in motion, incapable 
of meeting. The legislation of Rousseau's General Will must 
therefore be expected to be legislation for Galileian space 
and time. One might, bear in mind that it is the General Will 
that must be taught that spaces and times are a series, that 
is, that they are Galileian. In this sense this legislation 
is a flight from real space and time. 
Now if we regard men as historic beings in the sense 
that they each stand at a ~ and a ~ which encompass 
other men and in which they exercise decision and choice, 
and that the world in its becoming is described to them by 
the movement of their~ and~ (which are inseparable), 
1) Green fears that one might be "hypnotized" by Rousseau's 
fluent style into believing that there actually was such 
a transition. Compare his Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A Crit-
'ical Study of his Life and Writings, Chapter ?, 1?age 283. 
BUt Rousseau was, as we have seen, not interested in facts. 
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then the men of our two philosophers cannot, as parts of a 
machine, be the "political animals"1 )that men are in the 
thought of Aristotle. This fact that Rousseau's and Hume's 
men have no real time with a ~as its heart, is a link 
between the loss of will by the subjects of the state and 
the absence of personality in the Sovereign with which we 
are now about to dealo The position is, in short, that an 
entity composed of people who have been rendered 'tvill-less 
. . 
by their composition of that entity, is an entity composed 
of people who have lost personality and cannot itself be a 
person. The loss of will by men through the assumption of 
their wills in the General Will2 )serves, in !act, as an in-
troduction to. questions about the characteristics and func-
tions of the Sovere.ign. These questioJ:).s we are obliged to 
ask by what we have (iiscovered about the legislation of the 
General Will for Galileian space and time. 
(iii) 
Rousseau tells us quite clearly that his men do not 
stand at a no!_ in which they are faced with a particular 
situation which calls their wills and choice into action. 
1) See Chapter Note 17. 
2) We shall see that at least some of these wills are forced 
into the General Will, but a loss of will is suffered 
also by those who submit to the General Will without be-
ing forced to do so. They actually surrender their wills 
to the General Will. 
21?. 
He.says: "Each of us puts his person and all his power in 
common under the supreme direction of the General Will ••• ·:;t.) 
Here again, as where Rousseau speaks of the compulsion of 
the individual, 2 )he destroys the will of the person. If an 
agency, the General Will or any other will but a person's 
own, ~i~cts the person, as Rousseau here tells us, that 
person at once ceases to be free, except perhaps in so far 
as he has that freedom into which he has been forced, but 
that can hardly be a freedom in which he can have a choice 
and action. If we mean by freedom the absence of outside 
compulsion in a predetermined direction on the will in its 
choice in the now which is to have moral consequences, this 
freedom is a spurious freedom, and can be shoi~ to be so. 
Since, however, this spurious freedom is closely bound up 
with the control of men, we defer discussion of it to the 
penultimate chapter. The point at this stage is simply that 
if a person is forced to do a thing, his will has been re-
placed by another which is not his; he can no longer strive 
for personality (if we accept that a freedom to act is of 
primary importance in the gaining of personality). And if we 
accept that the human person is inseparable from real space 
1) D~ Contrat Social, Book 1, Chapter 6, Page 68. The entire 
paragraph in which these ""'ords appear, is italicized by 
Rousseau. We can only deduce that he wished to emphasize 
a surrender of the individual. Original French in Chapter 
Note 18. 
2) Ibid., Book 1, Chapter 7, Page 72. 
218. 
and time, then this surrendering of the "person and all his 
power" is, as Prof. Versfeld puts it, 1 )an "a .... chronic sus-
pension of personality." But we can recall, o·f course, that 
Rousseau tells us that the personality of the individual is 
repl~2_ed. 2 ) 
Now these men of whom the meeting is, owing to the sus-
pending of their personalities, a mere crossing of paths or 
a "coming across" in mechanical motion instead of the spa-
tial and temporal confluence that ~eetin~ is for Buber, are 
the masses of matter which the Sovereign, the General Will, 
has to keep from clashing in chaos. This Sovereign is then 
a device and not a person. Rousseau, in fact, admits the 
absence of personality in his Sovereign when he speaks of 
the state as a £ersona ficta.3)The General Will is obtained 
rather easily with the help of a little elementary mathemat-
ics:4)"There is often a great deal of difference between 
the will of all and the general will; the latter considers 
.only the common interest, while the former takes private in-
1) gousseau's Moral and Religious ·~~d !Qei~~­
se9}!;_ences. 
2) See Section i v of Chapter 4 of this study. 
3) 
4) 
Du Contrat Social, Book 1, Chapter 7, Page 71. It has 
already been pointed out that the state, in Rousseau's 
thought, is similar to a company in law. 
Ibid., Book 2, Chapter 3, Page 82. We shall examine this 
polnt in the context of the control of men in the next 
two chapters. For the original French of the passage see 
Chapter Note 19. 
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terest into account, and is no more than the sum of par-
ticular wills: but take away from these same wills the plus-
ses and minuses that cancel one another, and the General 
Will remains as the sum of the differences. 11 In the society 
of the Middle Ages the Sovereign was a person, God, but, as 
we have seen, God can hardly be a Sovereign in Rousseau's 
political thought. However, the point to note is that if 
the General Will can be obtained by means of algebra, it 
cannot be a person, and if it is not a person, it is itself 
a-chronic, that is, it can have no other space and time than 
the derived space and time of Galileian .physics. It is in-
.teresting to note Rousseau's use of mathematics in the pas-
sage quoted above. One might say that the "will of all" is 
a simple arithmetic sum, while the General Will is an al-
gebraic sum. The particular wills in the General Will come 
and go, but this algebraic sum of wills which is the General 
Will,_ remains unchanged because it is nothing but an alge-
braic sum. It is changeless, that is, it is a-temporal, and 
has to legislate only for the changeless situation between 
men: their war against one another. 
A striking attribute of the General Will which test-
ifies strongly to its timelessness and lack of personality, 
is that it is corruptible by the things of real time, that 
time which also, according to Rousseau, corrupts men when-
ever and wherever they come together in colonies. It is so 
/ 
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corruptible that Rousseau thinks it wise to remove it from 
real space and time, but in doing so he strips it of per-
sonality and the directedness of a person. With reference 
t·o the education of the General vlill Rousseau says :l),, ••• it 
must .be got to see objects as they are, and sometimes as 
tpe~ought to appear to i!; it must be •••••••• secured from 
the seductive influences of individual wills, taught to~ 
t~~nd~~~~~eries, and made to weigh the attrac-
tions of the present and sensible advantages against the 
danger of distant and hidden evils." (We note here .Rous-
seau's fear of the future and his wish to suppress the de-
sires of men). 
Compare this "education" of the General Will in Rous-
seau's Social Contract with the duties of the magistrates in 
Hume's blueprint for a good society. The magistrates must 
"oblige men, however reluctant, to consult their own real 
and permanent interests, "2 )because, like Rousseau's General 
Will, frequently "he (mag) is seduced from his great and im-
portant, but distant interests, by the allurement of present, 
though often very frivolous temptation. This great weakness 
--~-------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Du Contrat Social, Book 2; Chapter 6, Page 96. For the 
o~iginal French see Chapter Note 20. 
2) Of the Origin of Government, Page 114 of Volume 1 of the 
Essays. I say here bluepr.i:Qt f££ a ~ood _so£}ety because 
although Hume here treats the origin of government, it is 
clear that his notions are similar to those contained in 
his Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth. 
is incurable in human nature." To be sure, Hume does not 
wish to instil a mistrust of the future into his body pol-
itic as does Rousseau, but; like Rousseau, he has no doubts. 
about the proneness of the body politic to seduction and 
the necessity for education of the people by some entity 
placed over them. !t is clear also, that in the thought of 
both our philosophers, society does not progressively re-
veal to men what their desires are, and consequently what 
they wish to be, but prescr~be~ their desires, as it were, 
and makes becomin~ impossible for them. Another difference 
between Hume and Rousseau which seems to emerge from the 
two quoted passages is that Hume's "education" of the body 
politic leans more towards a discipline than does Rousseau's. 
One feels obliged to point out in this context that if the 
General Will is to be protected from the seductive influ-
ences of individual wills, it is extremely difficult to see 
that the General Will can ever represent those individual 
wills (or even some of them) which have been assumed in it. 
We see in the underlined 'li'Tords in the passage quoted 
from the Social Contract a purposeful attempt by Rousseau to 
remove the Sovereign from space and time and to place it in 
the predictability to which the space and time of science 
must lead. Times and spaces as a series are times and spaces 
which do not overlap, and in which men cannot meet. The Gen-
eral Will must be taught to see men as matter in motion, and 
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must look upon itself as an ~· If this is so~ men cannot 
be bound to it through the confluence of spaces and times, 
but must be bound to it by some means which goes with mech-
anism. How hostile Rousseau is to a Sovereign in real space 
and time he indicates to us when he assures us that "Legis-
lation is made difficult less by what it is necessary to 
build up than by what has to be destroyed. rrl) Obviously, it 
is the things that history as a "story" has produced, that 
have to be destroyed. One becomes aware of this mechanical 
bond between the state and its subjects also in Hume 1s writ-
ings; and, like Rousseau, he refers to the state as a ma-
chine :2 ) "Perhaps, rust may grow to the springs of the most 
accurate political machine, and disorder its motions." 
(iv) 
In order to educate the General Will Rousseau needs 
the services of a Legislator. Novr according to Rousseau this 
Legislator will not interfere with or detract from the sove-
reignty of the General Will, but if he is to be what Rous-
seau says he has to be, he ~~11 soon have the General Will 
1) Du Contrat Soqial, Book 2, Chapter 10, Page 109. For the 
original French see Chapter Note 21. Rousseau is here 
very much a child of the Enlightenment. See also Chapter 
Note 22. 
2) Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth, Page 493 of Volume 1 of 
the Essays. BUt Hume thinks that his Commonwealth could 
last~for a very long time. It.is meant to be changeless, 
therefore, that is, outside real time. 
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at his mercy and be the de facto ruler of the state. 1 )"It 
would take gods to give men laws, 11 says Rousseau, 2 )and that 
is precisely what his Legislator would have to be. He would, 
like God, have to stand outside time: "It would have in the 
march of time, to look forward to a distant glory, and work-
ing in one century, to be able to enjoy in the next. 113)It 
would even have to feel itself 11capable, so to speak, of 
changing human nature, of transforming each individual, who 
is by himself a complete and solitary whole, into part of a 
greater whole from which in a manner he receives his life 
and being. 114 )Another admission, we might remark, on Rous-
seau's part that in his political thought man is a particle 
of matter in motion, undirected, and exclusive of all other 
men. We might remark further that, though he may receive 
life and being from.Rousseau's state, it would be as "a.part 
of a greater whole" (the greater whole being a machine) and 
therefore a being which he would have in common with all 
-----------------------------------------
1) See Chapter Note 23. 
2) Du Contrat Social, Book 2, Chapter 7, Page 97: 11Il faudr-
ait des dieux pour donner des lois aux hommes." 
3) Ibid. For the original French see Chapter Note 24. 
4) It seems to me that Rousseau's Lawgiver very closely re-
sembles Hobbes' "mortal god." A question arises: Why does 
Rousseau's translator (G.D.H.Cole) here refer to the 
Legislator as it? No doubt he looks upon the Legislator 
as a bo~ of man, but it does seem to rob the Legislator 
of personality. 
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other objects, for he would hardly receive personality from 
the state. 
If Burne's political ideas are akin to those of a so-
cial contract, one can hardly expect to find that he re-
gards man more as a "political animal" than does Rousseau. 1 ) 
Like Rousseau's men, Burne's are not real, but abstractions, 
artificial constructions. He carried the fragmentation of 
human psychical life to its logical conclusion and destroyed 
the self making man an artificial composition of succeeding 
fragments of sensation. A man becomes an isolated bundle of 
sensations with no space and time of the inner life which 
would make meeti~ possible~ Now if one's inner life is an 
artificial composition of succeeding fragments of sensation, 
one's outer or public life must of necessity be an artifi-
cial relationship2 )of things in Galileian space and time, 
in contrast to a relationship of human persons. If the man 
becomes an abstraction, so must society become an abstrac-
tion, and must cease to be,.as it was in the mediaeval 
Christian state, a state of union and inclusion; it becomes 
a collection of ~ts. Hume does, in fact, look upon the state 
as an artificial construction, that is why he divides human 
relationships into "natural" and "artificial" relationships. 
--------------------------------~·------------------------------
1) See Chapter Note 25. 
2) See Chapter Note 26. 
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The whole of his Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth is written 
from this point of view. In this commonwealth men are so 
much at war with one another that the author has to make 
provision for safeguards everywhere. Hume's men, like those 
o.f Rousseau, cannot receive personality from the state, for 
the state is.an entity.which must ensure a peaceful and 
orderly not-meeting, so to speak, rather then a meeting. 
The human beings in Hume 's state, as in that of Rousseau, 
are alienated from their true selves, from every other human 
being and, as we shall see presently,. in the eyes of the 
Christian, also from. God. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Justice and Morality_in Derived S£ace and Time 
(i) 
If, in Hume's and Rousseau's state, human beings are 
alienated from their true selves and from one another, we 
must expect to find in the thought of our two philosophers 
conceptions of morality quite unlike those which we find in 
the thought of a philosopher who looks upon persons as re-
lated to one another through the interpenetration or co-
alescence of spaces and times. ltle have seen (in the pre-
ceding chapter) that Hume and ·Rousseau alike make morality 
ahistoric, that is, they contemplate morality outside real 
space and time. They do not look upon it as arising from a 
relatedness of men through a confluence of the spaces and 
times of their inner lives. We must now give our attention 
to the nature of this ahistoric morality. 
Hume is not obscure when he says: 1 ) 11 ~he minds of all 
men are similar in their feelings and operations; nor can 
anyone be actuated by any affection of which all others are 
not in some degree susceptible. As in strings equally wound 
up, the motion of one communicates itself to the rest, so 
all the affections readily pass from one person to another, 
and beget correspondent movements in every human creature ••• 
·---------------------------------------
~~en I perceive the causes of my emotion, my mind is con-
veyed to its effects, and is actuated by a like emotion~··· 
No passion of another discovers itself immediately to the 
mind. We are only sensible to its causes and effects. From 
these we infer the passion; and consequently these give rise 
to our sympathy." It would be difficult to imagine anything 
more mechanical in hum&~ relationships than the relatedness 
of men as sketched here by Hume, and as difficult, conse-
quently, to imagine a passage anywhere in v.rhich men are made 
more uniformly amenable to calculation "by the lmvs of mo-
tion," to use Rousseau's phrase. 'v'Je need only note such 
words as the minds of all men are similar, all oth~£_9~~ 
reS£~£t movements and £~~~a~~ e~£~~· Clearly, the 
morality of men related in this way, the morality of which 
Hume wishes to be the Newton, must be a morality for the 
constructed "man-in-general" of the Enlightenment. 
In terms of Hume's thought the vibration of a string 
set up by that of another string, as is· daily demonstrated 
in instructional laboratories in physics, is .e. sympathy of 
one string with another. What Hume, in the field of human 
study calls sympathy, the physicist in the field of the 
study of the behaviour of material bodies calls resonance. 
Sympathy has, in other words, a mechanical and material 
basis; there is no I-Thou relationship in which there is a 
confluence of spaces and times. One might note in this con-
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text that the wound-up strings which Hume.uses as an anal-
ogy, are things of which the motions in Galileian space 
and time can be calculated; definite mathematical formulae 
exist for the treatment of the vibrations of such stretched 
strings. lrle recall that Rousseau saw his fellow men as mas-
ses of matter of which he could calculate the motions by 
means of such formulae. 
It is not difficult to see that it is only a small 
step from Hume's view on the relatedness of men to one 
another, to utilitarianism. The whole notion of mechanical 
relationships among men underlies the device of the social 
contract, as we saw in the preceding chapter, whether it be 
the social contract of Hobbes,· Locke or Rousseau (or Hume 
for that matter). If men are objects in motion, the main 
function of the Sovereign is to prevent clashes, and polic-
ing becomes one of its main purposes. Goodness, justice 
and, as we shall see presently, even religion, do not go 
beyond mere use. "So true is it," says Hume, 1 )"that (this) 
virtue derives its existence entirely from its necessary 
use to the intercourse and social state of ma."lkind. rr He 
continues:rrThus the rules of equity or justice depend en-
tirely on the particular state and condition, in which men 
1) •of Justi~, Section 3, Part 1 of An __ En~uir~ Concerni£~ 
the PrinciJ<les of I"ioEal~, Page 1sr of oiUme ~ of'"t'Ee 
Essays. Also Page 183. See also Chapter Note l and Note 
~6 of Chapter 5. 
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are placed, and owe their origin and existence to that 
UTILITY, which results to the public from their strict and 
regular observance." 
It was pointed out at the beginning of this study that 
the elimination of personality by the adoption of the space 
and time of science issued in the thought of both Hume and 
Rousseau in the problem of what to do with God. Now this 
problem of God is connected with the fact that morality in 
the social contract state is a result of the policing func-
tion of the Sovereign. That this Sovereign is a policeman, 
both our philosophers tell us. riBy means of these two ad-
vantages, in the execution and decision of justice," says 
Hume, 1 )"men acquire a security against each other's weak-
ness and passion, as well as against their own, and under 
the shelter of their governors, begin to taste at ease the 
sweets of society and mutual assistance." (Vle notice in 
these words the "insufficiencies 11 of men v.1hich make them 
seek the state). Protection by policing is the purpose of 
the state also for Rousseau: "The problem is to find a form 
of association which will ~~d and protect with the whole 
common force the person and goods of each associate ••• o 112 ) 
-----------------------------1) A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3, Part 2, Section 7, 
Page 303.-- ---
2) Tiu Contrat Social, Book 1, Chapter 6, Page 66. Original 
French in Chapter Note 2. The underlining is mine; these 
words are not italicized by Rousseau. 
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Justice, we notice, does not flow from the :gteeting_ of men 
so that personal spaces and times cannot be involved. The 
use that justice must. have indicates to us what it really 
is for Hume and Rousseau: basically it is nothing but order 
among men who are hostile to one another. We can now attempt 
to·answer the question of what virtue and good are for our 
two philosophers, and we shall find that the notion of 
justice as order in society flows from their views on good 
and evil. 
We find that Hume's theory of good and evil is pre-
cisely that of Hobbes: they are nothing but new names for 
pleasure and pain respectively. In fact, Hume himself does 
not hesitate to equate good to pleasure and evil to pain.1 ) 
If this is so, At hen the function of the Sovereign would be 
mainly to see to it that one person does not cause pain to 
another, that is, that no-one does evil, and this preven-
tion of evil would be justice. Virtue, morality and justice 
then all arise from feeling (agreeable sensation) and in 
society ultimately become synonymous with order and dis-
cipline. Beyond this there is no connection between good 
and evil and society; rather, there is an absence of any 
relationship between one person and another, and an absence 
of God. The individual is solitary and exclusive, and there 
1) A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 2, Page 215 of Volume 2. 
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is no growth of good and evil in the sense in which r1ari tain 
sees such a growth in the parable of the smver. 
Hume continues:1 )"Desires arise from good, considered· 
simply, and aversion from evil .. The will exerts itself when 
either the presence of good, or the absence. of evil, may be 
attained by any action of the mind or body. 112 )rn the words 
any action we have the rudiments of a law of nature, and we 
are reminded again that Hume looked upon himself as the 
Ne~~on of moral thought. If this is so, we must expect him 
to v.rri te about morality and virtue as predictable motions of 
pieces of matter, and to use the language of Newton. This 
he does: "There is a general course of nature in human ac-
tions, as well as in the operations of the sun and the 
climate ••••• The knowledge of these characters (of nations 
and men) is founded on the observation of an uniformity in 
the actions that flow from them; and this uniformity forms 
the very essence of necessity ••••• in judging of the actions 
of men we must proceed upon the same maxims as when V.Te 
reason concerning external objects."3) 
\rJe have here once again the "universal man" v.rhich is 
1) A Treatise of Human Nature, Part 3, Page 215 of Volume 2. 
2) See Chapter Note 3. 
3) A Treatise of Human Nature, Pages 184 to 185 of Volume 2. 
The Treatise abounds with passages such as the one quoted 
here. 
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inHume's moral "science" what the universal revolving 
planet is in Newton's natural science. The behaviour of 
this man can be predicted, and if it can be predicted, the 
man himself· can be controlled, and this is very necessary 
if there is to be order among men who are hostile to one 
another. The use of the "universal ID?Jl 11 is that a society of 
universal men would be orderly; justice and virtues there-
fore have the use that they would promote an orderly societyo 
H th -1-1 ) II th • t th t d ume says av .•••• ere are some v~r ues, a pro uce 
pleasure and approbation by means of an artifice or con-
trivance, which arises from the circumstances and necessity 
of mankind. Of this kind I assert just;!;_~ to be ...... for the 
notion of injury or injustice implies an immorality or vice 
committed against some other person ••••• Instead of depart-
ing from· our ovm interest, or from that of our nearest 
friends, by abstaining from the possessions of others, we 
cannot better consult both these interests, than by (such) 
a convention; because it is by that means we maintain so-· 
ciety, which is so necessary to their well-being and sub-
sistence, as well as to our own •••••• I observe, that it will 
----------·---------------------------
1) A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3, Pages 252 to 268 of 
Volume 2. For Hume justice is an artificial virtue since 
it applies in an artificial construction, the state. It 
has nothing to do with the directedness of the human per-
son, and consequently the space and time which apply are 
the space and time of Galileian science. 
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be for my interest to leave another in the possession of 
his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with re-
gard to me ••••• After this convention, concerning abstinence 
from the possessions of others, is enter'd ~nto and every 
one has acquir'd a stability in his possessions, there im-
mediately arise the ideas of justice and injustice ••••• our 
property is nothing but those goods, whose constant pos-
session is established by the la\vs of society; that is, by 
the laws of justice.rrl) 
(ii) 
Newton had the view that the universe consisted of 
11massy, impenetrable particles, 11 and the parallel inHume's 
thought seems to be that humanity consists of 11massy, im-
penetrable particles 11 which, Rousseau tells us, has motions 
which he can understand in terms of the laws of mechanics. 
The far-reaching consequences of this view for Western so-
ciety will be examined in the next chapter; at this point 
we follow a clue, provided by Hume's notion of good and 
evil, for the breaking of the cycles of history, that is, 
for the substitution of progress for history. To break these 
cycles an act of will would be required on the part of men, 
·--"----
1) Compare Orr's David Hume and his Influence £n Philosoph~ 
and Religion, Pages 167 to 168: In the "develOpment of 
the utilitarian philosophy in Britain, Hume's writings 
take a very important place. In some respects the theory 
of utility has never found a better advocate than it did 







but m~h have no fre'e will and cannot choose, except in so 
f'ar as they can avoid pain and grasp at pleasure. Now if 
philosophers (like Hume and Rousseau) can provide a blueprint 
for ~ society with orderiand pleasure and without :pain, this 
a.bsehc~ or pain and presence of pleasure, that is, the ab-
sence of eVil and presence of good, will awaken desire in 
men and they will then adopt this society. The cycles of 
h~story Wiil then have been broken; but the breaking of ·~ 
these cycles will then not be an act of free will, but an 
.act of desireo Men will grasp at that which they suppose to 
be without pain and offers them pleasure. 1 )"In general," 
says Hume, 2 )"it is certain, that, wherever 'life go, whatever 
we reflect on or converse about, every thing still presents 
us with the view of human happiness or misery, and excites 
in ou:r breast a syll1pathetic movement of pleasure or un-
easiness." 
Clearly flUme's morality is a morality of feeling. But 
this ·he tells us quite cle~rly:3)"It appears evident, that 
the ultimate ends of human actions can never, in any case, 
be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves entire-
1') See Chapter Notes 3 and 4. 
2) Why Utility Ple~, Section 5 of .Qoncerning ~he Prin-
~iples of .Horals, Page 209 of Volume 2 of the ~· 
3) ,P,oncerning_ the Principles-2f.._!'.1Q.!:.als, App. 1, Page 264 










ly to the sentiments and affections of mankind, without any 
dependence on.the intellectual faculties ••••• something must 
be desirable on its own account and because of its immediate 
accord or agreement with human sentiment and affection. Now 
as virtue is an end ••••• it is requisite that there should 
be some sentiment, which it touches; some internal-taste or 
feeling, or whatever you please to call it, which distin-
guishes moral good and evil, and which embraces the one and 
rejects the other." 
This. morality of feeling, associated with a utilitari-
an justice (order in society),affords good grounds for say-
ing that as Hume distinguished between "artificial" and 
"natural" relationships, he implicitly distinguishes be-
tween an "artificial" and a "natural" virtue and an "arti-
ficial" and a "natural" morality. In fact, Hume does speak 
of justice as an "artificial" virtue, so that we can infer 
that there must also be an "artificial 11 morality. "Arti-
ficial" morality and virtue go with "artificial" relation-
ships that arise with the necessity of the state, and are 
really little more than new names for order and discipline • 
Hu • t 1 ) II h t • • th me wr1 es: ••••• as every man as as rong connex1on w1 
1) \rJhy Utility Pleases, Section 5 of Concerning_ th!?_ ~ig_­
ciples of M~aTs, Page 209 of Volume 2 of the Essays. 






society and perceives the impossibility of his solitary 
subsistence, he becomes on that account, favourable to all 
those habits and principles, which promote order in society 
••• ,.As much as we value our happiness and welfare, as much 
must we applaud the practice of justice and humanity, by 
which alone the social confederacy can be maintained and 
every man reap the fruits of mutual protection and assist-
ance." 
"Natural" virtue and morality, of course, go with 
"natural" relationships and are matters o.f feeling. We feel 
that we must repay money lent to us in secret by friends, 
even though they have no recourse to the law, and we feel 
that we are virtuous if we do so. There is therefore a wide 
rift between the two virtues and moralities, just as there 
is, as Hume admits, a vdde rift between government and 
governed which cannot be wholly overcome. It must be borne 
in mind though, that "artificialn virtue and morality are 
also rooted in feeling, the acceptance of pleasure and the 
rejection of pain. "If use.fulness, there.fore~ be a source 
of moral sentiment," Hume argues, 1 ) "and if this use.fulness 
be not always considered vli th reference to self; it .follows, 
that every thing, which contributes to the happiness of so-
--------------------
1) Why Utility Please~, Section 5 of Concerning the Prin-




ciety, recommends itself directly to our approbation and 
good-will." We approve of things that are useful to the 
state, in other words, because they are indirectly useful 
to us; they bring pleasure to us and avert pain. The virtue 
and morality which are synonymous with the acceptance of 
pleasure and rejection of pain, really only become sepa-
rated into an "artificial" and a "natural" virtue and mo-
rality when, in the body politic v.rith its "artificial" re-
lationships, absence of virtue and morality is likely to be 
punished with pain, whereas in "natural" relationships there 
is no such threat. 1 ) 
(iii) 
As is the position in Burne's thought, virtue in that of 
Rousseau has little or nothing to do with the I-Thou rela-
tionsbip of one person to another as a confluence of spaces 
and times, and certainly nothing with the time process of 
change, growth and history. In goes with his "natural rEt-
ligion," in fact, as Christian virtue goes vli th the Chris-
1) One might be deluded into thinking that "natural" vir-
tue issues from an I-Thou relationship, since persons 
close to one are involved, but this is not so. Persons 
close to one are, after all, not the only ones who have· 
spaces and times that can overlap \•li th one's ov.m. The 
plain fact is that exercising a "natural" virtue (such as 
paying back money borrowed in secret) is pleasant since 
it gives us the feeling that we are honourable --- it 
rouses pride in us. This is what Hume tells us. See Page 




tian religion. Rousseau's virtue is, no less than Hume's, 
a virtue which is ultimately made useful, but, like Hume's, 
it is one of feeling. This bond betvJeen virtue and feeling 
is something which Rousseau both found and helped to create 
in his age. He was the founder of the romantic movement in 
literature and philosophy, but he also found his audience 
very receptive. It must be remembered that when Rousseau 
lived, faith and the morality of the Christian Church had 
already been undermined, and that what had taken their place 
in the minds of those who sought their salvation elsewhere, 
was a sentimental ecstacy. 1 ) 
Now Rousseau's autobiographical works, especially the 
Confessiog~, abound vJi th instances where the author lays 
stress on the virtue of his or someone else's behaviour 
simply because that behaviour touches his feeling. We must, 
in this context, compare Rousseau's life with his philos-
ophizing.2)we have to do with a man who writes much about 
morality and justice, yet whose life abounds (if \ve are to 
believe the Confessions, or even parts of it) with acts 
anti-social, a-social and even criminal by his own standards 
---------------------·---------- ·----·-------
1) See Chapter Note 5. 
2) Compare Prof. Versfeld 's Rou~eau 's Moral....§_g_d Relig!_~§. 
yiews and their Cqnsegue~~· Prof. Versfeld poi~ts out 
that since Rousseau preaches one thing and pract1ses 
another, his preachings must be suspect. 
• • ( 
• 
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set in the Social Contract. So he writes a philosophy of 
education and abandons his own children to an orphanage, an 
act which he "white-washes 11 by comparing himself with Plato 
(who advocates state care of children)o He is a partner in 
the purchase of a girl of twelve for purposes which we do 
not hesitate to .call immoral, and agairi tells us that it 
was really a virtuous act since he taught her music while 
waiting for her to become old enough to be of use to him 
and his partner. We can multiply instances, but these two 
will suffice to illustrate the principle that as long as an 
act could in some way be made to give Rousseau a feeling of 
virtue t that act ~ virtuous. This principle is spr·ead 
over many pages in Rousseau's works, but we find it stated 
explicitly and clearly ori one page· of Hume 's Treat~:l) 
11The chief spring or actuating principle of the human mind 
is pleasure or pain; and when these sensations are remov'd 
both from our thought or feeling, we are, in a great meas-
ure, incapable of passion or action, of desire or volition2 ) 
•••••• moral distinctions depend entirely on certain peculi-
ar sentiments of pain and pleasure, and that whatever men-
tal quality in ourselves or others gives us a satisfaction, 
1) Book 3, Page 334 of Volume 2 •. -
2) Hence our clue to how the cycles of history as Hume and 
Rousseau see it, are to be broken. Men will grasp at a 




by the survey of reflection, is of course virtuous; as 
every thing of this nature, that gives uneasiness, is vici-
ous. Now since every quality in ourselves or others, which 
gives pleasure, always causes pride or love; as every one, 
that produces uneasiness, excites humility or hatred: It 
follows, that these two particulars are to be consider'd as 
equivalent, with regard to our mental qualities, virtue and 
the power of producing love or pride, ~~~and the power of 
producing humility or hatredo In every case, therefore, we 
must judge of the one by the other; and may pronounce any 
quality of the mind virtuous, which causes love.or pride; 
and any one vicious, v.rhich causes hatred or humility." Hence 
we can say that Hume's "natural 11 virtue, though it may ap-
pear so, does not issue from an I-Thou relationshipa There 
is no necessity for an I-T£~ relationship to establish 
Burne's or Rousseau's virtue; it is quite independent of 
other people, and is centred only on the one who feels~l) 
But though this virtue is centred on the one ~'!Tho feels, 
it is not difficult to see that an;y communication td or by 
othe·rs of whatever causes these feelings, must depend on 
what Hume calls sympathy. ltle recall the analogy of the two 
wound-up strings. 2 )Men must communicate in this way, of 
--------
1) See Chapter Note 6o 





course, because they are spatially ruLd temporally isolated 
and cannot meet. And one of the men least capable of meet-
ing is Rousseau himself, whose isolation from his fellow 
men is reflected in his use of the mechanical bonds of the 
state to establish morality among men. This use of mech-
anical bonds to establish morality becomes very evident 
when one studies his idea of a state religion, as we shall 
do presently. Such a morality must,· of course, be utilitari-
an, as Hume's is utilitarian, and in such a scheme of things 
whatever is communicated or transmitted between men, must 
be communicated or transmitted mechanically. There is no 
striving for the Good, that is, there is no history. This 
sort of transmission is very similar to the conduction of 
he.at in a solid: energy is handed from atom to atomo Men 
take the place of atoms and remain spatially and temporally 
isolated; there is no confluence of spaces and times, so 
that the space and time of a virtue of feeling and a util-
itarian morality must be those of Galilee's physics. 
(iv) 
It seems quite obvious novJ that there can be no con-
nection between morality --- utilitarian morality --- and 
religion in the thought of our two philosopherso To be sure, 
both are derived from feeling and both are ahistoric, but 
this does not provide any connection in the sense in which 
24-2. 
Christian morality is connected with the Christian religion. 
It is hardly possible that Rousseau's natural religion can 
be founded on anything but feeling. If he does not accept a 
mediator between man and God, he cannot accept the Old 
Testament as the relation of a progressive revelation of 
God to man, promising a culmination in an Incarnation. And 
since, as Hume holds, one cannot arrive at God empirically, 
the only other source of religion for Rousseau is his feel-
ing. Nevertheless, the name Rousseau gives it --- natural 
religion--- suggests a link with the 11science of man," 
the study of human nature. We cannot doubt that this link 
is provided by the fact that Rousseau wishes to incorporate, 
as it were, religion in the "science of man 11 by establish-
ing a state religion based on what he regards as sound prin-
ciples of political science. It must be noted, however, that 
the religion is then based on the principles of political 
science, and not political science on religious principles. 
The state is all-important in Rousseau's thought, as we 
shall find in the next chapter. 
It seems inevitable now, that this natural religion of 
feeling which really has nothing to do with morality as 
conceived by Hume and Rousseau, should in the end also turn 
out to be utilitarian, or, as is the case, give rise to a 





turns out to be an instrument of control of human beings; 
we defer the matter, therefore, to the next chapter. vfuat 
is of importance here is that in this state religion the 
Sovereignty of God disappears and the religion becomes sub-
servient to the state in which the General Will is the 
Sovereign. 
. The Sovereignty of God had a very definite meaning for 
the thinker of the Christian Middle Ages. It meant that the 
relationships between human beings were governed by God 
through His Christian C~urch; the rulers of the world were 
delegates of God who found their guidance for their rule in 
the Decalogue and the teachings of Christ. The term Sove-
reignty of God survived after the ~addle Ages, but before 
phrases like Will of_i£e People and General Will it has 
lost its force. Rousseau must be looked upon as one of the 
testators who bequeathed this problem of reconciling the 
Will of the People with the Vilill of God to the generations 
after him, the problem which arose with his deposition of 
God as Sovereign of the state. This deposition was, more-
over, accompanied by a very definite destruction of the 
"vertical" relationships which men of the Middle Ages had 
felt to exist between themselves and God (and which pious 
persons must necessarily feel to exist). Furthermore, if 




of union with and inclusion in the Kingdom of God, then. our 
religion is directed, not only to God, but also to our fel-
low men acGording to the command that we must love our 
neighbours as we love ourselves~ 
But natural religion is an affair purely for the isol-
ated individual and ca~~ot encompass other people. Now since 
Rousseau was, of all people, perhaps the one least able to 
meet other people and communicate something to them, what-
ever has to do with other people is, in his view, a matter 
for the state. It is precisely because his natural religion 
does not encompass other people that Rousseau has to find 
another religion for the state which does, in some way or 
other, encompass people. However, because the state is a 
mechanism and its citizens are bound to the Sovereign by 
means of mechanical·ties, one must expect this civil re-
ligion, as Rousseau calls it, to bear all the hall-marks of 
a mechanical tie. We shall find in the next chapter that 
this is so. The relationships between people is a matter 
for the state, and civil religion is one of its instruments. 
It cannot enc.ompass people through a confluence of spaces 
and times, and must be as ahistoric and atemporal as Rous-
seau's natural religion; consequently it must also be re-
garded by those who adhere to a faith of revelation, as a 




self in time and history.l) 
With regard to the state religion we can point out that 
Rousseau makes a very definite point of cutting the bond 
between God and the citizen when he says:2 )"All justice 
comes from God, who is its sole source; but if we knew how 
to receive so high an inspiration, we should need neither 
government nor laws ••••• Humanly speaking the laws of justice 
are ineffective among men •••• conventions and laws are there-
fore needed •••• " He then places the making of the laws in 
the hands of another Sovereign, the General Will, and these 
laws become, as he says, nothing more than the conditions 
of living together. When Rousseau says that there are no 
fundamental laws by which the Sovereign can feel bound,3)he 
does not exclude the laws of God. 
Hume's words are not as direct as those of Rousseau, 
but their effect is the same; "That the DEITY is the ul-
timate author of all government, will never be denied by 
.. 4 )H any..... e then goes on to show that governments are all 
based on force instead of on consent, and says: "vilere all 
1) See Chapter Note 8. 
2) Du Contrat Social, Book 2, Chapter 6, Page 92. Original 
:French in Chapter Note 9 . 
3) Ibid. 
4) Of the Original C~ntract, Pages 440 to 450 of Volume 1 
of the ~ssa;ys. 
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men possessed of so inflexible a regard for justice, that, 
of themselves, they would totally abstain from the proper~ 
ties of others; they had for ever remained in a state of 
absolute liberty, without subjection to any magistrate or 
' 
political society: But this is a state of perfection, of 
which human nature is justly deemed incapable." 
For· Hume, as for Rousseau, religion is something to 
be used to cement the state. Morality is nothing more than 
a mechanical relationship between undirected human beings, 
and since the religion of the state is derived from this 
morality, it becomes a social morality, as utilitarian·as 
the relationships between human beings from which it is 
de-rived. Hume's "designed" religion, like that of Rousseau, 
cannot shape the relationships among men·beyondbinding 
them in a more or less mechanical way to the super-It which 
is the Sovereign. Beyond that the shaping of human rela-
tionshi.ps is reserved for that super-It. This fact that 
morality and religion alike, in the thought of our two phi-
losophers, have the properties of physically transmissable 
substances or energy (compare Hume's stretched strings) 
makes them the logical morality and religion for the state 
looked upon as a mechanism. If the civil religion is "of 
use" to the state, and the state is there to govern the mo-
t,:Lons of reified human beings in Galileian space and tiiD.e, 
then the space and time of this religion are those of the 
physics of Galileo. 
What is important for us to note for the purposes of 
the next chapter is that this religion, sundered from time 
and history, is only a "binder" in the state, a sort of 
gravitational pull which must act on the citizens. vie shall 
see what becomes of it in the context of the control of men 
as masses of matter. 
248. 
CHAPTER 7 
The Control of r1en as Masses of Matter 
(i) 
The hostility of men.towards one another that under-
lies the social contract theory of the state makes this ex-
pedient to resolve the problems of society one in which the 
control of men is inherent. The state comes into being so 
that order may be created or restored among men at war with 
one another, and this order cannot come about except through 
control. Now Hume and Rousseau reduce men to masses of mat-
ter; the political theories of our two philosophers con-
sequently become theories for the contr0l of masses of mat-
ter in motion. For an examination of this control an ap-
propriate starting point is the deprivation of human beings 
of their wills. 
Both Hume and Rousseau require that for order among 
men to come about, men should, so to speak, place their 
wills at the disposal of some larger, all-embracing entity. 
Rousseau calls this entity the General Will, and he says 
that men must p:J_ace their person and all their power "in 
common under the supreme direction of the General Will."l) 
This amounts to an assumption of the will, and one has dif-
ficulty in concluding otherwise th~D that it is lost to the 
1) Du Con.trat Social, Book 1, Chapter 6, Page 68. 
-~. '.-
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person whose will is thus assumed. Moreover, the will is 
assumed into an entity vThich, we have discovered, is atem-
poral, that is, it is placed outside time which is of the 
essence of personality. 
Our philosophers, however, go further. With regard to 
the infallibility of the General Will, for instance, Rous-
seau says :1 )"Hmv can a blind multitude which often does not 
know what it wills because it rarely knows what is good for 
it; carry out for itself so great and difficult an enter-
prise as a system of legislation? Of itself the people wills 
-always the good, but of itself it by no means always sees 
it. The General Will is always in the right, but the judg-
ment which guides it is not always enlightened ••••• the in-
dividuals see the good they reject; the public wills the 
good it does not see. All stand equally in need of guidance. 
The former must be compelled2 )to bring their wills into 
conformity with their reason; the latter must be taught to 
know what it wills." What is immediately striking in this 
passage is that though the General Will can be guided, the 
individuals must be compelled, and we might well ask ho'trl it 
would be possible to guide the General Will after the in-
1) Du Contrat Social, Book 2, Chapter 6, Pages 95 to 96. 
For the original French see Chapter Note 1. 
2) The underlining of this word is mine; it is not ital-
icized by Rousseau. 
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dividual wills have been compelled. 
We have another dualism in this passage: as the words 
stand they indicate that the individual will and reason are 
opposed to each other if the individual does not submit to 
. 
the General Will. The opposition 'can be eliminated by com-
pulsion, says Rousseau, but in that case the will of the 
individual must disappear. We conclude then, that whether 
the individual is made to conform to the General Will, or 
w·hether he "surrenders" his will to it, he is rendered will-
less. It must follow that the legislation of the General 
Vvill and "forcing into freedom" go together, and that this 
"forcing into freedom" is nothing less than a suppression 
of personality. If a man chooses and acts of his ovm free 
will, he can be told that he must conform. to,the law as 
formulated according to the "science of man." In this way 
civic freedom becomes a freedom from clashes with one's 
fellow men, but can extend no further. This is a controlled 
state and can hardly be called freedom: 
The word guida££~ in the passage now becomes suspect. 
If the General Will is to be guided after the individual 
wills have been compelled, the guidance would seem to con-
tain the germ of the maxim that "the King can do no wrong," 
which easily becomes "the Government can do no wrong," and 
finally, when the government is government by a dictator, 
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"the dictator can do no wrong. " We shall see presently that, 
in fact, this guidance leads, in many cases, to precisely 
thatel)Certainly the word compelled makes it quite clear 
that Rousseau's citizens are masses of matter that are pro-
pelled in the mechanism which is the society of the social 
contract, itself a product of an age of the apotp.eosis of 
science and mechanism with their space and time of Galileian 
physics. 
Now here again it will not do to argue that by the 
v10rd com:eelled Rousseau really meant something else, for 
instance that the individual must be made to understand by 
argument that he really wills what his reason tells him to 
will Q If Rousseau did mean something else, v.rhy did he use 
compelled? Argument is guidance, and guidance Rousseau re-
serves for the General Will. In any case, whatever device 
one uses to make a person's will something other than vlhat 
it is, one destroys that person's will, and if the individu-
al is made to a~re~ with the General Will, that individual 
becomes will-less2 )and he comes under control. 
Since freedom is so closely bound up ·with human per-
sonality, and since men have, in the philosophies of Hume 
·--------------------------------------
1) During Mussolini's period of government in. Italy, the 
common slogan was: Il Duce ___£a sem£E._e ragione (The Leader 
is always right). 







and Rousseau, come to be particles in motion~ bereft of all 
personality, it should not surprise us to find that when 
our two philosophers use the word free~~' they use it to 
indicate something connected with the forced morality and 
utilitarian justice which we have found the morality and 
justice of the state based on a contract to be. Rousseau 
can hardly be clearer than he is in the §.Q£ia±. Cont~:l) 
"In order that the social compact may not be an empty for-
mula, it tacitly includes the understanding, which alone 
can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey 
the general will, shall be compelled to do so by the whole 
body. This means nothing less than that he will be forced 
to be free." We notice how close together the words £Q.!!!.-
pelle.9:_ and force£ are used. Hume is hardly less clear than 
Rousseau in telling us that a man can be "forced into free-
dom." He says :2 ) "But government •••• not contented to protect 
men in those conventions they make for their mutual in• 
terests, it often obliges them to make such conventions, 
and forces them to seek their own advantage, by a concur-
renee in some common end or purpose." One might venture to 
---------
1) Du Contrat Social, Book 1, Chapter 7, Pages 71 to 72 .• 
Original French-In Chapter Note 3. 
2) A Treatise of Human Nature, Volume 2, Page 303. This no-
tion of forcing a man into freedom seems to have a Greek 
background. See Chapter Note 4. 
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say that any reigning king of the eighteenth century could 
have put the arguments of both Hume and Rousseau to good 
use by justifying any act of force against his subjects 
with them. We shall find, in fact, that it is precisely 
this use which men after our two philosophers had for their 
arguments. 
vfuat one must find a little extraordinary about the 
notion of freedom in th~ thought of Hume and Rousseau is 
that there vmuld be men, even though they may be only a. few, 
who would have to be forced to accept it. This freedom is 
therefore something quite apart from human personality and 
consequently outside real time. It is the civic freedom of 
the state of the social contract, a freedom which presents 
us with the paradox that.men have to be controlled when they 
possess it. It is the very antithesis of Bultmann's notion 
of freedom. For Bultmann (whose view on freedom is essen-
tially Christian) freedom belongs to the person in his his-
toricity, that is, it is freedom 11for responsible acting."l) 
Rousseau makes freedom something that one has 11 only negati:ve-:-
1y as being untouched by encounters, 11 since it is something 
into and in which men are controlled. An encounter, Bult-
1) Histo;£,;Z and Eschatolo~, Chapter 10, Page 149. See also 
Hulsbosch' s God's Creation, Chapter 3, Page 64: 11 My free-
dom cannot be affirmed by somebody other, because the 
originality of my own person would thereby be deniedo" 
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maTlJl says, 11is .something which calls a man's unfettered 
choice into acticn; it is the essence of the historicity of 
men. rrl) 
The paradox of a freedom in which men are controlled, 
and the consequent "absence of encounters" provide us with 
a means of showing that the freedom in the thought of our 
two philosophers is a spurious freedom. We ask first: What 
does Rou·sseau set out to do in the Social Contract? The re----
ply has already been given: He wishes to justify the ex-
istence of the stateo He wishes to propound a political 
theory by which the individual in the s~ate, while obeying 
the .laws framed so as to reflect the General Will and in-
terest, should remain as free as before. 2 )0ne infers that 
for Rousseau natural liberty is not a complete liberty, 
since it is limited by the extent to which a man can de-
fend himself against others. Then, if a man submits to such 
an incomplete freedom in the state of nature, he would more 
readily submit to human laws which he ·himself has willed 
because they are necessary for his safety. This is the ex-
change of natural liberty for civic liberty. But civic free-
dom then becomes a :freedom from. fear of his fellow men, and 
we must ask: Is this real liberty, and has he really willeu 
----~-----------
1) See also Bergson's ~im~and Free Will. 
2) Du Contrat S~ci~~' Book 1, Chapter 6, Page 66. 
the laws be free, responsible choice? It seems rather that 
it is a freedom born in his isolation from his fellow men 
whom he fears and with whose motions his own are regul.ated 
in the space and time of Galileian physics. He wills laws, 
not because ~hey are a striving to the Good, but because 
his will has been directed by the danger of exploitation by 
his fellow men and what he looks upon as a promise of an 
absence of paino His will is not ~lly responsible, and 
since civic freedom is not a freedom of striving, there is 
no real action. If personality is created by action, that 
.is, by the putting into operation of freedom, then this 
11forcing into freedom 11 is a destruction of personality, for . 
it goes contrary to action. 
Now 1r1hen a law becomes the will of the majority -..,;-
and according to Rousseau's method of determining the Gen-
eral \rJill it is more often than not the will of the major-
ity --- it is no longer the will of those vlho are not among 
the majority. The notion that one 1 s real vJill is implicit 
in the General Will fails hereo 
(ii) 
Novl if morality in the body politic .is forced (as we 
have seen that it is in the social contract state) and if 
freedom itself is closely connected wi.th compulsion, the 
state must become that around which control and compulsion 
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must revolve, that is, it must replace the individual in 
importance. Control of morality must issue in a control of 
religion, consequently we find that Hume and Rousseau alike 
are in favour of a state religion. Hume conceives a state 
in which religious matters are strictly under the super-
vision of the state, while Rousseau puts loyalty to the 
state before loyalty to any church except that vThich is 
created by the state to serve its interests and is there-
fore an integral part of its organization and functioning. 
Rousseau tells us in the Social Contract1 )that "no 
state has ever been founded without a religious basis," and 
that2 )"it matters very much to the community that each citi-
zen should have a religion ••••• There is therefore a purely 
civil profession of faith of which the Sovereign should fix 
the articles •••• The dogmas of civil religion ought to be 
few, simply and exactly worded, without explanation or com-
mentary. The existence of a mighty, intelligent and bene-
ficial Divinity, possessed of foresight and providence, the 
life to come, the happiness of the just, the punishment of 
the wicked, the sanctity of the social contract and the 
laws •••• " HeTe we have a religion specifically "designed" 
----------~--------------------~------~-------------------
1) Book 4, Chapter 8, Page 201. For the original French see 
Chapter Note 5. 
2) Ibid .. , Page 206. Original French in Chapter Note 5o 
Wenote that the Sovereign, not God or the Church, .fixes 
the articles of faith. 
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to serve a purpose as an engineer would design a piece of 
machinery. \ve find no histori-c growth in it, no progressive 
revelation and no Incarnation. 
We cannot fail to note the name Rousseau gives his 
_ state religion: £i vil religiog,. It goes, of course, with 
civi~ (or civic) freedom. This name, coupled with the in-
clusion of the sanctity of the social contract as part of 
the dogma of the Rouss,eauian state .:religion, makes it the 
' / 
very antithesis of the Christianity of the }liddle Ages. The 
state is the end and the religion the means, whereas in the 
~uddle Ages the state was an institution of God which grew 
out of the service of God. But one must not be misled into 
thinking that this civil religion is Rousseau's natural re-
ligion. Natural religion is purely Rousseau's private af-
.fair of feeling which is ambiguously related to other men, 
and really has no bearing on human relationships. Rousseau 
and Hume make the state the end and religion the means to 
that end the moment they transfer the sovereignty from God 
to the people, and when religion becomes an instrument, it 
must cease to be historic, and can be effective in human 
relationships only as a mechanical tie. 
That the state is ever uppermost in Rousseau's mind 
and that the God in whom he professes to believe, really 
takes second place, one can hardly doubt when one finds 
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that he condemns sin only because it affects the state:1 ) 
"Those who distinguish civil from theological intolerance 
are, to my mind, mistaken. The two forms are inseparable. 
It is impossible to live at peace with those we regard as 
damned; to love them would be to hate God who punishes them: 
we positively must either reclaim or torment them. Wherever 
theological intolerance is admitted, it must inevitably 
have some civil effect; as soon as it has such an effect, 
the Sovereign is no longer Sovereign, even in the temporal 
sphere: thenceforth priests are the real masters, the kings 
only their ministers." This passage, of course, makes it 
clear what sin really is in Rousseau's opinion: It is dis-
obedience to the state and nothing more. It cannot be any-
thing more if morality is no more than the regulation of 
motions in Galileian space and time, and justice no more 
than order in society: 
We find Rousseau placed in the position of having to 
choose between, on the one hand a®1itting God and history 
into the state and confounding his notions of an infallible 
and almighty General IJ\Till, and, on the other, retaining the 
General Will as almighty a~d making God a mere instrument 
in the service of the state. There is no doubt about which 
1) Du Contrat Social, Book 4, Chapter 8, Page 208. For the 
original French see Chapter Note 6. 
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he chooses: he isolates God from men as he isolates men 
from one another. The state and its laws come first, and he 
sees the established Christian Church as a.threat to them: 1 ) 
"There is a (third) sort of religion of a more singular 
kind, which gives men two· codes of legislation, t~rm rulers 
and two countries, renders them subject to contradictory 
duties, and makes it impossible for them to be faithful both 
to religion and to citizenship •••• such is Roman Christian-
ity~? ••••• It leads to a sort of mixed and anti-social code 
which has no name. 11 Rousseau goes on to say that this kind 
of religion "is so clearly bad that it is a waste of time 
to stop to prove it such. All that destroys social unity is 
worthless; all institutions that set man in contradiction 
to himself are worthless." 
Here again Rousseau admits the existence of a dualism 
which he cannot bridge with his mechanism. In the truly 
Christian state there is no divided loyalty, and man is not 
set in contradiction to himself; loyalty to the state is 
looked upon as loyalty to God.3)But in Rousseau's mind, as 
1) Du Contrat Social, Book 4, Chapter 8, Page 201. For the 
original French see Chapter Note 7. 
2) Rouss.eau 1 s rejection of a }1ediator does not lead one to 
think that he is better disposed to Protestantism than 
to Catholicism. 




in the mind of most Enlightenment philosophers --- those 
who are not atheists --- there is a rift between the Will 
of God and the Will of the People 9 the Sovereignty of God 
and the sovereignty of the people. 
(iii) 
Nov1 if one asks on what grounds a man should be ex-
pected to accept the state religion of Hume and Rousseau, 
the answer can only be that he must accept it if he wishes 
to· be a good citizeno If he wants to be a good citizen, he 
has no choice in the matter of religion, and his mind, as 
far as the religious ties vvi th his fellow men are concerned, 
is m~de up for him. Rousseau, in fact, tells us so:1 )"Now 
it matters very much tb the community that each citizen 
should have a religion. That will make him love his du~y ••• 
••• There is therefore a purely.civil profession of faith of 
which the Sovereign should fix the articles, not exactly as 
religious dogmas, but as social sentiments without which a 
man cannot be a good citizen or faithful subject. vJhile it 
can compel no one to believe them, it can banish from the 
State 1r1hoever does not believe them --- it can banish him, 
not .for impiety, but as an anti-social being, incapable of 
truly loving the lm•TS and justice ••••• If anyone, after pub-
------
1) Dl Contrat Social, Book 4, Chapter 8, Pages 206 to 207. 
For-the original-French see Chapter Note 9. 
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licly recognizing these dogmas, behaves as if he did not 
believe them, let him be punished by death: he has committed 
the worst of all crimes, that of lying before the law. 11 
Privately, of course, the citizens can believe what 
they please (as Rousseau privately has his natural religion) 
11 so l.ong as their dogmas contain nothing contrary to the· 
duties of citizenship~ But v.rhoever dares to say: 'OUtside the 
Church is no salvation,' ought to be driven from the State, 
unless the State is the Church and the prince the pontiff. 11i) 
Rousseau could hardly have stated more clearly that good 
citizens must be controlled with regard to their religious 
matters as they are controlled in their relationships to-
wards one another in Galileian space and time. And_clearly 
the state is uppermost in Rousseau's mind; the Church, re .... 
ligion and God become servants of the state. 
Rousseau, it seems, would, if he could, model his state 
religion on the state worship inherent in the political life. 
of many ancient states such as Sparta and Rome. vle must 
remember that in Rousseau's opinion, the world has deteri-
orated. He recognizes that ancient religions had their 
weaknesses, but'he still considers them good "in that it 
unites the divine cult with love of the laws, and making 
-----------------------------------
1) Du Contrat Social, Book 4, Chapter 8, Page 209o For the 
orl"ginalFrenc-h see Chapter Note 10. 
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country the object of the citizen's adoration, teaches them 
that service done to the State is service done to the tutel-
ary godb It is a form of theocracy in which there can be no 
pontiff save the prince, and no priests save his magistrateso 
To die for one's country then becomes martyrdom; violation 
of its laws impiety; and to subject one who is guilty to 
public execration is to condemn him to the anger of the 
gods. 111 )Obviously Rousseau regards time that brought Chris-
tianity with its close connection with history as a "story," 
as the Great Corrupter. 
Hume does not offer the citizen of the state a religion 
which is materially different. He institutes ,tho .~Sove·re;!.,gn 
for precisely the same purpose as does Rousseau, that is, 
for preventing clashes betvJeen people v1ho are so many mate-
rial bodies moving in Galileian space and time, so that one 
must expect him to extend the control of the Sovereign over 
the subjects as far as he considers it necessary --- and 
he considers it necessary, for the sru{e of order (justice), 
to extend this control to vJhat spiritual life he grants the 
2' people: 1 "The Presbyterian government is established; and 
the highest ecclesiastical court is an assembly or synod of 
1) Du Contrat Social, Book 4, Chapter 8, Page 207. For the 
original French see Chapter Note 11. 
2) Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth, Page 486 of Volume 1 o.f 
the ~ssa~. See also Chapter Note 12. 
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all the presbyters of the county. The magistrates may take 
any cause from this court and determine it themselves. The 
magistrates may try and depose or suspend any presbyter." 
Now the question of forcing a man into freedom taken 
together with the notion of forcing him into a state religi-
on; raises an interesting question: Would it be possible for 
anyone to consider himself as not having given his consent 
to being governed by a particular General Will, that is, can 
a person look upon himself as not being a party to the con-
tract that created a particular state with its legislative 
body? It might be argued that since Rousseau perhaps looked 
upon the social contract merely as a device for justifying 
the state as an accomplished fact, the question really does 
not arise. However, since the device is used to found govern-
ment on consent, the question seems to be of material in-
terest; if the question of whether a man can consider him-
self not bound by the contract does not arise, the whole 
problem of justifying the eXistence of the state need not 
arise either. 
Vlfe have established that the social contract comes into 
being, that is, government by consent comes into being be-
cause men have come to be in a state of war with one another. 
It must stand to reason that to prevent the continual war-
ring of man against man, the Sovereign must of necessity 
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oppose each man who opposes his "~:vill against that of his 
fellow _man, that is, a general control of men must be es-
tablished, and Rousseau does make the point that the social 
contract must come into being by ~;£.§!lim~~~ consent. There-
fore, if there are some individuals vJ'ho refuse consent, 
there can be no social contract; at least some individuals 
would then remain in a state of natural liberty and be able 
to continue the war against one another. Now Rousseau ap-
plied his notion "forcing into freedom" only to dissenters 
from the General itlill, but if the socj_al contract comes into 
existence because people are at \·rar ~,Ji th one another, then 
it is not clear that this contract serves any purpose unless 
all are forced into peace (and "freedom"). No man can then 
have the alternative of not being a party to the contract. 
One must conclude then,. that the social contract is not a 
contract of cons·ent; individuals are forced to consent as 
they are "forced into freedom" if they act contrary to the 
dictates of the General Will. Once again we see the differ-
ence between the social contract state and the state of 
Aristotl,e: for Aristotle the state exists because men are 
directed towards one another, that is, their spaces and 
times overlap or interpenetrate; the social contract herds 
people together .in a state by forcing them into it. This 
force is either that of circumstances of continual hostility 
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issueing from random motions in Galileian space and time, 
ar that of an entity which denies them existence outside 
the state. 1 ) 
(iv) 
The control of men extends further than their persons, 
and includes their property. Rousseau makes this quite clear 
when he tellp us that all men put their persons ~their 
power under the direction of the General \'Jill. 2 ) Surely their 
power must include the ability to acquire property and there-
fore the property itselfa Rousseau tells us further: 11Each 
man alienates, I admit, by the social compact·only such part 
of his powers, gQQQ.s and liberty as it is important for the 
community to control, but it must be granted that the sove-
reign is the sole judge of what is important. u3 )Rousseau 
here leaves no·doubt that the individual is to have no say 
or choice in the matter of 'lt.That he would be willing to part 
with in exchange for the blessings of citizenship; the Gen-
eral vJill judges. 4 )\rJhen this General vJill is incarnate in 
1) The fact that a·man cannot choose to remain outside.the 
social contract seems to have a further consequence with 
regard to tho relationships between states. See Chapter 
Note 13. 
2) See Chapter Note 14 .• 
3) Du Contrat So~, Book 2,. Chapter 4, Page 86. For the 
original French see Chapter Note 15. 
4) See Chapter Note 16. 
1 
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one man, as it is in a dictatorship, its judgment is usual-
ly that it should control everything. 
With regard to the control of the citizens of the state 
Green writes:1 )"The twentieth-century reader must be for-
given if he views the last statement (that the General Will 
~...... -_,...... -. --
~hL~L~5!.~f._whati.§_~QE!ant) with some distrust, 
seeing in it the very idiom of •••• ~every totalitarian re-
gime vvhich places the citizen at the complete mercy of what 
is called the State, obliterating him, in fact, as an in-
dividual. To this skepticism Rousseau would react by point-
ing out that in- a good state, based on a proper social con-
tract, the citizen has only himself to blame if he allows 
such ~n iniquitous system ever to materializeo And he would 
add that in these despotic or totalitarian states the social 
contract has been dissolved because the people were so 
stupid and apathetic as to transfer their sovereignty into 
the hands of an individual or clique. The inhabitants of 
such countries have really lapsed back into the sto_te of 
pure nature and each is therefore free to follow his own 
caprice regardless .of his neighbours." 
If- this would really be Rousseau's o..nsitmr to the objec-
tion that his Sto.te is o. toto..li to.rinn state in embrio, vie 
might point out, firstly, that the moment the Genero.l Will 
--- - -------·------
1) Jean-Jo.cgues- Rousseo.u: A Cri t_ico..l §.tu~y of his Life and 
~~~' Chapter 7, Po.ge~go. 
• 
becomes an algebraic sum of wills, and therefore the will 
of the majority, as according to Rousseau himself it does 
become, the individual is already in the hands of a "clique." 
Secondly, the Lawgiver is made so strong that he is bound to 
become a dictator as, in fact, he did during the French 
Revolution. Lastly, everyone is not again as free as he was 
in the state of nature to follow his own caprice when a 
totalitarian regime places itself in power; everyone is then 
in no uncertain way under the iron control of the state. 
But one must remember that for Hume and Rousseau alike, mo-
rality and justice are order in society, and orderly total-
itarianism is not contrary to'this morality and justice. 
Green also gives us Rousseau's probable reply to the 
statement that his philosophy contains the germ of state 
control of property and the loss of all property by the 
citizen. It is this: He really cannot lose anything "because 
man in the natural state had no real possessions since, at 
any moment, they could be taken ·from him by superior force. 
It is only by the social contract that such a precarious 
tenure is transformed into property, that is to say, into 
possession approved and guaranteed by the community ... More-
over, although in principle the state is the sole master of 
all the goods of its members, it is the latter who, as the 
sovereign people, will fix the regime unde"r which property 
• 
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is held. 11 Here again we might reply to Rousseau that once 
the regime becomes totalitarian, the people are no longer 
in control of it, and cannot guarantee anything The guaran .... 
tee of possession is closely bound up with the stability of 
the state as a democracy in which the people are sovereign, 
and in the philosophy of both Hume and Rousseau, the posi-· 
tion of the people is, to say the least, very precarious. 
The state exists, after all, to prevent the warring of man 
against man, and it does so by control!igg men. 
The implication of the social contract theory that the 
state must control all property, receives further strength 
from the Enlightenment notion that all men are the same. 
This notion contains the germ of state ownership of proper-
ty. Differentiating factors mean differences between men, 
and therefore inequalities. vfuen the emphasis is placed on 
the destruction of inequalities, as it was in the Enlighten-
ment, it means also the bringing down of the privileged to 
the level of common humanity. Private property differenti-
ates one man from another, and if one wishes to do away 
'II>Ti th all differentiating factors, one must surely abolish 
the private ovm.ership of property and place all property 
under the cont-rol of the state. Rousseau, in fact, seems to 
have been very conscious of this differentiation of persons 





Discourse on the Origin of Ineguality:1 )" ••••• all the in-
equality which now prevails, owes its strength and growth to 
the development of our faculties and the advancement of the 
human mind, and becomes at last permanent and legitimate by 
the establishment of property and laws." 
It is true that equality of wealth does not appear ex-
plicitly in Rousseau's scheme, says Green, 2 )but he quotes 
from Vaughan: " ••••• no citizen shall be rich enough to buy 
another or so poor as to be obliged to sell himself.n (Com-
pare the state o~mership of industry in Communist countries 
because one person must not work for anothe.r). "In short, " 
says Green, "there must be no extremes of wealth or poverty. 
The paramount consideration, alvv·ays, is to maintain the 
strength and unity of the State which cannot, obviously, be 
done if rich individuals are able to impose their will on 
their poor neighbours. The object of all legislation must be 
to achieve a state of things vrhereby ' ••••• each citizen is 
perfectly independent of all the others and excessively de-
pendent on the State .. 'n3) 
1) Page 221 of the Everyman's volume. 
2) Jean-Jacgues Rou~u: A Crit~cal §~~ of his Life and 
'ltJrit~, Chapter 7, Page 294. "• ••• que nul citoyen soit 
nssez opulent pour en pouvoir achetor un autre et nul 
assez pauvre pour etre contraint de se vendre.n (V.l:61). 
3) V .. l.:61. " ..... que chaque citoyen soit do.ns une po.rfaite 
independence de tous les autres et dans une excessive 






The conclusion \l.rhich forces itself upon us is that the 
social contract expedient is a blueprint for a society in 
which men and their belongings can be controlled as matter 
can be controlled in a workshop. The significant thing is 
that the space and time of the physics of Galileo apply to 
both men and things; both are seen against the background 
of this space-time frame.of reference. The licence granted 
for the "forcing into freedom" is really a licence granted 
for the enslavement of men by "the superman with his pure 
activism,"1Js history has seen in several countries this 
century. 2 )rn the General Will Rousseau forged an instrument 
of control as effective as a military command in an army. 
(v) 
It remains now to consider the linking-up of the thought 
of our·two philosophers and their times with the actual e-
vents of history in their own century and after, and with 
certain characteristics of our time. Our starting point is 
the conclusion already arrived at in preceding chapters that 
the society of Hume and Rousseau is a mechanism, an artifi-
cial construction of artificial per$ons. The answer has also 
already been given to the question: For what purpose is this 
------------------------------------------·---------------------
1) Prof. Versfeld's Oor Gode en_Af_gode, essay Rousseau die 
Verslawer van die Mens~, Page 4!7 




machine constructed? For the purpose of order and control. 
There is a related question: If we wish to know something 
about men, for what purpose do we want this knowledge? The 
answer is again: For the purpose of control, that is, if we 
wish to create a society with discipline and order accord-
ing to the social contract model. This was the outcome, if 
not the expressed purpose of the "science of man. "l \fuen 
man has been made subject to the science of man, everything 
is decided and controlled for him, because everything can 
be predicted. 2 )The Sovereign is there, says Hume,3)"to 
oblige men, however reluctant, to consult their own real and 
permanent interests. In a word OBEDIENCE is a new duty vJhich 
must be invented to support that of JUSTICE' and the tyes of 
equity must be corrobo-rated by those of allegiance ..... Order 
in society, we find, is much better maintained by means of 
government; and our duty to the magistrate is more strictly 
guarded by the principles of human nature, than our duty to 
our fellmv-ci tizens." 
About a decade after the deaths of Hu.me and Rousseau 
the French Revolution shattered the old order in France, but 
instead of true democracy replacing that order, the new or-
1) See Chapter Note 18. 
2) See Chapter Note 19. 
3) Of the Origin of Government, Volume 1 of the Essals~ 
Pages 114 to 11'5. · 
I 
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der soon came to be government by the few1 )as a result of 
the state of war between the populace and the anti-popular 
elements. At this time men were coerced extensively into 
accepting what the few regarded as good for them; there was, 
in other words, an extensive "forcing into freedom," and, to 
use Hume's expression, ObedienC£ became a duty to support 
justice, and justice became the control of men. 2 \1e find put 
into practice the idea of the education of the General ~vill 
and the guidance of the Lawgiver;3)it was, in short, a time 
in \l'lhich men were regarded in practice as 11uni versal men. 114-) 
The bloodshed during this period of French history testifies 
to the force tha,t is necessary to make men "universal men 11 
and to strip them of the spaces and times proper to them •. 
Another phenomenon in the history of these centuries 
relevant to our purpose, is the expansion of Europe to do-
minions beyond the seas. When the science of the seventeenth 
century had issued in the hostility to Christianity of the 
eighteenth century and technology was beginning to stir, 
Spain and Portugal had already succeeded in dividing the 
South American continent between them, the Netherlands had 
1) See Chapter Note 20. 
2) See Chapter Note 17. 
3) See Chapter Note 21. 
4-) See Chapter Note 22. 
had its Golden Age of colonization and art, and France and 
Britain were struggling for supremacy in India and North 
America. To the expansion of intellectual horizons, more 
specifically scientific horizons, was added an almost un-
limited expansion of geographic horizons of available ter-
·ritory for exploration and exploitation. The isolation of 
Europe had been ended by the sudden discovery of a new he-
misphere and new continents practically unpenetrated and 
unknovm. Europe had begun to "think imperially, " to use the 
words, of Joseph Chamberlain a century later, and \'le shall 
find that this "imperial thinking" found a source of en-
couragement in the philosophies of, among others, Hume and 
Rousseau. 
Now imperialism meant movement, both of men and of mat-
ter, with little distinction between the tv;o, 1 )for the.world 
steadily became commercialized and commerce meant the neces-
sity of ever faster and more efficient transport. It meunt 
that men were subjected to the same space and time measure-
ment as things, the Galileian rate of displacement measured. 
in miles or kilometres per hour, and there was no question 
of personal or natural spaces and times. But what is rele-
vant to our purpose is the fact that from the domination of 
of matter in commerce o.nd industry, flowed the necessity to 




dominate men, 1 )not only those in the mother countries, but 
also those in the colonized lands. The consequence was the 
atrocious conditions under which people worked in factories 
and mines in Europe, imposed on them without regard for 
either their physical or spiritual well-being. 2 )we have also 
in this period of history, an almost unparallelled blossom-
ing of the slave trade; men were literally treated as goods 
and moved about as sucho 
(vi) 
\ve can end this thesis with a consideration of our own 
age. Though slavery has been abolished and the atrocious 
V~rorking conditions in industry have disappeared, 3 )the worker 
in any industrial country in the world is still very much a 
reified engine of production, since production, sales and 
distribution (and therefore transport) are still keywords 
in the society of our century. If a worker is to produce, 
and if this production is, as it must be, largely the motion 
of things ih Galileian space and time, then one must expect 
the worker to be a controlled p~rt of a mechanism. His own 
motion must be in the spac·e and time of Galileo 's physics. 4-) 
1) See Chapter Note 24-. 
2) See Chapter Note 25. 
3) See Chapter Note 26. 
4-) S0e Chapter Note 27. 
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A modern industry has to do with mechanisms and is itself a 
mechanism of which the parts, those responsible for produc-
tion, function in spatial and temporal isolation under the 
control of the management. This is also true of those who 
are made responsible for the transport and distribution of 
manufactured goods. We say that in order to function proper-
ly, industry must be well organized, but organizatio? has 
come to be merely another word for control of men and ma-
chines without any distinction between the two. 1 ) 
Now .. in the case of this very refined mechanism --- our 
modern industry, organized to perfection --- of which the 
workers are parts, we have a very definite contract: the em-
ployer agrees to pay the worker for his labour and the work-
er agrees to work for the employer and submit to the control 
of the management. In .. a large number of cases, in fact, the 
contract is actually a written one. lrJe ho..ve, therefore, in 
industry, o. social contro.ct sto..te o.s both Hume and Rousseo.u 
conceived it; v.Je ho.ve in it, not only the control of men as 
mo.tter in motion, but also that rift between subject o.nd 
authority2 )which both our philosophers o.dmit, cannot be 
bridged in the states they rego.rd as good, states of which 
the space ond time of Go.lileo's physics are the only space 
l) See Chapter Note 28. 
2) The m:mse . of so mony strikes. See Chapter Note 29 ~ 
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and time. 
If.we wish to point out that our industrial age seems 
to be disregarding what Bergson, Heidegger, Alexander and 
others regard as real space and time, and that men are .real-
ly separated from their natural spaces and times, we must 
also point out that our.age is applying the space and time 
of the thought that produced the age. 1 )Galileo commenced 
the control of material bodies by studying their motions 
under the influence of forces and making a space-time arti-
fact for this purpose. From these'simple studies flowed the 
~ 
almost perfect control of matter i'n motion as we know it to-
day in, for instance, the rocket missile, flung electronic-
ally controlled, not only between continents, brit between 
celestial bodies. From Galilee's rolling balls and falling 
weights tq these missiles there was a time interval of some 
.three centuries in which Europe was told that space and time 
were outside the human person, imposed on him by the suc-
cession of events and things in the material world, that 
they were, in fact, only frames of reference for measuring 
position and motion. 2 )we fi.nd then, that since the time of 
Galilee there has been a superimposition of the space and 
time of elementary mechanics on the personal spaces and ; 
1) See Chapter Note 30. 







times of human beings, so that the latter became latent. 1 ) 
No doubt, the process was quite unconscious, flowing na-
turally from the thought of these centuries, but Rousseau, 
we have seen, appears to have grasped somehov1 that Galileian 
space and time could be associat~d with order and organiza-
tion, for one of the things which, according to him~ the 
General Will is to be taught, is "to see times and spaces 
as a se~ies."2 )Times and spaces as a series ape precisely 
as Hume conceives them and are applicable to human beings 
only when they have been reduced to abstractions as Hume and 
Rousseau reduces them and, as is the case for production in 
industry, are not required to meet. ---
In the space and time of control, which are the space 
and time of technics, the actions of men are not responsible 
and personality must be submerged in the necessity of law 
and prediction. In the space and time of freedom the his-
toricity of men, that is, their possession of choice o.nd 
responsible action, emerges. Tho control of men as masses 
of matter may seem a strange outcome of the thought of two 
philosophers who were champions of tho individual. vJe co.n 
explain it only by the fact that they isolated the individu-
al in space and time. They did not see him ~s a directed 
~----~---------------------------------------------------
1) S3e Chapter Note 31. 
2) See Chapter Note 32. 
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being with a subjective space and time overlapping those of 
other individuals. They both wanted a science of human na-
ture, and science requires a measurable space and a measur-
able time. For the sake of the individual they wanted this 
science and the order that goes with it; they failed to es-
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A Postscript: From Hum~ an~ Rousseau to Heidegge£ 
The separation of men from the spaces and times proper 
to- them, and their consequent reification as we see it in 
the industrialized world about us, is bound to turn the 
thoughts of some thinkers towards the future. Heidegger, 
for whom "the future is the primary tense, 111 )is an example. 
He is of special interest to us, of course, since we have 
made such liberal use of _his thought in distinguishing be-
tween real and derived space and time. Through his whole 
development this philosopher became extremely conscious of 
what he calls the separation of things from Being (to which 
we have already referred). This is really another way of 
saying that he became conscious of the projection of things 
against a frame of reference of Galileian space and time. 
In this study we have occupied ourselves with the projec-
tion of human beings against such a frame of reference, 
_a. projection by which they became things. In terms of Hei-
degger's thought; therefore, we have occupied ourselves 
with the separation of human beings from Being, hence our 
further interest in him. 
Now in Sein und Zeit man is characterized as an· es-
lj Barrett in "What is Existentialism?, Chapter 8_, Page 202. 
Another thinker v1ho is preoccupied with the future of 
man, is, of course, Teilhard de Chardin. 
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sentially temporal being, and this makes him an essentially 
historic·being. "It was to be expected, therefore," says 
Barrett, 1 )"that Heidegger's thought, as it developed, would 
pass into that great area of the philosophy of historye••·• 
the theme of history is central to the later Heidegger, and 
whatever he attempts to interpret --- whether it be poetry, 
the meani~g.?f technology, or a pre-Socratic philosopher 
--~ is understood within his own bold and simple scheme for 
Western history as a whole." 
For Heidegger the central fact of man's present his-
tory is technology, through which he has acquired a domina-
tion over things2 )(as was pointed out in the preceding 
chapter) and has achieved the first global civilization in 
history. This global civilization, however, cannot be seen 
apart from the so-called population explosion, and the nett 
result is that hu.man existence is becoming more and more 
"artificial.·" By this we mean that man has more and· more 
machines to aid him, ·and is in ever closer contact with his 
fellow men. The world is becoming ever more mechanized and 
humanized. We have at least some of the progress which Hume 
and Rousseau and other philosophers of the Enlightenment 
1) ~fuat is Existentialism?, Chapter 8, Page 201 • 
. 2) For this conclusion one must peruse Heidegger's later 
works, Holzwege (1949) and Collected Essays and Lec-
tures (I954). 
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hoped for -..,.~ better medical services, more consumer goods, 
better working conditions although, of course, this 
progress has also brought its disadvantages and its new 
problems and fears to off-set the advantages. New problems 
and new fears are not included in the Enlightenment scheme, 
and are quite contrary to its notion of progress, but they 
are part of history -~- something the Enlightenment wished 
to abolish in favour of progress. Heidegger, however, sees 
them as history and recognizes the grip that we have given 
science and technology on the world, as history. Whether we 
are for it or against it, there is nothing we can do about 
it, and Heidegger thinks that it will continue for a very 
long time. 
What is more relevant in the context of the separation 
of men from the spaces and times proper to them, and the 
reification of human beings by· Hume and Rousseau, is the 
very long philosophical preparation which went before our 
present technological era. We pointed out ;in Chapter 2 that 
· it was perhaps no accident that the space and time of the 
science of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries came 
into being in the West. Now technology is also a product of 
Western civilization. Art and religion we find in both East 
and \'lest, but science is a Western product only,1 )and tech-
1) See in this context e.lso Ortega y Gasset•s The Revolt of 
the Masses, Chapter 12. 
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nology goes with it. This science, Heidegger tells us, be-
gins with the Greeks, and if we ask why it begins with the 
Greeks, the answer is: Because they were orientated towards 
it by their philosophical conceptions, while the Chinese, 
Indians and other non-occidentals were orientated different-
ly. It is not the case that the Greeks (or the Westerners) 
were mentally superior to the Orientals. Barrett gives us 
Heidegger's conclusion:1 )"Greek philosophy detached clear 
and distinct objects from the enveloping presence of Being, 
and made these into objects for ration~l research. Because 
the Greek philosophers began to grasp ~eing in a certain 
way, science became possible .••••• philosophy prepared the 
way by a certain conception of Being that made science pos-
sible. ;,2 ) 
Now if the grip of technolog~ on mankind is to last a 
very long time, as Heidegger says. it will, what can we ex-
pect of the future? What Heidegger tells us in fact, is 
that the space and time of technics, the space and time of 
the society of Hume and Rousseau, will be man's space and 
time for a long time to come. The result, Heidegger thinks, 
may be that tradition will be lost. The separation of things 
1) What is Existentialism?, Chapter 8, Page 210. 
2) Compare with what was said in Chapter 2 on the deriva-
tion of Galileian space and time. 
·J'·t_' . 
. , .. ·,: 
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from Being (and we add: the separation oi humans from their 
spaces and times) means the greater "objectification of 
objects." Objects cease to have human associations; motor 
cars and modern furniture are replaced after a fevJ years 
and do not become family heirlooms. r-1odern housing schemes 
do not consist of buildings that can be treasured by pos-
terity. Even nature has receded before man, and who knows 
when nature reserves· will have to make room for housing 
schemes which consist of houses that can be broken down af-
ter a few years without any sense of loss1 In short, man 
may lose his historic sense altogethe~ and live in a present 
of ceaseless technological change. 
For Heidegger, as for Spengler? our present is the 
evening of the West~-- an evening,before a night that will 




Outline of the Subject and Historical Back~£~nd 
Note 1 
See, for instance, Teilhard de Chardin's The Phenomenon 
of Man, Chapter 1, Page 41, where he says-rhat the ----
modern physicist knov..rs that, instead of finding that 
the cosmic corpuscle (electron, proton, neutron, etco) 
has a radius of action as limited as its dimensions,"we 
find, on the contrary, that each of them can only be 
defined by virtue of its influences on all around it. 
\Nhatever space we suppose it to be in, each cosmic ele-
ment radiates in it and entirely fills it. However nar-
rowly the 'heart' of the atom ms.y be circumscribed, its 
realm is co-extensive, at least potentially, with that 
of every other atom. This strange prc,perty we will come 
across again, even in the human mole·~ule. 11 
Note 2 
Compare Degenaar' s Die SterflikheicJ. van die Siel, Page 
49: "Op die vraag vmt die mens J..S, ~ antwoord ~die mens 
vind homself as deurleefde liggaam wat van homself bevms 
kan word. Op die vraag hoe vind die mens homself? ant-
woord ek: altyd as deurleefde ligg,aam v..rat iets doen, wat 
handelend optree, wat gerig is, wat hom orienteer in die 
wereld •••• Ek as deurleefde liggaam wat van homself bevms 
kan word, staan hier voor u, ek ~;z!:, op die papier en ek 
spreek u aan. In hierdie handeling en ru{tiwiteit waarin 
die~urleefde liggaam homself bevind, le die gerigtheid 
van die mens •••• Hierdie gerigtheid openbaar sig as 'n 
gerigtheid op die v..rereld, op die medemens en op 'n Nag 
wat meer is as die wereld en medemens •••• Die mens ken 
homself via die wereld waaraan hy handel, via die mede-
mens met wie hy verkeer en via die Mag teenoor wie hy · 
hom bevind." 
Degenaar here speaks of a directedness towards God. 
If we accept the existence of God, therefore, we must 
also accept that a man has, in addition to the "horizon-
tal" relationships with his fellow men, 11Verticaln re-
lationships_ with God. Compare Hulsbosch's God'§ __ Creatio~, 
Chapter 3, ·Page 53: "Our relation to our feTIOws is not 






taken as directedness to God, in the sense that both as-
pects belong indissolubly together ••••• " 
Note 2 
Compare Frederick Copleston's Contemporary Philosophy, 
Chapter 8, Page 104: "But in t~case of modern thinkers 
••••• the emphasis is laid on freedom rather than self-
consciousness. Freedom becomes recognized as the chief 
characteristic of the human person. Perhaps, however, it 
would be preferable to say that human freedom ~s regard-
ed as the efficient cause of personality, Ol.""' at least as 
its necessary condition, for personality is looked upon 
as something to be won, something to be created and main-
tained with effort." 
Compare also Roubiczek's Existentialism, For and 
!f£airl;~~' Chapter 9, Pages 171 to 1'/4. - · ···~ --~ 
Note 4----
See Temmer•s Time in Rousseau and.fiF~t, Chapter 4-, Page 
58: nThe e.fforts of Rousseau and Ka·.1t to constitute 
themselves mediators of the conflicts of their lives 
and thoughts become more comprehen'.:Jible when these ef-
forts are envisaged in the context of the history of 
ideas. The complexity of this transformation has been 
well emphasized by Paul Hazard and Ernst Cassirer. The 
latter's study The P:qiloso~E.;y of the Ertightenme_p.!_, in 
particular, stresses the rlse of a critlcal movement 
that sought to prove the self-sufficiency of nature and 
intellect as opposed to any transcendental mediation. 
This eighteenth-century critique was all-inclusive and 
the reappraisal was complete." 
See also Hazard's ~rppean ~ought in the Eighteenth 
Century, Part 1. 
Note 2 
Compare Degenaar's Die Filosof~~limaat v~~_£ie Moder-
ne Wereldbeeld in which he gives the following view of 
the universe of the Enlightenment: · 
l."Absoluutheid: die wereld is objek.tief en absoluut; 
menslike gesigspunt is uitskakelbaar. 
2.ll:Enkelvoudigheid: die wereld is deelbaar in eenvoudige 
en deursigtige elemente. 
3."Tydloosheid: die tydsverloop is elimineerbaar • 
. 4-. "Oneindigheid (absolute ruimte): die wereld strek sig 
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uit in 'n oneindige ruimte. 
5."Kousaliteit (absolute determinasie): alle gebeure in 
die wereld is absoluut bepaal deur noodsaaklike kousali-
teit.11 
Note 6 
The very name Enlightenment seems to me to indicate that 
the thin\:ers of the eighteenth century had the notion 
that the entire world lived in darkness till they ar-
. rived on the scene. It seems to indicate a self-assur-
ance which the modern scientist --- the foremost sci-
entists of the Enlightenment were also among its most 
prominent philosophers --- vmuld hesitate to speak with. 
To be sure, the thought of the eighteenth century was not 
all science and hostility to Christianity; there was a 
great conflict of opinions, but the over-all picture of 
the Enlightenment period is one in which the character-
istics given in this chapter, predominate. Moreover, when 
we examine the nineteenth century --- as we shall later 
on in this study --- we can see only too clearly the con-
tinuation of the triumphs of science and the self-assur-
ance of the eighteenth. 
Note 7 
See Willey's The Eighteenth-centu~ Background, Chapter 1, 
Page 18, where the author quotes Hazard as saying that 
the deists of this time were 11rationalists with a nostal-
gia for religion. 11 That is, says \rlilley, they were men 
11\nTho had allowed the spirit of the age to separate them 
from orthodoxy, but who liked to believe that the slope 
they had started upon, was not slippery enough to lead 
them to atheism .. 11 
But to atheism it did lead some of them as the 
"great machine 11 became more important than its mechanic 
through the cupido scien~ and the cupido d~inand~ (to 
which we shall have to g~ve attention in due course). 
Note 8 -----
The 11rehabilitation of nature 11 of the eighteenth century 
has its origin really much further back than that cen-
tury. We can trace it, in fact, to a dualism which had 
long existed in mediaeval thought, namely that between 
Nominalism and Realism. As early as the ninth century 
A.D. Nominalism asserted that, not universals, but the 
particular things about us, the things of the senses tnTi th 
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which reason could easily deal, which could easily be ob-
served and about which laws could be formulated, were the 
only realities. This Nominalism issued in the seventeenth 
century in the science of Da Vinci, Gilbert, Harvey, Kep-
ler, Copernicus, and ultimately Isaac Newton (whom Hume 
mentions several times in his writings). The things of 
the tangible world were the things of nature to which man 
was advised by the thought of the Enlightenment to look 
for salvation. Science made this nature divine, and ro-
manticism echoed its divinity. See also Chapter Note 7 
above. 
Note 9 
Compare Bultmann's History and Es£hatolos~' Chapter 1, 
Page 8: " ••••• human life is determined (~n Enlightenment 
£hilosoEhies) •• 4 •• by natural laws. Therefore man is un-·· 
derstood as a natural being, and anthropology becomes 
biology. Human life is understood as determined by eli~. 
mate and geography and economic conditions.". 
Compare also Collingwood's The Idea of Histopy, Sec-
tion 9, Page 79: "Man (in the Enlightenment) ••••• is re-
garded as part of nature, and the-explanation of histor-
ical events is sought in the facts of the natural world. 
History so conceived would become a kind of natural his-
tory of man, or anthropology ••••• " 
Note 10 
It must not be accepted that prediction became the prin-
cipal aim of science. It was the cupido sciend~ which was 
then, as it is now, the motive behind the activities of 
the scientist. The modern scientist seeks coherent sys-
tems and rational explanations which will serve as in-
struments and direction pointers for further investiga-
tion, rather than prediction, though prediction and its 
fulfilment provide the test for his achievements and the 
correctness of formulated laws. Prediction is, however, 
a necessity when the results of science are handed over 
to technology for application in the conquest of matter, 
and it is prediction that gives mathematics with its ex-
actness its enormous role. For Hume and Rousseau, of 
course, predictability meant the presence of order in hu-
man affairs. It is for this reason that they wanted a 
science of man. 
Note 11 ••••••••• 
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Note 11 
See Sullivan's The Limitations of Scienc~, Chapter 6, 
Section 3, Page 135: " •••• the developing scientific out-
look owed its main features to the predilections of the 
mathematician. And the main assumption of the philosophy 
accompanying this scientific achievement is that the real 
may be identified with the quantitative. Compared with 
the fully developed modern scientific outlook, we see . 
that these early men of science were too prone to legis-
late for the universe on the basis of certain a priori 
assumptions --- assumptions which were really expressions 
of their dominating mathematical predilections. The mod-
ern scientific outlook differs from theirs by the more 
tentative character of its assumptions ••••• it; is no long-
er an article of belief that nature is necessarily math-
ematical." 
At least another t\vo and a half centuries of de-
velopment in science and mathematics after Galilee was 
necessary before Bell (r.1en of Mathematics, Pages 31 to 
32) could reply to Galilee 1 s judgment that God had v.rri t-
ten the book of the universe in mathematical characters: 
"If we care to inspect the symbols in Nature's great book 
through the critical eyes of modern science, we soon per-
ceive that we ourselves did the \vriting, and that we used 
the particular script vie did because we invented it to 
fit our own understanding •.•• If 'Number rules the uni-
verse, ' ·as Pythagoras asserted, Number is merely our del-
egate to the throne, for we rule Number." 
Compare also Sir James Jeans ' remark (~Q£_V!JS~rious 
Universe) that "The Universe begins to look moro l1ke a 
Great Thought than a Great Machine." 
Note 12 
See De Corpore, Chapter 1, Section 2: "Philosophy is such 
knowledge of effects or appearances, as we acquire by 
true ratiocination from the knowledge \r{e first have of 
their causes or generations as may be from knovring first 
their effects •••• By ratiocination I mean computation. Now 
to compute is either to collect the sum of many things 
that are added together, or to know what remains when one 
thing is taken out of another." 
Note 13 
Compare Becker's !he Heavenly Ci~ of th~ .]H5_htoenth-cen-
tury Philosophers, Chapter 3, Page 100: 'For the task-Of 
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the philosopher-historian, theoretically sperucing, was to 
note the ideas, customs and institutions of all peoples 
at all times and in all places, to put them side by side, 
and to cancel out as it·were those that appeared to be 
merely local or temporary: what remained would be those 
that were common to humanity. From these common aspects 
of human experience it would be possible, if at all, to 
discover, as Hume put it, the 'constant and universal 
principles of human nature' and on these principles to 
base a reconstructed society." 
Note 14--
To the scientist, also of today, simplicity is beauty. 
Copernicus simplified the mechanical model of the solar 
system, but this simplicity also appealed to him and his 
followers on aesthetic grounds. It must be obvious, how-
ever, that when a man is simplified by making him an ab-
straction, the simplification (with the purpose of making 
him "fit in" with nature, in a comprehensive and beauti-
ful system) is achieved at the expense of personality. 
The Enlightenment sought to "explain" man as a natural 
phenomenon. In physics a fact is explained by showing how 
it can be inferred from something more general. Before 
Newton's day there ltmre no general laws of mechanics; 
there was only a variety of specific laws, each applic-
able to a specific mechanical system, one for planets, 
one for falling bodies, one for pendula, and so on. It 
was Newton's calling to show how many such specific laws 
were implicit in other more general ones. A large number 
of facts could, for instance, be inferred from his laws 
of motion and gravitation, and since Newton's day this 
unifying process has extended further and into more and 
more branches of physical science. It reached its great-
est heights in our ovm century with Einstein's attempt at 
a unified field theory in which he sought to bring gravi-
tation and electro-magnetism under one roof. Compare in 
this context Fletcher's ~eomet£9~YB~}~~: ~h~ G~etEY of 
§pace-Time: "All the diverse efforts of theoretical phys-
ics can be said to have a single common goal: unifica-
tion, the explaining or understanding of as many varied 
pliysical phenomena as possible in terms of the minimum 
fundamental concepts and assumptions. 11 According to Flet-
cher geometrodynamics seeks also to reduce electric 
charges and elementary particles of matter to the geome-
try of space-time. See Appendix 7. 
Not only did this process of unification give an im-
mense power of prediction to the mathematical sciences, 
but also greater power of explanation 
which physics explains things). It is 
wondered why Hume held Ne\.vton in high 
to apply his procedure to man. 
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(in the sense in 
therefore not to be 
esteem and sought 
The search for simplicity by science and its method 
of obtaining it by abstracting from things in their con-
crete totality, derived their first impetus from the 
nominalism of the thirteenth century, and in this first 
impetus a principle known to physicists as Occam's Razor 
or rule of econo~ of hypothes~ looms large, for it real-
ly set a course in simplification. A gift to science from 
William of Occam, it has come to be one of the canons of 
scientific method, and lays dmvn the rule that \vhen more 
than one explanation of an observation is available, one 
must provisonally choose the one that involves the least 
number of assumptions. Occam was, in fact, a forerunner 
of Francis Bacon, infusing long before him that induction 
into thought which has since become the very backbone of 
science, while his insistence on the reality of things in 
contrast to universals heralded the emoiricism v.rhich Hurne: 
applied so rigorously after him. ~ 
The more a man is made an abstraction, the fevwr become 
the attributes that separate him from lifeless objects. 
It seems to me that the usefulness of having as fevr di-
viding lines as possible between beings overshadowed all 
other considerations in the Enlightenment. It is this 
action of science which led Benedetto Croce to prefer art 
to it. The sciences take us avmy from the individual and 
the actual world to one of ever-increasing abstraction. 
Art, on the contrary, takes us directly to the particular 
.person and the unique fact or situation, to the concrete 
individual. 
Exemplifying simultaneously the erasing of lines of 
demarcation in the Enlightenment period and the search 
·for proof of the "self-sufficiency of nature and intel-
lect as opposed to any transcendental mediation 11 is Lo. 
Mettrie 1 s L 1 Homme Machine. Commencing v-ri th Descartes' 
automatism of anlmals, La Mettrie argued that if animals 
could feel and act without an immortal soul, then man, 
being merely an advanced animal, had ho need of a soul 
either. Here we see the notion of nature in the thought 
of the time. vfe hnve D. scientist, 0. doctor to be precise, 
who looks upon the human body which he dissects when it 
is dead, as the entire man, o.nd looks upon this man in a 
way hardly different .from the vvo.y in which Go.lileo looked 
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upon his falling weights and swinging pendula. La Mettrie 
was not one of the great names of the Enlightenment, but 
he is of interest in the context of the erasing of lines 
of demarcation because he was succeeded in the centuries 
after him by biologists who contended (and still contend) 
that the distinction between the animate and inanimate is 
really only an arbitrary one. 
Note 16 
Compare Whitehead's Science and the Modern World, Chapter 
6, Pages 147 to 148:' "The convergent effect of bhe nevl 
power for scientific advance ••••• transformed the middle 
period of the (nineteenth) century into an orgy of sci-
entific triumph. Clear-sighted men of the sort who are so 
clearly wrong, now proclaimed that the secrets of the uni-
verse were finally disclosed." 
This self-assurance was already evident, however, in 
the eighteenth century. We find it, for instance, in La 
Mettrie's L'Homme Machine, and it is present also in the 
works of Descartes in sp~te of his starting point of his 
uncertainty about everything. It seems to me that even in 
the seventeenth century Galileo possessed a good measure 
of this self-asslirance:when he declared that God had writ-
ten the book of the universe in mathematical characters. 
We shall find, however, that in his case this self-assur-
ance was tempered by the problem of man who did not be-
have as mathematically as did rolling balls and pendula. 
CHAPTER 2 
Space~ and Times and the Human Person 
Note 1 
Perhaps it would be more correct to say that Leibnitz and. 
Newton "codified" the calculus. Archimedes already had 
the fundamental notion of limiting sums from which the in-
tegral calculus sprang, and actually applied that notion. 
He also used the method of the differential calculus in 
one of his problems. Fermat also had the notion of the 
calculus, while Galileo himself used a method which is now 
used in the teaching of the integral calculus to make 
clear the elementary notion of an integral as a sum, a 
method akin to what we know as Simpson's rule and the mid-
ordinate rule for finding areas when one deals with plane 





Acco~ding to Du Toit (Qi~_~d~~_t~tropolo~iese Kategorie 
by K~erk~gaard, Page 7TKierkegaard nad a rrrion 's share II 
in the reawakening of the interest in the question of time 
in the twentieth century. This he had through, among 
others, Heidegger and Barth. Du Toit points out that in 
his §2inoza and Time, Alexander says that he looks upon 
the 11discovery of time 11 as the most important character-
istic feature of the thought of the first quarter of the 
twentieth century. 
~9te 2 
But even Kant does not appear to have been able to grasp 
the connection of the human person \'Ti th space and time 
fully. Spengler points this out in a footnote on Page 6 
of Volume ~ of his. ~f !£L~est: "Kant's error, an 
error of w~de bear~ng which has not even yet been over-
come, was first of all in bringing the outer and inner 
Man into relation with the ideas of space and time by 
pure scheme •••• " 
However, the fact that he did bring the outer and 
inner IVJ:an into relation with the ideas of space a.11.d time 
is important. 11 The· concept, 11 says Barrett in his "vfuat is 
Existentialism? (Part 2, Chapter 2, Pages 172 to 1745 -~is 
temporal structure of experience ••••• There can be no mean-
ing without time --- that is the momentous conclusion that 
Heidegger extracts from Kant ••••• Kant (thereby) paves the 
way for an ontological analysis of human existence as es-
sentially temporal and finite. 11 (It would be \vell to re-
member at this stage that Kant wrote his Cri~h~~~££ 
Reason as an answer to Hume) • 
Note 4 
See his Spac~, Time and Dei:tY., Volume 2, Page 48: ~~~~m~ 
is the principle of motion and change ••••• Commonly ~-G ~s 
personified in the figure of a scythe-man mowing dovm the 
old to make room for the young. This figure represents 
rather the transitoriness of things than the real nature 
of Time ••••• It forgets that the same Time which mows down 
the grass produces the nevv crop •••• Time is in truth the 
abiding principle of impermanence which is the real cre-
ator." Alexander says further, on Page 337, that Time 11iS 
creative: (that) something comes into being which before 
was not. 11 
See also Note 9 below. 
Note 5 
See Heidegger • s Sein und Zeit, Chapter 2, Page 17: "We 
shall point to temporality as the me~~ing of the Being of 
that entity which we call 'Dasein. 1 If this is to be de-
monstrated, those structu~es of Dasein which we shall pro-
Visionally exhibit, must be j_nterpreted over again as 
mOdeS Of temporality • II . 
(Ale der Sinn des Seins des Seienden, das wir Dasein 
nennen, wird die Zeitlichkeit aufgewiesen. Dieser nach-
weis mus.z sich bewHhren in der wiederhol ten Interpretation 
der vorlliufig aufgezeigten Daseinsstrukturen als Modi der 
Zeitlichkeit). 
Note 6 
Compare Prof. Versfeld's St.Auggstine as Psychotherapist: 
"Ontology is the science or-Deing, and we have to remem-
ber that for Augustine, as for Heidegger, questions about 
man are primarily ontological questions •••• If he could 
say: aeternitas ipsa Dei substantia est, he can now say: 
tempus·ipsa creaturae substantia est: the te!D.porality of 
a creature is its very substance. Temporality is a mode of 
being, and the very substance of a finite thing is time. 
This does away at one stroke with the notion of time as an 
empty continuum or framework of reference into which be-
ings are interjected so that their position in time is 
something extrinsic to u-rhat they are, and in that sense 
fortuitous. Temporality and change not only belong to their 
being but are at the very centre of it and define what it 
is. Ontology then becomes primarily an investigation of 
time." 
It seems to me that in his notion of anxiety Heidegger 
bas some affinity with Kierkegaard who puts:forward the 
notion of dread as a means to realization of being for man, 
though Heidegger has denied any connection with Kierke-
gaard. For Heidegger nothingness is the alte~native to be-
ing, and being is being in Time. 
Note Z 
Du. Toit, however, points out (in his Die ~d as Antro~o­
logiese Kategorie by Kierkegaard, Page 28 that Kierce-
gaard speaks of the temporal and the eterna!_ and not of 
time and eternity. He points out that whereas the terms 
time and eternitt relate to metaphysical realities, tempo~ 
~and eternal ave no claim to substantiality. Kierke-
~rd wants to investigate time as an anthropological re-




Decline of the West, Volume 1, Introduction, Page 6.: The 
description of the world-as-history "reviews once again 
the forms and movements of the world in their depths and 
final significance, but this time according to an entire-
ly different ordering which groups them, not in an en-
semble picture of everything known, but in a picture of 
life, ·and presents them not as things-become, but as 
things-becoming." 
See also Note 9 below. 
Note 9 
The notion of things-becoming with a purpose is the core 
also of Whitehead's philosophy. To grasp this philosophy 
fully, one should read vli th his Science and the l\1odern 
World, also his Process and Reality, his Principles-of 
Natural Knowledge and his Concept of Nature. "What is 
relevant to our purpose is that, for Whitenead, the notion 
that nature consists of material atoms occupying fixed 
places at fixed times, and constituting more complex 
things by being moved from one place to another, is false. 
Mind does not consist of fixed entities in time as we 
shall find to be the case inHume's philosophy. Passage 
is an essential character of nature. God's purpose is the 
evocation of intensities. There is creative advancement 
in the universe. Time is the primal motion stuff, the 
principle of creativity, and this creativity is alvvays 
towards individuation, greater intensity and self-real-
ization. · 
Note 10 
See Bergson's L'Evolution Creatri~, Pages 1 to 23. Miss 
Cleugh vmrns (Time, Chapter 5, Page 111) against a too 
direct translatlon .of Bergson's word duree with duration: 
"We have immediate apprehension of duree-rn a way in which 
we do not have immediate apprehension of duration ••••• 
Bergson •••• insists that duree is directly and intimately 
experienced as a ceaseless flow." The word underlined 
(flow) gives "the key to the difference --- more often 
felt than experienced --- between duree as Bergson uses it 
and duration as it is commonly understood in English •••• 
When we talk of duration we tlrink of something enduring, 
through a period of time, of lastingness. This lastingness 
is the very antithesis of what Bergson wishes to express: 
his duree is not endurance but flovJ." 'v'Je shall have oc-
casion to compare this._. ~~~ with-the time _££;ythms of the 
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ancient Hebrew and to find that it also contains Spen-
gler's becoming and the carrying movement of time in 
Christian thought. 
Compare the above also with Kierkegaard's The Concept 
of Dread, Page 77: 11 (But) precisely because every moment,· 
like the sum of the moments, is a process (a going-by) no 
moment is a present, and in the same sense there is neither 
past, present nor future. If one thinks it possible to 
maintain this division (of time into moments) it is be-
cause we ~patiabhze a moment, but thereby the infinite suc-
cession is brought to a standstill, and that is because 
one introduces a visual representation, visualizing time 
instead of thinking it." 
In his Essai sur les Donnees Immediates de la Con-
science Bergsan also-illaintains that we really try to 
visualize time. 
Note ll 
See Bergson's Essai sur les Donnees Immediates de la Con-
science. It must be borne in mind that the tfme-of our--
eiementary mechanics is a time of prediction, whereas in 
his private time the person is placed in a situation which 
has no precedent and is not governed by laws. See Van 
Peursen's treatment of the now which now follows in the 
text. 
Note 12 
Van Peursen's view of the now seems to me to be in full 
agreement 'rith Ililda OakleYTs statement in Histo~and 
the Self (Chapter 12, Page 265) that " •••• I hard thar-sub-
ject-or-'spirit' is necessarily individual. Its individu-
ality seems involved in the nature of the subject. That 
there exist other subjects with which it is in relation 
appears also to be involved in the nature of experience 
for any subject, even the most purely contemplative expe-
rience. For all such experiences imply self-transcendence, 
and self-transcendence begins in the apprehension of other 
selves. Without this the individual could not be aware 
that his knowledge involved any relation except to the 
parts and elements of his own being.Q ••• Past, present and 
future belong to the very being of the self, even though 
the past into which the future (through the present) is 
ceaselessly moving, has alone existential being in its 
content, the future being a form with imagined content. 
The imagination of this content is indispensable to the 
activity of the self. History then seems implicit in the 
being of a society of selves. Its being is found to depend 
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on the meaning given by selves to events." 
Compare now Van Peursen's view of the now with Kier-
kegaard's "glance-of-the-eye" notion (The COii'Cept of Dread, 
Page 78) : "Nothing is so swift as a glance of the eye, and 
yet it is commensurable with the content and value of , .,,~:' 
eternity ••••• A glance is therefore a designation of time, 
but note that this means of time in the fateful conflict 
when it is touched by eternityo" On Page 48 he says: "The 
present is the eternal or rather, the eternal is the pre-
sent, and the present is full." 
Note 13 
Compare Teilhard de Chardin's The Phenomenon of Man, Book 
4, Chapter 1, Page 240: "Through the discovery yesterday 
of the railway, the motor car and the aeroplane, the phys-
ical influence of each man, fornerly restricted to a few 
miles, now extends to hundreds of leagues or more. Better 
still: thanks to the prodigious biological event repre-
sented by the discovery of electro-magnetic waves, each 
individual finds himself henceforth (actively and passive-
ly) simultaneously present, over land and sea, in every 
corner of the earth." 
Note 14 
Compare Prof. Versfeld's Education for Africa: "But in 
fact, as anthropologists and others are showlllg, every 
culture has its own space and time. In fact, recent work 
in existential psychiatry has shown that there is a sense 
in which every individual has his own space and time. 
Thas pathological boredom is treated as a disorientation 
of the individual's time sense, and therapy consists in 
the redintegration of the patient's personal time. Nor is 
this so very new, for in principle the approach is that of 
St • Augustine. " 
Compare also Prof. Versfeld's St.Augustine as Psycho-
therapist: "There ave as many kinds of time as there are 
kinds of creature. In a sense, indeed, there are as many 
times as there are men, because each man is a unique pe~­
sonality, and has the kind of time which is proper· to h~s 
being as a person." 
Compare also Sweeney's Do Cells Have Clq,q!E_? and 
Treisman's The Psychology of Tim~. 
Note 15 ••••••• 
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Note 15 
Buber writes in his I and Thou, Pages 8 to 9: "If I face a 
human being as my ~' and say the primary word I-Thou to 
him, he is not a thing among things, and does not consist of 
things. This human being is not He or She, bounded from 
every other He and She a specific-poinr-rn space and time, 
within the net of the world; nor is he a nature able to be 
experienced and described, a loose bundle of named qualities. 
But with no neighbour, and whole in himself, he is Thou and 
fills the heavens. This does not mean that nothing exists 
except himself. But all else lives in his light ••••• 
"And just as prayer is not in time;-but time in prayer, 
sacrifice not in space, but space in sacrifice, and to re-
verse the relation is to abolish the reality, so with the 
man to whom I say Thou. I do not meet ~Qth him at some time 
and place or other~~Even if the man to whom I say Thou is 
not aware of it in the midst of his experience, yet rela-
tion may exist. For Thou is more than It realiseso No de-
ception penetrates here; here is the cradle of real life," 
In his God Transcendent Karl Heim speaks of boundaries 
of content in the case of two spaces that are physically ~· 
separated but adjacent (physical space). In the case of 
spaces that are not separated physically and can have no 
physical boundary, yet are not the same, he uses boundary of ---.........\!....--.=--.... 
dimension for the description of the separation betvieen such 
spaces. But these spaces can interpenetrate, and in this way 
he arrives at the possibility of a beyond for God ,,vhom we 
cannot reach with an astronomical telescope. One must, hov.r-
ever, in the interpretation of the spaces of persons, not 
visualize any sort of identifiable separation between the 
two or more spaces. They coalesce completely. 
Note 16 ----
Compare Pannenberg's Was ist_der_Men~?, Chapter ll,_Page 
98: "Die LebensgeschiC'F.i.'te des einzeinen •••• vollziet sJ.ch 
nicht in lrunstlicher Abgeschlossenheit, sondern.ist ganz und 
gar verflochten in die Geschichte anderer I"'enschen, in die 
Gemeinschaft, in der der einzelne die Erfullung seines be-
sonderen Strebens findet und der er mit seiner Tatigheit 
dient. Gerade auch seine Individualitat gewinnt der einzelne 
nur durch den Dienst an der Gemeinschaft, in der er steht 
oder zu der er sich mit andern zusammenfindet.$ ••• die ein-
zelnen Menschen (finden) ihre Bestimmung nicht je fur sich 
allein, sondern ••• die Bestimmung des Menschen (ist) letzlich 
eine fur alle. Nur der Weg der einzelnen zu dieser fur alle 
Menschen gemeinsamen Bestimmung ist ein je besonderer, und 
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er bildet die Individualitat der einzelnen Menschen aus. 
Note 17 
Compare Poulet's Etudes sur le Temps Humain, Introduction, 
Pages 4- to 5: "Dieu, Conservateur de 1 1etre, etait par le 
fait meme Conservateur du principe des actions de l'etreGOOO 
Tout devenir dans l'ordre de la nature, comme dans l'ordre 
de l'esprit, requerait une determination directe de Dieu. 
(Poulet here refers his reader to St.Thomas Aquinas for 
whom "creation and continued existence are one indivisible 
action.") ••••• Ainsi l'operation divine fondait le temps non 
seulement en la permanence qui le rendait possible, mais en 
l'actualite qui le rendait necessaire et reel. Actualite 
qui pouvait etre instantanee, mais qui, lorsqu'elle etait 
temporelle, l'etait selon la continuite d'un mouvement in-
interrompu vers un fin ••••• Le temps finalement emportait le 
chretien vers Dieu." 
Note 18 
Compare Du Toi t 's Die. tyd ,!3-S Antr£££l£giese Ka!_~2_Ei£__£l_ 
Kierkegaard, Page 17: "In die Joodse en Iraniese apokalip-
tiek is dit (weer) die eschaton, die eindtyd, wat die teen-
woordige sin gee." See also the Book of Daniel, Chapter 12, 
Verse-12, in which Daniel receives to his question concern-
ing the "end of these things, " the reply: "But go thou thy 
way till the end be: for thou shalt rest, and stand in thy 
lot at the end of the days." 
Note_l2. 
Compare Poulet's Etudes sur le T~s ~~in, Introduction, 
Pages 1 to 2: The mediaeval Christian world, he says, was 
"un monde de choses substantes qui ne subsistaient pas par 
elles-meme. Si du neant elles passaient a l'etre, si du 
possible elles passaient a l'actuel, si leur existence rest-
ait contingente et dependente, c'est que ces existences 
etaient des existences creees. En un sens, elles continu-
aient a chaque moment d'etres creees, non que Dieu en chacun 
de ces moments s'obligeat de les creer a nouveau, mais parce 
qu'en tout leur champ existentiel, c'est de la meme action 
creatrice qu'elles continuaient de recevoir l'etre.ll 
Note 20 •••••• 
Note 20 
See, for instance, Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, Chapter 2 of 
the Introduction, Page 18: "Wenn Sein ausder Zeit begriffen 
werden soll und die verschiedenen Modi und Derivate von Sein 
in ihren Modifikationen und Derivationen in der Tat aus dem 
Hinblick auf Zeit verstandlich werden, dann ist damit das 
Sein selbst --- nicht etwa nur seiendes als ,in der Zeit' 
Seiendes, in seinem ,zeitlichen' Charakter sichtbar gemacht. 
,Zeitlich' kann aber dann nicht mehr nur besagen ,in der 
Zeit seiend.' Auch das ,Unzeitliche' und ,Uberzeitliche' ist 
hinsichtlich seines Seins , zei tlich. ' Und das vviederum nicht 
nur in der Weise einer Privation gegen ein ,Zeitliches' als 
,in der Zeit' Seiendes, sondern in einem ££~iti~ ••••• Sinne~ 
Note 21 
Compare Pannenberg's Was ist der Mensch?, Chapter 11, Page 
96: "Der Mensch is seinem Wesen nach geschichtlich ••••• Es 
handelt sich hier zunachst urn die Lebensgeschichte des ein-
zelnen Menschen, wie sie etwa in einer Biographie oder Auto-
biographie ruckschauend beschrieben werden kann." We shall 
return to this point of autobiography when we come to study 
Rousseau's Confessions, and we shall show hmv Rousseau ex-
tricates himself, as it were, from history. 
Note 22 
In a footnote on Page 49 of the Introduction to his Decline 
of the West Spengler quotes from Goethe: "The Godhead is--·-
effective in the living and not in the dead, in the becoming 
and the changing, not in the become and the set-fast; and 
therefore, similarly, the reason is concerned only to strive 
towards the divine through the becoming and the living, and 
the understanding only to make use of the become and the 
set-fast." vve shall find that the Enlightenment notion of 
progress was one akin to scientific law rather than to or-
ganic growth. 
NQ!.~ . ..1.~ 
Compare Toynbee's ~ Historian~~~££ac£_~o ~£li~io~, Part 
1, Chapter 1, Pages 5 and s:-rr1men a nuniber of Claimants, 
standing at different points in Time and Space, make the 
identical claim that each claimant's o~m particular point in 
Time-Space is the central one, common sense suggests that, 
if Time-Space does have any central point at all, this is 
not to be found in the local e.nd temporary standpoint of any 
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generation of any parochial human community,~ ••• ,'l'his as-
tronomical vie'"' of History provides a radical correction of 
tbe bias towards self-centredness that is innate in every 
living creature; but it corrects self-centredness at the 
price of taking the significance out of History --- and in-
deed, out of the Universe itself." 
Note 24 
Compare 'l'oynbee's An Historian'~~oach to Rel~ion, Book 
1, Chapter 1, Page-r!: ' ••••• the picture of a non-repetitive 
Universe governed by a personal God promises to give History 
a maximum significance •••• " 
Note 25 
Compare Du 'l'oit's ~ ~d as Antropolo£~se Kategorie by 
Kierkegaard, Pages 20 to 21: For us, the author says, "Die 
stroom van die tyd laat hom nie omkeer nieo Anders vir die 
primitiewe gesteldheid vir wie die tyd wesenlik omkeerbaar 
is.-. ••• Die , omkering 1 van die tydsrigting is daarin gelee 
dat elke moment sy werklikheid nie in sy eie uitsluitende 
selfstandigheid vind nie, maar in partisipering aan die oor-
sprongsgebeure ••••• Elke handeling is as rituele herhaling 
sigself en die oerhandeling; alle tye val saam in die oer-
tyd." See also Note 26 below. 
Note 26 
Compare 'l'oynbee's An Historian's Aptroach to R~ligio~, Chap-
ter 1, Page 8: "One of these views the Graeco-Roman and 
~ndian view) sees the rhythm of the Universe as a cyclic 
movement governed by an Impersonal Law. On this view the ap-
parent rhythm of the stellar cosmos --- the da;)r-and-night 
cycle and the annual cycle of the seasons --- is assumed to 
be the fundamental rhythm of the Universe as a whole •••••• 
From this astronomical standpoint it is impossible for an 
historian to believe that his own here and now has any spe-
cial importance; but it is equally difficult for him to be-
lieve that .any other human being's here and now has ever 
had, or will ·ever have, any special importance either." 
Note 27 
See Boman's Hebrew Thought Compar~d viJith Greek, Chapter 3, 
Page 127: "Plato's interpretation of time deserves particu-
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larly to be observed by a theologian; while the sober Aris-
totle analyses the time of natural science, Plato occupies 
himself with the time of religion. Therefore the problem of 
the relation of time to eternity arises for him; eternity 
for him is not endless astronomical time, but the life-form 
of the divine world to which God alone belongs. Time desig-
nates for him the life-form of the world of nature, the 
world produced by God •••• Plato calls time a moving image of 
eternity •• ~.We see here also how the spatial governs Plato's 
line of thought; time is only a pictorial moving imitation 
of immovable and unalterable eternity which represents per-
fection." Boman continues on Page 151: "Our notion of eter-
nity inherited from Plato is at base the same thing as the 
divine beyond, and is therefore rather more something spa-
tial than something temporal." See also Appendix 6. 
Compare with the above Prof. Versfeld's St.Augustine 
~the Sense of History: "Plato does not succeed in making 
time, history and actual human life meaningful. For him the 
intelligible world is a timeless world of forms, which we 
shall find beyond the miseries of the cave of history." 
Prof. Versfeld finds the contrast betv,reen the Christian time 
conception and the Greek in the contrast between.St.Augus-
tine and Plato, and says that in Plato "we do not, like 
Augustine, see the presence of God and Ilis grace in the 
movement itself, but only at the point where the movement 
ceases, and we contemplate the Good in a timeless ecstacy 
where our differentiation as persons is transcended." 
Note 28 
Compare Boman's Heb~w Though!_QomE~red with Greek, Chapter 
3, Pages 133 to 134: "As subjective time-determinants for 
man we may cite sleep and wakefulness, work and rest, meal-
times; we may also have shorter rhythms, such as heart-beat, 
pulse-beat and respiration. It is common to all of these 
that they can determine a point of time or an interval of 
time without using any sort of spatial movement •••••• the 
phases of the moon, the weaker and stronger heat of the sun 
in the course of a day are time-rhythms and not time move-
ments. So for the Hebrew the seasons of the year too, are 
eternal rhythms: 
Seedtime and harvest, 
Cold and heat, 
SUmmer and wintero (Gen. 8:22) 
Human life runs its course as an eternal rhythm: earth-man-
earth ••••• we shall find in this alternation no trace of a 
circular line but purely and simply rhythmic alternation." 
It seems to me that hm·mver one might argue against 
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crediting the Biblical Hebrevl vd th an extraordinary time 
consciousness on the grounds of language, as does Barr, 
these arguments do not affect the historic sensitivity of 
the Hebrew and therefore his gift of connecting the event 
with the person. If we do not accept that the ancient He-
brew had an almost unique time sense nnd the Greek a space 
sense, it would be difficult to explain why, in the Old 
Testament, music is mentioned so often (something of time 
and rhythm) and the Hebrews never gave the world an art of 
sculpture and architecture worth mentioning, while the 
Greeks, on the contrary, gave the world some of its most 
beautiful sculpture and architecture. And, obviously, if we 
do not credit the Hebrew with an extraordinary historic sen-
sitivity, we cannot regard the Old Testament as a progres-
sive revelation of God. 
The time sense of the ancient Egyptians appears to have 
been something like that of the Hebrews. Sec in this context 
Spengler's De~li£e of_ihe We~i, Introduction, Volume 1, and 
c<;>mpare Du Toi t' s Die Ty£_§,~ .AntE_QQ.Olo~esc ~£~e_~ 
Klcrkegaard, Page 17. 
Compare Jean Gui tton 's The ModeE_ni ty_ ,of St. Aug_u~t~£, Page 
10: "It is understandable that tho inner history of an in-
dividual never suggested itself to the Greek mind. This was 
not because the Greek, as is so often said, had no concep-
tion of 1the person,' but rather because in tho pure Greek 
view, there is no real connection between tho event and tho 
'person. 1 11 Contrast Hebrew thought. See Note 28 above. · 
Note 2_Q 
Compare Maritain's Qn tho Philos~hy of His~ry, Chapter 1, 
Page 29: 11 ...... the acceptance of tfmo ·--- and of history 
far from being a matter of course for man, is for him a 
difficult and dearly paid achievement. l"'an is naturally 
frightened of the irreversibility of his own duration and 
tho very newness of unpredictable events. He refuses to face 
thorn. Hence the negation of time by archaic civilizo.tions. 
They defend themselves against tho dire reality of history 
either by constructing mythical archetypes, or by assuming 
periodic abolishment and regeneration of time, and a peri-
odic recurrence of the same historical cyclos ••• accoptanco 
of time and of history was a conquest of Christianity and 
modern times •••• " 
See also Mircea Eliade's Cosmos and HisiO£l, The Myth 
£L~e Et£_rnal Re~~' Chapter 4-. 
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Note 31 
Compare Bultmann's History and Eschatology, Chapter 1, Page 
5: "Even the ancient Greeks saw the world as a sequence of 
coming to be and passing away, although they were looking 
not at history but at nature. But for Greek thinking also 
the question arose about the essence, the 'true existence' 
of man. And it was answered by the consideration that change 
was not subject to chance, but occurred according to laws, 
and that there was an order into which man fitted well." 
Note 32 
See his Hebrew Thou~ht Compared with Greek, Chapter 3, Pages 
137, 139 and 156: 11 or us space is like a great container 
that stores, arranges and holds everything together; space 
is also the place where we live, breathe and can expand free-
ly. Time played a similar role for the Hebrews. Their con-
sciousness is like a great container in which their whole 
life from childhood on and the realities which they experi-
enced or of which they had heard, are stored ...... For the 
Hebrews who have their existence in the temporal, the con-
tent of time plays the same role as the content of space 
plays for the Greeks. As the Greeks gave attention to the 
peculiarity of things, so the Hebrews minded the peculiarity 
of events ...... Consequently the Hebrew language formed no 
specific expressions for designating the outline or contour 
of objects and did not even need them." (See also Appendix 
5 in which the question of language is discussed). 
It might be pointed out that if, for the Hebrew, time, 
and not space, was a great container, space would probably 
be closely connected with time in his thought. We shall re-
turn to this point presently. See also Appendix 7. 
Note 32. 
We have to do here, of course, vrlth the problem of Zeno's 
flying arrow. Since his time mathematicians have ever been 
involved in difficulties with the mathematical concepts of 
the infinite, limits and continuity, and these difficulties 
still haunt them today. See Bell's Men of Mathematics, Chap-
ter 2, Page 38: "Time after time the paradoxes and sophisms 
which cPept into mathematics with these apparently indis-
pensable concepts have been regarded as finally eliminated 
only to reappear a generation or two later, changed but yet 
the same." We are confronted with these difficulties, no 
doubt, because our mathematical tools are inadequate for the 
· treatment of the supra-physical space and time from which 
physical space and time are abstractions. Compare Bergson's 
view (L'Evolution Creatrice) that we really split up the 
continuity of life into a series of "still" pictures such as 
those of a cine film. Compare also Chappell's Time and Zeno's 
Arrow: "Modern physicists also hold that time is continuous 
and~ence infinitely divisible, but for them there is no in-
consistency irt saying that something is infinitely divisible 
and yet composed of indivisibles, as.there was for l~istotle~ 
Bergson looks upon a trajectory as an act of progress and 
not a thing. It cannot be divided in its creation, only when 
it has been created (L'Evolution Creatrice). In his Essai 
sur les Donnees Immedrates-de-ra-Conscience he says arso-
that the-elements of time form-a-continuous or qualitative 
multiplicity with no resemblance to number. See also Appen-
dices 7 and 8~ 
Note 34 
In order to illustrate the atomization of space and time in 
Galileian mechanics we take an example from elementary mech-
anics. Let s be the displacement (space) of a body which 
moves with a constant acceleration £ for a time i, then 
s=ift2 
By differentiation of s with respect to t we get the velo-. 
city of the body at time i= 
ds/dt=V=ft 
Now both ds and dt are infinitesimals, tiny fragments of 
space and time, and the ratio ds/dt actually gives the move-
ment over a tiny fragment of space ds in a tiny fragment of 
time dt, and this is the definition of velocity, time-rate 
of displacement, for example centimetres per second. 
The process of integration consists of placing frag-
ments of space and time end to end betv~een certain limi'ts 
and so obtaining an interval of space and timeo So the orig-
inal distance s is obtained by the integration of the ds 
fragments and the dt fragments: 
Jds=Jrt.dt, i.e. s=fft2 
The symbol J is merely an elongated S to indicate that a 
summation is to be effected, so that it is clear that a 
mathematical integration is nothing more than a sum of parts 
that do not overlap. Note also that space and time arc quite 
separate. 
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Compar~ Prof. Versfeld's Th~~£££lem of the~ Conteltorar~: 
"'What ~s most relevant for our purpose is the Bib ica:r-and 
Augustinian refusal to separate the time of a being from its 
substance, and its substance from its action.. Its action is 
what it does here, and from the point of vie'ii'J' of a spiritual 
participant. Space, therefore, also becomes a locating rath-
er than a location. It is impossible to separate the being 
here of a thing from its being now, any more than it is pos-
sible to separate the eternity of God from his omnipresence. 
Action is what gives spatiality to things, and their spati-
ality is a mode of their action. 11 
God, according to the Biblical Hebrei.I'J' and the media.eval 
Christian, created space and time, and did not, as Descartes 
seems to hold, create in space and time. Nmi'J' it is interest-
ing to note that geometrodynamics holds that "Space-time is 
not an arena; it encompasses everything, and thus only ge-
ometric ideas are fundamental. 11 (Fletcher's Geom~rod;ygam;h£_s: 
The Geometr;y: of Space-Time). Compare A. S. Alexander 1 s §PS...£~, 
Time and_ Dei~. Alexander combines space and time to con-
stitute space-time which he denies has anything to clo with 
the space-time continuum of physics. He uses the analogy 
that time is the mind of space and space the body of time, 
and in this way drives home the notion that they are inse-
parable. It is this notion of the inseparability of space 
and time that is relevant to our purpose. Space-time is, for 
Alexander, no more a mere sum of space and time than real 
space or real time was a mere sum of fragments for the an-
cient Hebrew and mediaeval Christian. See also Appendices 
7 and 8. 
li~te 37 
Hebrew Thought Comgared with Greek, Chapter 3, Page 157: 
Boman goes on to say: 11 As the Israelites established natural 
time units by means of their ends and boundaries, they did 
the same thing with the natural units of area: the lands, 
the isles of the world •••• the field of Ephron 'throughout 
the whole area' means 'within its borders on every side~' 
(Gen. 23:17) .. " It must be pointed out that in the case of 
space too, Boman does not rely entirely on etymological evi-
dence, so that his thesis with regard to the absence of 
boundary lines in the Hebrew space conception must be e,llovi-
ed to stand. We have in Hebre1v space "awareness" then, e. 
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"formless" space in contrast to the form-consciousness of 
the Greek. (See Appendix 5). In his Concepts of Space (Chap-· 
ter 2, Page 33) Jammer draws attention to the fact that long 
before the mediaeval Christian thinker (e.g. Tommaso Campa-
nella) penned the thought that "space is in God, but God is 
not limited by space," the Hebrews wrote in their post-Tal-
mudic literature that 11the Lord is the dwelling place of His 
world, but His 'irmrld is not His dwelling place." 
Compare also Chapter 1 of Auerbach's tlimesis. 
Not~2.§. 
?ompare.Burtt's The Metaphy~ical Foundations of Modern~gy~­
J.cal ScJ.ence, Chapter 2, Page 33: 11 0ur current conception of 
mathematics as an ideal science, of geometry in particular 
as dealing with an ideal space rather than an actual space 
in which the universe is set, was a notion quite unformulat-
ed before Hobbes, and not taken seriously till the middle of 
the eighteenth century, though it was dimly felt after by a 
few Aristotelian opponents of Copernicus." See also Note 11, 
Chapter 1 of this study. 
Note 39 
Compare Fletche~'s Geometr~amics: the Geomet£l of S~~­
Time: "Geometry is one of the chief foundations upon which 
physical theories are built. In mechanics, for instance, 
many of the central concepts such as length and trajectory 
are purely geometric; in chemistry many gross properties of 
substance depend upon the size, shapes and spatial relation-
ships of the molecules of which they are made. In fact, it 
is very difficult indeed to imagine physics vli thout geometry; 
the mathematics of most branches of physics often begins 
with the introduction of co-ordinates (x, y and z) to de-
scribe the 'where' of various phenomena." 
Note 40 
Compare Prof. Whiteman's Foundational Problems of Space and 
Time, Chapter 4: 11 The actual criterion is that if there is 
atechnique for attaching a ~~sure to a construct in cer-
tain experimental circumstances, then in those circumstances 
the construct is said to be regarded as having an element of 
.'physical reality,' or as referring to an existing 'theoret-
ical entity. ' Obviously, then, the perceptual presentation 
is 'physical,' so measurability becomes also a criterion of 
'physicality. '"It appears then, that Galilee's judgment that 
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mathematics was the language in which God wrote the book of 
the universe, is one of the most important judgments in the 
story of the abstraction of derived space and time from real 
space and time. It gave rise to the Enlightenment idea that 
"the real could be identified with the quantitative." (See 
Note 11 of Chapter 1 of this study), 
Prof. vJhi ternan continues in Chapter 5 of his book: "For 
measurement of any phenomenon means attaching number to iti 
and if we say that the measure is seven units (for example), 
there is clearly implied some constructive means by which, 
in a certain sense, each of these units is the same. It is a 
prior question to be resolved, therefore, in what way pre-
cisely this sameness is determined. In all the commoner 
methods of time measurements it is clear that use is made of 
the movement of some cyclic system ••••• " Prof. lrJhiteman then 
goes on to consider other methods such as radar technique 
and says: " •••. the view that time-measurement can be estab-
lished without prior appeal to the metrical properties of 
space (now) appears untenable •••• " See also Appendix 8 .. 
Note 41 -----
Compare Prof, VJhiteman's Foundational Problems of Space and 
Time, Chapter 4: "It will be more correct, therefore, to 
think of the local Euclidean spaces 'carried' by different 
observers as heing individually distinguishable but cohering_ 
9onceRtualbY (on account of their essential sameness) so 
that, after subjective differences are abstracted or trans-
cended, a common substructural \.ITorld is found to exist for 
all •••• Or we can simply think of each individual as parg£_~­
Eating in the common substructural wor1c~ ~ 1.-1hich merges in 
his subjective space and time \.~Then physical actualization 
occurs for him." The same argument obviously also applies to 
time. 
Note LJ-2 ------
"Die vvohnungsnot ist fUr Gott eingetreten." --- David Fried-
rich Strauss as quoted b;y Karl Heim in his God Transcendent, 
Page 31. Heim here wishes to point to the difficulty ex-
perienced in finding a place in the universe for God if we, 
look upon space as treated by science by means of mathemat-
ics as the only or the r9al space. 
!!ote ~2. 
Compare Burtt's The Metaphysic~l Fo~~dat~ons of Modern Ph~~ 
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ical Science, Chapter 3, Page 90: "With final causality 
gone, God as Aristotelianism had conceived him, was quite 
lost; to deny him outright, however, at Galileo's stage of 
the game, was too radical a step for any important thinker 
to considero The only way to keep him in the universe was to 
•••• regard him as the First Efficient Cause or Creator of 
the Atoms.~ ••• God thus ceases to be the Supreme Good in any 
important sense; He is a huge mechanical inventor, whose 
power is appealed to merely to account for the first appear-
ance of the atoms, .the tendency becoming more and more ir-
resistable as time goes on, to lodge all further causality 
for itJhatever effects, in the atoms themselves." 
t 
Note 44 
Compare also Von \vezsacker' s The Relevance of Science, Chap-
ter 6. The author here points out that the lasr-tfiing Gali-
leo wanted was to become a martyr for science as he is so 
often described. He had no quarrel with the Church, and his 
sole purpose was, as Von \tveizsacker puts it, to "bring math-
ematics to the earth." (Geometry had till then played its 
major role in the study of the stars of the heavens). He 
thought that the secrets of the material universe could be 
solved by means of mathematics, and he wanted to apply math-
ematics to the motions of things on the earth as Archimedes 
had applied it to things in equilibrium. He never suggested, 
and probably never thought, that mathematics had to be ex-
tended to apply also to those matters pertaining to the 
Church, God and salvation. But, as Von vveizsacker points out, 
Galileo did not grasp the role of science in history. 
CHAPTER 3 
Note 1 
Those who are aquainted with Cartesian co-ordinate geometry. 
will have no difficulty in grasping the meaning of this 
statement. In this geometry, invented by Descartes, to whom 
we shall, by no mere coincidence, refer presently~ we make 
use of a set of axes (at right angles to each other, though 
this is not essential), divided into equal parts which are 
numbered. vJe can thus have a space axis and a time axis, and 
by means of them locate a position in space and time as we 
locate a position in a town by counting a certain number of 
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streets in one direction and then a certain number in the 
direction at right angles to the first. VIe can have the 
Cartesian axes joined, or separate and moving relatively to 
each other as we please. 
Note 2 
See his P_£=!:_nc!_ples of Phil0§.£!2hY, Part 1, Page 201: rrThus 
because we aiscover in our minds the idea of God~ or of an 
all-perfect Being, we have a right to inquire into the 
source whence we derive it, and we will discover that the 
perfections it represents are so immense as to render it 
quite certain that we could only derive it from an all-per-
fect Being; that is from a God really existingo For it is 
not only manifest by the natural light that nothing cannot 
be the cause of anything whatever •.••• rr 
NotL2. 
Compare Lucien Levy-Bruhl's The Cartesian SEirit and His-
tor;y,, Page 192 of Philosop~y and History: "The dominant ten-
dencies of his (Descartes' thought, and his constant atti-
tude in regard to the philosophy and science of his time •••• 
imply a lack of sympathy, one might even say a kind of aver-
sion, or if it is preferred, an absence of comprehension, 
in relation to researches of an historical nature ••..• To 
listen to Descartes was to break vTi th tradition, to consider 
it, as he did 9 as at the same time inadequate and injurious, 
and to join in the struggle to get rid of it.rr 
· Note 4 
Descartes writes in his Discourse on t·1ethod, Part 6, Page 
72: " ••••• it is possible to arrive a;t; knowledge, which is 
very useful .in life, and (that) instead of the speculative 
philosophy which is taught in the schools, a practical phi-
losophy may be found, by means of which, knovving the power 
and the action of fire, water, air, stars and heavens, and 
all the other bodies which environ us, as distinctly as we 
know the various trades and crafts of our artisans, we might 
in the same way be able to put them all to the uses to which 
they are proper, and thus make ourselves, as it vrere, mas-
ters and possessors of nature. This is to be desired, (not 
only) for the invention of an infinitude of artifices which 
would allow us to enjoy without trouble the fruits of the 
earth and all its commodities ••••• " 
Compare also Von Weizsacker 's The Relevag£_~£f Sci~n££_, 
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Chapter 7, Page 115: "The Christian concept of creation 
seems unnecessary if we do not want to say that God, being 
beyond time, created infinite time with the world. But Des-
cartes tells us that the world has been made by God in time, 
and that God then gave it just that quantity of motion v.rhich 
is still present in it •••• (Page 117) He still needs the om-
nipotent God for his proof that science is trustworthy; but 
he no longer needs God within science. Nature is satisfac-
torily described by geometry." 
It is of interest to note that "the \-~Thole magnificent move-
ment of modern science is essentially of a piece; the later 
biological and sociological branches took over the{r basic 
postulates from the earlier victorious mechanics, especially 
the all-important postulate that valid explanations must al-
vmys be in terms of small elementary units in regular chang-
ing relations. To this has likewise been added, in all but 
the rarest cases, the postulate that ultimate causality is 
to be found in the motion of physical atoms."--- Burtt in 
The Met~h~sical F£undations of Modern Ph~~~~~-Sc~~' 
Chapter 1, Page 17. 
Note 6 ___ .. __ 
See his L 'Evolution Creatrice, Chapter 4, Page 273: "It 
(£hysics) detaches rthese)-events from the whole, which at 
ev~ymoment puts on a nev.r form and which communicates to 
them something of its novelty. It considers them in the ab-
stract, such as they would be outside the living whole •••• 
It retains only the events that can thus be isolated •.•• our 
physics dates from the day when it was known hov.r to isolate 
such systems." 
Note 7 
Bergson contradicts Hume and is quite certain that the l 
(ego) does exist. (See Appendix 9). An interesting question 
arises: Did Hume believe in a life hereafter? All his life 
he professed to believe in God, but I find it difficult to 
see how he could bring a belief in a life beyond the grave 
to accord with his denial of personal identity~ especiallJr 
in view of the reduction of religion to a social morality. 
Note 8 •••.• 
3llo 
Note 8 ---
The value of Kant's treatment of time remains, says Miss 
Cleugh in her Time (Chapter 4, Page 108), "in his formula-
tion of, rather-than in his answer to the difficult problems 
which he first opened up: in his insistence upon the impor-
tance of time in metaphysical speculation and, more specif-
ically, in his treatment of time as a principle by which 
events are given as connected in experience·o 11 
Note_2. 
Compare Burtt's The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Ph~­
ical Science, Chapter 7, Page 262: "The scientific notion of 
time has almost lost touch with duration as immediately ex-
perienced. Until a closer relation is regained, it is prob-
able that science will never reach a satisfactory descrip-
tion of time." 
See also Note 33 of Chapter 2 of this study. The matter 
of connecting the time of the physicist with the inner time 
of our lives seems to be of the utmost importance, and it is 
this problem that occupies Prof. Whiteman in his Foundation-
al Problems of Space and Time, a detailed discussion or long 
summary of which, however, falls outside the scope of this 
thesis. 
Note 10 --
As a "physicalized" time. See Note 20 of Chapter 2. Compare 
with Stewart's The Political and Moral PhilosQphy of Davi~ 
Hume, Chapter 2, Page 31: "Hume's argument {here) is that we 
often treat our ideas of space and time as if those ideas 
themselves were independently real •• o .. The v-TOrd 'space' re-
fers to the manner in which many of our perceptions, all 
those of extended things, appear to us. The \vord 'time' re-
fers to the manner in which all our perceptions, those of 
both external things and of 'moral' activities, such as mu-
sical performances, social and political processes, and 
thinking undergo change. If all perceptions were annihilated 
•••• neither space nor time would remain. These two are not 
two independent beings or things, but instead they are the 
two fundamental ways of being. Space and time do not exist 
independently. They are the dimensions of existing beings 
and things ••••• What we call 'time' is the manner of appear-
ance, an observed relation among our perceptions •••• " 
It is not clear to me to which passage inHume's works 
Stewart here refers. He writes merely of "the topic of most 
of the second part in 'Of tho Understanding. ' 11 He so ems, 
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however, to accentuate the fact that Hume makes space and 
time functions of the outside world. They are not subjective 
since they are "the _·dimensions of .existing beings and things.~' 
And however Hume may mean that annihilation of our percep-
tions would annihilate space and time, his treatment of them 
in the Treatise remains the same as that of Galilee and the 
calculus. If, therefore, Stewart wishes to intimate that 
Hume does not treat space and time as two separate scales of 
measurement {though perhaps the one scale must be used with 
the other as we need two numbers for the co-ordinates of a 
point in a plane) I cannot agree with him. I do not think, 
however, that saying that the word 'space' refers to the 
manner in which our perceptions appear to us, and the word 
'time'to an observed relation among our perceptions, is any 
different to saying that when we have measured the distances 
between things and the volumes they occupy, and the inter-
vals between events, we have established space and time. 
Ndte 11 - -
See Prof. Versfeld's Oor Gode en Afgode, Essay Die Begri£ 
van 'n Christelike Geskiedenis, Page 141: "Ons eie selwe is 
konstruksies ••••• rangskikkings 'geimponeer op die stroom van 
one bewussyn, waardeur ons dan eenvoudig voorgee dat ons 
selfidentiteit en substansiele realiteit besit. Dus is sowel 
die begrip van persoonlikheid as die begrip van die heelal 
as 'n stelsel van noodwendige verhoudings; albei illusies; 
en niks word aan ons oorgelaat behalwe die nuttelose spel om 
voor te gee dat ons persone is wat orde vind en orde maak in 
'n ondeursigbare wereld." Compare also with Appendix 9. 
Note 12 
Flew points out in his Hume's Philoso~hy of Belief, Chapter 
1, Page 5, where he discusses Hume's treatment of personal 
identity, that "we know that he (~) was dissatisfied with 
'\IJ'hat he had said, but could not see how to improve on it. 
For in the appendix, added to Book III (of the Treatise) on 
its first publication in 1740, he admitted that 'upon a more 
strict review of the section concerning personal identity, I 
find myself involved in such a labyrinth that I must confess 
that I neither know how to correct my former opinions nor 
how to render them consistent. 1 This dissatisfaction was, of 
course, for Hume a very good reason not to put his account 
of the matter before the public a second time. But for us it 
is an equally good reason to value that first report. We can 
use it to learn that what Hume was trying to do, cannot be 
done; and why not. For surely he goes into this labyrinth as 
a result of his mistaken presumption.that people are, as it 
were, bodiless collocations of experience." See also Appen-
dix 9. 
IT2_t2_~2_ 
Compare Whitehead's Science and _the· Modern World, Chapter 1, 
Page 5: "For we shalf find that, since the time of Hume, the 
fashionable scientific philosophy has been such as to deny 
the rationality of science. This conclusion lies upon the 
surface of Hume's philosophy. Take for example the following 
passage from Section 4 of his lgQ~QQ££erni~~an __ Un-
derstanding: 'In a word then, every effect is a distinct 
event from its cause. It could not, therefore, be discovered 
in the causes; and like the first invention or conception of 
it, ~ior~, must be entirely arbitrary.' 
If the cause in itself discloses no information as to 
the effect' so that the first invention of it must be en--
tirely_ arbitrary, it follows at once that science is impos-
sible, except in the sense of establishing entirely arbi-. ~-"""-\!--.-- ... -
~rary connections whlch are not warranted by anything in-
trinsic to the natures of either causes or effects. Some 
variant of Burne's philosophy has generally prevailed among 
men of science, but scientific faith has risen to the oc-
casion, and has tacitly removed the philosophic mountain." 
See also Note 14 below. 
Note 14 
One might usefully compare Hume's empiricism with what Berg-
son calls the "true empiricism" in his Introduction to 
Metap~§.~£§., Pages 31 and 32: "A true el?p~ricism is.that 
which proposes to get as near to the orlglnal self as pos-
sible, to search deeply into its life, and so on, by a kind 
of intellectual auscultation, to feel the throbbings of its 
soul: and this true empiricism is tho true metaphysics. It 
is true that the task is an extremely difficult one, for 
none of the ready-made conceptions which thought employs in 
its daily operations can be of any use •••• " This true em-
piricism Bergson considers to be connected with real space 
and time, and he points to the effect of an application of 
derived space and time to epistemology: "Insteo.d of attach-
ing ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place our-
selves outside them in order to recompose their becoming 
artificially. We take snapshots, as it were~ of po.ssing re-
ality." 
See also Appendix 8 and compare St. Thomo.s Aquino.s' 
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dictur esse i se ac·tus essentiae ('to be' is the very act 
by which an essence is ent7, dist. 33, que l, art. 1, 
ad. lm.) See also Etienne Gilson's God and Philosophy, Chap-
ter 4, Page 42 and Note 15 below). 
Prof. Versfeld points out in his Rondom die ~liddeleeue, Page 
51, that if we knew only our ideas, our-sGfence would-be a 
knowledge of nothing. (See also Notes 13 and 14 above)e It 
is of interest to note that St~Thomas' sense of the concrete 
leads him to everything from which Hume's empiricism leads 
him away; and since time is of the essence of things, a 
sense of the concrete and of the existence of things is at 
the same time that historic sensitivity which we shall find 
absent in the thought of our two philosophers. For St. Thomas 
the first and most immediate act of the mind, says Prof. 
Versfeld, is to observe the existence of things. He is "at 
home" among the things that are. 
Compare also S .• Alexander's The Historic!.!L_~€5.§.., 
Page 17 of Philosop!!L_and Histor;y: "e ••• Hume went too far, 
and left the world an atomic chaos. Atomism is no reproach •• 
• e.Atomism is one thing and disconnexion and chaos another. 
Absolute atomism and absolute unity are equally unacceptable. 
Hume himself betrayed his own excess of zeal in his break-
down over volition. He urged that there was nothing in the 
passage from a purpose to its execution by the bodily limbs 
to inCI.icate compulsion. Nor is there; but he forgot that we 
have direct experience of the passage and it is this trans-
ition which is all that causality in this case means." 
Note 16 
Dans la puissance de vouloir, ou plutot de choisir, et dans 
le sentiment de cette puissance, on ne trouve que des actes 
purement spirituels dont on n 1explique rien par les lois de 
la mecanique. 
Tout est dans un flux continuel sur la terre. Rien n'y garde 
une forme constante et arretee, et nos affections qui:,·s 'n.t-
ta~bent aux choses exterieures passent et changent neces-
sairement comme elles. Toujours en avant ou en arriere de 
nous, elles rappellent le passe qui n'est plus, ou previen-
nent l'avenir qui souvent ne doit etre: il n'y a rien lade 
solide a quoi le coeur se puisse attacher. Aussi n'a-t-on 
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guere ici-bas que du plaisir qui passe; pour le bonheur qui 
dure je doute qu'il y soit connu. A peine est-il dans nos 
plus Vives jouissances un instant OU le coeur puisse Veri-
tablement nous dire: Je voudrais que cet instant durat 
toujours. 
Note 18 
' ••••• ou l'ame trouve une assiete assez solide ~our s'y re-
poser toute entiere et s'assembler la tout son etre, sans 
avoir besoin de rappeler le passe ni d'enjember sur l'ave-
nir; ou le temp ne soit rien pour elle, ou le present dure 
toujours sans neanmoins marquer sa duree et sans aucune 
trace de succession •••• 
Note 19 --
Die uurwerk kantel. En die ligbruin by 
hang roerloos voor die blom wat nooit bevrug 
word, nooit sal saadskiet, welk en nooit verby 
hierdie verstarde uur sal groei. Die lug 
het stil soos ys gaan staan, so wit en blou. 
Die brander wat wou oorbuig, val, en skuim, 
bly in sy ligte sirkels vasgehou 
en moet sy see 'n ewigheid versuim. 
We need only look at the process of life itself to re-
alize the impossibility of Rousseau's dreams. lrl.F.Pauli 
writes in his The World of Life, Chapter 3, Page 46: "This 
dynamic nature (of life) may be compared to the form and 
pattern of a waterfall, a fountain, a whirlpool, or perhaps 
to the organized symmetry of a juggler's act with ten balls 
in the air at the same time. The waterfall cannot be stopped 
in mid-air and still be a waterfall. The juggler cannot 
'hold it;' the act must be dynamic or it will collapse. In 
the same way, life must continue as a dynamic system or 
come to an abrupt end in death." 
Note 20 
Compare Temmer's Time in Rousseau and Kant, Introduction, 
Page 10: "Uncommonly perspicacious in his insights into the 
nature of time, his ideas and remarks about it relate most 
often to his desperate wish to provide his chaotic life with 
an interior coherence •••• autobiographic works •••• represent 
an original effort to comprehend and justify his existence 
within the framework of human time, responsibility and sal-
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vation. But in the very heart of his life-long synthesis 
Rousseau senses the insufficiencies of his integration .. " 
' Note 21 ·---
Dans cette etrange situation, mon inquiete imagination prit 
un parti qui me sauva de moi..;_meme et calma ma naissante sen-
sualite; ce fut de se nourrir des situations qui m'avaient 
interesse dans mes lectures, de les rappeler, de les varier, 
de les combiner, de me les appropier tellcment que je de-
vinesse un des personnages que j'imaginais, quo je me visse 
toujours dans les positions les plus agreablos selon mon 
gout, enfin que l'etat fictif ou je venais a bout de me met-
tre, me fit oublier mon etat real dont j 'etais si mecontent. 
On verra plus d'une fois dans la suite les bizarres offets 
de cette disposition si misanthrophc et si sombre en ap-
parence, mais qui vient en effet d'un coeur trop affectucux, 
trop aimant, trop tendre, qui, fauto d 1cn trouver d'exis-




J'ai des passions tres ardentes, et tandis qu'elles m'agit-
ent, rien n'egale mon impetuosite: je ne connait plus ni 
menagement, ni respect, ni crainte, ni bienseance ••.•• hors 
le seul objet qui m'occupe, l'univers n'est plus rien pour 
moi.Mais tout cela ne dure qu'un moment, et le moment qui 
suit me jette dans l'aneantissement. 
Rousseau here as a bond with Hume, but they both link up 
with Descartes who tells us in his ~~~a££ysical Meditations 
(Third Meditation, Page 129): "For the whole time of my life 
may be divided into an infinity of parts, each of 'lrlhich is 
in no way dependent on any other; and, accordingly, because 
I was in existence a short time ago, it does not follow that 
I must now exist, unless in this moment some cause create me 
anew as it were--- that is, conserve me.rr This cause must, 
of course, be God, so that God creates in time and does not 
create time. 
Note 24 
La prevoyancel la prevoyance qui nous porte sans ce?se ~u 
'dela de nous ..... voila la veritable cause de nos misc;res. 
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Quelle manie a un etre aussi passager que l'homme de regard-
er toujours au loins dans l'avenir qui vient si rarement et 
de negliger le present dont il est sur. 
~te 2?. 
Compare Poulet's ~udes sur le Temps Humain, Chapter 10, 
Page 164: "L 'e·space ou main tenant il se trouve, n 1 est plus 
le lieu ou s'epanouissait son moi, mais celui ou le non-moi 
s'affirme, resistant, opaque, le lieu de la matiere. L'in-
stant· present n'est plus pour lui, ni celui qui le content~· 
ait, ni celui ou il se decidait a assourir un besoin simnle 
dans 1' instant qui sui vai t. r-1aintenant le futur tarde avenir 
dans la mesure meme ou on l'appelle, ou on souhaite le voir 
remplacer le present insatisfaisanto Le passe ne sert plus 
seulement le point de comparaison mais le lieu de regret." 
Note 26 ---
The fragmentation of time "a demembre pour ainsi dire les 
differentes parties de notre etre interieur, et le sentiment 
de notre existence s'en est obscurci. Par nos desirs nous 
vivons dans le futur, par nos passions dans le passe, par 
nos sensations dans le present. Notre mois s'ecartele aux 
differents points de la duree. Il s'agit inversement de con-
centrer toutes les forces de notre Stre saisie de l'§me dans 
l'instant present." 
Note 27 
Comme en general, les objets font moins d'impression en moi 
que leurs souvenirs, et que toutes mes idees sont en images, 
les premiers traits qui se sont graves dans rna tote y sont 
demeures., et ceux qui s'y sont empreints dans la suite se 
sont plutot combines avec eux qu'ils no los effaceso Il y a 
une certaine succession d'affections et d'idees qui modifiont 
celles qui los suivent, et qu'il faut connaitre pour on ~icn 
juger. Je m'applique a bien developpor partout los premieres 
causes pour faire sentir l'onchainement des effots. 
Note 28 
Compare Green's Jean-~acgues Ro~~~u: A Critical et~~-£[ 
his Life and \rJriti~s, Chapter 1, Pages 44 to 45: n •••• Rous-
seau, far from percefving psychic states permeating one 
another or, as Bergson would say, 'organizing themselves 
like the notes of a tune,' perceives thorn as a succession, 
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each one of which determines that vlhich follmvs. Such is 
exactly, in fact, the point of view of an associationist 
psychologist~" 
•., • • .• n I etaient par rapport a moi qUe deS etreS mecanique' 
qui n 'agissaient que par impulsion, et dont je ne pouva:Ls 
calculer l'action que par les lois du mouvement •••• C'est 
ainsi que leurs dispositions interieurs cesserent d'etre 
quel9.u~ ·chos~ P,OUr ~oi; je ne, vis p~us en eux gue des mas7es 
differement mues, depourvues .. a mon egard de toute morali te. 
Compare Temmer's Time in Rousseau and Kant, Chapter 1, Page 
16: "Ilis (Rousseau'S"}.fe'1Tow-men-bec0rrie8:15'stractions strip-
ped of meaning;-irrealities of a mechanical nightmare. Time-
less, like matter, their existence is nothing more than 'des 
masses differement mues,' human matter set in motion by 
frightening and morally unaccountable forces.," 
CHAPTER 4 
The Reified Human Beigg in HistoEZ 
Note l ...... __ 
Compare Whitehead's Science and the l\1odern vvorld, Chapter 5, 
Page 111: "Of course, we find in the-efgnteenthcentury 
Paley's famous argument that mechanism presupposes a God who 
is the author of nature, but even before ••••• Hume had writ-
ten the retort that the God whom you vlill find, . will be the 
sort of God who makes that mechanism. In other words, that 
mechanism can, at most, presuppose a mechanic, and not mere-
ly a mechanic but its mechanic." We shall come to Burne's 
break with Christianity presently. 
Note 2 
C01p.pare Prof. Versfeld 's St. A£fi£Stine a£d th~ __ §.ense of _fli§_-
toE,;Y_: "It is a defect in Plato's thought, from the moral · 
philosopher's point of view, that he worked with the concept· 
of human nature rather than with that of personality. Human 
nature is v.rhat we all have in common, and ~tvhen we think of 
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it, we make abstractions from the differentiating circum-
stances of history, body temperament, and education and so 
on which makes each of us what he is." 
Not~_2. 
Compare Collingwood's ~e Ide~ of Hi~£El, Part 2, Section 
10, Page 83: "Burne's abolition of the spiritual substance 
amounted to laying down the principle that we must never 
separate what a mind is from what it does, and that there-
fore a mind's nature is nothing but the ways in which it 
thinks and acts. The concept of mental substance is thus re-
solved into the concept of mental process. But this did not 
in itself necessitate an historical conception of mind, be-
cause all process is not historical process. A process is 
historical only when it creates its own laws; and according 
to Burne's theory of mind the laws of mental process are 
ready-made and unchanging from the beginning. He did not 
think of mind as learning to think and act in new ways as 
the process of its activity developed. He certainly thought 
that his new science of human nature, if successfully a-
chieved, would lead to further progress in the arts and 
sciences; but not by altering human nature itself --- that 
he never suggests to be possible --- only by improving our 
understanding of it~ 
Note 4 
I do not think that I can agree vrith Bultmann where he says 
in his History and Eschatology, Chapter l, Page 10, that 
Burne did not see the consequences for history of his sub-
stitution of mental process for mental substance. I think 
Humc saw it quite clearly, and also saw that his substitu-
tion and his view on history go together, that, in fact, the 
substitution was a sine qu£_~on for his view on history. 
~,ote 2. 
Compare Collingwood's The Idea of Histor~, Part 2, Pago 85: 
"The same error (of assuming human nature· to. be consto.nt) 
gave them (the Enr!ghtenment thinko~) o. fo.lse view not only 
of the past but of the future, because it made them look 
forward to a Utopia in which all the problems of human life 
should have been 5olved. For if human nature itself under-
goes no change when we come to understand it better, every 
new discovery we make about it will solve the problems which 
novJ perplex us because of our ignorance, and no nevJ problems 
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will be created. Our advancing knowledge of human nature 
will therefore gradually relieve us of the various difficul-
ties under which we now labour, and human life will con-
sequently become better and better, happier and happier. 
And if the advance in the science of human nature extends to 
the discovery of the fundamental la\"lS governing its manifes-
tations, 'tvhich thinkers of that age thought quite possible 
on the analogy of the way in \vhich the seventeenth century 
had discovered the fundamental laws of physics, the milleni-
um will be achieved. Thus the eighteenth-century conception 
of progress was based on the same false analogy betvveen 
knowledge of nature and knowledge of the mind." 
Note 6 ---
See Maritain's On the Phi~oSO£h~-~f_HistoE~' Chapter 1, Page 
1: 11 Christianity has taught us that history has a direction, 
that it works in a determined direction. History is not an 
eternal return; it does not move in cycles. Time is linear, 
not cyclical •••• 11 He continues on Page 28: 11NovJ I would 
scarcely observe that time, the time of human history, has 
an inner structure •••• Time has a meaning and a direction •••• 
Here we are confronted, not only with the singularity of 
particular events, but with the singularity.of the entire 
course of events. It is a story which is never repeated; it 
is unique." 
I do not think that we must say that Hume looks upon 
time as cyclic. Time, in his philosophy, is altogether se-
parate from history and does not possess an 11inner struc-
ture. " For him time is the time of Galileo 's physics. It is 
the events of history in time that are cyclic and "tick off" 
time as does a pendulum. The events are seen against the 
background frames of reference of Galileian space and time~ 
Compare Marion Osborne's Rou~~g_~~Burke, Chapter 4, 
Page 86: "Rousseau had no doubt that man was capable of im-
provement, but he was convinced that if theories 'li'rcre to be 
of any practical value, they would have to be based on an 
understanding of men as they were, and as they would con-
tinue to be." 
Noto 8 
This translation of the French text vvas taken from the 
English translation of the Social_Q£~!~£! by G.D.H.Cole 
• 
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(Eyeryman's Library). The French is as follows: "Il faut 
lu1. (the General Will) faire voir ••••• rapprocher a ses yeux 
les lieux et les temps ••• e" 
Note 9 
One is inclined to have a little sympathy with Rousseau in 
his antipathy to the bigger cities of his time. Some ugly 
factories were beginning to appear around Paris and had al-
ready appeared around British cities where the Industrial 
Revolution was in full swing. 
Note 10 
C?mpare Mircea Eliade's ~~~~nd Historz. Maritain, in 
his On the Philosophy of Histor~, points out that Eliade 
stresses the fact that the acceptance of time and history 
is a "dearly paid achievement" for man .. Maritain's words 
have already been quoted in Note 30 of Chapter 2. In the 
first chapter of his book Eliade holds that ritual in ar-
ch::tic cultures is really meant to be a "re-enactment" of some 
original action by a god or by the gods. 
Note 11 
La loi judaique, toujours subsistante, celle de l 1enf'ant 
d 'IsmaE:n, qui depuis dix siecles regit la moitie du monde, 
annoncent encore aujoud'hui les grands hommes qui les ont 
dictees; et tandis que l'orgueilleuse philosophie ou l'a• 
veugle esprit de parti ne voit en eux que d'heureux impos-
teurs, le vrai politique admire dans leurs institutions ce 
grand et puissant genie qui preside aux etablissements 
durables. 
Note 12 
Rousseau has the notion of a great lawgiver who must es-
tablish immutable laws outside time, in common with Des-
cartes. Descartes writes in his Discourse on Method (Part 2, 
Page 13): "I fancied that those nations which, starting from 
a semi-barbarous state and advancing to civilization by slow 
degrees, have had their laws successively determined, and, 
as it were, forced upon them simply by experience of the 
hurtfulness of particular crimes and disputes, would by this 
process come to be possessed of less perfect institutions 
than those which, from the commencement of their association 
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as communities, have followed the appointments of some wise 
legislator. 11 • 
We notice in this passage the hostility to history and 
the institutions which it produces, that is, to tradition. 
We shall come, in due course, to the ahistoricity of the 
laws of Rousseau's General Will. 
Note 13 
I chose to quote from .the Book of Daniel because the author 
is so clear in connecting the event vJith the person, but 
~tvhat is true of Daniel is true of all the Prophets. I could 
have contrasted Rousseau with any of them. Now there may be 
those who would point out that in his Confessions Rousseau 
meant to give us only the simple story of his life, and that 
it is really not fair to compare his autobiography with a 
book 1111hich 11had no author, 11 as is often said about the Book 
of Daniel. This latter part of the criticism would stem from 
the modern view that the character Daniel did not really ex-
ist, that the Book of Daniel was written about 160 BeC. and 
not in the sixth century B.C., and that the unknown author 
made use of fiction to achieve his purpose. This is a view 
which, for reasons into which I cannot go here, I cannot ac-
cept, and I am supported in this by Prof. Fensham, of Stel-
lenbosch, as well as by the writer of the article on Daniel 
in the Zondervan Bible Dictionary. I also seem to have the 
support of the Italian writer Manzoni who wrote in his La 
Rissurezione: "Daniel remembe-red the years vThich were not 
yet born. 11 '(E degli anni an cor non nati Daniel se ricordo). 
The comprehensiveness of Daniel's now is well put in this 
sentence. ---
With regard to the contention that Rousseau wanted to 
give only the simple story of his life and vJas not concerned 
'irvi th history, I point out that the simple story of one's 
life should be history. The whole point in autobiography, 
properly understood, is to make sense of oneself in the be-
coming of the world, This Rousseau does not do. In any case, 
the Qonfessio~ is also not a true story of his life. 
Note 14 
According to Spengler Goethe was a paragon of historic sen-
sitivity. Spengler relates in his Decline of the \rvcst (Vol. 
1, Page 25) how Goethe, standing a~~vouac fire on the 
evening of the Battle of Valmy, said to those assembled 
there: "Here and now begins a new epoch of world history, 
and you, gentlemen, can say that you 'were there. 111 Spengler 
continues: "No general, no diplomat, let alone the philoso-
phers, ever so directly felt history 'becoming;'" 
~2 
Compare. Becker's The Heavenly City of the_Eig_£teenth-c~­
tur~~losophers t Chapter .3? Page 99: 11 T~ey (the ~!_ighten­
ment £hllosophers) were looklng for 'man ln general, 1 and it 
is unreasonable of us to be annoyed because they did not 
look for him at Ingelheim or Lustnau on July 1, 887. Nan in 
general, like the economic man, was a being that did not ex-
ist in the world of time and place, but in the conceptual 
world, and he could therefore be found only by abstracting. 
from all men in all times and all places those qualities 
which all men shared. No doubt Charles the Fat, being, like 
Socrates, a man, might exhibit at Ingelheim or Lustnau some 
of the qualities he shared with Socrates. The important point 
was to note those qualities as exhibited: it mattered not 
vThether they were exhibited at Ingelheim or at Lustnau, 
whether on July 1 or on some other day, the exact time and 
place being no more than temporal 'accidents' useful chief-
ly for illustrative purposes." 
Note 16 
Compare Becker's The Heavenly C~_!Q~~bghteen!h~­
tury Philoso£hers, Page 109: "Hume managed with unobtrusive 
skill, to weave into the texture of the narrative a condem-
nation of the very things the eighteenth century wanted con-
demned --- tyranny, superstition, intolerance. The story is 
a narrative of events, but it is after all well told, and 
above all told en Qhilosophe: that is to say, not in order 
to trace the evolution of events or to explain them in terms 
of their origins and effects, but in order to apply to events 
the 'idea of the just and the unjust, ' in order to apply to 
them the ready-made judgments of the age of reason. 11 We shall 
see in the next two chapters what the ideas of God 1r1ere in 
Burne's age, but it must be pointed out here that in this con-
text of historiography Hume seems to join hands vJ"i th Karl 
Marx who also uses history for the purpose of condemnation. 
See also Note 18 below. 
Compare also Stewart's The Moral and Political Philoso-
J2E.L_of David ~~~' Chapter 11, Page298 to 299: II ••••• in -
none of these works •••• does he display the true historian's 
love for the past. The same must be said of the History of 
England, a work which, like the Discourses, was Writtent·o 
teach'Tessons directly relevant to contemporary politics •••• 
In view of its pragmatic nature, it is not surprising that 
he wrote the Histq_r;y_ backwards ••••• " 
Compare aiso ~reig's David Hum~, Chapter 20, Page 268: 
11 
••• o.the weakness of the XVIIIth-century historians, taken 
as a group, is their lack of what we now call historic sense~ 
••••• the spirit of their age was self-assured, positive, and 
rather smug, and they _judged the past as if it were the 
present." 
!fot~!.Z 
Compare Collingwood's The Idea. of Historz, Page 77 : " ••••• 
writers like Voltaire and Hume did very little to improve 
the methods of historical research. They took over the 
methods devised in the preceding generation •••• ~and even 
these methods they did not use in a really scholarly spirit. 
They were not sufficiently interested in history for its 
own sake •••• Hume's History of England is a very sketchy 
piece of work untilhe comes to •••• the age of the Tudors." 
The writer of the article on Hume in the 1950 edition of 
the Encyclopaedia Brittanica says that parts of his his-
tories are little better than party pamphlets. Though this 
judgment is perhaps a little harsh, his first volume cer-
tainly did annoy the English Whigs of his time. 
Compare also Trevor-Roper's Hume as Historian (Page 93 
of the Sym;posiu;g_): "Neither Hume nor any of the 'philosoph-
ical historians' of the eighteenth century wrote vivid his-
tory. They did not seek, as their successors after the Ro-
mantic movement did, to plunge back, bodily and mentally, 
into the past. Archaic languages, local colour --- these 
devices for bringing the reader himself into the scenes of 
history never occurred to them. They sat in·Edinburgh or 
London or Lausanne and wrote about remote, unvisited coun-
tries and distant, disagreeable centuries in the cool style 
of the eighteenth century. The idea that they should become 
part of the past, wear its clothes, sink into its conven-
tions, sympathise with its bigotries would have shocked 
them."· One might point out that this is precisely the at-
titude of an historian who looks upon history as an eternal 
recurrence of events. 
Note 18 --
In Macchiavelli's The Prince, Section~' Page 39, we read: 
"The Romans, in the provinces they seized, did watch (these) 
matters carefully. They established settlements, appeased 
the weaker powers without increasing their strength, crush-
ed the powerful, and did not allow any powerful foreigner 
to win prestige. The province of Greece provides a good ex-
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ample •••• In these instances the Romans did what all wise 
rulers must: cope not only with present troubles but also 
with ones likely to arise in future, and assiduously fore-
stall them." From the above we can deduce that for fJ!acchi-
avelli, as for Hume and Rousseau, men are always and every-
where the same. Hume, in fact, on more than one occasion 
refers us to Macchiavelli. 
NotL19 
De tous les auteurs chretiens, le philosophe Hobbes est le 
seul qui ait bien vu le mal et le remede ••••• Mais il a du 
voir que l'esprit dominateur du christianisme etait incom-
patible avec son systeme, et que l'interet du pretre serait 
toujours plus fort que celui de l'etat ••••• Je crois qu'en 
developpant sous ce point de vue les faits historiques, on 
refuterait aisement les sentiments opposes de Bayle et de 
Warburton, dont l'un pretend que nulle religion n'est utile 
au corps politique, et dont l'autre soutient, au contraire, 
quo le christianisme en est le plus forme appui. On prouv-
erait au premier que jarnais etat ne fut fonde que la reli-
gion ne lui servit de base; et au second, ~ue la loi chre-
tienne est au fond plus nuisible qu'utile ala forte con-
stitution de l'etat. 
r.£:t~_gQ 
Compare Marion Osborn's Rousseau and Burke, ill1apter 7, Page 
159: "As a moralist, Rousseau could not see that the moderns 
had made any further progress toward perfection than the 
ancients had done before them. Indeed, he was inclined to 
believe that, if anything, there \'las evidence of retrogres-
sion." 
Note 21 
Compare Becker's The Heavenly C~_£f the EigE~eenth~-
1:!J.ry Philosopher§_, Page 98. Becker quotes Rousseau's words 
in the Social Contract: "t!lan is born free, and is every-
where in chains. How-was this change made? I do not know." 
Becker then adds: "And we at once feel that the:v'-cth8 eigh-
i~th-century philoSO£he£s) have it on the tip~ of their--
tongues to dismiss us with an impatient 'and v-re do not 
c·are. ' 11 
Note 22 
Spengler applies this cycle to cultures. We shall give at-
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tention towards the end of this chapter to Spengler and his 
pessimism. In Rousseau's philosophy education is·to be used 
to break the cycles of events on the human scene, and basic-
cally this is also the contention of Plato.as put forward 
in the Reuublic. Education is to be used to create an im-
mutable, perfect state. 
Compare Temmer's Time in Rousseau and Kant, Chapter 4, Page 
57: Temmer here mentions the critique of C.E.Vaughan of 
Rousseau's political doctrine and writes: "He shows that, 
from a historical and theoretical point of view, Rousseau's 
notion of a social contract, which is to provide a founda-
tion for the idea of right, presupposes a moral awareness 
of social obligations that are apparently the result of the 
contract. Vaughan therefore rejects Rousseau's assumption 
of a moral act outside the continuum of time and goes on to 
say: 'Time, however, is just what he is not willing to give 
•••• the good is always, in his view, the birth of a simple 
moment, the product of a single effort. Thus all that is 
salutary in a man's record--- the contract which gave him 
'reason and humanity,' the Latv which gave to that contract 
reality and substance -~- lies wholly outside the natural 
order. vJe should like to stress that this ~emporalitJ: of 
the politico-moral act is in perfect harmony with tEe time-
lessness of •••• a quest for moral self-fulfilment and for 
artistic self-creation in a timeless past and future ••••• ·•" 
Note 24 
Compare Green's Jean-Jacgues E£U~~eau:_A Critical~~ 
his Life and \·Jriti~s, Chapter?, Page 283: Green poJ...nts to 
a sentence in the original draft of the Social. Q~ntrac~ 
(which does not appear in the published vwrk} which makes 
it clear that Rousseau is not concerned with historical 
facts, but solely with principles: "I seek right and reason 
and I do not argue about facts. 11 (Mais je cherche le droit 
et la raison et ne dispute pas des faits). Green says: 
"This caveat was not embodied in the final version, so that 
the reader, surrendering to the appeal of Rousseau's style, 
is apt to be hypnotized into believing that, at some stage 
in human evolution, man actually entered into the associa-
tion so minutely defined in his treatise. In fact, like 
Emile, the Social Contract is a fiction stylizing the au-
t-,.lior T s political ideas and principles. 11 
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Note 25 
Chacun de nous met en commun sa personne et toute saaEuis-
sance sous la su£reme direction de la volonte generale: et 
nous recevons en corps chague membre-c·om:me Eartie indivr=-
sible du tout. A I 1instant, au lieu de la personne part~­
culiere de chaque contractant, cet acte d'association pro-
duit un corps moral et collectif, compose d'autant de mem-
bres que l'assemblee a de voix, lequel recoit de ce meme 
acte son unite, son moi commun, sa vie et sa volonte. 
Note 26 
••••• se trouve engange, sous un double rapport: savoir, 
comme membre de souverain envers les particuliers, et comme 
membre de l'etat envers le souverain. 
Note 27 
Rousseau writes: " ••••• la personne ~orale qui constitue 
1 'Etat comme un etre de raison, parce que CC•.:·ntest pas un 
homme •••• " Cole's translation of this passage in the Every-
man's Library edition of the Social Contract is as follows: 
" ••••• the moral person which constitutes the state as a 
12ersona ficta, because not a man •••• " Gasc's French dic-
tionary gives the meaning of etre de raison as imaginary 
being or creation of the brain. --
Note 28 
••••• il (the Sovereign) est alors dans le cas d'un particu-
lier contractant avec soi-memei par ou l'on voit qu'il n'y 
a ni ne peut y avoir nulle espece de loi fondamentale ob-
ligatoire pour le corps du peuple, pas meme le contrat so-
cial. 
Note 29 
••••• le souverain, ne tirant son etre que de la saintete du 
contrat, ne peut jamais s'ohliger, meme envers autrui, a 
rien qui deroge a cet act primitif, comme d'aliener quelque 
portion de lui-meme, ou de se soumettre a un autre souve-
rain. 
Note 30 
Le christianisme est une religion toute spirituelle, occupee 
uniquement des choses du ciel; la patrie du chretien n'est 
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pas de ce monde ••.• un seul hypocrite, un Catilina, par ex-
emple~ un Cromwell, celui-la tres certainement aura bon 
marche de ses pieux compatriotes ...... Les vrai chretiens sent 
faits pour etres esclaves, ils le savent et ne s'en emeuvent 
guere; cette courte vie a trop peu de prix a leurs yeux. 
~-2.!. 
To anyone who reads f~me's Essay on ~uracles it must appear 
as an attempt, even a very purposeful attempt, to reduce 
Christianity and its historical foundations, to a tissue of 
fables which is to be believed only by people who have tak-
en leave of their reason. 
Compare Collingwood's The Icl~§::._Q..f.. His~or;y_, Part 2, Page 76: 
"Hume, in his historical vmrk, and his slightly older con-
temporary Voltaire, ste.nd at the head of a nevJ school of 
historical thought. Their work, and that of their followers, 
may be defined as the historiography· of the Enlightenment. 
By the Enlightenment, Auftlarun&, is meant that endeavour.& 
•••• to secularize every department of human life and thought. 
It was a revolt not only against the power of institutional 
religion but against religion as such." 
Hume tells us in his DialQ_~e§__Concer_pi~g__£l_~i~.F~!._g~ligion 
that we have no right to supposi tion.s concerning the moral 
qualities of God. "Furthermore, 11 his biographer l\1ossner 
comments (Chapter 22, Page 289 of his ~~o~_David g~), 
nthe inference from a unique effect (the world) to a unique 
cause (the Deity) is branded as unphilosophical. In prac-
tice, consequently, historical religion loses utility for 
those who are capable of thinking for themselves.n Note the 
word uti±_it;z:. 
Compare Cassirer' s Rou§_~~-Kagi.1.._Goethe, Page 45: "In re-
ligion also Rousseau rejects any dependence on external 
authority and any subjection to it. This at once excludes 
tradition as a religious source. There is no traditional 
doctrine that can lead us by a royal road to God •••••• The 
principle of mere scriptural authority is hence abandoned 
once and for all. The vJritten word can never constitute the 
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mediator between man and Gode •••• 11 
NotL22. 
One might usefully compare our two philosophers with Comte 
who, apparently also regarding a religion as a necessity, 
wanted to make humanity itself the god and direct religion 
to its worship. \1/e have a similar phenomenon in our own cen-
tury. The zoologist Huxley wishes to replace God with Evolu-
tion v.Jhich uses man as its instrument. In honour of Evolu-
tion Huxley foresees a new religion, complete with priests 
and rituals. 
It seems to me that the very derivation of the word £rogress 
(from progredior) indicates the historicity of progress and 
makes it dependent on a becomin~. Compare Maritain's On the 
Philosophy Q_f ~stor~, Chapter 1' Page 8: II e •••• if 'V'Te med--
itate on the simpie notion of a rational animal, we find 
that progress towards good --- some kind of progress to-
wards good --- is implied in the very concept of reason. 
Reason is by itself essentially progressive. Therefore a 
being endowed with reason must necessarily, in some way or 
other be progressive, not immutable, and progressive in the 
sense of progressing tov1ards improvement, towards good. 11 If 
we accept that progress and purpose are thus linked, then 
Hume's and Rousseau's conception of progress goes with the 
absence of an eschatology in their view of history, as es-
chatology that is, in the Old Testament sense.. ':ve shall 
find that tge,_g_Q_od in their thought is synonymous vli th ~he 
useful. · 
We find the same view on history in the thought of the 
Emperor Marcus Aurelius as we do in that of Hume. See his 
Meditations, Book 11, Chapter 1: 11 The properties of the 
rational-soul are these: ••••• it traverses the v1hole universe 
and the surrounding void, views its forms, stretches out in-
to infinite time, comprehends and considers the periodical 
death and rebirth of all things, and discerns that the men 
i'Tho come after us shall see no new things, and that they 
who lived before us savv nothing more than we, but that, so 
to say, every man who reaches two score years, and has been 
gifted with average intelligence, has contemplated all 
things past and all things future in virtue of the lavv of 
uniformity. 11 
~2!,e _37 ••••••• 
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Note_2_2. 
Compare Cassirer's ~sseau, Kant, G£~he, Page 26: The 
author--here relates that at the end of his life Rousseau 
wrote that it had never been his wish to turn back the wheel 
of history. This is quite understandable. To have wanted to 
turn back the 'ljl_rheel of history would have meant a repudia-
tion, so to speak, of the Enlightenment notion of progress; 
but, at the same time, Rousseau is alvmys referring us to 
the past when, so he thinks, the world was a better place. 
Ilistory, of course, does not show a continuous improvement 
of things. There are periods of decay as well as periods of 
growt!;l,periods in which good predominates as well as periods 
in \vhich evil seems to Dredominate. In his On the Philoso-
Ilh;Y._2f_History ( Chapter_c 2, Page 36) Nari tai:nqliotes, to fl-
lustrate what he calls the lm,v of two-fold contrasting pro-
gress in history, the parable in Chapter 13 of the Gospel 
according to St .IVIatthew in v-rhich a man sowed good seed in 
his field, only to have his enemy come and oversovJ it vJi th 
cockle, and says: "It means that good is not divided from 
evil in human history--- they grow together •••• It is in 
undergoing these two internal movements that human history 
advances in time. The Christian knows that, though constant-
ly thwarted and constantly concealed, the work of the spirit 
is carried out in spite of everything as history goes on, 
and that thus from fall to fall, but also from obscure gain 
to obscure gain, time marches towards the resurrection. r: He 
continues on Page 38: "~ve have here a notion of progress 
which is quite different from the necessary rectilinear and 
indefinite progress \vhich the eighteenth century dreamed of 
and in which future things were supposed to be always and 
by right better than past ones; and, on the other hand, 
from that negation of any progress and that disregard for 
~he God-given elan at work in us which prevails among those 
who despair of man and of freedom." (Sec also Appendix 11). 
Compare also 1!Jhi tehead 's Science and the i"'odern World, 
Chapter 1, Page 1: "The progress-ofcfVTlization-is' not -
wholly a uniform drift tovmrds better things. It may per-
haps wear this aspect if we· map it on a scale ·which is large 
enough. But such broad views obscure the details on \vhich 
rests our whole understanding of the process." 
Compare also Von Weizsacker's The Relevance of Science 9 
Chapter 5, Page 81: The author here-arBo-quotos-the parabre 
of the sovrer and makes the interesting comparison be-tween 
the separation of good and evil on the Day of Judgment with 
the separation of Israel from other nations by the Covenant 
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of Sinai. The major point is that man is given a choice and 
through that choice there is an end in history. "History 
will come to an end." Von Weizsacker then quotes Jesus him-
self: "The Harvest is the end of the world." 
Compare Orr's David Hume and hi~ l£f!~~~on Philo~ophy and 
Religion, Chapter 10, Page 205: rron Hume 's principles the 
onlyConaistent philosophy of existence would be pessimism." 
Rousseau anticipated Spengler's pessimism; one might in 
this context also consider the philosophy of Arthur Schopen-
hauer, the most pessimistic the 1dest has ever producedo In 
the thought of both Spengler and Schopenhauer we have to do 
with cycles, in the thought of Spengler with culture cycles 
and i,n that of Schopenhauer with the will continually grow-
ing and at the same time devouring itself. It seems that as 
soon as 'ltle have to do irli th cycles in history, that is, as 
soon as we dispense with eschatology, we have a pessimism. 
Note 40 
Compare-Maritain's On.~he Phil9sophl_Qf t~stQ_£~, Chapter 1, 
Page 32: ''••&•-the essential question for the philosopher 
of history is: \IJhat is the end of history?n He then quotes 
f''Iircea Eliade 1 s Cosmos and HistQ.EZ: n ••••• the horizon of 
archetypes and repetition cannot be transcended with impuni-
ty unless we accept a philosophy of freedom that does not 
exclude God. And indeed this proved to be true when the 
horizon of archetypes and repetition vms transcended, for 
the first time, by Judaeo-Christianity •..•• " 
CHAPTER 5 
Note 1 
Compare Cassirer 's B£~§.£_a~ -~§:.E:.~J.._Go§:_the, Page 27: nv~lhen 
Rousseau examines the available forms of 'political philos-
ophy,' he finds them all insufficient and without founda-
tion~ •••• The Aristotelian doctrine that man is 'by nature' 
a social being •••• Rousseau rejects. He does not believe in 
that 'social instinct' on which the theorists of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries hoped to found society ••••• 




Etudes sur le Temps Humain, Chapter 10, Pages 163 and 165: 
'ii'j)e"-r-retat de nature 1 1homme passe ou tombe a l'etat de 
societe. D~ns ce nouvel etat le sujet s'oppose a l'objet, 
le moi se decouvre un non-moi. L'homme ne vit plus dans une 
sorte diabsolu, ne se limite plus ala sensation pure •••• 
A cote du present, le futur et le passe se dessinent, in-
citent aux comparaisons et aux preferenceso C'est le regne 
du relatif, et c'est le regne du temps ••••• le temps est le 
lieu de l'insuffisance et, par consequent, du mal et du 
malheur •••• " 
See .Aristotle's Politics, Chapter 2, Page 3: ".And when mRny 
villages so entirely-Join themselves together as in every 
respect to form but one society, that society is a city, 
and contains in itself, if I may so speak, the end and per-
fection of government: first founded that we might live, 
but continued that we might live happily." 
Note 4---
Je veux chercher si, dans l'ordre civil, il peut y avoir 
quelque regle d'administration legitime et sure, en pren-
ant les hommes tels qu'ils sont, et les lois telles qu'elles 
peuvent etre. Je tacherai d'allier toujours, dans cette re-
cherche, ce que le droit permet avec ce que l'interet pre-
scrit afin que la justice et l'utilite ne se trouvent point 
divisees .. 
Rousseau draws a distinction in this passage between justice 
and utility •. We shall find that for Hume justice and utili-
ty are the same. Rousseau's distinction is, however, of . 
little avail, for in the end his philosophy is as utilitari-
an as that of Hume. 
Note 6 --
Je suppose les homme parvenus a ce point ou les obstacles 
qui nuisent a leur conservation dans l'etat de nature l'em-
portent, par leur resistance, sur les forces que chaque in-
di vidu peut employer pour se mainteniJJ dar..s cet etat ••••• le 
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genre humain perirait s'il ne changeait sa maniere d'etre." 
Compare Thomas Hobbes I De Ci ve' Chapter 1' Section 2: rrwe 
do not' therefore' by nature seek society for its own sake' 
but that we may receive some honour or profit from it •••• 
For if they (~) meet for traffic, it is plain every man 
regards not his fellow, but his business; if to discharge 
some office, a certain market-friendship is begotten, which 
hath more of jealousy in it than true love, whence factions 
sometimes may arise, but good will never ••••• All society 
therefore is either for gain or for glory •••• vve must there-
fore resolve that the original of all great and lasting so-
cieties consisted not in the mutual good vrill men had to-
wards each other, but in the mutual fear they had of each 
other •••• " 
Note 8 
Ce passage de l'etat de nature a l'atat civil produit dans 
l'homme un changement tres remarquable, en substituant dans 
sa conduite la justice a l'instinct, et donnant a ses ac-
tions la moralite qui leur manquait auparavant. 
Note 9 ·-
Quoiqu'il se prive dans cet etat de plusieurs avantages 
qu'il tient de la nature, il en regagne de si grands •••• que, 
si les abus de cette nouvelle condition ne le degradaient 
souvent au-dessus de celle dont il est l'en arracha pour 
jamais .••••• 
Note 10 
See Hume's Of the Ori~inal Contract (Pages 454-455 of Vol. 
1 of the EssaY?,}: '1AI moral duties may be divided into 
two kinds. The first are those, to which men are impelled 
by natural instinct7 ••• independent of all ideas of obliga-
tion, and of all views, either to public or private utility. 
Of this nature are, love of children, gratitude to benefac-
tors, pity to the unfortunate •••• The second kind of moral 
duties are such as are not supported by any original in-
stinct of nature, but are performed entirely from a sense 
of obligation, when we consider the necessities of human 
society." 
It seems to me 'that Hume 's own friendly and sociable 
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nature really clashed violently with what he thought his 
observations of human society were. Here we have a man who 
is aware of relationships among men as a "coming together" 
because he feels them, but judges society by the "artifici-
ality" of relationships among men as they have come to be 
for him through the application of the conceptual man-in-
general. One might say that Hume feels the interpenetration 
of spaces and times of persons, though he is unaware of it, 
and observes spaces and times which cannot interpenetrate. 
Note 11 
Mais qu'est-ce done enfin qu'une loi? ••••• quand toutle 
peuple statue sur tout le peuple, il ne considere que lui-
meme ..... Alors la matiere sur laquelle on statue est gene-
rale comme la volonte qui statue. C'est cet acte que j'ap-
pelle une loi ••••• Su~ cette idee, on voit a l'instant qu'il 
ne faut plus demander a qui il appartient de faire des lois, 
puisqu'elles sont des actes de la volonte generale •••• 11 
Note 12 ---
••••• en un mot, toute fonction qui se rapporte'a un objet 
individuel n'appartient point ala puissance legislative •••• 
Les lois ne sont proprement que les conditions de l'as.soci-
. at ion civile • 
Note 12. 
••••• de la l'exact concours des parties, et eni'in la plus 
grande force de tout. 
Note 14 
It might be pointed out that a man with a free choice and 
capable of free action will express his values through his 
choice and actione Compare now Ellul's Law ~s I~resent~­
tion of Value: "VJhen the values contained in the lavJ are 
represented by the individual to the individual as his own, 
then these values can help him in giving his ovm acts a 
meaning •••• the law can never be taken as in itself a real-
ization of value. It is rather a possibility offered to man 
to achieve the realization of value. Value can never be 
considered as an existent, an immutable essence, a preestab-
lished model from which one must begin, still less a kind 
of static reality included in the law •••• " It must be point-
ed out that the Enlightenment "science of man" sought pre-
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cisely such a static realit2; the legislation of Rousseau's 
General Will would be that. This legislation would not aim 
at creating values, which spring from our personalities, 
but at creating order among warring men. 
Compare also Prof. Versfeld's Law and the Idea of the 
Contemporar;l. 
~ote 15 
••••• ce que l'homme perd par le corttrat social, c'est la 
liberte naturelle ••••• ce qu'il gagne, c'est la liberte 
civile •••• 
Note 16 
A considerer humainement les choses faute de sanction na-
turelle, les lois de justice sent vaines parmi les hommes; 
elles ne font que le bien du mechant et le mal du juste, 
quand celui-ci les observe avec tout le monde sans que per-
sonne les observe avec lui. 
Rousseau's judgment in Book l, Chapter 8 of the £ocial C~­
tract, that the state makes of a man !!instead of a stupid, 
unimaginative animal,n rather nan intelligent being and a 
man,n seems to contradict the conclusion that Rousseau does 
not look upon men as npoli tical animals 11 as does Aristotle, 
but I think the contradiction is only apparent. These words 
emphasize that men need the state because of their insuf-
ficiencies which, Rousseau thinks, are removed by the state. 
The state is an accomplished fact which must be justified, 
and Rousseau's purpose was to justify it and establish a 
blueprint for a model society. This he thought he had done 
in the Social Contract. He thought that the General Will 
could be taught-what was good for it and that since every 
man's will was really inherent and implicit in the General 
Will, all men could be taught virtue, and in this sense be 
made !!intelligent beings and men.n Compare the Greek notion 
that virtue could be taught. The passage seems to me to go 
with Rousseau's notion of the necessity of a Lawgiver who 
must teach, and of himself as a great lawgivero 
Compare also Green's Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A Qritical 
§.tudL_of his Life and ~vri ting_§_, Chapter 7, Page 286: nis it 
psychologically credible that man, just emerged from the 
state of nature, would have possessed the intelligence to 
realise the advantages of Rousseau's social contract? My 
ovm view is that Jean-Jacques, brooding over his vision of 
i~ 
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man's terrible plight in this life or death crisis, felt 
that the 'very remarkable change' might well have been ef-
fected by a sudden expansion of human intelligence such as 
does in fact occur in the case of individuals whose exis-
tence is suddenly threatened." Instead of acting \vi th brute 
might to defend himself, man must now think in vJhat 'ltlaY he 
can protect himself and his possessions with lmvs. But one 
must ask: Is this true morality? Thinking about self-pre-
servation is not the same as free choice and historic mo-
rality. 
Note 18 
Chacun de nous met en commun sa personne et toute sa puis-' , , , 1 sance sous la supreme direction de la volonte genera e •••• 
No-te 19 
Il y a souvent bien de la difference entre la volonte d.e 
tous et la volonte generale; celle-ci ne regarde qu'a, l'in-
teret commun; l'autre regarde a l'interet prive, et n 1est 
qu'une somme de volontes particulieres: mais 6tez de ces 
memes volontes les plus et les moins qui s'entredetruisent, 
reste pour somme des differences la volonte generale. 
Note 20 
Il faut lui faire voir les objets tels qu'ils sont, quelque-
fois tels qu 'ils doivent lui para:Ltre ...... la ga.rantir des 
seductions des volontes particulieres, rapprocher a ses 
yeux les lieux et les temps, balancer l'attrait des avan~ 
tages presents et sensibles par le danger des maux eloignes 
et caches. 
Note 21 
Ce qui rend penible l'ouvrage de la legislation est moins 
ce qu'il faut etablir que ce qu'il faut detruire •••• 
Note 22 -----
Rousseau is at one with Hume. Compare Collingvwod '.s The 
~ of. P..isto!:_;y, Part 2, Section 9, Page 78: "They(HUiiie and 
Voltaire) only began to be interested in history at the 
point wnere it began to be the history of a modern spirit 
akin to their ovm, a scientific spirit. In economic terms 
this meant the spirit of modern industry and commerce. In 
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political terms it meant the spirit of enlightened despot-
ism. They had no conception of institutions as created by 
the spirit of a people in its historical development; they 
conceived them as inventions, artifices devised by ingeni-
ous thinkers, and imposed by them on the mass of the people. 
Their idea of religion as due to priestcraft was merely an 
application of the same principle •••• " 
Compare also Gentile's The Transcendi~f Time in His-
tor;y: (Page 91 of Phil~an?- History): "Reality is spirit 
and spirit never is but is always coming to be, not some-
thing given, but free activity. That is what distinguishes 
it from nature, and, such being its essence, spirit which is 
identical with reality, is history, or the process of self-
realization. The truth of this is clearly seen wherever we 
have to study an actual creation of spirit, such as a the-
ory, a work of art, a revolution, a reform, an institution, 
a law. Such a creation, as soon as we try to understand it, 
appears as a process, as something evolved." 
Rousseau's laws are therefore a flight from time and 
history. 
Compare Green's op~n~on that the Lawgiver is an "enigmatic 
personality." In his ~~cgues_Rousse~: A C_ritic~ St~9:;r 
of his Life and vfriting:?, Chapter 7, Pages 2~n to293 he 
says: "• ••• from Rousseau's description of the c;,lmost god-
like qualifications which the Lawgiver must po~sess, it is 
hard to see how he could fail to shape the general will of 
the legislative assembly, since his function if. to persuade 
them to follow what he, with his di vinatory pov-,rers, knows 
to be the real interests of the community •.••• r:·or is it 
clear why Jean-Jacques assumes that the Lav,rgivEr is address-
ing a body that has no 'esprit social, ' that iE; to say, no 
notion of common interest when surely that is :i.mplicit in 
the original act which produced the social contract .. " One 
might point out to Green that the General Will has to be 
taken out of time which corrupts it. 
Note 24 
•••• il faudrait une intelligence qui •••• dans le progres des 
temps se menageant une gloire eloignee, put travailler dans 
un siecle et jouir dans un autre ••••• doit se sentir en etat 
de changer pour ainsi dire la nature humaine, de transformer 
chaque individu, qui par lui-meme est un tout parfait et 
solitaire, en partie d'un plus grand tout dont cet individu 
receive en quelque sorte sa vie et son etre .••.• 
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Note 25 
Compare Stewart's The Moral_and P9.li tic a!_ P£ilos£E_gy_ ~f. 
Q§..yid Hume, Chapter 5, Page 107: 1'Tlie famiTy, friendships 
and humanity are relationships based on the feelings human 
beings have for others; but society and state a~e relation-
ships among men which result from their common desire to 
acquire external goods." 
Note 26 
In :eviewing Stew~rt's ~he Moral and Political Phi~~ 
Dav~d Hume, The T~mes L~terary Supplement writes: rrTlie~e­
ginning of society for Hume is scarcity. In primitive con-
ditions there is not enough to go round, so men have to work 
together to overcome scarcity. And in order to pass from 
precarious possessions to rightful ownership they create 
political institutions. (Is this not a social contract?) 
This is the origin of vrhat Hume calls 'justfcer-:==-there 
must be a rule of law to ensure the keeping of contracts. 
';):he state, thus understood, is artificial, while the family 
is natural, and its existence calls for the exercise of 
what Hume calls I artificial virtues e I II 
CHAPTER 6 
Note 1 
Compare Orr's ~~Hume and his Influence on Fhilosop~~ 
and Theolog;z, Page 183: "It is the case accordingly, that in 
the utilitarian school which succeeded Hume, the egoistic 
genesis of even benevolent sentiments is frankly recognized 
and the motive of self-interest is invariably fallen back 
on as the ground of obligation." In a footnote Orr quotes 
Bentham's frank admission: "I am a selfish man, as selfish 
as any man can be. But in me, somehow or other, so it hap-
pens, selfishness has taken the shape of benevolence." Not 
all the utilitarian philosophers were as honest as this, 
Orr points out. 
Note 2 ---
Trouver une forme d'association qui defende et protege de 




Good and evil then, are agreeable and disagreeable sensa-
tion. They awaken desire and aversion and they alone can 
set the will in motion. It seems to me that such a view · 
makes men little better than moths who are sent to their 
destruction in a flame by the chemistry of thei~c· bodies 
which they cannot alter or resist. 
Note 4 
In a review o~ David BUrne: A Sym£OSium The Times Literary 
Supplement wr1tes: "He (Hume) had a moral theor.J of his own 
•••• This was a special kind of hedonism. But it was not an 
egoistic hedonism." 
Note 5 
Compare Bert-rand Russell's History of IIJ~stern F1.ilosophy, 
Chapter 18, Page 701: "Cultivated people in eighteenth-cen-
tury France greatly admired what they called la sensibilite 
which meant a proneness to emotion, and more partiCUlarly -
to the emotion of sympathy. To be thoroughly satisfactory, 
the emotion must be direct and violent and quite uninformed 
by thought. The man of sensibility would be moved to tears 
by the sight of a.single destitute peasant family, but would 
be cold to well-thought-out schemes for ameliorating the 
lot of the peasants as a class. The poor were supposed to 
possess more virtue than the rich; the sage was thought of 
as a man who retired from the corruption of courts to enjoy 
the peaceful pleasures of an unambitious rural existence ... .-. 
The poor, in the imagination of those who cultivated sen-
sibilite, always had a few paternal acres, and lived on the 
produceof their own labour without the need of external 
commerce. (Com:rare RQ£sseau's no~;!;_~:m of.._!he_no£~~~e.va~). 
True, they were always losing the acres in pathetic circum-
stances, because the aged father could no longer work, the 
lovely daughter was going into decline, and the wicked mor-
gagee or the wicked lord was ready to pounce either on the 
acres or on the daughter's virtue •••• 
Note 6 ---
Compare Prof. Versfeld 's Rousseau's ~Q_ral_and R§!Jl,gi_o~ 
Y!_ews_~their_Q£!!..§.~9.£~~: nThe virtue of Rousseau, which 
he never ceased to commend, is a voluptuous enjoyment of 
his own ego, and cannot be understood apart from his dogma 
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of the natural goodness of man. This dogma affirms that 
one's temperament is its own justification. The sense of 
sin arises from the objective checks upon the impulses of 
one's own ego. Remove the checks and one experiences a glo-
rious sense of elation •••• Rousseau's explosive effect upon 
history arises from the genius with which he generalizes 
his personal malaise in the face of responsibility into a 
general theory of democracy." 
Note 7 
The Times Literary Supplement says in a review of Stewart's 
The Moral and Political Phil~so:Q_hy of David Hume: "Hume's 
mora! philosophy is connected with his social psychology. 
A central notion is what he calls 'sympathy.' Morality, for 
Hume, was not rooted in rational principles but in human 
feelings. To this extent he was on the side of Rousseau 
against Kant." This is how I would sum up Stewart's view, 
and I can agree with it, but it must be borne in mind that 
Hume distinguishes bet'l.'leen a "natural" and an "artificial" 
morality, and that his "artificial" morality is very clear-
ly utilitarian. 
Note 8 
Compare Sabatier 1 s Outline of a Philosoph;y of ReligioD_, 
Chapter 1, Page 28: "I now understand why 'natural relig:.-
on' is not a religion. It deprives man of prayer; it leaves 
God and man at a distance from each other~ No intimate com-
merce, no interior dialogue, no exchange between them, no 
action of God ••••• " 
One notes that there are really no grounds on which 
anyone should accept Rousseau's natural religion. There is 
no authoritative document such as the Bible and no witness-
es who can testify to the soundness of the religion. One 
must depend solely on feeling. 
CHAPTER 7 
The Control of Men as Masses of Matter 
Note 1 
Comment une multitude aveugle, qui souvent ne sait ce qu' 
elle veut, parce qu'elle sait rarement ce qui lui est bon, 
executerait-elle d'elle-meme une etreprise aussi grande, 
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aussi difficile qu'un systeme de legislation? De lui-meme, 
le peuple veut toujours le bieni mais de lui-meme il ne le 
voit pas toujours. La volonte generale est toujours droite, 
mais le jugement qui la guide n 1est pas toujours eclaire •••• 
Les particulieres voient le bien qu'ils rejettent; le pub-
lic veut le bien qu'il ne voit pas. Tous ont egalement be-
soin de guides. Il faut obliger les uns a conformer leurs 
volontes a leur raison; il faut apprendre a l'autre a con-
naitre ce qu'il veut. 
Note 2 ---
Any doubt one might have as to whether Rousseau meant the 
words which he uses to be interpreted as they stand, must 
surely be dispelled by the consideration that he had time 
enough to find others if he did not. It is known that he 
turned the Social Contract over in his mind for some time 
before he puhlished-i t ·,-and it is also knmm that he did 
omit at least one sentence in the original draft from the 
final published version. I do not think that we are entitled 
to interpret Rousseau's words in any other way but as they 
stand. 
Compare Prof. Versfeld's Eousseau's Mor~g£ Rebhgi-
gioue_yiews and_!.he~E__QQg_Se9._£en~-:---riWill belongs to us as 
persons. In so far as our real will is the general \vill, 
we cease to be persons. Rousseau's Confessions go together 
with the Social Contract in a manner in-whic~Augustine's 
Qonfessio~ go with t~City of.~. Just as Augustine's 
is the story of the discovery of personality and of the will 
from which he draws the public consequences in the Q~~-of 
Go1, so Rousseau confesses to the loss of will, from which 
he concludes to our immolation in an abstract sovereignty •• < 
••• It is •••• an a'chronic suspension of personality.n 
Afin done que ce pact social ne soit pas un vain formulaire 
il renferme tacitement cet engagement, qui seul peut donner 
de la force aux autres, que quiconque refusera d'obeir a la 
volonte generale, y sera contraint par tout le corps: ce 
qui ne signifie autre chose sinon qu'on le forcera a etre 
libre ..... 
Note 4 
The question of the freedom of the will did not arise in 
Greek philosophy, for the will was thought to follow reason, 
l\1an was a part of nature, and in human affairs the Greeks 
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sought laws as they sought them in nature, so that the his-
toricity of man was not a problem. And since the will was 
thought to follow reason, virtue could be taught. So Socra-
tes, for instance; thought that if only a man could be taught 
what was right, he would follow the right road. It seems to 
be a small step from this to Rousseau's notion that the Gen-
eral Will must be taught to bring its wishes and desires 
to accord with reason, and that, since a man's real will was 
really implicit in the Gene-ral \rlill, he could be "forced in-
to freedom."But assumption of a man's will in the General 
Will actually renders him will-less, and this seems to me 
to overthrow Rousseau's contention. 
No~-~ 
••••• jamais Etat ne fut fonde que la religion ne lui servit 
de base •••••• Or il importe bien a l'Etat que chaque citoyen 
ait une religion •• ~ •• Il y a done une profession de foi pure-
ment civile dont il appartient au souverain de fixer les 
articles, non pas precisement comme dogmes de religion, mais 
comme sentiments de sociabilite sans lesquels il est impos-
sible d'etre bon cito;yen ni sujet fidele •••• Les dogmes de 
la religion civile doivent etre simples, en petit nombre, 
enonces avec precision, sans explications ni commentaires. 
L'existence de la Divinite puissante, intelligente, bien·-
faisante, prevoyante et pourvoyante, la vie a venir, le bon-
heur des juste, le chatiment des mechants, la saintete du 
contrat social et des lois •••• 
Note 6 
Ceux qui distinguent l'intolerance civile et l'intolerance 
theologi~ue se trompent, a mon avis. Ces deux intolerances 
sont inseparables. Il est impossible de vivre en paix avec 
des gens qu'on crois damnes; les aimer serait hair Dieu qui 
leS pUni t: il faUt abSOlUrnent quI On leS: J?amcne OU qu·'on leS 
tourmente. Partout ou l'intolerance theologique est admise, 
il est impossible qu'elle n'ait pas quelque effet civil; et 
sit6t qu'elle en a, le souverain n'est plus souverain, meme 
au temporel: Des lors lcs pretres sont lcs vrais maitres, 
les rois ne sont que leurs officiers. 
~te '7 
Il y a une troisieme sorte de religion plus bizarre, qui 
donnant aux hommes deux legislations, deux chefs, deux 
patries, les soumet a des devoirs contradictoires, et les 
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empeche de pouvoir etre a la fois devots et citoyens. Telle 
est la religion des Lamas, telle est celle des Japonais, 
tel est le christianisme romain ••••• Il en resulte une sorte 
de droit mixte et insociable qui n'a point de nom ••. & •• (La 
troisieme) est si evidement mauvaise, que c'est perdre le 
temp de s'amuser ale demontrer. Tout ce qui rompt l'unite 
sociale ne vaut rien; toutes les institutions qui mettent 
l'homme en contradiction avec lui-meme ne valent rien. 
Note 8 
Compare Maritain's On tbe_PhilQ_§..Q.2_hy Q_,f Hi_§.~ory, Chapter 3, 
Page 87: "There was a sacraL age, the age of mediaeval 
Christendom, mainly characterized, on the one hand, by the 
fact that the unity of faith was a prerequisite for politi-
cal unity,and that the basic frame of reference was the 
unity of the social body, religio-temporal in nature, which 
was the Resp'9:£licana Christiana; and, on the other hand, by 
the fact that the dominant dynamic idea was the idea of 
fortitude at the service of justice. The modern age, on the 
contrary, is not a sacral but a secular age. The order of 
temporal society has gained complete differentiation, and 
full autonomy in its own sphere, which is something normal 
in itself required by the Gospel's distinction between God's 
and Caesar's domains. But the normal process \vas accompan-
ied --- and spoiled --- by a most aggressive and stupid pro-
cess of insulation from and finally rejection of, God and 
Gospel in the spheres of social and political life. The 
fruit of this we contemplate today in the theocratic athe~ 
ism of the Communist State." 
Note_2. 
Or il importe bien a l'Etat que chaque citoyen ait une re-
ligion qui lui fasse aimer ses devoirs ••••• Il y a done une 
profession de foi purement civile dont il appartient au 
souverain de fixer les articles •••• ~sans lesquels il est 
impossible d'etre bon citoyen ni sujet fidele. Sans pouvoir 
obliger personne ~ les croire, il peut bannir de l'etat 
quiconque ne les croit pas; il peut le bannir, non comme 
impie, mais comme insociable, comme incap~ble d'aimer sin-
cerement les lois, la justice ••••• Que si quelqu'un apres 
avoir reconnu publiquement ces memes dogmes, se conduit 
comme ne les croyant pas, qu'il soit puni de mort; il a 
commis le plus .grand des crimes, il a menti devant les lois. 
Not£_;hQ •••••• 
Note 10 
••••• autant que leurs dogmes n'ont rien de contraire aux 
devoirs du ci toyen. rJiais quiconque ose dire: Hors de 1' E-
glise point de salut, doit etre chasse de l'Etat, a moins 
que l'Etat ne soit l'Eglise, et que le prince ne soit le 
pontife. 
Note 11 
•••• en se qu'elle reunit le culte divin et 1 1 amour des lois, 
et que, faisant de la patrie l'objet de l'adoration des. 
citoyens, elle leur apprend que servir l'Etat, c'est en ser-
vir le dieu tutelaire. C'est une espece de theocratie, dans 
laquelle on ne doit point avoir d'autre pontife que le 
prince, ni d'autres pretres que les magistrats. Alors mourir 
pour son pays, c'est aller au martyre; violer les lois, c' 
est impie; et soumettre un coupable a l'execration publique, 
c'est le devouer aux courroux des dieux ••••• 
Note 12 
Compare Orr's David H~e and_his Influence~ Philoso£?Jl 
and Religion, C'.h'apter 10, Page-r9'7: "It was essential to 
Hume's-scheme (for a good state) that the church should be 
under the control orthe-magistrates." Orr then quotes the 
passage from Hume also quoted in this study, and comments: 
"Thus Burne's boasted liberality turns round into the sheer-
est tyranny." 
Note 12. 
It seems to me that one might ask whether the General vJill 
of a particular state would not, in its infallibility, de-
cide that t·he people of another state are not free and 
should be "forced into freedom." Not long after Rousseau's 
death, Napoleon came on the European scene and placed a 
brother on the throne of almost every country in liJestern 
Europe. One is reminded also of the large number of "liber-
ations" of one nation by another in our own century, and of 
threatened "liberations." See also Note 14 below .. 
~:t 
Compare Talmond's ~e_Qri~ins of Totalitar~a~_pe~acy, 
Part 1, Chapter 1, Page l : "A mighty fiat conjures up the 
social entity (in Rou§_seau's_ihought) whatever its name, 
the state, the social contract, the sovereign or the general 
v-Till. The entity is autonomous, without, as it were, ante-
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cedents or an external point of reference. It is self-suf-
ficient. It is the source and maker of all moral and social 
values •••• Man has no other standards than those laid do'W!l 
by the social contract. He receives his personality and all 
his ideas from it. The state takes the place of the absolute 
point of reference."· 
I cannot, of course, agree that man receives his per-
sonality from the social contract, for reasons given through-
out this thesis. 
Note 1.2. 
On convient que tout ce que chacun aliene, par le pacte 
social, do sa puissance, de ses biens, de sa liberte, c'est 
seulement la partie de tout cela dont l'usage importc ala 
communaute; mais il faut convenir aussi quo le souverain 
seul est juge de cette importance. 
~te 16 
Compare Green's ~an-~acgues Rousseau: A Critic~l_etudy of 
his Life and vJriti~, Chapter 7, Page 290: "They (the ci ti-
zens)lgive up only that part which is necessary to the 
state for its own conservation. Anything else is retained 
by the individual citizens, though here, of course, the 
state is the sole judge." 
~-17 
Talmond says in his Conclusions (The Ori~ins of Totalita-
rian DemQ,£ra£J:_, Page 249): "Totalitarian democracy, far 
from being a phenomenon of recent growth, and outside West-
ern tradition, has its roots in the common stock of eigh-
teenth-century ideas. It branched out as a separate and 
identifiable trend in the course of the French Revolution 
and has had an unbroken continuity ever since.e •• It was the 
eighteenth-century idea of the natural order (or general 
will) as an attainable, indeed inevitable and all-solving, 
end that engendered an attitude of mind unknown hitherto in 
the sphere of politics, namely the sense of a continuous 
advance ••••• accompanied by an acute awareness of a struc-
tural and incurable crisis in eA~sting society ••••. Totali-
tarian democracy early evolved into a pattern of coercion 
and ce:otralization •••• It envisaged man E.£_r §_~, stripped of 
all those attributes vThich are not comprised in his common 
humanity (also 2.f .. his privat~ace and time, therefore, 
~ng him an abstraction) ••••• It v:as impossible to expect 
all men •••• to merge their personalities immediately in a 
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common type of humanity ••••• (This) conception of popular 
sovereignty asserted itself as soon as it began to be seen 
that the vlill of the majority would not necessarily be the 
same as the general vvill. So the seemingly ultra-democratic 
ideal of unlimited popular sovereignty soon evolved into a 
pattern of coercion. In order to create the conditions for 
the expression of the general will the elements distorting 
the expression had to be eliminated, or at least denied ef-
fective influence." 
Note 18 -----
Compare Talmond 's The Origins £f Totali tarian __ ;Qem£_cra~, 
Part l, Chapter l, Page 18: 11 Hel vetius, laying all the em-
phasis on utilitarianism, of which he v'las, in his pe L.' Es-
J2ri t (1758), the first teacher, and Holbach, \orri ting in the 
seventies, and preaching materialist determinism, both pos-
tulated a kind of cosmic pragmatism, of which the social 
order was only a replica. The structure of the world is 
such that if society were properly balanced, all that is 
true would also be socially useful, and all that is useful 
would also be virtuous. None therefore would be vicious ex-
cept fools, and none unhappy but the ignorant and wicked, 
in other vvords, those who presume to kick against the na-
tural order of things." 
Compare Talmond's The_Origins_££ Totalitarian Democ~, 
Part 1, Chapter 1, Pages ldto 19': "Condorcet writing at 
the height of the Revolution in 1793 •••• summed up in a most 
moving manner the achievement of his age by claiming that 
it had come into the possession of a universal instrument 
equally applicable to all fields of human endeavouro The 
same instrument was capable of discovering those general 
principles which form the necessary and immutable laws of 
justice, of probing men's motives, of 'ascertaining the 
truth of natural philosophy, of testing the effects of his-
tory and of formulating laws of taste.' Once this instru-
ment had been applied to morals and politics, _a degree of 
certainty ~Tas given to those sciences little inferior to 
that which obtained in the natural scienceso This latest 
effort, Condorcet claimed, had placed an everlasting barrier 
between the human race and the 'old mistakes of its infancy 
that will forever preserve us from a relapse into former 
ignorance.' The analogy with the claims of dialectical ma-
terialism in the next century is evident." 
Note 20 •••••• ---
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Note 20 
Comp·are Talmond 's The Orhg~§._Of ·:rotalitaria~mocracy, 
Page 251: " ••••• the 1.dea of free popUI"ar self-expression 
was made to give place to the idea that the general will 
was embodied in a few leaders who conducted the war vii th 
the help of highly organized bands of the faithful. The Com-
mittee of Public Safety governing in a revolutionary manner 
with the help of the Jacobin Clubs and the Babouvist Secret 
Directory ••••• lf 
Note 21 ----
Compare Talmond's The_Q£i~~of_!otalitarian De~cpacy, 
Part 3, Chapter 4, Page 211. Talmo:llif1i'ere \vri tes on the 
role of Francais-Noel Babeuf in the French Revolution, and 
he says: "That there was no contradiction between the idea 
of a party _,of the vanguard and the idea of the general will, 
and that the general will was not the spontaneously express-
ed will of individuals but something that ought to be will-
ed, and that must be imposed if necessary --- Babeuf claim-
ed to have learnt from no less a person than Robespierre, 
who --- Babeuf quotes him with approval --- taught that 
'true lawgivers ought not to co-ordinate their laws to the 
corrupt morality of the people for whom they are destined, 
but they ought to be able to restore the morality of the 
people by their laws, first to base these on justice and 
virtue, and then to know how to surmount every difficulty 
in order to impose them upon men. ' (~~~ R~_§.§_eau 's La~­
giv~_£, the corruP,tibilllL_Q.f th~_GegeraL_~iiT end !J:.Q_rcing 
into freedom.') ••••• The masses must be brought in .•.•• But 
it was not for them to determine policies, to c:.ssert their 
will •••• The leaders, and not the masses, were to make the 
wheels turno 11 
Note 22 
Compare Talmond's T~e Origins_Q.f_!otalitarian Democrac~, 
Page 250. Talmond here points out that when the emphasis is 
placed on the destruction of inequalities as they were in 
the French Revolution (and is in Marxism), it means also a 
bringing down of the privileged to the level of common hu-
manity and "on sweeping away all intermediate centres of 
power and allegiance, whether social classes, regional com-
munities, professional groups or corporations •••• The power 
of the State, unchecked by any intermediate agencies, be-
came unlimited •.•••• This exclusive relationship between man 
and the State (in the French Revolution) implied conformity 
(compare 'forcing into freed~')~It was opposed to both 
diversity which goes with a multiplicity of social groups, 
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and the diversity resulting from humru1 spo~taneity and em-
piricism ••••• It is a vision of a society of equal men re-
educated by the State in accordance with an exclusive and 
universal pattern~ ••• Communist Babouvism already saw the es-
sence of freedom in ownership of everything by the State 
and the use of public force to ensure a rigidly equal dis-
tribution of the national income, and spiritual conformity. 11 
We see here how men are ~~lifi~~ by stri7ping them 
of all the attributes vJ'hich differentiate men from one an~ 
other, also --- and this is what concerns us in this study 
--- of their private spaces and times to make t~em masses 
controlled in the space and time of the physics of Galileo. 
Compare Prof. Versfeld 1 s Education for P...frica: "Novr there 
is a connection between being uprooted fi"om -one 1 s proper 
time and being uprooted from one's proper place. Modern phi-
losophers and psychiatrists are engaged in some fascinating 
researches in this field. Descartes' reification, thingifi-
cation of human beings resulted first in a sense of dislo-
cation from time. He is singularly without historic sensi-
tivity, He rejects tradition as the mistress of errors and 
wishes to make a clean break with what I may call cultural 
time by his doubt. We are to think in timeless geometrical 
abstractions which will enable us to control matter in mo-
tion. This is a way of thinking very helpful to the manu-
facture of muskets, and cannor., and ships and trains, which 
are all ways of dislocating things and shifting them about 
in space. It is a way of thinking which enabled the Euro-
pea.n to dis-locate himself from Europe and spread himself 
and his goods all over the world. Dislocation in time was 
accompanied by dislocation in space, and the trouble was 
tha.t the goods spread abroad were so largely things, and 
that the men who spread them were getting into the habit of 
regarding themselves and others as things, vvhom they had 
little compunction in using and dislocating." 
It was Herbert Spencer who, in the nineteenth century, 
became the philosopher of industrialism and technology. His 
philosophy is the culminating eocpression of the mechanical 
point of view. He was, in fact, an engineer turned philoso-
pher, and as such endowed industrialism and technology with 
the attributes of a religion. 
Note 24-----·-
Compare Prof. Versfeld' s Education for -~r~£~: "You cannot 
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set out to dominate nature without trying to dominate your 
fellow men, and assuming to rule over the image of God in 
a manner which paro.dies the privilege of God .. As C.S .. J.Jewis 
showed so well in his pamphlet, ~~Abolition of M~, every 
power gained over nature is a power gained by some men over 
other men. For instance, we invent flying machines, and 
that puts our movements under the control of the owners of 
the flying machines. i.Ve learn to apply ballistics, which 
means that the population of a whole to'll'm can fa.ll· under 
the control of a few men behind machine guns ••••• the final 
issue of dominative thought (as it) was achieved in the 
19th century ••••• Man's imperium over time is now asserted 
to be complete." 
A Royal Commission in Britain in 1842 prepared a report 
(with sketches) on half-naked women dragging loaded tubs 
of coal by means of chains passed around the waist and be-
tween the legs, and children carrying big sacks of coal to 
the surface up spiral stairways. · 
Note 26 ----
Because industrialists have found that better working con-
ditions make for greater production. Dr. L.A. VJhi te in his 
Science_Q£ Culture (Chapter 6, Page 128) gives a similar 
reason for the abolition of slavery. "Slavery," he says, 
"as an institution will exist and endure only when the mas-
ter can derive profit and advantage by exploiting the slave 
•••• The efficiency of production is of course determined by 
the degree of technological development •• ~ ••• when culture 
--- particularly the technologiacl culture --- had reached 
a certain point where it could no longer be operated effici-
ently by human chattel, then the institution of slavery be-
came extinct. Slavery died out, not because someone dis-
covered the essential dignity of man, or because .. of a rising 
spirit of Christianity or Democracy, but because, as Lewis 
H.Morgan put it long ago, a freeman is a better 'property-
making machine' than a slave." 
Note 27 
That the modern worker is still very much subject to Gali-
leian space and time as a controlled being is Ehovm by the 
rule of "clocking in" and "clocking out" every day. Another 
symbol is the "assembly line" with its repetition work, 
each task on it taking a precise interval of time to com-
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plete and being necessary before the next stage can be done. 
Coupled with it is a survey of work potential of men in in-
dustry which is, significantly enough, called time and mo-
tion study, while labour is measured in man-hours·.-------.. -- . - ----·-... -
~ 
Note 28 
Compare Prof. Versfeld 's Education for Africa: "Nm.v lrJestern 
philosophy has been for some three centuries-imperialistic 
_in a very pervasive manner. tfuen I say im£ert~~~sti~ I mean 
something very definite. I mean that it has een con9erned 
with domination and with the techniques of domination. It 
has been concerned with a \'Till to power over nature and 
over history. It has sought to rule over space and time. 
The Baconian spirit has received no better formulation than 
Descartes' statement that the function of philosophy is to 
make us masters and possessors of nature. lfJhen Descartes 
made metaphysics the handmaid of physics ---- thus reversing 
the traditional relationship --- he \'Jas subordinating every-
thing else to the problem of the movement of things in 
space, and elevating the changing above the non-changing. 
Even Western theory of knowledge ••••• has been shoed on this 
last. It expresses our will to exert an ;!;_mp~_£.:h~~ or 2-.9..~:h£h­
um over nature. 
Note 22_ 
Compare Leighton's Field Qf Phhl£SO£h_l_, Chapter 37, Pages 
599 to 602: "The tremendous development of large-scale ma-
chine production h~s ••••• lined up, in battle ar-ray, the 
groups or organized 'capital' on the one side c=.nd organized 
'labour' on the other, with the non-combatants between to 
suffer most of the damage from their intermittent warfareo" 
One could, perhaps, ask whether the modern idea that men 
should have more leisure time is not simply an "unconscious" 
realization that men have to be allov.reo_ to live in their 
natural private spaces and times whenever it is possible to 
spare them from industry." 
Note 31 
We have heard much in this century of the impact of lrJestern 
civilization on the African. What we have to do with here 
is the impact of Galileian space and time, the space and 
time of technics and control, on the subjective cultural 
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space and time of the African tribes which, like the space 
and time of the Old Testament, is not nearly the same as 
that of which it has to suffer the impact. This seems to be 
Prof. Versfeld's contention in his Education for Africa. 
Compare also vfuitehead's ecience ana tge~odern'World, 
Chapter 1, Page 4: ".Another contrast wnich singles out sci-
ence from among the European movements of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries is its universality. Modern science 
was born in Europe, but its home is the whole world. In the 
last two centuries there has been a long and confused impact 
of Western modes upon the civilization of Asia." We can now 
add: "and of Africa. " 
Compare also the introduction by F.S.C.Northrop to 
Heisenberg's ?hysics and Philoso~~· 
Unless we give this interpretation to these words, it is not 
clear to me why Rousseau maintains that the General Will 
should be taught this. The words would seem to be "out of 
the blue" unless Rousseau associated Galileian space and 
time with order and control. Perhaps he realized the disor-
der caused in his own life by his hostility to space and 




In spite of certain antithetical undercurrents in its 
thought, such as Nominalism and Realism (see Note 8 of Jhap-
ter l),the system of life and thought of the Middle Ages was 
Christian and monolithic. Science, religion and philosophy 
were united in a way of thinking and living which had given 
' . 
stability and solidarity to human lives for a thousand years 
after the fall of the Western Roman Empire in A.D. 476; 
Christianity had, in fact, had that influence for more than 
a century before that year, for it would not have been able 
to capture the imperial court had it not before the begin-
ning of the fourth century A.D. already captured Rome her-
self. Compare in this context Leff's Medieval Th£ught, Chap-
ter 1, Pages 25 to 26: "Only the Church retained a central 
organization and universal character, (t~t i~ when the 
West££? Roman Em£~~e crumble£). Modelled on the lines of im-
perial administration., with its dioceses and provinces cor-
responding to Roman divisions, it was able to maintain its 
cohesion when the Empire crumbled.. It was therefore the main 
bastion of order and administration, able to take charge of 
cities ·and regions. This ability, together with its unique 
spiritual authority, was to make tho Church the most influ-
ential power in preserving the past and refashioning the 
future." 
From this monolithic Christian system we pass at the 
end of the Middle Ages to a state of affairs in Europe which 
brought about the overthrow of much that had shaped human 
life, especially through the disturbance of human relation-
ships as contemplated and lived,;:during all those centuries 
which followed the surrender of Rome to Christianity. Europe 
became heterogeneous with the creation of many national 
states, and the daily affairs of men became more and more 
separated from those of the Church. Henceforth human rela-
tionships were to be contemplated in an atmosphere of hos-
tility to Christianity in which the monolithic mediaeval 
system had been r-eplaced by a diversity of thought in which 
every human mental and spiritual activity went its own way 
in isolation from the rest. 
This latter loss of control of an unfragmented person-
ality over the human passion for knowledge (the cupido sci-
endi), the feeling (cup~sentendiendi) and the passion for 
power and domination (cupi~QE!.:.h!!.§.!!91) has a special sig- · 
nificance in this study. We shall have to do, throughout it, 
with the destruction of personality, and the problems which 
Hume and Rousseau examine are, in fact, the creations of 
this dissolution in man himself and the consequent dualisms 
in his society. 
APPENDIX 2 
Burtt gives the following description of the thought of 
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the Middle Ages in his The Metaphxsical Foundations of 
Modern Physical Science, In"€roduction, Pages 4~·=-s and 6: 
For the Middle Ages man was in every sense the centre 
of the universe. The whole of nature was believed to be·te-
leologically subordinate to him and his eternal destiny. 
Towards this conviction the two great movements which had 
become united in the medieval synthesis, Greek philosophy 
and Judeao-Christian theology, had irresistibly led. The 
prevailing v-rorld view of the period was marked by a deep and 
persistent assurance that man, with his hopes and ideals, 
was the all-important, even controlling fact in the universe. 
This vievr underlay medieval physics. The entire vmrld 
of nature v-ras held not only to exist for man's sake, but to 
be likewise immediately present and fully intelligible to 
his mind. Hence the categories in term·s of which it was in-
terpreted were not those of time, space, energy and the like; 
but substance, essence, matter, form, quality and quantity 
---- categories developed in the attempt to throw into sci-
entific form the facts and relations observed in man's un-
aided sen$e-experience of the world and the main uses which 
he made it serve .• !"Ian was believed to be active in this ac-
quisition of knowledge.:_ __ nature passive ••••• And, of course, 
that which v1as real about objects was that 'ltvhich could be 
immediately perceived about them by the senses. Things that 
appeared different, were different substances such as ice, 
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water and steam ••••• Similarly on the teleological side; an 
explanation in terms of the relation of things to human pur-
pose was accounted just as re.al as and often more important 
than an explanation in terms of efficient causality which 
expressed their relation to each other. Rain fell because it 
nourished man's crops as truly as because it was expelled 
from the clouds. Analogies from purposive activities vvere 
freely used ••••• Quantitative differences were derived from 
teleological distinctions ...... vmter in water was believed to 
have no weight inasmuch as it was already in its proper 
place. But we need not multiply instances; these v.rill suf-
ficiently illustrate the many respects in which medieval 
science testified to its presupposition that man ..... was the 
determinative factor in the world ••••• The vlhole universe was 
a small, finite place, and it was man's place. He occupied 
the centre; his good was the controlling end of the natural 
creation ............. The medieval think8r never forgot that 
his philosophy was a religious philosophy with a firm per-
suasion of man's immortal destiny. The Unmoved l\1over of 
Aristotle and the Personal Father of the Christian had be-
come one. 
APPENDI!_2 
J.A.Leighton writes as follows in his The Field of Philoso-
1?~-.Y.' Chapter 13, Page 157, on the philosophy-tEat O:Ccom-
panied the scientific development of tho seventeenth and 
eighteenth (and also the nineteenth) century: 
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The significant nettl thing in the background of modern phi-
losophy --- the novel standpoint in thought that shapes the 
point of vi.ew of much of modern thought, is the development 
of a mechanical view of the world. It is the conception of 
nature as a vast mechanism, infinite both in extent and the 
complexity of its details. At the same time it is·a mechan-
ism whose fundamental principles of operation are known. 
Nature is viewed as a self-running mechanism ••••••• The medi.-
eval philosopher viewed nature animistically and teleologic-
ally ........ in the physics and cosmology of scholastic phi--
losophy, as in those of Plato and Aristotle, things and 
events in nature are conceived and explained in terms drawn 
from human purpose and will. Brute matter is subservient to 
purpose,·to good. In modern physics and cosmology all chang-
es are explained in terms of the push and pull of blindly · 
operating mass particles moving in space •••• onatural occur-
ences are the mathematical and inevitable resultants of the 
previous configuration of mass particles and their motions •. 
•••• whatever happens now is the inescapable consequence of 
a blind push from the past. The future is not a real factor 
in determining the character of the present; the latter is 
the inevitable echo of the past. 
APPENDIX 4 
It seems to me that when primitive man contemplates time as 
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a result of his observation of recurring natural phenomena, 
there is some .attempt, unconsciously perhaps, to connect 
these phenomena (and therefore time) vJith human life, though 
the extent to which the event was connected with the person 
was, in the past, never achieved as completely as in the 
case of the Biblical Hebrew. 
See in this context Du Toit's Die Tyd_as Antropologiese 
Kategorie by Yderkega~rd, Page 21. Du Toit says that in 
phenomena which exhibit periodicity primitive man saw a 
suspension Of succession rather than a reversal, and con-
tinues: "Die herhaling van die rituele siklus van die kalen-
derjaar is identies met die oorspronklike kosmogenie. Veral .. 
Hircea Aliade bet beklemtoon dat hierdie primitiewe tyds-
belewing, waarin eintlik niks nuuts kan gebeur nie, maar 
oergebeure eindeloos herhaal word, die opheffing van tyd en 
- ' 
geskiedenis in die rituele gelyktydigheid met die 'a-tyde-
like' oertyd bestaan. Tereg bring van der LeemrJ egter na 
vore dat die opheffing van tydelike suksessie nie net die 
oorspronklikheid van menslike bandeling in die oertyd ver-
le nie. Dit beteken_ew~~~~- dat die 'natuuE_lilce' P.E.£§.£.§..§_~, 
di~seisoenswisselin~e ens., ni~~~~ns~lf_yer!£££_ni~, 
~~afhanklik.l:.~_van di£ :voltre.kki!!.fLY:§:_n die__godi_g_~. ~J--~§.§. 
deur di~m§_Qs ......... e. ... • -~- (My underlining) 
"Die primi tiewe tydsbelevving oriente or sig in die eer-




Nie in die kringloop van die son en die maan, maar in die 
vrisseling van lig en· donker, die fases van die maan, word 
die tyd allereers geopenbaar ••••• 11 
Now in Plato's contemplation of time the celestial 
bodies play a prominent part, but in a quite different way. 
We shall find that the part they play in Plato's thought, 
aided by Greek geometry, may be looked upori as a step in 
the direction of that complete separation of space and time 
-from the human person which.we find after Galileo. This 
will, I think, become clear if this appendix is read to-
gether with Appendix 6. 
APPENDIX 5 
Even the language of the_Hebrew, says Boman in hig Hebr~~ 
ThQught ComEar~q_wi!h Greek (Chapter 1, Page 27), is strik-
ing as the language of a "time" people in contrast to Greek 
ascthe language of a "space" people. "If Israelite think-
ing is to be characterized," he writes, "it.is obv:lous first 
to call it dynamic, vigorous, passionate and sometimes quite 
explosive in kind; correspondingly Greek thinking is static 5 
peaceful, moderate and harmonious in kind •••• The antithesis 
••••• cannot •••• be simply stated as 'dynamic-static' but 
preferably it should be designated dynamic-harmonic or 
-resting. 
"·····.Hebrew •••• betrays in many respects the idiosyn-
cracy of the Israelite psyche. The verbs especially, whose 
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basic meaning always expresses a movement or an activity, 
reveal the dynamic variety of the Hebrew thinking. ·When a 
verb is to express a position like sitting or lying, it is 
done by a verb which can also designate a movement."-
Boman sees the contrast between the Hebrew language 
and the Greek also between Hebrew and our \IJeste.rn langua.ges, 
and wr;ites (Page 28) that "our distinction between past, 
present and future, like the Greek conception of time in 
general as well as our own, is much more a matter of space 
than of time." In Greek and Western thought, he says, we 
have, instead of time rhythms, time lines; the present is 
the point on' the line on which we stand, the future is 
found at some point on the line in front of us while behind 
us lies the past. First we have the perfect, then farther 
back the imperfect and farther yet the pluperfect. Boman 
then continues (Chapter 3, Page 125): "The Greek language 
also has. corresponding verb-forms which can be delineated 
in quite similar manner on a straight time-line; therefore 
the popular time conception of the Greeks is as rectilinear 
as our own." 
Now in his Biblical Words for Time Barr examines the ----
"building of a structure from the lexical stock of the bib-
lical languages, and the assumption that the shape·of this 
structure reflects or sets forth the outlines of biblical 
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thinking about a subject. The subject in this case is time. 
I hope to show that this procedure is, in this case at any 
rate, an entirely faulty one." Barr then precedes to criti-
cize several writers on the subject, and concludes (Page 
153): " ••••• it has been shown that the use of lexical struc-
tures in the investigation of time has been extremely faul-
ty. \fuile this faultiness may in part be traced to the 
overlooking of certain evidence, I submit that the method 
itself is faulty, and that the overlooking of the evidence 
necessarily followed from the adoption of the method ...... " 
Before coming to this ·conclusion Barr says that " .... it 
has been suggested, and not from some extra-biblical posi-
tion but on the basis of the biblical material itself, that 
there may not in fact be sufficient material ·in the Bible 
on which a purely biblical view of tirrie may be built." 
I draw the attention to the words ~biblical since 
it seems to me that there is evidence for a Hebrew view of 
time in contrast to a Greek view if vle go beyond etymology 
and add other evidence to that of the Bible. Vle do not now 
consider the question of language. I had the benefit of a 
conversation with Prof.F.C.Fensham, of Stellenbosch, and he 
supports Barr in his criticism of Boman's use of language 
to arrive at an idea of Hebrew and Greek time conceptions; 
but he thinks, he says, that there would be a difference 
between the two time conceptions. It seems to me that on 
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the basis of what we accept the Old Testament to be, a pro-
gressive revelation, as well as on the basis of Hebrew and 
Greek historiography, it cannot be denied that the Hebrew 
had a time conception and historic sensitivity which the 
Greek did not have. Bultmann contrasts these two histori-
ographies in Chapter 2 of his !,!istory and Eschatology as 
"completely different." The Greek searches for laws of na-
ture; the Hebrevr ·looks for "divine education" fun the acts 
of God 11in the direction of the goal." 
This difference in historiography throws doubt on an-
other of Boman's statements, that is that the Greek time 
conception was "as rectilinear as our own~" The Greek his-
toriography seems to go with periodicity and eternal re-
currence, and Bultmann, to illustrate this, quotes Chrysip-
pus as saying: "Socrates and Plato will exist again and 
every man vli th his friends and his fellow citizens; he will 
suffer the same and do the same. Every city, every village 
and field will grow again. And this restoration v1ill not 
happen once, but the same 'tATill return without limit or end." 
Compare also Cornford 's Plato 1 s C£§_mology, Page 103: "Pla-
to's view of Time as inseparable from periodic motion is 
... 
no novelty, but a tradition running throughout the whole of 
Greek thought, which always associated Time with circular 
movement ••••• And, as Aristotle says, there is a cycle of 
all things that have a natural movement and come into being 
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and pass away." However, there are some elements in Plato's 
view on time that seem to be associated with a rectiline-
arity, the rudiments, so to speak, of Galileian time. These 
elements are the tendencies towards measurement of time 
which we find in Plato's thought. (See Appendix 6). Beyond 
this Boman's contention does not appear to find much sup-
port. 
vJhether this difference between the Hebrew and Greek 
time conceptions always existed or appeared only later, say 
about 1200 B.C. to 1000 B.c., need not concern us, though 
there seems to be evidence.that that is the case. (Is the 
judgment of Solomon that there is nothing new under the sun, 
a remnant of a cyclic time conception?) 
There is also the consideration of the arts of the two 
peoples mentioned in Note 28 to Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
In this context I am supported by Spengler who looks upon 
the classical Greek as a paragon of ahistoricity, though a 
master of form in sharply bounded space. With this art of 
the classicQ1 Greek one must couple Greek geometry \vhich 
seems to me to be very strong testimony in favour of the 
spatial "orientation" of the classical Greek. (See Notes 37 
and 38 to Chapter 2 of this study). Compare in this context 
Cornford 's Plato's Cosmol2_g;y_, Page 103: "Time is more ab-
stract, unsubstantial, phantom-like than Space. ~~at fills 
Space is body that we can see and handle; what fills Time 
is movement ••••• " 
APPENDIX 6 
In her Time ~liss Cleugh says that the time of science is 
really cyclic because it is a repeti tiorr of ide:J.tical parts. 
No doubt she adopts this vie1111 because Galileian time is 
measured by means of reciprocating motions of material ob-
jects; but this time, I think, must be looked upon as a 
line divided in its motion forward by similar operations. 
One must remember that the space and time of science are 
both frames of reference ~ide things. Fliss Cleugh quotes 
a passage from vveyl' s Space, Time and M§.!..!..~E. in which "the 
latter holds that physics really postulEttes repetition and 
that this is related to the possibility of constructing in-
struments for measurement: "If an isolated physical system 
reverts to exactly the same state as that in which it was 
. I 
at some earlier instant, the same succession of states will 
be repeated in time, and the whole series will constitute a 
cycle. This is a clock. " "Hence, " says Miss Cleugh, "phys-
ical time is doubly an abstraction: not only in that it ab-
stracts from the different judgments of duration of indi-
viduals, but also in that it abstracts from the irrevocabil-
ity and irrevers~bility of timeo 11 I can agree with l\liss 
Cleugh on the first type of abstraction (as I have already 
done in the last paragraph of Section V of Chapter 2 of -
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this thesis) but I cannot agree with her on the second. I 
draw attention to Weyl's words the same succession of states 
will be repeat~ in tim-e. It seems to me that Weyl here 
definitely looks upon things as outside the time of science~ 
Is Miss Cleugh not identifying the events that "tick off" 
time, with the time of physics itself? It is not time that 
I'Jeyl sees repeated, but the events in time. 
We must ask: Could the calculus treat a cyclic time? 
The answer seems to' be that it could not. Furthermore, has 
Yuss Cleugh not forgotten the Second Law of Thermo-dynamics 
which tells us which way the arrow of time points in its 
irreversibility? This whole question of the Second Law of 
Thermo-dynamics and entropy seems to me to indicate that 
the time of physics is linear and is outside things. For 
instance, radio-active decay is a quite irreversible process 
and by no lmmm means can it be reversed, while the process 
of the swing of a pendulum is in part reversed. The same 
time can therefore be applied to both radio-activity and_ 
the .pendulum if that time is outside them. Compare Barter's 
Relativity and Reality, Page 2: "Time is (similarly) meas-
ured by material changes •••••• but we conceive of time as an 
independent passing, while these changes only mark its pass-
ing in the way material objects measure distance in space •• 
••• we do not regard a change in those measurements, such as 
by a change in the speed of a clock or a change in the 
length of material, as being a change in time or space, but 
only in these imperfect means of measuring them .. " The new-
est discovery (1965) of the decay of the neutral K-meson 
into two !I-mesons supports the view that the time of phys-
ics is outside things and is not a continued repetition. 
This discovery v1as not what physicists expected, that is 
that physical processes are symmetrical with regard to time. 
Sciama writes in K-mesons, T!_me Reversal and Cosmology: 
"The most natural interpretation of such a breakdown is in-
deed the obvious one.o .... that there is, as it were, an ar-
row of time built into the basic laws of nature." But of 
this discovery Miss Cleugh could, of course, not have knmm 
'ltlhen she wrote her book .. 
I think we can safely say that as soon as we begin to 
measure time we no longer have a cyclic time, but a linear 
time outside the·things of the tangible world, measured off 
by cyclic motions of these things. Space and time then be-
come frames of reference against which moving t.hings are 
projected .. This brings us to Plato. It seems to me that in 
Plato's thought we have the rudiments of a linear, measured 
time emerging out of the Greek conception of a cyclic time. 
(See Appendix 8 for the principles of time measurement) .. It 
is true that in the !ima~~ Plato couples time with cir-
cular~ motion, namely that of the celestial bodies. He says: 
"Time came into being together with the Heaven, in order 
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that, as they were brought into being together, so they may 
be dissolved together, if ever their dissolution should 
come to pass; and it is made after the pattern of the ever-
enduring nature, in order that it may be as like that pat-
tern as possible7 for the pattern is a thing that has being 
for all eternity, whereas the Heaven has been and is and· 
shall be perpetually throughout all time." 
So far we clearly have ever-enduring cycles; but Plato 
then speaks of the ~rts of time, days and nights, and I 
think one can look upon these parts as lying in a straight 
time line "marked off" by the circular motions of the celes-
tial bodies. "In virtue then," says Plato in the Timaeus, 
nof this plan and intent of the god for the birth of Time, 
in order that Time might be brought into being, Sun and 
Moon and five stars 'vJanderers, ' as. they are called 
were made to define and preserve the numbers of Time." If 
we number things, do we not place them one after another? 
(See Appendix 8). Compare also Cornford's Plat~s 2osmology, 
Page 102: "The 'indivisible' being of Plato's intelligible 
world demands a duration that 'abides (rests) in unit:y. 111 
. (He-re we hav~ ho§_tili t;y:..:._i2__ch~g_~, but th§.£_comes the 
nee~~ to measu~ ti~. Cornford goes on to say: "Time 
is essentially divided into three 'forms,' past, present 
and future; and it moves according to number, being measur-
ed by a plurality of recurrent 'parts, ·1 the periods called 
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day, month, year. Nothing that we can call Time can exist 
without these units of measurement; and these again cannot 
exist without the regular revolutions of the heavenly bod-
ies, the motions of the celestial clock. Time, accordingly, 
is said to 'come into being together with the Heaven,' in 
the sense that neither can exist .:without· tho_ other~" 
APPE111DIX 7 
1:Je might r·efer to the 't~Jords of Minkowski that space and 
time separately are abstractions or shadmvs, and consider 
the space .... time continuum of the "new physics," asking if: 
the space-time of this "nevJ ,physics" is not, in fact, a step 
in the direction of bringing space and time nearer to their 
pre-Galileian Hebrevv and Christian status. Space and time 
are not independent of each other, but have a joint opera-
tion in physi.cal events and vary jointly.. Time has to be 
added to the three dimensions of space in the exact deter-
mination of physical events. The "here-ness" of a thing·is 
inseparable from its "now-ness." This becomes clear v.rhen 
one considers the concept of an interval in Einstein's 
special theory of relativity. Sir Arthur Eddington writes 
in his Spa£~, ~and Gravitation, Chapter 2, Page 34: 
"JVieasurement of length and duration is a comparison vvi th 
partitions of space and time drawn by the observer concern~ 
ed with the help of apparatus which shares his motion. Na-
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ture is not concerned with these partitions •••• Each observ-
er bases his separation of space and time on his Ol.'m track . 
through the ~orld. 11 But in four-dimensional space-time 
there is a certain generalized partition (or extension) be-
tween two events of which the distance in space and the 
separation in time are particular components. This is call-
ed the interval between two events and is the same for all 
observers, however they resolve it into space and time se-
parately. We see again how physics aims at the elimination 
of the individual. 
Another notion which seems to be important in the con-
sideration of the joining of space and time is that space 
is curved in the vicinity of matter and that mass is cre-
ated by increasing velocity, but such a consideration would 
fall outside the scope of this study. It is, hov.rever, in--
teresting to read how, according to Fletcher (Geometro-
~~i£.§..:_ihe Geomett:,;y:_of S:Q~-Time) geometrodynamics s~es 
a single space-time continuum. The Hebrev.r and mediaeval 
Christian vievJ' was that God created space and time. The 
work of Galileo separated them into t'llvo separate frames of 
reference. From this separation must follow that God ere-
ated in space and time. Now it seems to me significant that 
geometrodynamics does not look upon space-time as an 11arena ~~ 
Space-time, says Fletcher, 11 encompasses everything," and 
it seeks to explain all physical phenomena as aspects of 
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the geometry of a curved space-time, in other words, in 
terms of the curvature mentioned above. One is tempted to 
see in this all-embracing nature of the space-time of geo-
metrodynamics (as opposed to the "arena" notion) at least a 
step in the direc.tion of the created space-time of the He-
brew and the creativity.of time in Alexander's thought. 
But the step taken by the "new physics" in combining 
space and time is only one. Much more would be necessary. 
This subject is treated by Prof. vfuiteman in his Foundation-
Problems_£f_~a~~ and Time in which it becomes clear that 
from Einstein to what we have called real space and time is 
still a long way. For instance, after treating the trans-
formation from one set of space co-ordinates to another 
(Chapter 13) Prof. irJhi ternan says: "Precisely conceived and 
elegant though this mathematical formulation undoubtedly is, 
it partly obscures the state of affairs ••••• what the observ-
er deals with directly is in fact neither a co-ordinate 
system nor a map but a continually changing sensory Eres~n­
~io~ in his 'real' personal space-time ••••• The truth ~s 
established by the multitudinous confirmations of the Speci-
al Theory of Relativity, is that no communal ~~ can be con~ 
structed so as to show by simple displacement on it, whnt 
the perspective of a given observer would be, except in the 
very limited case when space-time.is flat and the observers 
all at rest in some chosen map (i.e. 'inertial frame'). To 
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indicate what the presentations to observers would bo, vvhG.t-
ever motions they may have, we need a triple infinity of 
maps ••••••• no space-time perspective is actual for an ob-
server till his 'subjective' standpoint is brought into re-
lation with the object-field." (See also Appendix 8). 
It seems to me that it was the common factor of light 
that brought space and time together in Hebrew thought. 
Jammer writes ( Conc£lltS of Space, Chapter 2, Page 38): 11 The 
first thing to fill this space (~ich God created) is light, 
the all-pervading, all-preserving medium of three dimensions 
whose importance is not confined to its physical function 
as a transmitter of heat, power and other influences; it is 
also metaphysically the T.tray to God.. 11 
APPENDIX 8 
In the preface' to his Foundational Problems o!.fipace and 
Ti~ Prof. vVhi ternan says: 11 The study of space and time used 
to mean physical measurement, mathematical reasoning,, or 
philosophy. Today it would include, also, certain provinces 
of psychology, psychical research and mysticism, these hav-
ing nov1 become recognized fields of experimental investiga-
tion and systematic knowledge. 
11 
••••• it is no longe,r possible to discuss the actuali-
ties of space and time merely from the standpoint of a 
mathematician OT a physicist. 
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"In this book I have recognized the need to reconstruct 
the study of space and time from the very foundations.~~ 
What is relevant to our purpose is that Prof. Whiteman 
confirms that. the space and time of our foot-rules and 
metre-sticks and the time of our clocks are abstractions, 
and recognizes, to use a quotation which he himself takes 
from Polanyi's rerson~l Knowledge, "the vision of a reality 
beyond the impressions of the senses.o ••• 11 
Our senses have given us the space of rules and rods 
and the time of clocks, which~ the space and time of ele-
mentary physics. I:Jhen vve measure, we assume nthat what we 
mean by perception of physical objects is sufficiently 
clear and does not require analysis, 11 and that "once stan-
dards of length and time have been fixed with the help of 
measuring apparatus and an agreed procedure for 'correction' 
in accordance with certain t.heories, no furth~~~§.. 
of measurement is needed --- only analysis of the ~l_ts 
of measurement. This unwarranted assumption •••••• is respon-
sible for many unsolved difficulties in the subject as well 
as for the prevalence of materialistic views of the opera-
tion of nature. 
"Closely associated with this is the assumption that 
all ~ct knovr~.9Ji~....Qf_s]2_ac~_an9:,_~ime is. ~3.S2,re§_§_e£....~£-la~~ 
9oncerning_§..'!:!,Ch ~~~~t of physical objects or con-
ditions. n 
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Prof. Whiteman then points out that "we cannot explain 
the universal CQ!!£e£_ts of_space and time in te~of meas-
urements2!:ffich_..Eres'!:!.EPose them. 
"Measurement, in the usual narrov1 sense of the word, 
cannQt therefore be the ultimate means of knowledge of truth 
or reality in the physical world," even though it is inval-
uable in helping us to think precisely. Prof. Whiteman then 
goes on to show that abstractions of space and time flow 
from the custom "among philosophers to restrict the term 
'perception' to physical perception, assuming that an ab-
solute or at least a very workable distinction can be made 
(and is ~n fact made instinctively or by habit, as it were) 
between vv-hat is physical and what is not," together with 
the "usual criterion (is) that if there is a technique for 
attaching a~~ to a construct ••••• then ••••• the eon-
struct is to be regarded as having an element of 'physical 
reality.'" "Obviously, then, the perceptual presentation is 
'physical,' so ~~~rabilit~ becomes also a criterion of 
'physicality. '" 
What happens now in the case of space and time? 
Prof. \·Vhiteman writes in Chapter 13: "Now if it is ac-
cepted that the physical measures and mathematical tech-
niques do provide evidence of an objectivity common to all 
observers, and that this approach agrees (when redundancies 
are abstracted) \IITi th the approach by spatial identification 
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and supraperspectival analysis, then this latter approach 
must likewise be accepted as providing evidence, direct in 
this case, of an objectivity common to all observers who 
are able to observe its manifestations. Thus we conclude. 
that the real spatial identification and relations discern-
ed by one observer are essenti~t_l;z_ the s~ as those dis-
cerned by another observer. There may of course be differ-
ences due to blending with imaginative impressions of spa-
tial identification. But just as we are entitled to say 
that the existi£g th~~ in the observation of three apples 
by one person is '·the same' as the existing three in the 
observation by another person, the objects being on general 
grounds identified as 'the·same,• so we are entitled to say 
that the real spatial identification of an object by one 
person is •·the same' as the simultaneous real spatial iden-
tification of the object by another person (for on what 
grounds should we say it was different?). Likevrise, there-
fore, we are entitled to say that the local Euclidean space 
'carried' by one person is the same as the local Euclidean 
space 'carried' by another, provided., of course, that both 
are real." 
Prof. irJhiteman intimates that we should "think of the 
local Euclidean spaces 'carried' by different observers as 
being individually distinguishable but cohering c~m9.~~l;h~~ 
(on account of their essential sameness) so that, after i3U-o-
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jective differences are abstracted or transcended, a common 
substructural world is found to exist for all. ·such coher-
ence then provides the 'subject-object middle ground.' Or 
we can simply think of each individual as participati~ in 
the common substructural world, which merges in his sub-
jective space and time when physical actualization occurs 
for him." 
The same argument obviously applies also to time. 
It appears then, that the space of our rods and sticks 
and the time of our clocks are obtained by considering the 
common substructure only, and that this is the result (at 
least partly) of limiting perception to what belongs to the 
~~£al universe. This appears to be Prof. \fuiteman's con-
tention when he says in Chapter 4: " ••••• it will be mis...:. 
leading to restrict the term ~erceptio£ to what belongs to 
the £.£;ye.t£§!:.1 universe, thus implying (what is not true) that 
the circumstances commonly used to rule out 'illusions' 
would also rule out psychical and mystical experience. I 
shall therefore always add the epithet 'physical' to the 
term percept~~ if the reference is to the physical uni-
verse. 11 
In Chapter 13 Prof.. 'v'Jhi ternan says: 11 ••••• we point to 
the fact that no space-time perspective is a£i~al for an 
observer till his 'subjective' standpoint is brought into 
relation with the object field. This principle is not mere-
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ly to the effect that colours and other 'secondary' qual-
ities come into being only when an observation is made. It 
asserts also that if we set up in our thought a one-level 
1container' of space and time, and if 1.11e place in it objects 
with the primary qualities only and then imagine the second-
ary somehow made perceivable by us when we make an observa-
tion, then we have formed an entirely false view of the 
workings of nature. Except approximately, in the local and 
mac,roscopic sphere, there is no such container, and there 
is no such clear-cut distinction between primary and second-
ary qualities ••••• 
Tl.rile must next set ourselves to answer the question, 
'vfuat exactly is manifested on any given occasion?' 
"The Principle of Total En££1El-P.~ asserts that ap. 'ob-
ject' is recognized as a totali~y and that we can then pro-
ceed to discover perceptual details, each of which then be-
comes a central actuality as we bring it to the forefront 
of our attention; that the more obvious of these details 
will be found to be constituents of a primary perspective 
for the occasion in question; and also that we can transcend 
the limitations of the primary perspective by sup£~P~£~~~­
ti va;!;_ in~tion~, which present other perspectives 'in po-
tentiality' and thus serve to make each three-dimensional' 
object intelligible as such.n 
The above should suffice to enable us to obtain some 
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notion of ho~ the space and time of Galileian physics are 
"derived" from real space and time, and that this derived 
space a~d this derived time are essentially a space and 
time outs;L.de the human person and in which we cannot regard 
a thing ;i,n its "concrete totality" since they are not 
"merged" ;in the subjective space and time of a person, and 
exclude utotal encounter." 
APPENDIX_2. 
On the question of personal identity Bergson writes as fol-
lows in his Introduction to MetapQ~~~' Pages 9 to 10: 
" ••••• i~ I search in the depth of my being that which is 
most uniformly, most constantly and most enduringly myself, 
· I find ~n altogether different thing (from the m?tle;y_ crowg._ 
of pet£~ti££~). There is beneath these sharply cut crys-
tals and this frozen surface, a continuous flux which is 
not comparable to any flux I have ever seen. There is a suc-
cession of states each of which announces that which fol-
lows and contains that which precedes it. They can, proper-
ly speaking, only be said to form multiple states when I 
have already passed them and turn back to observe their 
track. Whilst I 111as experiencing them they were so solidly 
organized, so profoundly animated with a common life, that 
I could not have said where any of them finished or where 
another commenced. In reality no one of them begins or ends, 
but all extend into each other." 
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Compare the above also with Price's Hume's TheOFY· of 
the External World, Chapter 1, Page 5: " ..•• it may be doubt-· --- -
ed whether his theory of the self (Hume's) is consistent 
either with his theory of Inductive Inference or with his 
theory of the external world. For 'the imagination' which 
plays no prominent part in the two last, seems uncommonly 
like the permanent self which he has rejected; or at least 
it seems to be permanent in a sense in which a series of 
impressions and images is not. Indeed, there is the same 
di·fficul ty within the section on Personal Identity itself 
(Book 1, Part 4, Section 6). His account of the identity 
of continuants in general is not easily reconciled with the 
identity of the self in particular .• A continuant, he says, 
is a series of numerically and qualitatively diverse par-
ticulars along v.rhich the imagination makes a smooth trans-
ition. The identity of a continuant is therefore a 'fictiti-
ous' or, as others might say, a 'constructed' identity. But 
if the fmagination is to make this smooth transition from 
item to item, must it not itself have an identity which is 
not fictitious or constructed?" 
Hilda Oakeley remarks in her ~story a~he Self, Chap-
ter 9, Page 230, that "no biography could be written of the 
self as Hume discovers him, observing rather the absence of 
such an entity from the bundle of perceptions, feelings, 
etc., certainly no such autobiography as he himself pro~ 
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duced." No doubt Husserl would agree vJi th .lVTiss Oakeley. 
Husserl's notion that consciousness is "intentional" seems 
to me to be the very antithesis of Hume's that we are no 
more than our perceptions. 
APPENDIX 10 
11/i th regard to making God an "outsider" in the affairs of 
men, Kant's philosophy seems to have an outcome which does 
not differ greatly from that of Rousseau's thought. Compare 
Maritain's ~oral Philo~9£~, Chapter 6, Page 96: 
"IT'he operation which he (Kant) carried out with singular 
systematic power (thus) consisted in the construction of a 
purely philosophical ethics, an ethics of Pure Reason, 
which would-be at the same time an ultimate completion of 
--- and substitute for --- the traditional ethics inspired 
by the Christian Faith. In other words, after having secu-
larized them, he transferred the features of revealed ethics 
and of Christian morality--- as they.had come to be under-
stood through the vicissitudes of a secular human experi-
ence --- into a purely philosophically moral theory, where 
reason, sovereign organizer and legislator of human life, 
concerned itself with religious belief •••• only in order it-
self to determine the legitimacy of that belief and the 
conditions of its existence and the proper bearing o£ its 
content ••••• " 
On Page 104 he continues: "Brie£ly, in Kantian ethics 
respect £or the law or reverence £or the law has taken the 
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place of the love of God above all things, which is the 
foundation of traditional Christian ethics •••• Reverence for 
the law has taken the place of the love for God, just as 
the unlimited goodness of the will, existing within the mo-
ral agent, has taken the place of the infinite goodness of 
the absolute ultimate end, which exists outside him and 
above him •••• " 
Further, on Page 116: "The Kantian revolution thus 
leads to an a-cosmic-idealist ethics, constructed in com-
plete independence of any observation of the situation of 
man in the world and in the universe ••••• " 
Will Durant (The Story of Philosophy, Chapter 6) trace::; 
the path that led from Rousseau to Kant in the making o.f 
God an· ·"outsider" in morality, and it leads from the Good 
from God to the Good from "the Norm" which Kant places in 
man. This path is also traced by Ma.ritain (Page 103): "•• •• 
the dignity of the person is such that, in the words of 
Rousseau, it can only obey itself. This perfect autonomy 
first of all excludes God as legislator from the proper and 
constitutive domain of morality, since in dividing good from 
evil the eternal reason and vvill of God as Legislator ••••• o 
V'JOuld impose·upon us from without the law of Another." 
APPENDIX 11 
Stewart also recognizes the existence of a "linear" history 
inHume's thought next to the "cyclic" history. On Page 289 
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of his J'he Moral and_f:2.~?-tical Philosophy_, of David Hume he 
writes: 
11 The declared purpose of the Treatise is anti-historical. 
In the first book Hume's main task is to account for the 
knowledge we have about the 'natural world, ' and this he 
seeks to do by contending that our beliefs arise from re-
peated instances of natural causation ...... in the first and 
second books he is seeking to improve the moral sciences by 
introducing into them the method employed successfully in 
the physical sciences. 11 He continues on Page 291: uBy at-
tempting to introduce the experimental method into the moral 
sciences, Hume implies that whatever changes take place in 
the moral (or historical)sphere are negligible." But "Stewart 
finds Hume already shifting in that same Treatise to a 
11linear" view, giving in 11 0f Morals" not simply a logical 
account of moral standards, but also a chronological ac-
count. Stewart, however, also recognizes that in his Of !£~ 
Ei~£_an£_Pr~ress of A£t~and Sciences and The Natural His-
tory 2.f_~~on Hume expounds very clearly a "cyclicrr view 
of history in contrast to the "linear" view in his ;E9li~~ 
DiSCQ."!:!E.§.£§., the "linear" view which Stewart now finds in 
the Treatise. 
Now Stewart explains these conflicting views by say-
ing (Page 297): "Perhaps we may.say without too much exag-
geration that, like most of us, Hume had conflicting ideaso 
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On the one hand,,he believed in nature, a repetitious, self-
contained causal continuum and, on the other, he believed 
in historical change, a process of genuine innovation. 11 
However, if we remember what progress meant to the En-
lightenment, there is, I think, no real dualism in Burne's 
thought. The idea of progress could be "put into effect 11 if 
the cycles of history could be broken, and in those \vorks 
in which Hume seems to propound a "linear 11 view of history, 
he really breaks these cycles in his imagination so to speak. 
Ste\oJart could perhaps have been satisfied by merely point-
ing this out, for he seems to agree with me. He says (Page 
292): "VJhat we have here, we must notice, is a 'speculative 
history,' not a factual history of civilization; in it, the 
logical steps in man's moral advance, as conceived by Hume, 
are treated as chronological steps." He says also: 11 His aim 
in 'Of Morals' was to show that the virtues, especially the 
civil virtues, could spring from human nature and man's 
circumstances, and this development could be shown most 
easily by providing a fictitious historical account." 
But Stewart also says (Pages 296 to 297): 11But we have 
seen, too, in 'Of Morals,' the Political Discourses, and -- ·- ... 
the ~tory of England, he also treats change as linear 
progression. This view, of course, is not necessarily con-
trary to the other: the linear process could be subsumed as 
the upswing of a circle. Still, the thought persists that 
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Hume•s study of the past had led him to presuppose that a 
unique, vast change in men's morals and science had taken 
place, and that this belief, not the weak logical thought 
of inclusive cycles, was the foundation of his historical 
writing. 11 
I can agree with this paragraph i.f Stewart means by 
the words that Hume's stugy of !Qe past had led him to pre-
~uppose that a uni~~~~§t changeo •••• had taken ~a~, that 
Hume suppos~d that the Enlightenment had at last broken the 
cycles of the events of the human scene, and that he had a 
hand in it, and if Stewart means that Hume wrote his his-
tory from the point of vievv of wan~ing to te~~.£....a ligeari!Y-
for human progresso Hume's views on the events of history 
before him are too explicitly cyclic for any other conclu-
sion. Stewart himself quotes from the Histor;r__of England 
(Volume 3) and says: rrThe potentialities of the human mind 
remain the same (according to Hume) but changes in morale, 
brought on by changes in political arrangements and by the 
maturation of the arts and sciences themselves, cause both 
rises and <subsequent declines in the attainments of nations 
and cultures. Here we have almost a cyclical theory of 
history. 11 
The first sentence of the passage quoted by Stewart is 
worth requoting here: "But there is a point of depression, 
as well as of exaltation, from which human affairs naturally 
return in a contrary direction, and beyond which they sel-
dom pass either in their advancement or decline." 
~ cannot agree with Greig that Hume did not believe in 
progress. Greig writes (David HUme, Chapter 20, Page 269): 
"He could see no valid reason to suppose that the human 
race was steadily moving from worse to better in a straight 
and happy course for the millenium. Why should he? A belief 
in progress •••• ois not required for the historian." I agree 
with the first part of this passage, for BUrne had a cyclic 
view of history, but.for Hume's didactic historiography a 
belief in the possibil!t;y_ of progress, if not in past pro-
gress, was necessary. Hume thought that progress would come 
only through the breaking of the cycles of the events on 
the human scene. 
APPENDIX 12 . - -
Hume 's writings abound v,rith passages in which he stresses 
the necessity of government because men are unable to keep 
the peace, and expounds the reasons for the existence of 
government as if he accepts the notion of a social contracto 
Indeed, in his Of the Original Contract (Page 450 of Volume 
1 of the Essays) he says that the consent of the people for 
the existence of a government· "is surely the best and most 
sacred way" of justifying it, but he says also that he can-
not see much consent in the governments of his day. He says 
clearly that the social contract cannot be looked upon as 
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historical, and that in his opinion government originated 
in the establishment of authority by a "strong man" (or a 
clever one), an authority "Vlhich came gradually to be accep-
ted. because ":it is impossible for the human race to subsist, 
at least in any confortable or secure state, without the 
protection of government." (Page 444). 
But once people accept this authority we have a con-
tract, and Hume accordingly uses the notion of a social 
contract to show that government must rest on consent. For 
instance, in ·An Enquiry Concerning the PrinciE~~§ 9J~oral~ 
(Section 4, Of Pol;htical Society, Page 197 of Volume 2 of 
the Essays) he writes: "vi/hat need of positive law where 
natural justice is, of.titself, a sufficient restraint? Why 
create magistrates where there never arises any disorder or 
iniquity? \rJhy abridge our native freedom when, in every in-
stance, the utmost exertion of it is found innocent and 
beneficial? It is evident that, if government were totally 
useless, it never could have place, and that the SOLE foun1 
dation of the duty of ALLEGIANCE is the advan~age, vlhich it 
procures to society, by preserving peace and order among 
mankind." 
We find something similar in his 9f _the QE.igin p.f.. 
Government (Volume 1 of the Essays, Page 114): "All men are 
sensible of the necessity of justieo·to·maintain,peace and 
order; and all men are sensible of the necessity of peace 
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and order for the maintenance of society ••.• it is impossible 
to keep men, faithfully and unerringly, in the paths of 
justice •••• Men must, therefore, endeavour to palliate what 
they cannot cure. They must institute some persons •••• whose 
·peculiar office it is to point out the degrees of equity, 
to punish transgressors, to correct fraude and violence •••• 
The persons, who first attain this distinction by the con-
sent, tacit or express, of the people, must be endov,red with 
superior personal qualities ••••• 11 
It is clear then, that Hume "drifts" into using a so-
cial contract device. 1ile notice, moreover, that, as in 
Rousseau's Social Contract, Hume does not solve the dualism 
of government-govGrned, and that his state also rests on 
force, for the governed must be forced to order. Lastly, 
we discern in the words must be endowed with SU£,erior_pe£_-




The Bibliography is divided into the f'ollowing groups of 
works, and in every group the works are arranged in the al-
phabetical order of the names of the authors: 
Q:.rouE._.A: Works by Hume and Rousseau. Some of Rousseau 1 s 
, works were studied in the original French, others 
as translations into English. The English translations were 
bound in one volume which was always available. 
Q:_roup B: Works (not including essays and articles) which do 
not deal directly with Hume and Rousseau, but were 
consulted in connection with space and time, the human per-
son, history, etc. l'-1any of the works in this group do refer 
to Hume and Rousseau, but since they do not deal directly 
with these two philosophers, they are listed in this group. 
Some of these works, originally not written in English, were 
read in the languages in which they ~vere originally written, 
others as translations into English. 
Groul?....Q: V'Jorks on Hume and Rousseau and their :philosophical 
and other writings. 
Group D: Essays, articles and lectures. 
Groul? E: \l!orks (including articles) which were read for a 
11background" or comparative study, or treated some 
particular topic relevant to this study.. In some cases only 
certain chapters were relevant. 
GrOU£ F: Unpublished works. 
Groul? A 
. Works_bY, Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature 
(Longman's, 1898. Two volumes edited by T.H. 
Green and,T.H.Grose) 
Autobiography 
(Hunt and Clar~e, London, 1826) 
History of England 
(Cadell and Davies, and other publishers, 
London, 1818. New edition) 
All the other works from which quotations appear in this 
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study, appear in the two volumes of Hume's Essays (edited 
by T.H.Green and T.HoGrose and published by Longman's, 1898) 
Works by Rousseau.: Du Contrat Social 
(Editions Sociales, Paris, 1963)' 
Confessions 
(Librairie Generale Francaise, Paris, 
1963) . 
Les Reveries du Promeneur Solitaire 
(Librairie Droz, Geneve, 1948) 
Emile* 
La Nouvelle Heloise* 
Correspondance* 
*) These three works were read in the Oeuvres de Rousseau 
published by Firnim-Didot et Cie., Paris, 1876. 
Discourse on the Origin of Inequality** 
Discourse on Political Economy** 
Discourse on the Moral Effects of the 
Arts and Sciences*·~ 
**) These works are bound in one volume of the Everyman's 
Library and were published in 1947. 
Group B · 
Alexander,A.S. --- Space, Time and Deity 
· · (MacMillan and Co. , London; 1934) 
Barr, J. 
Barrett,W. 
Becker, C .. L. 
Biblical Words for Time 
(SCM Press, London, 1962) 
\~at is Existentialism? 
(Grove Press, New York, Second Printing) 
The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-century 
Philosophers . 
(Yale University Press., 1960) 
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Bergson,H. --- Essai sur les Donnees Immediates de la 
Conscience 
(Presses Universitaires de France, 1962) 
Bergson,H. L'Evolution Creatrice 
(Presses Universitaires de France, 1962) 
Bergson,H. --- Introduction to Metaphysics 
Boman, T. 
(MacMillan and Co., London, 1913. Translated 
by T.E.Hulme) 
Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek 
(SCM Press, London, 1960. Translated by J.L. 
Moreau) 
Buber,M. --- I and Thou 
(T. and T.Clark, Edinburgh. Translated by R.G. 
Smith) 
Bultmann,R. --- History and·Eschatology 
(Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1962) 
Burtt, E. A. --- The l\'Ietaphysical Foundations of Modern 
Physical Science 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1959) 
Cleugh,M.F. --- Time 
(Methuen and Co~, London, 1937) 
Collingwood,R.G~ --- The Idea of History 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1949) 
Copleston,F. --- Contemporary Philosophy 
(Burns and Oates, London, 1957) 
Cornford,F.McD. --- Plato's Cosmology 
(Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 
London, 1937) 





Discourse upon Method* 
Metaphysical Meditations* 
Principles of Philosophy* 
*)All three works were translated by J.Veitch and published 
in one volume by Blackwood and Sons, Edinburgh and Lon-
don, 1913. 
Eliade ,.M. --- · Cosmos and History 
· (Harper Torchbooks, 1959) 
Gui tton, J. --- The Modernity of St. Augustine 
(Geoffrey Chapman, 1959) 
Heidegger,M. Sein und Zeit 
(Max Niemeyer Verlag, TUbingen, 1963) 
Heidegger,M. --- Holzwege 
(Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt-am-Iv'lain, 
1952) 
Heim,K. --- God Transcendent 
Hobbes,T. 
(Nisbet and Co., London4 Translated by E.P. 
Dickie) . . 
Relevant passages from the T'1olesworth collec--
tion of his works. 
Jammer, r1. --- Concepts of Space 
(Harper Torchbooks, 1960) 
Ilierkegaard,S.A. --- The Concept of Dread 
Kwant,R.C. 
(Oxford University Press, 1944. Trans-
lated by W.Lowrie) 
Sociale Filosofie 
(Aula-boeken, Utrecht en Antwerpen, 1963) 
Leff,G. ---Medieval Thought, St.Augustine to Ockham 
(Pelican Books, 1962) 
Mari tain, J .. 
Northrop,F.S.C. 
On the Philosophy of History 
(Geoffrey Bles, London, 1959) 
Introduction to Heisenberg's Physics 
and Philosop~ 
{George Allen and Unwin, London, 1958) 
Oakeley,H.D. --- Ilistory and the Self 
(Williams and Norgate, London, 1934} 
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Pannenberg,W. --- Was ist der Mensch? 
(Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Gottingen, 
1962) 
Plato ~-- The Timaeus 
Rahner,K. 
(Penguin Classics, 1964. Translated by H.D.P.Lee) 
The Theology of Death 
(Burns and Oates, London, 1965. Translated 
by C.H.Henkey) 
Roubiczek,P. --- Existentialism, For and Against 
· (Cambridge Unive:rsity Press, 1964) 
Snengler 0. --- Decline of the West 
~ ' (Alfred A.Knopf, New York. Translated by 
C.F.Atkinson) 
Sullivan,J.W.N. --- Limitations of Science 
(Mentor Books, 1957) 
Talmon,J.L. Origins of Totalitarian Democracy 
(Seeker and Warburg, London, 1952) 
Toynbee, A. --- An Historian's Approach to Religion 
(Oxford University Press, 1957) 
Versfeld, M. --- Oor Gode en Afgode 
(Nasionale Pers, Kaapstad) 
Von Weizsacker, C .. F. --- The Relevance of Science 
. (Collins, London, 1964) 
Walsh, 1rJ. H. --- Metaphysics · 
·(Hutchinson University Library, 1963) 
Whitehead,A~N. --- Science and the Modern World 




The Seventeenth-century Background 
(Peregrine Books, 1962) 
The· Eighteenth.;..century Background 





Babbitt,Io --- Rousseau and Romanticism 
(Houghto;n Miffiin and Co~, Boston and 
New York; 1919) ·· 
Bongie, L. L.,. --- David Hume, · ~ophet of the Counter-revoJ..u.,.. 
tion · 
(Oxford University Press, 1965) 
Cassirer,E. --- Rousseau, Kant, Goethe 
(Princeton University Press, 1945. Trans-
lated by Gutmann, Kristeller and Randall) 
Flew,A.G.N. Humeis Philosophy of Belief: A Study of 
his First Enquiry 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, New York and 
London, 1961) 
Green,F.C. --- Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A Critical Study of 
his Life and iPJri tings 
(cambridge University Press, 1955) 
Greig,J.Y.T. --- David Hume 
(Jonathan Cape, London, 1931) 
Huxley,T.H. --- Hume 
(Eversley Series, London, 1893) 
Kydd,R.M. ---Reason and Conduct in Ifume's Treatise 
(Oxford University Press, 1946) 
MacDonald,F. --- Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A New Study in 
Criticism ' 
(Chapman and Hall, London, 1906) 
Maund, C. --- Hume 's Theory of Knowledge : A Critical Ex-
amination 
Mossner, E. c. 
(MacMillan and Co., London, 1937) 
The Life of David Hume 
(Thomas Nelson and Sons, Edinburgh, London, 
Melbourne and Cape To~m, 1955) 
Orr,J. ---·David Hume and his Influence on Philosophy and 
Theology . 
(T. and T.Clark, Edinburgh, 1903) 
Osborne ,A.M •••••••••• 
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Osborne,A .. M. ---Rousseau and Burke: A Study of the Idea of 
Liberty in Eighteenth-century Political 
Thought 
(Oxford University Press) 
Poulet,G. --- Etudes sur le Temps Humain 
(Librairie Plons, Paris) 
Price,H.H. Burne's Theory of the External World 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1940) 
Smith,N.K. --- The Philosophy of David Burne / 
(Macr!Jillan and Co., London, 1941} 
Stewart, J. B. 
Temmer,M.J. 
The Moral and Political Philosophy of 
David Hume 
(Columbia University Presst 1964) 
Time in Rousseau and Kant 
(Librairie ~tinard, Paris, and Lebrairie 
E.Droz, Geneve, 1958) 
Group D 
All essays in this group marked with an asterisk are from 
Philosophy ano. gis!.£U, edited by R.Klibansky and H.J.Paton, 
and presented to~rnst Cassirer on his 6oth birthday.(Ox-
ford, Clarendon Press, 1936). All essays marked with a 
double asterisk are from pa~d Hume: A_§r~~il~, edited by 
D.F.Pears. (MacMillan and Co., London and Nevv York, 1963). 
Alexander,S. --- The Historicity of Things* 
Chappell,V.C. 
Degenaar, J. J. 
Ellul, J. 
Time and Zeno's Arrow 
(Journal of Philosophy, April 2, 1962) 
Die Filosofiese Klimaat van die Mod~rne 
Wetenskap 
(Bulletin of the Department of Philosophy 
of the University of Cape Town, Aug. 1962) 
Law as Representation of Value 
(Natural Law Forum, Notre Dame University, 
Volume 10,_ 1965) 
Fletcher, J. G. --- Geometrodynamics: the Geometry of Space-
Time 
(Discovery, November 1964) 
Foot,P.R. --- HUme on Moral Judgment** 
Gardiner,P.L. --- Hume's Theory of the Passions** 
Gentile,G. --- The Transcending of Time. in History* 
Gwynne,P. --- Time Reversal 
(Discovery, October 1965) 
Hampshire,S.N. --- Humeis Place in Philosophy** 
Kolbuszewski,J. Time and Travel 
(Discovery, October 1965) 
Levy-Bruhl,L. --- The Cartesian Spirit and History* 
Pears,D.F. Hume 's Empiricism and Modern Empiricism** 
Pears,D.F. Hume on Personal Identity** 
Sciama,DoW. --- K-mesons, Time Reversal and Cosmology 
(Discovery, May 1965) 
Stebbing,L.S. --- Some Ambiguities in Discussions Concern-
ing Time* 
Treisman,M. --- The Psychology of Time 
(Discovery, October 1965) 
Trevor-Roper,H.R. --- Hume as Historian** 
Van Peursen,C.A. --- Lecture on Time delivered at Stellen-
bosch in 1963 and recorded by Dr. J.Jo 
Degenaar 
Versfeld, r-'1. --- Rousseau's Moral and Religious Views and 
their Consequences 
(Bulletin of the Department .of Philosophy, : 
University of Cape Town, August 1962) 
Versfeld,M. --- Education for Africa 
(Education for Reality in Africa, Salisbury, 
1963) 
Versfeld,M. --- Law and the Idea of the Contemporary 
(Natural Law Forum, Notre Dame University, 
Volume 10, 1965) 
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Warnoek,G.J. --- Hume on Causation** 
Williams,B.A.O. --- Burne on Religion** 
Albright,W.F. Archaeology and the Religion of Israel 
(The Johns Hopkins Press, 1942) 
Aristotle ~-- Politics 
Auerbach,E. 
Augustine,St. 
(Everyman's Library, 1947. Translated by 
W.Ellis) 
Mimesis 
(Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957) 
Confessions 
(r.1odern Library, 1949. Translated by 
E. B. Pusey) 
Augustine, St. --- City of God 
Barter,E.G. 
(Everyman's Library, 1962. Translated by 
J.Healy) 
Relativity and Reality 
(Watts and Co., London) 
Bell,E.T. --- Men of IVIathematics 
Bultmann, R. 
Burtt,E.A. ---
{Victor Gollancz Ltd., London, 1937) 
Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary 
Setting 
(Fontana Library, 1960) 
The English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill 
(Modern Library, 1939) 
This book was consulted in connection with a 
"background" study of utilitarianism. 
Durant, W. --- The Story of Philosophy, Chapter on Rouss~~u 
to Kant 
(Ernest Benn Ltd.~ London, 1946) 
Eddington,A •. --- Space, Time and Gravitation 
(Cambridge University Press, 1960) 
Einstein,A. --- Relativity: The Special and General Theory 




God and Philosophy 
(Yale University Press, 1960) 
E1ropean Thought in the 18th Century 
(Pelican Books, 1965) 
Hulsbosch, A. --- God's Creation 
(Sheed and Ward, 1965~ Translated by Mo 
Versfeld) 
Kant,I~ --- Critique of Pure Reason 
(Everyman's Library, 1950. Translated by J .N.D. 
Meiklejohn) 
Leighton, J .A. The Field of Philosophy, Chapters 12, 13, 
36 and 37. 
.Macchiavelli,N. 
(D.Appleton-Century Co., New York and 
London, LJ-th edition) 
\. 
The Prince 
·(Penguin Classics, 1961) 
J'fJ.argenau,H .. _.....,_ The Nature of Physical Reality, Chapter 7 
(McGraw-Hill, NevJ Yorl(; Toronto and London, 
1950) 
~1ari tain, J. Moral Philosophy 
(Geoffrey Bles, London, 1964) 
Ortega y Gasset,J. --- The Revolt of the Masses 
Plato 
(UnvTin Books, London. Translator 
anonymous) 
The Republic 
(Modern Library, 1949. Translated by B.Jowett) 
Russell,B. --- History of Western Philosophy, Chapters 17, 
18 and 19 
(George Allen and Unvdn, London, 1946) 
Teilhard de Chardin,P. --- The Phenomenon of Han 
(VJm.Collins and Sons, London, 
1961 .• Translated by Bp Wall) 
Unesco Courier, March 1962 --- Various articles on Rousseau 
Versfe1d,M. --- The Mirror of Philosophers 
(Sheed and Ward, London and New York, 1960) 
396. 
Versfeld, M. --- Rondom die Middeleeue 
(Nasionale Boekhandel, Kaapstad, 1962) 
\ilhi te, L.A. --- The Science of Culture 
(Grove Press, New York and London, 3rd 
Printing) 
Zondervan Bible Dictionary --- Articles on Eschatology, the 
Prophets, the Old Testament 
and Daniel · 
~ 
Du Toit,A.P. ~-- Die Tyd as Antropologiese Kategorie by 
Kierkegaard 
Versfeld,M. 
(Thesis for the M .• A. degree, University 
of Stellenbosch) 
Augustine and the Sense of History 
(Essay) 
Versfeld, M .. • · --- The Problem of the Contemporar3)) 
(Essay) 
Whiteman,J.H.M.o--- Foundational Problems of Spe.ce and Time 
(Thi~ work is to be published shortly) 
I found the reviews of Stewart's The Moral and Political 
Philoso:g!!y of David Hume and of ~~~~-~: !:. Sxiii.£9sl::!:!,JE_ · 
in the T1mes Literary Supplement of 23rd July, 1964, rather 
instructive~ · 
1) An Afrikaans version of this work, publishec:;. by the 
Afrikaanse Pers Boekhandel, Johannesburg, appeared while 
this bibliography was being prepared. The tj_tle of the 
work is Wat is Kon~mporer? 
